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Executive Summary  
 
The mandate of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) 
was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the 
conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to make 
recommendations concerning these and other matters.  
The Report comprises 5 Parts. Part I of the Report is an Introduction which 
discusses the historical context of the violence; Part II is a narration of the 
violence province by province. Part III deals with four cross cutting issues: 
sexual violence, internally displaced persons, the media and the nature and 
impact of the violence. Part IV deals with acts and omissions of state security 
agencies and impunity; and Part V contains recommendations made with a view 
to the prevention of future reoccurrence of large scale violence; the investigation 
of alleged perpetrators; and how to tackle the culture of impunity that has 
become the hallmark of violence and other crimes in the country. 
Sadly, violence has been a part of Kenya’s electoral processes since the 
restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the violence that shook 
Kenya after the 2007 general elections was unprecedented. It was by far the 
most deadly and the most destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also, 
unlike previous cycles of election related violence, much of it followed, rather 
than preceded elections. The 2007-2008 post-election violence was also more 
widespread than in the past. It affected all but 2 provinces and was felt in both 
urban and rural parts of the country. Previously violence around election periods 
concentrated in a smaller number of districts mainly in Rift Valley, Western, and 
Coast Provinces.  
As regards the conduct of state security agencies, they failed institutionally to 
anticipate, prepare for, and contain the violence. Often individual members of 
the state security agencies were also guilty of acts of violence and gross 




In some ways the post-election violence resembled the ethnic clashes of the 
1990s and was but an episode in a trend of institutionalization of violence in 
Kenya over the years. The fact that armed militias, most of whom developed as a 
result of the 1990s ethnic clashes, were never de-mobilized led to the ease with 
which political and business leaders reactivated them for the 2007 post-election 
violence. Secondly, the increasing personalization of power around the 
presidency continues to be a factor in facilitating election related violence.  
The widespread belief that the presidency brings advantages for the President’s 
ethnic group makes communities willing to exert violence to attain and keep 
power. Inequalities and economic marginalization, often viewed in ethno-
geographic terms, were also very much at play in the post-election violence in 
places like the slum areas of Nairobi. 
One of the main findings of the Commission’s investigations is that the post-
election violence was spontaneous in some geographic areas and a result of 
planning and organization in other areas, often with the involvement of 
politicians and business leaders. Some areas witnessed a combination of the two 
forms of violence, where what started as a spontaneous violent reaction to the 
perceived rigging of elections later evolved into well organized and coordinated 
attacks on members of ethnic groups associated with the incumbent president or 
the PNU party. This happened where there was an expectation that violence was 
inevitable whatever the results of the elections. 
The report concludes that the post-election violence was more than a mere 
juxtaposition of citizens-to-citizens opportunistic assaults. These were 
systematic attacks on Kenyans based on their ethnicity and their political 
leanings. Attackers organized along ethnic lines, assembled considerable 
logistical means and traveled long distances to burn houses, maim, kill and 
sexually assault their occupants because these were of particular ethnic groups 
and political persuasion. Guilty by association was the guiding force behind 
deadly “revenge” attacks, with victims being identified not for what they did but 




possible by the lawlessness stemming from an apparent collapse of state 
institutions and security forces. 
In general, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of the attackers 
and the relatively effective coordination of the attacks. However, in most parts of 
the country affected by the violence, failure on the part of the Kenya Police and 
the Provincial Administration to act on intelligence and other early warning signs 
contributed to the escalation of the violence.  
The post-election violence is also the story of lack of preparedness of, and poor 
coordination among, different state security agencies. While the National 
Security Intelligence Service seemed to possess actionable intelligence on the 
likelihood of violence in many parts of the country, it was not clear whether and 
through which channel such intelligence was shared with operational security 
agencies. The effectiveness of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration 
Police was also negatively affected by the lack of clear policing operational 
procedures and by political expediency’s adverse impact on their policing 
priorities.  
The report recommends concrete measures to improve performance and 
accountability of state security agencies and coordination within the state 
security mechanism, including strengthening joint operational preparedness 
arrangements; developing comprehensive operational review processes; merging 
the two police agencies; and establishing an Independent Police Complaints 
Authority. 
To break the cycle of impunity which is at the heart of the post-election violence, 
the report recommends the creation of a special tribunal with the mandate to 
prosecute crimes committed as a result of post-election violence. The tribunal 
will have an international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans 















The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) began on 
23rd May 2007 with an announcement published in the Kenya Gazette Notice 
No.4473 vol. cx-no.4. The members of the Commission as appointed were its 
Chair, Mr. Justice Philip Waki, a judge of Kenya’s Court of Appeal and two 
Commissioners, Mr. Gavin McFadyen and Mr. Pascal Kambale respectively 
nationals of New Zealand and the Democratic Republic of Congo respectively. 
Two Kenyans, Mr. David Majanja and Mr. George Kegoro, were appointed the 
Counsel Assisting the Commission and Commission Secretary. 
The international members of the Commission arrived in Nairobi within a week 
of the publication of the Gazette notice. As required by law, the Commission took 
an oath of office before the Chief Justice on 3rd June 2008. The Commission held 
its first press conference the same day. 
Both the Government of Kenya (GOK) and the multi donor Trust Fund for 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation, managed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), funded the Commission’s work. The former 
provided the Commission with office space, security, and transport, while the 
latter paid the Commission’s expenses, including staff costs.  The GOK also 
assisted the Commission during field visits and hearings. In addition, the 
Commission received support from the Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu and Mombasa 
local authorities as well as from several religious organizations during its field 
visits. Assistance included various types of facilitation from the Anglican Church 
of Kenya’s Naivasha Diocese and the Catholic Dioceses in Nakuru, Kisumu, 
Eldoret and Mombasa.   
Setting up the Commission 
Initially the Commission attended to a number of logistical and administrative 




space, hiring staff, and collecting background documents. One time consuming 
matter that kept the Commission from immediately addressing its substantive 
work was the lack of office space. This was something the Commission did not 
and could not have anticipated. The Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
kindly assisted with temporary quarters even though they were not formally 
responsible for the Commission. However, it took three weeks of discussions 
with the Panel and various government officials until the Commission was 
properly settled and was able to clarify which entities would provide the logistical 
support needed to move forward.  
During this period, the Commission assembled background documents and 
other necessary material.  The Commission also identified, interviewed and 
completed staff recruitment.  A full list of Commission staff is annexed.  To 
ensure the independence of its investigators, the Commission advertised locally 
and internationally for these positions. For the same reason, the Commission 
decided that the head of its team of investigators should be an international 
rather than a local.  The Commission recruited a Canadian, Robert Grinstead, 
for this post. Later, the Commission also recruited an international consultant, 
Dr. Suzanne Mueller, a political scientist. 
Apart from the above, it was agreed that because part of the Commission’s 
mandate was to investigate the role and conduct of the security forces in the 
post election violence, none of their serving members would be eligible to apply 
for positions with the Commission.  In addition, the Commission also recognized 
the need for specialists who could investigate sexual violence. This was an 
important part of the post election violence and something the Commission 
wanted to probe comprehensively as an integral part of its mandate. The 
Commission, therefore, recruited two female investigators to examine sexual 
violence: one international, Ms. Melinda Rix of New Zealand, and another Ms. 
Gladys Mwariri, a Kenyan. The Commission also had the assistance of a full time 
psychologist counsellor, Ms Nyawira Kuria. The Commission also received 
assistance from various UN, government agencies, and NGOs specializing in this 




The Commission finally acquired office space on 17th June 2008. By 25 June 
2008, most of the staff was on board and the Commission was able to begin 
substantive work. Initially, the Commission consulted informally with a variety 
of groups and held a number of consultative meetings. 
The Commission concluded early in its tenure that it would not have enough 
time to visit all areas that had been heavily affected by the post election violence. 
The life of the Commission, as provided in the Gazette, was only three months 
and set to expire on 22 August 2008. Hence, the Commission immediately wrote 
to His Excellency the President of Kenya and to the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities asking for a 60 day extension so that it could plan ahead.   While 
the Panel supported the request, the National Dialogue and Reconciliation team, 
which was the final decision maker, did not. Instead the Commission was 
granted only a 30 day extension, published in the Gazette Notice no. 7288 Vol. 
cx – no. 67 dated 12th August 2008. 
The Commission conducted hearings in public in the following areas: Nairobi 
between 9 and 25 July 2008 and again from 19 to 27 August 2008, Naivasha on 
28 and 29 July, Nakuru from 30 July to 1 August 2008, Eldoret from 5 to 7 
August 2008, Kisumu from 11 to 13 August 2008, Borabu on 14 and 15 August 
and Mombasa on 1 and 2 September 2008. Because of the failure to obtain a 60 
day extension of time the Commission abandoned its original plans to conduct 
public hearings and investigations in Kakamega, Busia, Kericho, Bungoma, 
Laikipia, Thika and Limuru. Eventually, the Commission received another two-
week extension for the purpose of preparing this report through Gazette Notice 
No. 8661 in Vol CX – 74 dated 12th September 2008. The difficulty of receiving 
limited extensions piecemeal rather than all at once diminished the capacity to 
engage in forward planning. 
 
Establishing a communication strategy 
The public legitimately expected the Commission to work transparently and to 




information and to develop a reciprocal relationship with the media, the 
Commission appointed Ms Mildred Ngesa, an experienced journalist, as media 
relations officer. 
In addition, the Commission designed and established a website www.cipev.org 
to facilitate public access to information about our mandate and our work. The 
Commission also set up a secure email address, info@cipev.org for receiving 
confidential information and correspondence.  Once the Commission began 
hearings, the verbatim record of public proceedings was posted on the website.  
Aside from the above, the Commission conducted periodic media briefings to 
inform the public of its work. The three Commissioners appeared together on 
television interviews in the initial phase after which the Chair issued press 
releases and engaged with the media in other ways. 
 
Publication of Rules and Procedure 
The Commission also used its initial period to develop and publish its own rules 
and procedure. The capacity to make rules is granted under the Commissions of 
Inquiry Act and also under the terms of reference for the Commission. These 
rules, other than providing guidelines to assist the Commission in its work were 
designed to allow partnerships between the Commission and as many interest 
groups as possible. The rules and procedure for the Commission were published 
in the Gazette as Notice No. 4923 on 13 June 2008 as well as the newspapers on 
24 June 2008. 
 
Consultations with Government Departments and Others 
As part of its preparatory work, the Commission consulted with officials and 
departments of the government concerned with, or whose functions fell within 
the scope of the investigations. The purpose of these consultations was, firstly, 




Commission’s investigations. Secondly, the Commission sought to explore with 
the concerned officials the various practical arrangements necessary to enable 
investigations.  The initial meetings with officials were held in private.  The 
officials with whom the Commission met at this stage included the 
Commissioner of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons, the Commandant of the 
Administration Police, the Chief of the General Staff, the Attorney General, the 
Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) (represented by members 
of his Commission), the Director General of the National Security Intelligence 
Service, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion 
and Constitutional Affairs, and the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the 
President in charge of Internal Security and Provincial Administration.  This 
Commission appreciates the level of co-operation received from the various 
government departments throughout its work. 
The Commission also sought audience with the political leadership and managed 
to interview the Vice-President, the Prime Minister and one Deputy Prime 
Minister. An appointment sought with the President did not materialize while the 
former President declined to meet with the Commissioners. 
Initially, the Commission also visited a number of areas within Nairobi that had 
been severely affected by the post election violence, including Kibera. This 
enabled members to interact with local communities, obtain feedback from 
them, and also allowed the international members of the Commission to acquire 
a feel for the issues they would encounter elsewhere.   
 
Role of Civil Society 
The Commission deliberately decided to work closely with Kenyan civil society 
organizations and seek their assistance with information, contacts, and expertise 
in areas related to post-election violence. A number of these organizations 
attended the Commission’s hearings through lawyers who represented victims 
and communities and provided useful feedback to members of the public on the 




(KPTJ), the Inter-Religious Forum, the Kenyan Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists, (ICJ-K), the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 
the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR), different chapters of 
the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, and various religious and faith 
based organizations. 
 
Civil society and human rights organizations greatly contributed to the 
Commission’s work by: 
• Providing background material and reports concerning the history and 
patterns of human rights violations in Kenya. This helped the Commission 
establish  a foundation from which to proceed; 
• Giving access to their records, often including statements from witnesses 
they had interviewed and helping  map out geographic regions that should 
be the focus of investigations; 
• Providing contacts with local community leaders, individual victims, and 
other key contacts in communities where they had established trust and 
credibility; 
• Assisting  and providing  victims the Commission interviewed in public 
and in private with emotional support, based on long established 
relationships with them; and 
• Offering various types of assistance to victims, including medical services, 
counselling, and various types of community support. 
 
Standing Before the Commission 
The Commission addressed the question of legal standing from persons who 
wished to participate in its proceedings. The following government departments 
were covered by its mandate and hence were allowed to participate in the 
hearings: the Kenya Police Service, the Administration Police, the Provincial 
Administration, the Electoral Commission of Kenya, the National Security 





Groups of citizens and civil society organizations also applied to participate in 
the proceedings.  They included victims’ representatives, experts on specific 
aspects of the Commission’s work, and organizations that had been involved in 
addressing the post-election violence itself. All had useful information for the 
Commission. 
The Commission considered that the quality of proceedings would benefit from 
allowing as many interest groups as possible to participate. In the end, the 
Commission gave legal standing to the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) and 
the Centre for the Advancement of Women and Children, both of which were 
allowed to represent the interests of women in the context of the post election 
violence. The Commission also granted the Kenyans for Peace with Truth and 
Justice, the Rift Valley Internally Displaced Persons Association, the Centre for 
Justice and Crimes against Humanity, and the Tegla Lorupe Foundation 
standing as interveners.  Outside Nairobi, the Commission granted regional law 
societies standing in its proceedings. These included the Rift Valley Law Society 
in Nakuru, the North Rift Law Society in Eldoret, and the West Kenya Law 
Society in Kisumu, and the Law Society of Kenya (South Rift Branch) even 
though the Commission did not hold proceedings in Kericho, where the society is 
based.  
The Commission declined requests for standing by Kenya’s two main political 
parties, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity 
(PNU) because it did not think their participation was necessary. However, each 
of them testified through their Secretaries General.  
All groups participating in the proceedings were asked to furnish the 
Commission with lists of their witnesses and statements from the witnesses. A 
significant number of the witnesses who testified before the Commission were 
identified and processed by lawyers acting on behalf of various civil society 
organisations. To maintain control over its proceedings the Commission insisted 
that such witnesses coming in had to be processed with the full participation of 
Counsel Assisting the Commission. This ensured that relevant and credible 




Commission intervened to limit questions from lawyers.  The Commission’s 
experience was that allowing the diverse interests seeking representation greatly 
increased the quality of the inquiry. The lawyers for the various parties brought 
useful perspectives before the Commission that might have been missed 
altogether, if they had been excluded. In addition, the participation of these 
same lawyers enabled the Commission to reach out to witnesses who might not 
otherwise have come forward. This broadened participation and enriched 
understanding. Furthermore, a number of the lawyers admitted into our 
proceedings had sharply opposing points of view. This increased the objectivity 
and the credibility of the testified received. 
 
Methodological Issues 
Public investigative inquiries represent a methodological challenge: they are not 
courts of law but are influenced by Kenya’s common law tradition. In deciding 
how to proceed, we adopted a mix of chose a half way house that mixed both 
adversarial and inquisitorial methods. The rules and procedures reflected this 
choice. The Commission also felt this was the optimal means to uncover the 
truth concerning post election violence and impunity in Kenya. At the same time, 
the Commission went to great lengths to ensure that all witnesses were treated 
fairly and developed rules to protect them from unfair accusations. 
The Commission had to address a number of other issues. One was how to 
utilize the reports and other material received from various organizations, as 
provided by paragraph 2(a) (ii) of its terms of reference. The Commission treated 
this information as it did any other: testing and evaluating it independently to 
complement its own findings. 
Although the Commission would have preferred to hold all its hearings in public, 
paragraph 2(f) of its terms of reference allowed the holding of private hearings 
when necessary to instil confidence in witnesses and to allay their fears of 
reprisals. The Commission utilized both methods. Public officials mainly testified 




testified in public. However, many others chose to speak in private because they 
feared reprisals or were too traumatized to come forth in public. The Commission 
took great care to protect the privacy of witnesses who testified in camera. 
However, we did not have a reliable witness protection program which might 
have given greater solace to others who avoided speaking to us. One of the 
greatest challenges was to find victims and convince them to testify, something 
the Commission went to great lengths to do in spite of its constraints, including 
time. The investigation team of the Commission was able to come to towns only 
two to three days before the Commission. Hence, they had very limited time to 
find and prepare witnesses, something that elicited disappointment, particularly 
when the Commission was unable to stay long enough to hear everyone who 
wanted to testify. Nevertheless, there was a general realization that the 
Commission provided a unique opportunity and venue for individuals who had 
suffered horribly to come and tell their stories. The Commission did whatever 
possible to accommodate witnesses, in some cases holding extended hearings up 
to 14 hours a day. The Commission appreciates very well that in the final 
analysis only a miniscule sample of the avoidable suffering inflicted upon 
innocent Kenyans was heard.  
The Commission also faced criticism that it relied heavily on the testimony of 
public officials in its hearings.  The Commission viewed as it duty and within its 
terms of reference to call upon public officials to account for their actions.  It 
was for this reason that for the first time Kenyans were able to hear and see high 
ranking officers testify in public and be subjected to questions about their roles.  
In addition, the political parties at the centre of the political dispute that led to 
establishment of this Commission criticized the Commission for permitting them 
only one afternoon to present their side of the story. The Commission had to 
balance their desire for an open-ended forum, which already exists in 






Public hearings were to be managed to ensure a good representation of 
individuals and issues, while providing a form of outreach for ordinary citizens to 
hear from those entrusted with their safety and those who suffered from the post 
election violence. As a consequence, the hearings elicited an overwhelming 
response by members of the public who came to listen to the open proceedings. 
In some cases, the premises in which the Commission held its hearings were 
packed to capacity and others sometimes ran out of space. Interestingly, it was 
only after the Commission had held its hearings that members of the public 
came forward to the investigators seeking to testify. 
The Commission’s Methodology by Province  
Given the time constraints adverted to above the Commission was not able to 
visit each province and therefore the methodology which the Commission 
adopted for gathering evidence varied to some extent between the various 
provinces.  
 
Overall, the Commission relied on background material and reports from 
government, nongovernmental, and community based organizations (NGOs and 
CBOs) and individuals; recorded statements of victims taken by our investigators 
and the sworn testimony, statements and exhibits of witnesses who came before 
us. 
With regard to the Rift Valley province, the Commission heard witness testimony 
from 30 individuals: 25 in Eldoret and 5 in Nairobi.  These included officials 
from the provincial administration (4), the police (1), the NSIS (1), medical 
officers of health (5), hospital employees (2), and 15 victims and witnesses, all of 
whom came before us in camera. In addition our investigators took signed 
statements in private from 24 individuals, 17 of whom did not testify before the 
Commission. We also made site visits to roads that were blocked with huge 
boulders, to the Kiambaa church, where individuals were burned alive by 





NGOs, church groups and other local organizations found and prepared 
witnesses to meet the Commission. They also allowed their premises to be used 
as safe havens for individuals who wanted to testify in camera. In Eldoret, the 
Commission faced two main drawbacks. First, as in all places the Commission 
visited, there were time constraints. Given that some parts of the North Rift were 
major locus of the violence, the Commission could have benefited from more 
than the three days it had. Second, and most importantly, there was a pervasive 
climate of fear facing victims in the Eldoret area. Some witnesses who were 
worried about their safety were not prepared to testify in Eldoret. A few came to 
Nairobi to protect their anonymity. It is possible some witnesses who would have 
liked to have testified to the Commission, did not have the courage to do so and 
could not afford to travel to meet us elsewhere. It was our expectation that those 
against whom allegations had been made, especially the so-called “Kalenjin 
youth” would be available to testify before us or at least record statements. 
However, none of them came forward and therefore we did not have the 
opportunity to listen to an account of the violence from the perspective of those 
in the North Rift against whom allegations are made. 
Owing to constraints of time, the Commission did not hold formal sittings in 
Central Rift, but was able to make a visit to Kuresoi and Njoro areas where 
informal sessions were held with local administrators, the police and a number 
of victims. During its sittings in Nakuru, the Commission received sworn 
testimony from various witnesses who had a good overview of the district, 
including the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner (PC).  
The former Molo District Commissioner gave evidence in Nakuru Town.  In 
addition, the Commission relied to a large extent on the Minutes of the Molo 
District Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) (also supplemented by DSIC 
Minutes from the neighbouring Bureti District noting that these 2 committees on 
occasion held joint meetings, NSIS intelligence reports and the report by the 
KNCHR, numerous statements taken down by CIPEV investigators but who for 
reasons of time were never called to testify and used this primary and secondary 




reliance was also placed on reports by NGOs and other civil society and faith 
based groups and organizations. 
The Commission received evidence on violence in Koibatek through district 
government officials who testified in Eldoret as well as through statements by 
victims and eye witnesses who talked with Commission investigators. No formal 
sittings were held in the district though the DC gave sworn testimony in Eldoret 
while another witness also testified in Naivasha on behalf of IDPs regarding the 
violence in the district. Further, we received evidence in private from victims of 
sexual violence and other forms of physical harm. We then used DSIC minutes 
furnished by the Rift Valley Province PC and NSIS reports to supplement 
available information. Finally, the Commission relied on statements provided to 
Commission Investigators but who for constraints of time could not be called to 
testify. 
The Commission also received sworn testimony from a victim of the violence in 
Narok. In addition, we relied on DSIC minutes for Narok South District, NSIS 
intelligence reports and the KNCHR report. We also placed a high premium on 
the Akiwumi Report in describing the historical context of violence in this 
district. 
The Commission did not conduct any hearings in Western Province due to time 
constraints. In the circumstances, it was arranged that evidence from Western 
Province would be taken when the Commission was sitting in Kisumu from 11 to 
13 August 2008. In Kisumu, the Commission was only able to take the evidence 
of the following three officials from Western Province: the Provincial 
Commissioner, the Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer and the Provincial 
Medical Officer.   
Because it did not spend time for hearing in Western Province, the Commission 
and its investigators did not interact appreciably with the witnesses to a level 
where it would be satisfied that the evidence presented reflected the full range of 
information available in Western Province.  Further, unlike other parts of the 




witnesses and individuals who could testify from organized groups within the 
region.  Correspondence to the local branch of the Law Society of Kenya, for 
example, remained unanswered.1 The result is that when the Commission went 
to Kisumu, there were no witnesses, other than the officials, who came to testify 
on matters relating to violence in the Province. 
The Commission however made a brief visit to Kakamega town on 9th August 
2008 and toured the town where it saw properties that had been destroyed and 
damaged during the PEV. The Commission also visited the Kakamega Police 
Station IDP camp.  In writing this chapter the Commission relied on the 
testimony of the three officials, its observations during the visit to Kakamega and 
submissions made on behalf of some residents in Kakamega and other 
secondary evidence. 
The Commission held formal sittings for 3 days in Kisumu though part of this 
was devoted to Western Province. Senior provincial administration officials and 
police officers testified to get the perspective of the violence from Government 
officials. This was then juxtaposed from the sworn testimony of victims that was 
supplemented by information from the Ministry of Medical Services taking into 
account that the pattern of violence in Nyanza was typified by shootings 
attributed to Police. The Commission also relied heavily on professional 
associations like the Law Society of Kenya, Western Chapter which furnished 
detailed depositions from victims. Owing to the range of witnesses that were 
required to provide the Commission with the broad range of issues it had to deal 
with, focus was directed to the hardest hit regions namely Kisumu Town, Homa 
Bay District and Migori/Rongo Districts from which most of the Government 
witnesses were drawn from. 
The Commission held no formal hearings to receive evidence and testimony with 
regard to the violence in Nairobi. Senior officials at the highest levels of various 






Nairobi but with a view to setting the national context and not the violence in 
Nairobi per se. The Commission was able to make a site visit in Kibera in July 
2008 where it spoke to some local leaders, a number of administrators and also 
the police. Further, sworn testimonies from victims of sexual violence were 
received in camera. Taking into account this paucity of information, the 
Commission relied heavily on NSIS Intelligence and situation reports, the 
KNCHR report and reports by various civil society organizations. In putting forth 
the background for Nairobi District, the Commission also relied on desk research 
to explain the genesis of some of slum based violence that took the character of 
rent disputes with an ethnic angle. 
Although the Commission was not able to visit Central province due to 
constraints of time, it nevertheless was able to solicit accounts of what happened 
in that Province during the period. The Commission did not have opportunity to 
interview witnesses and individuals affected by violence. It, therefore, arranged 
for officials from the Province to provide statements on matters in relation to 
which it was conducting the inquiry. Submissions were received from the 
Provincial Commissioner, Central province, the District Commissioners of  
Kiambu East and  Kiambu West. 
The Commission also received and considered the Minutes of the Provincial 
Security and Intelligence Committee and District Security and Intelligence 
Committee meetings for the period before and after the elections to enable it 
appreciate the circumstances of post-election violence in Central Province. 
The Commission also announced through the media, in its public hearings, and 
elsewhere that Kenyans were encouraged to submit or send written submissions 
to the Commission. However, very little information was received from Central 
Province in pursuance of this. 
The account on the post election violence in the Central Province therefore is 
based on the material received from the officials identified above, and from a 




and the reports of other organizations that have documented the post election 
violence in the Province. 
Much of the two days of formal hearings held at the Coast was devoted to 
hearing the provincial administration and the police, and focused on the violence 
within Mombasa City and its environs. Substantial evidence was also obtained in 
private from key informants who had a good overview of the conflict and were 
well placed to speak authoritatively on the violence. In addition, testimony was 
received from victims and NGOs active in the region to piece together the history 
of violence as it happened in the Coast Province. 
 
Alleged Perpetrators: To Name or Not To Name? 
We realize that Kenyans and the international community have been hoping  the 
Commission’s report will  identify the individuals behind the 2007 post election 
violence.     After all,  the Commission’s first term of reference2 is to investigate 
the facts relating to the post-election violence. An important part of that 
investigation is to identify who planned, organised, facilitated, and committed 
egregious human rights violations.    
In carrying out its TOR, the Commission had to make a crucial decision: whether 
or not to name names. The issue is whether, in narrating the facts and 
circumstances relating to the post-election violence, the Commission should 
publicly disclose the names of those persons alleged by  various witnesses to 
have perpetrated violence at some level.  It is a choice the Commission found 
particularly vexing.  Therefore, it expended considerable time in researching and 
discussing this matter before making its judgment.  
One possible choice for the Commission  was to name the perpetrators publicly 
given the   clear advantage in doing so.  Kenya has an extremely troubled past. 






in horror  during and after the 2007 elections.  The causes of this sort of 
violence, which began in 1992 with the first multi party elections, have always 
been known from official reports of past commissions of inquiry. It isin these 
Reports that some individuals have been identified publicly as being responsible 
for the violence.  However, there has been no serious effort made by any  
government  to punish perpetrators of violence or to address the plight of their  
victims.  In sum, impunity has become the order of the day in Kenya.  One way 
of addressing  impunity is to publicly unmask and shame those who have been 
behind the chaos. A school of thought is that this should be done even if all that 
is available as proof is the victim’s version of events which seems probable.  
Where there is more than just  the victims’ account available, there is even a  
more compelling reason to name alleged perpetrators.  Legal and procedural 
niceties, the personal safety and reputation of the person named, would in that 
case be subjugated to by the national imperative of fighting impunity.  The 
named individuals, in any event, would have recourse to the courts to seek 
redress and the media to express their public rebuttals, if any. 
An alternative is to be faithful to certain legal fundamentals prior to the naming 
of alleged perpetrators in public. This Commission was appointed under the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act (Cap 102) Laws of Kenya where  its  Commissioners 
are required under section 7 (i) to make a “full, faithful and impartial inquiry”.  
The Commission espouses the rule of law and is guided accordingly in the 
discharge of its mandate.  One of the fundamental principles of law is the 
application of the rules of natural justice in the adjudication of disputes. The 
other is the presumption of innocence.  And one of the rules of natural justice, 
which the Commission jealously guards, is that no one should be condemned 
without giving them an opportunity to be heard.  Pursuant to this principle, the 
Commission hoped that it would have an opportunity to serve all individuals 
adversely mentioned during its inquiry with notices of such mentions and grant 
them an opportunity to record their evidence with the Commission.  For this 
Commission that opportunity never arose for a large number of adversely 
mentioned persons except for a few who came before us.  Even in these cases, it 




before naming names to verify all the material facts.  The main reason why this 
threshold was not met is that the time allocated to the Commission to complete 
its task was extremely  limited; it was in fact far too short to contact and hear 
the side of all those who had been adversely mentioned during the Commission’s 
hearings. Also, in some cases, the contacts and addresses of the named persons 
were unavailable. 
The second fundamental issue for the Commission is nevertheless to ensure that 
the perpetrators of the post election violence are brought to   account for their 
deeds and that the issue of impunity is addressed.  For this to be successful, the 
integrity of the evidence gathered by the Commission would have to be 
safeguarded. The evidence the Commission has gathered so far is not, in our 
assessment, sufficient to meet the threshold of proof required for criminal 
matters in this country: that it be “beyond reasonable doubt”.  It may even fall 
short of the proof required for international crimes against humanity.  We 
believe, however, that the Commission’s evidence forms a firm basis for further 
investigations of alleged   perpetrators, especially concerning those who bore the 
greatest responsibility for the post election violence.  In the nature of things, the 
premature disclosure of such evidence and those it relates to exposes it to 
possible sabotage or other adulteration before investigators have an opportunity 
to assess it. The Commission has in possession the names of powerful 
individuals in politics, government, business, the police and elsewhere whose 
capacity for interference with its evidence can neither be assumed nor 
dismissed. 
Furthermore the recently enacted Witness Protection Act 2008 which became 
operational on 2nd September, 2008 has not been tested.  It is our 
recommendation that the Act be fully operationalised to apply to the witnesses to 
ensure their ability to testify against powerful individuals without fear of 





The Commission has carefully weighed the choices available to it and has 
decided against publishing the names of alleged perpetrators in its report.  
Instead, these names will be placed in a sealed envelope, together with its 
supporting evidence. Both will be kept in the custody of the Panel of African 
Eminent Personalities pending the establishment of a special tribunal to be set 
up in accordance with our recommendations.  
In default of setting up the Tribunal, consideration will be given by the Panel to 
forwarding the names of alleged perpetrators to the special prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague to conduct further investigations 
in accordance with the ICC statutes.  This is a major recommendation made by 
the Commission. 
Basis for Recommendations 
Under its Terms of Reference the Commission was called upon to make specific 
recommendations on specific measures. Throughout the hearings and in written 
submissions, the Commission received a wide array of recommendations 
covering a whole range of issues, within and outside of the Commission’s 
mandate.   Some of these recommendations were general and others specific 
while others related to the normal functions of government.   Many expressed 
scepticism that whatever recommendations the Commission makes would never 
be implemented and as such this commission was a waste of time and public 
resources.  For those reasons the Commission made a judgment on what was 
relevant and important for recommendation based on the following factors;  
1. The recommendations should be deliberately specific to allow no scope 
for avoidance of responsibility in implementation. 
2. A few recommendations are easier to implement and present a lesser 
burden, financial or otherwise, on those tasked to implement them. 
3. It is important to identify short term and long term recommendations 
and propose a time frame for implementation. 
4. Over the last five years or so there have seen enormous reform 




to reinforce the ongoing reform process and agenda with the aim of 
empowering Kenyan institutions to effect change. 
5. The Commission should also clearly set out accountabilities and 
responsibilities for effecting recommendations and monitoring the 
implementation process. 
We believe the recommendations of this Commission are capable of   
implementation and monitoring and that where there is failure to implement, 




The verbatim recording of the Commission’s proceedings, statements, 
submissions and other evidence on the basis of which this report is derived have 
been compiled and handed over to the President of the Republic of Kenya with 
the request that it be placed in the National Archives for public reference. As has 
been explained, material that was received in camera and which tends to show 
culpability of certain individuals has been forwarded to the Panel of Eminent 












THE FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES 




CHAPTER TWO  
Post-Election Violence, 2007 – How Deep Are the Roots?3  
Introduction 
The main body of this Report examines the post-2007 elections violence in 
Kenya. This includes:  
• the facts and circumstances related to the acts of violence following the 
2007 presidential elections; 
• the actions or omissions of State security agencies during the course of the 
violence; and  
• sets of recommendations concerning measures to be taken to prevent, 
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responsible for criminal acts; eradicate impunity and promote national 
reconciliation;  improve the functioning of security agencies; deal with any 
other legal, political and administrative matters deemed necessary; and 
• make such suggestions to the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation 
Commission as the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV) deems necessary. 
 
These are the basic terms of reference of the Commission. 
This chapter examines the roots of the post-2007 elections violence in Kenya, 
while the Main Report contains the narrative, findings, and recommendations.  
This Chapter draws the views expressed at a consultative meeting which the 
Commission held with a group of Kenyan experts on 26 August 2008 and also 
from other studies and reports on the subject. Specifically, it attempts to isolate 
factors that explain the causes of the violence and why it escalated  as it did. 
These factors demonstrate also how and why violence has become a way of life in 
Kenya, a country once known for peace, prosperity, and its potential for 
development.  
We enumerate these factors below.  
The first is the growing politicization and proliferation of violence in Kenya over 
the years, specifically the institutionalization of violence following the legalization 
of multi-party democracy in 1991. Over time, this deliberate use of violence by 
politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish 
perpetrators has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of 
violence. This, in turn, has caused a further diffusion of violence in the country, 
which now is largely outside of the control of the State and its security agencies. 
Thus, violence has become a factor not just of elections but in everyday life. 
What this means in practice is that violence is widespread and can be tapped for 




Second is the growing power and personalization of power around the 
Presidency. This has had a twofold impact. First, it has given rise to the view 
among politicians and the general public that it is essential for the ethnic group 
from which they come to win the Presidency in order to ensure access to state 
resources and goods. Second it also has led to a deliberate denudation of the 
authority and legitimacy of other oversight institutions that could check abuses 
of power and corruption and provide some accountability, and at the same time 
be seen by the public as neutral arbiters with respect to contentious issues, 
such as disputed elections results. As a result, in many respects the state 
agencies are not seen as legitimate. 
Third, is a feeling among certain ethnic groups of historical marginalization, 
arising from perceived inequities concerning the allocation of land and other 
national resources as well as access to public goods and services. This feeling 
has been tapped by politicians to articulate grievances about historical injustices 
which resonate with certain sections of the public. This has created an 
underlying climate of tension and hate, and the potential for violence, waiting to 
be ignited and to explode. 
Fourth is the increasing problem of a growing population of poor, unemployed 
and youth, educated and uneducated, who agree to join militias and organized 
gangs. These gangs have been alleged to intersect with parts of the Government 
and the security forces. These groups now have become “shadow governments” 
in the slums and even in other parts of the country and have been used by 
politicians to attack their opponents; to secure their own security, and to gain 
power. Furthermore, these proliferating militias also are said sometimes to 
dovetail with the State and its security apparatus thereby not only reducing the 
State’s capacity to control the violence but also increasingly threatening the 
integrity of the State and the nation. This underlying endemic situation has 
created a climate where violence is increasingly likely to be used and where its 





The Use of Political Violence 
Violence was part and parcel of the colonial state, which used it to ensure 
control. After independence, President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and 
the stick to maintain power, with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the 
hands of the State, rather than outside of it. Opposition parties were subjected 
to political harassment and those individuals who refused to support the status 
quo experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial. 
Rallies, by students and others, were dispersed by the GSU using force. The 
Government is believed even to have been responsible for the murder of three 
political figures, Pio Gamma Pinto, Tom Mboya, and J.M. Kariuki, the last two of 
whom were viewed as threats to the then regime and potential contenders for 
political power. At the same time, individual members of the opposition were 
weaned back to the fold through appointments to Government positions, and 
allocations of land as well as provision of other perks. 
For a variety of reasons, repression under Kenya’s second President, Daniel arap 
Moi, became more draconian. First he did not start off with the same array of 
resources (e.g. land, civil service jobs, and a buoyant coffee boom) available to 
Kenyatta to reward his supporters and the general public. Second, in 1982, he 
experienced an attempted coup against him. This followed an unsuccessful 
attempt by parts of the Kiambu Kikuyu elite in 1978 to keep him from becoming 
the President. For both reasons and perhaps for others, violence, including 
detentions without trial and the routine torture of perceived and real dissenters, 
became institutionalized early on under Moi’s rule. This in turn generated a 
groundswell of dissent against his rule by a growing opposition movement, 
including politicians, lawyers, students, and others from all parts of the country, 
as well as members of the Kikuyu from Central Province  whose economic power 
he tried and partially succeeded in decimating. President Moi’s actions were 




position and that of his supporters, who were mainly drawn from his  
KAMATUSA4 allies from the marginal areas. 
In the period leading up to independence and through to 1964 when KADU was 
dissolved and its members joined KANU, KADU had campaigned for a federal 
system of government known by the Swahili name of “majimbo”, in part to 
protect the members of the smaller tribes from the numerical power of the larger 
ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu and Luo. To consolidate his base after 
becoming the President, Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin, 
through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and 
the military. Rightly or wrongly, these individuals given these were viewed by 
President Moi’s opponents as not qualified or competent. 
As the opposition to Moi’s leadership grew over the years, civil society became 
increasingly vocal and donors increased pressure on him, including through the 
use of financial sanctions, to democratize. In the end, President Moi very 
reluctantly agreed to allow multi-party democracy in 1991 and he presided over 
two multi-party elections during his rule, one in 1992 and another in 1997. 
Although he agreed to multi-party democracy, President Moi did not accept the 
idea that through this he might lose the presidency. Thus, it was in this period 
in the 1990s that violence became institutionalized during presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Under the amended Constitution, to win the presidency, 
President Moi needed to win his parliamentary seat, obtain a majority of the 
votes cast in the country, and receive 25% of the votes cast in five provinces. In 
both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition to President 
Moi and to the then ruling party, KANU, consisted mainly of non-KAMATUSA 
voters. Various reports covering elections held during this period alleged that 
high ranking political figures, civil servants, and others close to the heart of the 
Government organized and used violent gangs to intimidate people in  areas of 






and other groups. 5 The strategy was to keep opposition supporters from voting 
and the means used was to hire gangs in the Rift Valley and elsewhere to kill 
people and displace individuals from their home areas so that KAMATUSA 
candidates could win and President Moi could be assured of obtaining 25% of 
the vote in five provinces, the majority of the votes cast for the President, and the 
majority of elected Members of Parliament. In short, violence became a means of 
securing political power and winning elections. 
Elections related violence occurred not just in 1992 but also in 1997. In spite of 
the death and destruction that these methods caused and the reports from 
NGOs such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, and 
two Government Inquiries - the Kiliku Parliamentary Committee and  
Akiwumu Commission - no one was ever punished for this wanton killing and 
destruction even though names of perpetrators to be investigated and those 
“adversely mentioned” were contained in the reports of both Commissions. The 
Akiwumi Report was not made public until 2002, even though it was published 
in 1999.  
This led to a culture of impunity whereby those who maimed and killed for 
political ends were never brought to justice. This changed Kenya’s political 
landscape with regard to elections, a point noted by Human Rights Watch. Each 
of these reports implicated politicians as the organizers of the violence and 
killing for political ends, and noted that the warriors and gangs of youth who 
took action were both paid and pressed into service. Aside from this youths were 
sometimes promised land and jobs after evicting up country dwellers. However, 
from testimony in the Akiwumi Report, it is not clear if they got either. A pattern 
had been established of forming groups and using extra-state violence to obtain 
political power and of not being punished for it. 
                                                            











Some of the displaced individuals, including youth from Laikipia District, moved 
to Nairobi and became members of Mungiki, which up through the 1980s had 
been largely a cultural cum religious cult in the Kikuyu inhabited parts of the 
Rift Valley. Later it metamorphosed into a Mafioso style gang that grew and 
eventually became a shadow government in the slums of Nairobi and in parts of 
Central Province. Initially, the Mungiki were seen as substituting for a lack of 
public services in the slums. Later it started bullying individuals and 
businesses, including matatus and owners of real estate, into making payments 
for services which it would provide, including connecting electricity, providing pit 
latrines, and meting out justice. Mungiki and other gangs across the country 
(e.g. Taliban, Chinkororo, Kamjeshi, Baghdad Boys and many others) grew and 
multiplied within the context of a political culture that both used and tolerated 
extra state violence.  
Gangs and militias continued to proliferate all over the country, thereby 
increasing the presence of institutionalized extra-state violence both during and 
after elections, a pattern that continued to increase up through the 2007 
elections, even after President Mwai Kibaki took over power in 2002. Up through 
to the last elections, Mungiki and other political gangs continued to sell their 
services of violence on a willing buyer willing seller basis. As late as 2007 long 
after the Government had banned a number of gangs including Mungiki, they 
continued to operate with their leader Maina Njenga telling his followers to 
engage in more robberies to compensate for the decrease in revenue from their 
traditional matatu shakedown operations that had occurred as a result of the 
crackdown by the Government. 
As extra state violent gangs began to proliferate and continued to be used by 
politicians, the political terrain was transformed. Violence trickled down into 
daily life and the State no longer commanded the monopoly of force it once had 
in a previous era. As such diffused extra state violence existed all over the 
country, where it could be called up and tapped at any time, including being 




the Government itself used both its own and extra state violence for partisan 
political ends, it lost its legitimacy, was not seen as dispassionate, and 
consequently has been unable either to maintain peace and security or to reform 
itself.  
 
The Personalization of Presidential Power and the Deliberate Weakening of  
Public Institutions 
Power has been personalized around the presidency and this has been increased 
by changes in the Constitution under each President since independence. Laws 
are routinely passed to increase executive authority, and those laws seen as 
being in the way are often changed or even ignored. By 1991, the Constitution 
had been amended about 32 times. Among the amendments was the insertion of 
Section 2A, which made Kenya a de jure one party state until that provision was 
repealed in 1991. Even following the election of Kibaki in 2002 still rules were 
ignored within Ministries leading to financial scandals such as Anglo Leasing 
and others underscoring the once again the fact that the personal power of the 
President and his close associates trumped the law. Hence, as noted in the 
Akiwumi Report and in a number of articles on Kenya politics, the checks and 
balances normally associated with democracies are very weak in Kenya and are 
deliberately so. Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the civil 
service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of 
the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. Hence, the 
State is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in power.  
The above syndrome has had various consequences. 
The first is a sense of lawlessness that has led to Government institutions and 
officials being seen as lacking in integrity and autonomy. One result of this in 
the 2007 election was the perception by sections of the public that Government 
institutions, and officials, including the judiciary, were not independent of the 
presidency, were not impartial and lacked integrity. Hence, they were perceived 




seen as biased and unlikely to follow the rules increased the tendency to violence 
among members of the public. Furthermore, as the Akiwumi Report and other 
sources demonstrated, members of the provincial administration and the police 
also understood that it was sometimes in the interest of their personal survival 
to follow what they understood to be the directives or inclinations of either the 
President or MPs in their areas rather than to uphold the law. This led to some 
officials not following the law themselves, and sections of the provincial 
administration and security forces even engaging in acts of violence themselves.  
The second is the perception on the part of the public that given the power of the 
President and the political class everything flows not from laws but from the 
President’s power and personal decisions. This also has led the public to believe 
a person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits 
and as a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over 
power, from taking jobs, land and entitlements. All of this has led to acquisition 
of presidential power being seen both by politicians and the public as a zero sum 
game, in which losing is seen as hugely costly and is not accepted. Hence, there 
is tendency on the part of a variety of political actors to do anything, including 
engaging in violence to obtain or retain political power, leading to what one 
specialist has called a race to the bottom because of a fear of being dominated by 
other ethnic groups and being subjected to the associated consequences of that. 
This has created a climate of fear and suspicions which politicians easily exploit 
and use to mobilize violence.             
 The attempt to reduce the personal power that had been accumulated by former 
President Moi initially was the reason opposition forces sought to introduce the 
post of Prime Minister. This culminated in an informal Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) before the 2002 election between the then opposition 
coalition under which the coalition agreed to introduce the post of Prime 
Minister after the election. Once elected, however, President Kibaki reneged on 
the MoU. Discussions continued concerning constitutional change and the 
devolution of power. The Kibaki Government then came up with a draft 




of the provisions in the draft agreed to during the “Bomas” discussions. The 
Wako draft was put to the public at a referendum in 2005, where voters rejected 
it. As soon as the MoU was scuttled, a group led by Raila Odinga left the NARC 
coalition Government. President’s Kibaki Government was perceived as being 
unwilling to abide by its pre-election agreement with its partners and as 
retreating into an ethnic enclave. This was criticized by the public and was seen 
as an attempt by the so-called “Mount Kenya Mafia” to keep power to itself 
rather than share it.  Even though the MoU was not a legal agreement, the 
Kibaki Government’s turning away from it and removing from government the 
group of Ministers associated to Odinga had the effect of increasing the 
polarization of politics along ethnic lines. Even though the 2005 referendum was 
peaceful and the results were accepted rather than contested, the parameters 
were nevertheless drawn. With the ethnic political fault lines clearly drawn after 
2005, and the need to win the presidency seen as paramount, tensions began to 
mount. 
The post election violence therefore is, in part, a consequence of the failure of 
President Kibaki and his first Government to exert political control over the 
country or to maintain sufficient legitimacy as would have allowed a civilized 
contest with him at the polls to be possible. Kibaki’s regime failed to unite the 
country, and allowed feelings of marginalization to fester into what became the 
post election violence.  He and his then Government were complacent in the 
support they considered they would receive in any election from the majority 
Kikuyu community and failed to heed the views of the legitimate leaders of other 
communities.  
 
Land and Inequality 
Kenya consists of 42 ethnic groups who live in eight provinces. Many areas 
outside the major cities and towns are relatively homogeneous ethnically. 
Problems of inequality and marginalization thus are often viewed in ethno 




ethnic group are sometimes more pronounced than those between different 
ethnic groups and geographic areas. Studies done elsewhere have not found that 
the presence of a large number of ethnic groups or inequality per se explains 
large scale violence even though most of the violence in the Rift Valley has 
occurred mainly in ethnically mixed settlement schemes. Apart from this, 
citizens everyplace are concerned that resources, including land, and services 
are distributed equitably and are quick to point out inequities.   
Constitutionally, individuals may own land in any place in Kenya and in law no 
part of the country belongs to an ethnic group. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is 
de facto a characteristic of many areas, particularly as many of the newly 
created districts since the nineteen nineties have been ethno-specific, leading to 
the creation of ethnically homogenous effective “native reserves”. This in turn 
has created the notion of “insiders”, who are native to a place and “outsiders” 
who have migrated there, a notion that has been tapped by aspiring politicians. 
This raises the question of the balance between group interests and the rights of 
individuals as entrenched in the Constitution, a problem that also has crept into 
slums such as Kibera and Mathare which are now informally divided into 
ethnically homogeneous zones.  
Apart from the above, gross corruption in the acquisition, registration, and 
administration of land matters has been a major problem in Kenya. The Ndungu 
Report noted that throughout the 1980s and 1990s public land was illegally and 
irregularly allocated “in total disregard of the public interest and in 
circumstances that fly in the face of the law”6. “Land grabbing” and the 
allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption 
of this period. Those involved in this allocation were senior public servants, but 
also local land boards, the courts, and a range of officials including members of 
the provincial administration, politicians, and others. Land allocations were 
therefore used to reward “politically correct individuals”7, and became heavily 
                                                            






politicized. Given that the recommendations of the Ndungu report were never 
implemented, this has increased the sense of frustration in attempting to deal 
with land tenure disputes. The fact that institutions which could have been used 
to resolve land disputes have not been impartial has encouraged individuals to 
take matters into their own hands and to use violence to resolve them. 
Furthermore, as land is an emotive issue, politicians have capitalized on issues 
surrounding it, including encouraging violence during elections. 
In discussions of post-election violence, many Kalenjins argue that it is a 
product of longstanding anger over land distribution following independence. 
They argue that land was alienated by the colonial government and then unfairly 
parcelled out to Kikuyus and other groups whom they view as outsiders. Many 
Kalenjins believe that issues relating to land were the reason for both the pre-
electoral violence in the 1990s and the post election violence after the December 
2007 elections8. Others, including the Akiwumi Report dismiss this explanation 
pointing out that individuals from different groups lived side by side for many 
years until the advent of multi party democracy when violence was used to kill 
and displace opposition party voters to keep them from voting. Hence, the Report 
argues that even though the promise of getting land from those who were 
displaced was used to entice youth into violence, the desire for political power 
and not land hunger was the causal factor.  
Notwithstanding these views, the Ndungu Report noted that there has been 
corruption in the misallocation of land both in settlement schemes in the 
countryside and in the urban areas. Hence there is a land issue which needs to 
be addressed, particularly in parts of the country which are not ethnically 
homogeneous. Even now, this mentality and the fear that accompanies it has led 
to a type of quasi residential apartheid as Kenyans move into more ethnically 







Beyond the above, another issue that looms on the horizon is that some 
communities have done better than others which are poorer, less well developed, 
and more marginalized from the mainstream. This in turn has generated feelings 
of resentment and powerlessness, sentiments that can and have been mobilized 
violently. Furthermore, there is a large and growing underclass of urban poor 
who are not landowners and are unlikely ever to be landowners. The tendency 
has been to think of Kenya almost exclusively as agrarian and of land issues as 
paramount even though the number of Kenyans living in urban areas is 
increasing, a tendency likely to continue. 
 
Unemployed Youth 
Although Kenya’s population growth rate has been reduced and is now 
reportedly down to 3%, it still has an estimated two million youth who are 
unemployed. Furthermore, between 1992 and 1996, the number of street 
children increased 300% in just four years. Many of these initially rootless 
children who are now adults are the product of displacement by ethnic violence. 
They have grown up on the streets and are inured to violence, something that is 
clearly very dangerous. In addition, although many youth speak English, 
something that has raised their expectations, they have no hope of formal sector 
employment. The combination of being rootless, having survived amidst violence, 
plus their need for an identity and a livelihood makes them ready recruits for 
violent gangs, which exist all over Kenya and are tapped by politicians, 
particularly but not exclusively during elections.  
The gangs are devoid of ideology and operate on a willing buyer willing seller 
basis. Given the hierarchical nature of gangs and the upwardly mobile hopes of 
their members to become as well off as their leaders, youth can be mobilized for 
a variety of reasons, not just to meet their daily needs. This, in itself is a very 
dangerous situation, helping to explain why since the 1990s violent gangs have 





Additionally, there is also a growing problem of unemployment among youth who 
are university educated, estimated to be around 40,000 a year, given that only 
150,000 formal sector jobs have been created since 2003, raising the spectre of 
whether these individuals will also be ready to engage in violence as well if they 
are unable to find work9. 
Violent gangs, consisting mainly of unemployed youth have been mobilized into 
gangs along ethnic lines. Their power, to the point of having become shadow 
governments in many areas, stems from two sources.  First as the main aim of 
Government in the 1990s was to mobilize political support to gain and maintain 
political power, a good deal of revenue was spent on patronage rather than on 
maintaining infrastructure and providing social services. This meant that the 
country started to crumble, visually evident in the decay of roads and the 
proliferation of uncollected garbage, even in the capital city of Nairobi, which 
once had been called the “city in the sun”. This crumbling as well as a decline in 
social services and security also paved the way for violent gangs which provided 
them. This gave unemployed youth work, albeit within gangs, and made the 
latter extremely powerful. Over time these gangs operated as Mafioso shakedown 
gangs, with violence and impunity, as they continue to do. Increasingly, citizens 
began to ask who was in charge of Kenya, gangs or the Government. 
While one might have expected that the police could have dealt with the increase 
in violent gangs operating as virtual shadow states in so many parts of the 
country, the Government has been ineffective in dealing with them for several 
reasons. First, many politicians themselves have used these violent gangs to 
decimate their opponents, to protect themselves from a dictatorial state in the 
1990s, and to gain power then and now. This has itself given gangs such as 
Mungiki, the Taliban, Chinkororo and others a life and the ability to operate 
without fear of being caught. Second, by the time government was serious about 









continued to operate in spite of the bans. Third, security forces including police 
often were victims of these gangs themselves and used draconian but ineffective 
force against them.  
Furthermore, the fact that both the police and military are perceived historically 
to have been recruited along ethnic lines to protect the particular government of 
the day has increased the likelihood of their breaking down along ethnic lines in 
a crisis and being either unable or unwilling to maintain law and order 
impartially. This meant that post election violence proliferated and intensified for 
a number of months and that politicians and businessmen allegedly chose to 
hire gangs of youth to fight their attackers rather than call in forces whose 
loyalties could not necessarily be counted on. 
The post election period infused gangs of unemployed youth with more power 
than before and has given them an added currency. While clearly there is a 
problem of youth who grow up in slums and make their living by joining gangs 
because of a lack of good alternatives and the prospects of upward mobility, the 
issue is not one of poverty alone. Instead this situation intersects with other 
phenomena, including that of weak institutions, ethnic polarization, and the 
willingness of the political class to hire gangs to engage in violence to obtain 
political power. Furthermore, the power of these gangs should not be 
underrated, including their ability to force other poor unwilling youth to join 
them as they remain unchecked, grow, and along with other forces threaten the 
integrity of state and nation. In this sense, youth are both being exploited and 
have become exploiters themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
All of the above factors have dovetailed to make violence the method of choice to 
resolve a range of political differences and to obtain political power. 
Furthermore, because the violence surrounding elections has been ethnically 
directed, this has increased distrust among different groups and vastly eroded 




and negative connotation. The basic issue facing the nation is how to deal with 
these issues. Attempts have been made to crack down on gangs and half 
heartedly to reform institutions. Neither has been successful, in part because 
the Government has not been serious, has not been willing to address generic 
issues or underlying causes of violence.  
Furthermore, the main perpetrators of systemic violence have never been 
prosecuted. Currently Kenya is at a critical juncture. Violence is endemic, out of 
control, is used routinely to resolve political differences, and threatens the future 
of the nation. Because of the ethnic nature of the post-election violence, ethnic 
fears and hatred have been elevated in importance and could turn violent again 
even more easily than has happened in the past. What is required to address the 
points discussed above is political will and some basic decisions to change the 
way politics is conducted, as well as to address its intersection with other issues 
related to land, marginalization and inequality, and youth. Short of that, violence 
including that related to elections will continue to appear and will be ignited ever 
more readily. Kenya needs to decide if it wishes to let violence, corruption, and 
powerless institutions prevail or to introduce fundamental change. Simply put, 
the individuals and institutions who have benefited in the short term from the 
chaos and violence need to give up the methods they have used or Kenya could 
become a failed state. The report which follows is dedicated to discussing the 
Commission’s findings on the post 2007 elections violence and making 














Violence in Rift Valley Province 
 
The North Rift Region 
Introduction 
The North Rift region comprises the districts of Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia West, 
Trans Nzoia East, Nandi North, Nandi South, Marakwet, Keiyo, Baringo North 
and Baringo South.  The evidence made available to the Commission in relation 
to those districts is examined below, but more so, in relation to Uasin Gishu and 
Trans Nzoia which experienced the epicentre of the post election violence in that 
region.  
The Uasin Gishu District covers an area of 3218 square kilometres. It borders 
Lugari district of Western Province to the west. To the east, it borders Keiyo, 
Marakwet and Koibatek. On the southern side, it borders Nandi North and Nandi 
South districts. The Trans Nzoia districts of East and West are in the north.  It 
shares a small boundary with Kipkelion at its south easterly tip. The district is 
divided into six administrative divisions namely Turbo, Soy, Moiben, Ainabkoi, 
Kesses and Kapsaret. Politically, it has 3 constituencies namely Eldoret North, 
Eldoret East and Eldoret South.  It has three local authorities namely:  the 
Municipal Council of Eldoret, the County Council of Wareng and the Town 
Council of Burnt Forest.  
At an annual growth rate of about 4%, the population of Uasin Gishu, estimated 
at 744,083 in 1999, is currently close to one million people and a fair mix of all 
Kenyan communities. The district’s economy is agricultural based. There are a 
few industries in Eldoret, which is the district headquarters. Eldoret town is the 




country by rail, air and road networks. It has many institutions of higher 
learning, a referral hospital and other vital installation such as the Kenya 
Pipeline Oil Depot which serves some of the neighbouring countries. 
More than in any other part of the country, with the exception of the Molo 
district in Central Rift, violence in North Rift bore resemblance to previous cycles 
of election related ethnic violence. It is worth noting that the Akiwumi Report 
and the question related to acting upon its recommendation were most 
discussed in our hearings on the North Rift. The Commission therefore felt 
necessary to examine the pattern, actors and consequences of the 2007 post 
election violence in this region in the general context of the legacy of ethnic 
clashes experienced during previous election periods. 
 
Pre-Election Period and the Legacy of the 1990s State Sponsored Violence 
Previously, the North Rift had experienced serious violence before the 
presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1997. In 2007, the main 
difference was that the violence was more intense, more widespread, was urban 
as well as rural, lasted longer, and occurred after rather than before the 
elections.  
The North Rift is one of the regions which was investigated and extensively 
covered in the Akiwumi Report.10 According to that Report, the clashes broke out 
in Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, on 29 October 1991 before spreading out 
to other parts of the Rift Valley. Paragraphs 90 and 91 of the Report summarize 
the general nature of the violence and are reproduced below: 
“90. In each clash area, non-Kalenjin or non-Maasai, as the case may 
be, were suddenly attacked, their houses set on fire, their properties 
looted and in certain instances, some of them were either killed or 
severely injured with traditional weapons like bows and arrows, 






and co-ordinated. Their attacks were generally under the cover of 
darkness, and where the attackers were in broad daylight, the 
raiders would smear their faces with clay to conceal their identities. 
The attackers targeted mainly the Kikuyu, but also the Kisii, the 
Luhya, and the Luo, other non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai communities 
were not spared.  The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated 
to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, to cripple them 
economically and to psychologically traumatize them.  Many of the 
victims were forced to camp in schools, church compounds and 
shopping centres. There they lived in makeshift structures of 
polythene sheets, cardboard and similar materials.  They had little 
food and belongings with them and lived in poor sanitary conditions 
with their children who could no longer go to school. There was also a 
general lack of concern by the Provincial administration and the Police 
Force for their security and general welfare. 
91. In general, the clashes started and ended suddenly, and left a 
trail of destruction suffering and disruption of life hitherto unknown in 
this country. The causes of the clashes have been given as conflict 
over land, cattle rustling, political differences and ecological reasons 
among others. As stated elsewhere in this Report, these reasons were 
proffered to conceal the real motive or reason for the clashes.” 
The Akiwumi Commission came to the conclusion that there were three 
underlying reasons for the clashes: 
1) “Ambitions by Kalenjins of recovering what they think they 
lost when the Europeans forcibly acquired their ancestral 
land. 
2) The desire to remove “foreigners”, derogatorily referred to as 
“madoadoa” or “spots” from their midst. The reference was 
mainly towards the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo and other 
communities who had found permanent residence in the Rift 
Valley. 
3) Political and ethnic loyalty.” 
 
The Akiwumi Commission also came to the conclusion that the security forces 
and the Provincial Administration were negligent and unwilling to take firm and 




bring a quick end to them. Tribal leaders and politicians were also found to have 
instigated the clashes.11 
Recommendations were made to prevent the future recurrence of violence 
including recommendations for the investigations of named individuals 
suspected to have had a hand in the violence. But the findings and 
recommendations of that Commission, as related to the Rift Valley, were rejected 
by sections of the Government of the day and there followed no further visible 
action on the Report12. 
 
Build up of Tension  
Although several Government officials testified that the lead up to the elections 
was peaceful and did not experience any violence, there was also evidence that 
in the lead up to the elections all was not well. For example, the DC for Uasin 
Gishu Bernard Kinyua, started by saying that in his district “polling was smooth, 
very smooth, indeed the smoothest I have ever seen”. However, when specific 
incidents were put to him, he acknowledged that there were violent skirmishes 
before the elections and these contributed to an atmosphere of ever-escalating 
tension.  
These incidents included the burning in Eldoret of a vehicle belonging to the 
Brookside Factory on 26th December, on suspicions, later disproved, that stuffed 
ballots were stored in the premises of the Company, the attempts to burn 
another vehicle belonging to a bus company, Mololine, on the same day and for 
the same reason and the suspension, two days earlier, of the transportation of 
people to and from Eldoret, by bus operators who feared for the safety of their 
vehicles. Witnesses testified that electioneering continued throughout the period 







Constitution in 2005, and that, on all sides of the political divide, inciteful 
utterances were made by politicians and their cronies as part of the campaigns. 
According Stephen Ikua, the Koibatek DC, the Kalenjin people were made to 
believe that they had been marginalized by the Government and that their people 
had been removed from Government positions unfairly. The NSIS district co-
ordinator for Uasin Gishu informed the Commission that during the 2005 
referendum, the Kalenjin viewed the Kikuyu as arrogant and also felt that the 
Kikuyu looked down upon them, notwithstanding the fact that the Kalenjin were 
host to a large number of Kikuyu people. The DC for Koibatek, confirmed the 
extension of campaigns beyond the referendum period and also that there was a 
build up of tension resulting from the messages that were delivered as part of 
the campaigning. Although he was not able to furnish the Commission with a 
single example to verify his claims, he added that during the campaigns, 
vernacular radio stations were involved in the incitement of people along ethnic 
lines. The “majimbo” debate was particularly divisive as it brought back the 
issues of recovery of ancestral land by the Kalenjins and removal of “foreigners” 
(madoadoa) from the land, all underlying reasons for the 1990s clashes. 
According to the Uasin Gishu DC, Bernard Kinyua, references to madoadoa 
“were used frequently even in normal discourse within the district”. As the 
political temperature rose, so did incidents of violent confrontations between the 
political actors before election day.  As discussed later, in all those pre-election 
incidents of violence, no one was arrested and those who were, were released 
without any charges or prosecution. 
Although it was the impression of many witnesses that violence in the North Rift 
began on 30 December 2007 immediately after the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya (ECK) announced the presidential results of the 27 December polls, there 
was evidence that violence had began even before the election results were 
announced. For example the DC for Nandi South, Mabeya Mogaka, testified that 
violence in his district had begun on 29th December. The delay in the 
announcement of the results of the presidential elections, allegations of 
problems in the conduct of the election by both local and foreign observers, the 




well as incendiary remarks and hate speech by politicians, FM local media 
stations, and the public had built up noticeable tensions in many parts of the 
country.  
The Commission established that this was so also in Uasin Gishu District, which 
was the epicenter of the violence. 
 
Nature and extent of violence 
Various administrative officials and senior police officers in the North Rift who 
testified before us reported that massive violence all across Uasin Gishu District 
in particular, as well as in various parts of Nandi, and elsewhere erupted 
suddenly immediately after the ECK announced the presidential results on 30 
December. In Uasin Gishu, the violence entailed large marauding gangs of 
1,000-2,000 Kalenjin youth, brandishing machetes, bows and poisonous arrows, 
occasional firearms, matches and projectiles filled with petrol. These menacing 
gangs blocked and manned a variety of roads with trees trunks and huge rocks, 
some of which were transported by tractors, throughout the district. They also 
burned vehicles and tyres while refusing to allow anyone to pass as well as 
engaging in killing, rioting, and looting.13 This included numerous simultaneous 
attacks and cutting off all five entrances to Eldoret town, other roads and 
highways, as well as the main artery to Kisumu and Uganda, and beyond from 
Timboroa to Turbo.  
The Director of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, Prof. Harun Mengech, 
mentioned that some road blocks were established as early as 29 December. The 
violence was so overwhelming that for some time, long term trade was at a 
standstill with no supplies going in or out of Uganda and Eastern Congo. The 
Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee (PSIC) finally decided to call in 







escorting public service vehicles (PSVs) and tankers from the Eldoret Pipeline to 
the Kenya Uganda border. Security personnel deployed by the OCPD also 
assisted in protecting life and property, guarding IDP camps, and transferring 
them from the interior to safer locations in the centre. 
The barricades in town were so severe that, according to Prof. Mengech he tried 
unsuccessfully twice to get to his hospital on 30 December, first through the 
Moi’s Bridge/Matunda route and then through the Ziwa route. In each case he 
encountered youths, estimated to be between 15-20 years old, who were 
blocking the roads and who warned him he might not make it to the hospital. It 
took until 2 January 2008 for Prof. Mengech to reach the hospital and then only 
when the DC and the police gave him an armed escort. 
Within Eldoret town, the less well off areas of Munyaka, Silas, and Langas 
estates experienced heavy violence with a former international athlete, Lucas 
Sang killed. According to evidence presented by the KNCHR, Yamumbi, a farm 
area near to Eldoret was also seriously affected. Kalenjin raiders torched houses 
owned by Kikuyus there. Two deaths ensued, with one person dying in the 
presence of two police officers who had invaded the victim’s home. According to 
the evidence, the Kalenjin gangs reportedly came from the rural areas to attack 
Kikuyu residents in Eldoret town.14 
The former OCPD for Eldoret Division, Angelus Karuru, told the Commission 
that on 30 December, his office began receiving reports from all over the district 
of arson, theft, the destruction and looting of property, and the taking of 
livestock. Outside of town, gangs with crude weapons also barricaded access to 
various sites, including farming communities in the largely Kikuyu inhabited 
settlement schemes. Here, mostly unsuspecting and terrified victims were 
suddenly overwhelmed by large numbers of Kalenjin youth who set fire to their 
compounds, burned and stole their possessions, as well as maiming, gang 
raping, and hacking to death large numbers of defenseless families, most of 






Rurigi, Rukuini, Kiamumbi, Moiben Division, Matunda in Soi Division, and the 
area around Turbo. 
The nature of violence was best rendered in personal stories the victims and eye 
witnesses told the Commission. As one informant told Commission investigators,  
“At about midnight on December 30…I was awoken by screams. 
When I went out of the house I saw that neighbor’s homes belonging 
to Kikuyu were on fire. I remained out up to morning. I went to check 
what was happening. I saw houses burning at the boundary of 
Langas and Kapseret”. 
Another witness rendered yet another heart wrenching tale as follows:  
“Some Nandi were running after people on the road. I ran away with 
my children. I saw a man being killed by cutting with a panga and hit 
by clubs when I was running. I fell near a seasonal river in Kipkendui 
primary school while running away. My last born child fell a distance 
away from my arm, was hurt, and was crying. Some people were 
running after me and when I fell, two men caught me. They tore my 
panties and they both raped me in turn.”15 
In some cases, victims were attacked and killed by unknown assailants, in 
others the perpetrators were people they knew, including neighbors. One farmer 
from Chegaiya sub-location in Kesses Location testified to the Commission about 
having watched seven members of his immediate family being hacked to death, 
including his wife, who was hit on her head with a rungu and had her throat 
“slit with a panga”. He knew many of the attackers, some of whom were his 
neighbors and identified them by name to the Commission, as well as the 
numbers and owners of the vehicles which “were used to transport the armed 







An Elder Watches as His Family is Attacked 
70 year old Mzee Joseph Mwangi Macharia (Karobe) watched as seven members of his 
family were hacked to death – his wife, three sons (aged 36, 33 and 23), one daughter 
(aged 25), a grandson (aged 6) and a granddaughter (aged 6).  He narrated his ordeal as 
follows: 
On 31st December, 2007 at about 5 p.m., he had a family get-together in his house at 
Chagaiya village in Kesses location, when a group of about forty young people, among 
them his neighbours, struck. They said they wanted five heads from that house – his 
and his four sons’. 
As he pleaded for mercy one of them struck his son on the chest with a club and 
another shot him with an arrow as he tried to escape. Another son was pierced with a 
spear and his throat was cut. The rest of the family tried to hide inside the house but it 
was broken down and they were pulled out.  His daughter and her child were pulled out 
and their throats were slit. So was his wife’s throat. That is when Mzee Macharia 
escaped into a nearby bush and watched as his house was set on fire.  He stayed in the 
bush until the following morning. 
In the morning he went to a nearby AP camp where he collapsed and became 
unconscious. Three days later he was assisted by the APs and neighbours to dig a 
shallow grave where he buried his family before moving to an IDP camp in Limuru.  
They were only exhumed on 28th April, 2008 and given a decent burial. 
Mzee Macharia knew at least 14 of the assailants and recognized them during the 
attack. 
 
In a few cases members of the Kikuyu community were able to resist the attacks 
and even hit back at their attackers. In Matunda Centre, for example, some 14 – 
25 young Kalenjin men were hacked to death after they invaded the area in 
January 2008 to raid businesses at the centre.  They were overpowered by the 
local residents who killed all of them. In another incident, an eyewitness told 
Commission investigators the following: 
“On the 31st December I saw Kalenjin warriors being ferried by lorries 
from the Ziwa area. They were armed with arrows and bows. 
Immediately after alighting from the lorries they met with a rival 
group of Kikuyu youth from Munyaka. We had been told that a group 
of Kikuyu youth were coming from there to defend us against the 
Kalenjin attackers. They were armed with pangas (machetes) and 
rungus (clubs). Then a confrontation ensued between the Kikuyu 
youth and the Kalenjin youth. The Kalenjin would shout at the 




clubs and machetes. Shortly thereafter, police arrived on the scene 
and dispersed the combatants. The Kalenjins retreated towards the 
bushes in the Junction area and the Kikuyu retreated to Beta Farm. 
The Kalenjins set houses on fire as they retreated.” 
Overall, though, both the police and members of communities perceived to be 
both foreigners and PNU sympathizers (Kikuyu and Kisii in particular) were 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the violence and the number of the attackers. 
Those who escaped death ran to seek refuge in places they thought would be 
safe including churches, police stations, schools, and mosques. Among these 
many tragic stories, the incident which captured the attention of both Kenyans 
and the world was the deliberate burning alive of mostly Kikuyu women and 
children huddled together in a church in Kiambaa on 1 January 2008. They had 
sought refuge in the church following a 30 December attack on their village of 
Kimuri, bordering Kiambaa. According to reports, including witness testimony, 
mattresses and blankets were set ablaze with petrol and thrown into the building 
while mothers and babies who were trying to flee the inferno were pushed back 
into the church. Kikuyu men attempting to defend their church and loved ones 
were hacked to death with machetes, shot with arrows, or pursued and killed. 
The death toll for this horrific incident was 17 burned alive in the church, 11 
dying in or on the way to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, and 54 others 
injured who were treated and discharged. One woman who lost her mother in 
the inferno captured the horror of what happened when she told our 
investigators that: 
“On the 1st of January 2008 at around 10 a.m., I heard people yelling 
that some raiders were coming. I saw smoke coming from some 
houses in our village and the houses were burning. Everyone in the 
village started running away to the church (KAG). My mother who 
was 90 years old was with me at the time. I decided to take my 
mother into the church for safety. After a few minutes, I saw more 
raiders coming towards the church….We thought the raiders would 




by the raiders. The raiders threw some mattress into the roof of the 
church and threw more into the church. They were also pouring fuel 
(petrol) onto the mattresses. All of a sudden I saw fire break out. I 
took my mother toward to [the] main door to get her outside, but there 
were many others scrambling toward the door as well. We both fell 
onto the floor. I wanted to save my mother from the burning church, 
but one of the raiders prevented me. I saw the fire had reached where 
my mother was. I heard her cry for help as the fire burnt her, but I 
could not help.”  
 
An official of the Kiambaa Cooperative Farm, who testified in camera, also 
confirmed the above account, noting that those who had taken refuge in the 
church were surrounded on all sides and adding that when the “raiders” reached 
the church:  
“they started throwing stones, arrows and forcing children, women, 
and old ones in the church. They took all mattresses pouring petrol on 
and laying some at the roof…, against the wall and at the doors and 
set ablaze so all men trying to come outside was killed. Others 
escaped [and] survived with major cuts and inside were so many 
dead and others burned beyond recognition and some escaped 
severely burned….I saw many that I know them for many years but 
the constitution of this country was made for Kalenjin because they 
are able to kill, burn houses and also to loot livestock and there is no 
law to prosecute them”.16 
 
Although many attempts were made to quell the violence in Uasin Gishu District, 








almost unremittingly, with increasing numbers of IDPs pouring into camps. 
According to officials, violence did not abate until the peace accord between the 
two political aspirants for the presidency, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, was 
signed in Nairobi, but even after this, according to the DC Bernard Kinyua, they 
still continued to experience all sorts of incidents. 
The Commission also received evidence on the nature and extent of violence in 
the areas contiguous to Uasin Gishu, including Nandi North and Nandi South 
Districts. In his sworn testimony, the former D.C. for Nandi North, Mabeya 
Mogaka, told the Commission that there had been tension in the district for 
some time in part the result of Luhyas having bought land in Kapkangani, 
Kipkaren, and Chepkumia, as well as two Luhya candidates having been cleared 
to contest a parliamentary seat, something that was not accepted by prominent 
Nandi personalities in the district. He also noted that the administration had 
expected trouble including violence if either Luhya candidate won the election.  
According to the D.C., violence erupted immediately after the presidential results 
were announced on 30 December, but had already started before then on 29 
December. Overall the violence led to 1,475 homes being burned and destroyed 
and 7,800 people being displaced. Even though one person died in the end only 
12 individuals were arrested despite all the violence and destruction. Violence 
was directed at PNU supporters, government departments and houses, and the 
ethnically mixed Baraton University, with the worst destruction occurring after 
the newly elected MP for Ainamoi was shot dead on 31 January 2008.  
The Commission was also told that at the height of the violence, the provincial 
administration allowed a demonstration of 70,000 individuals from Nandi North 
and South to take place in Kapsabet, after having engaged with 12 Nandi elders 
to ensure that it was peaceful. The mere idea of a large demonstration was 
threatening enough to the displaced to make many of them move to the police 
station for safety, while numerous Kikuyu and Kisii asked for assistance to 




IDPs who had taken refuge in the Kapsabet police station and other in the 
Kabiyet police station were also being threatened and therefore were moved.17 
 
Impact of the Violence 
According to District Commissioner Kinyua and SSP Karuru, 205 people died in 
the post-election violence in the Uasin Gishu district. 167 of them have been 
identified while 38 remain unidentified in the mortuary.  Among those who died 
were an Administration Police Officer, Ewafula Wakhungu and a District Officer 
(DO). Both were killed in Cheptiret near the Chebii Primary School as they were 
attempting to quell violence at an illegal road block on 1 January 2008. 
From other witness testimony, mortuary records and other sources, including 
the evidence of the Director of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital Prof. Harun 
Mengech, the Commission was however able to determine that 272 persons died 
in the post election violence in Uasin Gishu District. The Casualty Section of the 
hospital recorded 521 victims of post-election violence. 50% were Kikuyu, 22% 
Kalenjin, 4% Luo, 9% Kisii and Luhya and 10% other tribes. The majority of 
these were young people. 161 of these were admitted while the rest were treated 
and discharged. Of those admitted 36 died from their injuries. The police 
brought another 107 bodies into the hospital’s mortuary, while the Kenya Red 
Cross brought 20. The total number of deaths recorded at the hospital was 
therefore 163. 
Out of the 127 bodies received from outside the hospital, Langas had the highest 
number of deaths followed by Kiambaa. The distribution was as follows: - Langas 
30, Kiambaa 20, Huruma 14, Hawaya 10, Malime 8, Tarakwa 7, Munyaka 7, 
Kimumu 6, Cheptiret 5, Kapsoya 4 and others 16 totalling to 127. Thirty three 







The causes of death according to the post mortems carried out showed that the 
majority of the deaths were due to sharp/pointed objects (33%), followed by 
burns (22%), blunt objects (14%), gun shots (14%), arrow wounds 6% and 
broken bones, 3% and others  in that order.  
Of the 163 deceased, the majority were between the ages of 21 and 30 (27%), the 
ages 41 – 50 (18%), ages 31 – 40 (15%). The possibility that there were dead 
people who were not brought to the hospital was not ruled out.  The period 
covered in the statistics was between 30th December, 2007 up to 6th February, 
2008.  
Property was also destroyed during the attacks. According to police records, 
52,611 houses were burnt; 58 motor vehicles belonging to civilians and 2 
government vehicles were also burnt.  
A total of 21,749 people were displaced from their homes, other places of 
residence and businesses and they were accommodated in IDP Camps.  13,417 
have since been reportedly resettled leaving 592 still in IDP Camps. 
From 30 December 2007 to 6 February 2008, the Moi Teaching and Referral 
Hospital in Eldoret received 521 patients. It was assisted with cold storage 
facilities and supplies by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
given that its own mortuary could take only 48 bodies. According to the 
hospital’s Director, about half of the victims received at the hospital were 
Kikuyu, about a fifth Kalenjin with others being Luhya, Kisii, Turkana, and 
Muslim. Most of the deceased were under forty with a concentration of 
individuals with almost 30% being between 21 and 30. The range in age of those 
who were injured and died was between 3 to 85. The numbers include those 
from hospitals outside the district as the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital is 
the only one with a mortuary and hence when bodies were found they were 
brought there. Even then, some victims of the violence never made it to any 
hospital, which accounts for the higher numbers of 205 dead in District in the 





The Commission also heard testimony about the impact of the post election 
violence in other parts of the North Rift, mostly from districts bordering Uasin 
Gishu District. This, and other information received demonstrates the extent of 
the post-election violence and the dislocations throughout the region, some of 
which had spilled over from Uasin Gishu, and some from the Mount Elgon 
region in Western Province.  
 
Dr. Sammy Osore, witness no. 61 and currently the District Medical Officer for 
West Pokot, was previously the District Medical Officer for Marakwet District, 
which borders on Uasin Gishu District. He confirmed that his hospital did not 
received patients with injuries from post-election violence. However, he noted 
that they provided drugs and medical supplies to an IDP camp at Kapchorop 
Division, bordering Trans Nzoia, where there had been a lot of violence. The 
camp contained 140 adults and 70 children who took refuge there because their 
lives were endangered. It was dismantled and consolidated with one in 
Kachibora in Trans Nzoia. He also mentioned that four of his staff, including two 
who lived in Chebyemit Market in Marakwet District had their houses broken 
into while they were voting and two others were displaced but neither was 
harmed or injured. 
 
Dr. Stephen Kaiya, the District Medical Officer for Nandi South testified that his 
District Hospital in Nandi Hills received 160 patients: 124 outpatients and 36 in 
patients, due to the post election violence. The majority of the outpatient cases 
had soft tissue injuries (48) and cut wounds (39), along with three rapes and 
other problems. Of those admitted, there were 11 with gunshot wounds, 6 with 
burns, 8 with cuts, and other injuries, with no recorded deaths. Most of those 
who came to his facility were from within the district, but he also had some 
patients who came from Nyando District which borders Nandi South and others 
from as far away as Burnt Forest. 
 
The District Medical Officer for Nandi North, Dr. Shadrack Keimi, testified that 




North, while the sub- district hospital is in Chepcherut. Although there were no 
fatalities there, the district as a whole recorded seven casualties. He also testified 
that 35 of his health care workers in various facilities in the District were 
threatened, with some having had their property destroyed and becoming IDPs, 
while another had to leave for “tribal reasons” resulting in the closure of the 
Kaptenyaloi Dispensary. The District Hospital received 228 patients: 151 with 
wounds from cuts (over half of which were women), 60 from blunt objects, 9 with 
fractures, and 2 from gunshots, as well as well as some with other injuries. The 
Mosoriot health center in the northern part of Nandi North, bordering Uasin 
Gishu, received 120 victims of post election violence. 103 had cut wounds with 
over half also suffering from blunt object injuries, and seven from gunshots,  
while the Kapkangani center bordering Nandi North and Western Province saw  
23 patients , 22 of whom had cut wounds as well as one from an arrow shot.18 
The District Medical Officer from Trans Nzoia District, Dr. Philomen Too, witness 
no. 64, is based in the Kitale Hospital which covers both the eastern and western 
parts of the District. In Trans Nzoia West the most severely affected areas were 
in Gituamba, Timbora Location in Saboti Division and Waumini near Kitale 
town, while in Trans Nzoia East, Geta Farm Salama, Kalaa area, and Makutano 
were the hardest hit. Five hundred and eight patients received treatment at the 
Kitale District Hospital from injuries stemming from post-election violence, 
including 119 gender based cases from rape or defilement, while the police 
recovered 105 bodies, not all of which were retrieved from the conflict areas. The 
injuries received included 137 from sharp or pointed objects, 329 due to blunt 
objects, 36 from burns, and 9 from gunshots. One hundred and five patients 
died, including 17 from gunshot wounds. The dislocation from the violence was 
so extensive that 5 IDP camps were set up in Trans Nzoia West and 4 in Trans 
Nzoia East.  
 
Both DCs for Trans Nzoia West and East, Francis Mutie and Seif Matata said the 






violence in Endebbes, which was involved in the ethnic clashes in 1992 and 
1997, stemmed from a spillover from the conflict in Mount Elgon and 
consequent attacks by SDLF militia. 
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration 
In accordance with our Terms of Reference, one of the main areas of our inquiry 
was to find out whether and to what extent the local administration and police 
were prepared for the violence that erupted, and how they ultimately responded 
to it. We shall now discuss the evidence presented before us in this area, which 
indicates that the police and the local administration were caught totally 
unprepared by the violence. We shall examine the police response in light of the 
availability of intelligence information indicating the high likelihood of violence. 
We shall conclude this section by discussing whether violence in North Rift was 
planned or spontaneous with no prior planning, as was the testimony of local 
administration officials. 
 
The Provincial Administration and Security Forces 
This issue is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Report. We shall limit 
ourselves to aspects particular to acts and omissions attributed to the police and 
the administration in the North Rift. 
 
According to Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu’s District Commissioner and the 
OCPD of Keiyo Division (previously OCPD of Eldoret Division) Angelus Karuru’s 
testimonies before us, the DSIC was prepared for the possibility of pre-election 
violence, including the likelihood of some celebratory violence after the election 
in Uasin Gishu. However, they did not anticipate widespread post-election 
violence, had not developed contingency plans for it, and had not beefed up their 
existing force of 600 police officers.19 Their testimony to the Commission was 







were forced to call in reinforcements from Baringo, West Pokot and Nairobi for 
contingents of GSU, the Anti-Stock Unit, the Administrative Police (AP), and 
some military personnel.  
 
A resident of Langas estate in Eldoret told Commission investigators that the 
police there were generally ineffective and unable to control roving gangs which 
surrounded the estate until the Police Commissioner arrived by helicopter with 
GSU reinforcements.20 That view has the support of a local religious leader who 
asserted that the security forces were powerless against the violence and 
furthermore there were ethnic divisions amongst them.21 Once reinforced, the 
district used its forces to unblock the main arteries and to disperse the gangs of 
young Kalenjin attackers in town and elsewhere. In conjunction with the DC’s 
office they also assisted victims by bringing them to IDP camps which initially 
were established in the area at the ASK Showground in Eldoret, at 8 camps in 
the Mau Forest, and in Mathare. Later they took the initiative to move them out 
of hostile rural areas when they received intelligence that Kalenjin warriors were 
planning to attack and evict IDPs from the camps themselves.  
 
The Commission was given evidence that the police were obviously overwhelmed 
by criminal gangs who proceeded in large numbers and appeared to plan their 
attacks. Roadblocks were manned and security forces and health care providers 
denied free movement. This hampered the police ability to rescue distressed 
victims of the attacks. The first time district officials heard of plans by Kalenjin 
youth to attack the Kiambaa farm, for instance, was during a DSIC meeting on 
31 December 2007. According to the OCPD, his office immediately dispatched 
officers to the area. However, because the access road was heavily blocked with 
rocks and old tractors at the turnoff to Kiambaa on the Nakuru Eldoret Road, 
they could not proceed. By the time they arrived the church at Kiambaa had 







In some cases, police on rescue missions faced not just road blocks but also 
attacks by hostile gangs of Kalenjin youths. The Commission heard about an 
incident in which five policemen in a land rover on a mission to assist an old 
Kikuyu man at Soi, encountered heavy road blocks from Huruma to Turbo and 
from Huruma up to Kitale. They were repelled by gangs of youth armed with 
bows and arrows, and had to return later to rescue him. A similar situation 
ensued at Mailu Nne on 31 December 2007. In still other cases, the police 
themselves were overwhelmed, attacked, and even killed. 
 
Beyond this the police took two pre-emptive measures which may have helped to 
minimize the violence. First, the OPCD for Uasin Gishu, Angelus Karuru, asked 
all five petrol stations in town to stop selling small amounts of petrol to 
individuals as opposed to legitimate motorists. He was acting on intelligence that 
petrol might have been used to set Kikuyu and Kisii houses on fire. Second, 
upon receiving intelligence of possible attacks on IDP camps that had been set 
up in areas where there had been violence, also mentioned in NSIS’s intelligence 
reports, he immediately deployed forces and vehicles to have them moved to 
safety in town as did some officials in the provincial administration in other 
parts of the North Rift. As witness number 86 from Chegaiya sub location who 
had lost all his family members and who testified before the Commission noted: 
“We remained in the Administration Police camp for four days.  
The attackers continued to attack us even in the camp. The Kalenjin 
officers in the camp joined their kinsmen in the attacks and the 
Kikuyu Administration Police officer had to take rifles from them.”  
 
On the other hand, there were numerous reports of the police and other security 
forces being heavy handed and even worse. During the violence they chased a 
group of demonstrators near the Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret and in the 
process lobbed both tear gas and fired bullets into the hospital. The D.C. for 
Uasin Gishu testifying before the Commission denied that this had happened 
saying that the tear gas must have been a by-product of what was used outside 




Commission that the police tried to enter the Hospital by force. Cross 
examination revealed that both canisters and bullet casings were found inside 
the Hospital, the OPCD admitting in his testimony that it was possible that in 
fact tear gas and bullets were fired into the hospital. 
  
The Commission also received evidence of numerous other instances of police 
brutality. Witnesses spoke under oath of horrifying tales of police brutality and 
indifference. This included police standing by, doing nothing and not coming to 
the assistance of individuals and communities under attack, joining in the 
attacks, including raping already vulnerable victims, and taunting Kikuyu 
victims with one of Kibaki’s campaign slogans, “kazi iendelee” (let the work 
continue) as they stood by watching helpless victims being attacked. In other 
cases there were reports of victims under attack seeking police help and being 
turned away. Among many cases, the Commission was able to determine that a 
senior police officer in Eldoret was responsible for personally shooting a number 
of individuals. The Commission visited one such victim at a hospital where he 
had been admitted with wounds sustained from gun fire. Similar allegations 
were made in the evidence produced by the KNCHR.  
 
The Commission was told that some chiefs either passively or actively 
collaborated with the attackers. At least thirteen of them were later interdicted 
after reports against them were made. In his sworn testimony, the District 
Commissioner of Uasin Gishu, Bernard Kinyua, admitted to having “received 
some information that the chiefs were not helpful” and “were not there for the 
people”, although he claimed that he had no information that chiefs were 
involved in the violence, nor were any names given in the intelligence reports he 
received.22 
 
However, evidence received by the Commission tells disturbing stories of chiefs 






part in the commission of violent acts. A Kikuyu pastor from Burnt Forest had 
this to say: 
“The young Kalenjin men started attacking and shouting that non-
Kalenjin had to go. We tried telephoning the OCS Burnt Forest station 
and the Chief countless times. Nothing happened. Kikuyu young men 
started trying to defend themselves. There was no response. The 
Chief arrived with his two police officers who were both Kalenjin. The 
AP officers started pushing the Kikuyu men back as the Kalenjin men 
burnt houses behind them. Everyone was pushed to the centre of the 
Kikuyu farm”.23  
 
Moreover, a resident of Kiambaa who testified to the Commission in private 
submitted as an exhibit a memorandum from “residents of Uasin Gishu”, 
identifying by name eight chiefs from “one ethnic group”, whom they claim had 
fuelled tribal clashes in 1992 and 1997, who had been threatening “people from 
other communities with eviction during the referendum in 2005”, and were 
“frustrating” the return of those who were evicted from Burnt Forest and 
Ainabkoi.  
 
In short, while not denying many instances where police mobilized quickly to 
assist victims to quell the violence or where they were overwhelmed, the 
Commission also has evidence that in some other cases victims of post election 
violence found the very people they thought would help and defend them as they 
were under attack participating in the violence themselves or indifferent to their 
plight. 
 
Under these circumstances, it is not so surprising that many victims of post 
election violence chose not to make reports to the police. This in itself was 
another part of the tragic breakdown of law and order and indicative of the lack 






of the provincial administration. It is also a pattern that supports previous 
findings from the Akiwumi Report. 
 
Intelligence Concerning Post-Election Violence and Its Use 
 
The National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the Provincial Security and 
Intelligence Committee (PSIC), and the District Security and Intelligence 
Committee (DSIC) each contributed intelligence information concerning security 
in Kenya before, during, and after the election. Before the election, the NSIS 
correctly analyzed the forces at work in the country and said that in the case of 
either a Kibaki or Odinga loss there was a strong possibility of post election 
violence, the worst case scenario being if the ODM candidate lost.24 Some of the 
pre-election intelligence received by the Commission from the three agencies 
predicted the post-election violence which engulfed the North Rift, particularly in 
Uasin Gishu District. 
 
The NSIS’s Situation and Hot Spot analysis from June 2007 until February 
2008, given to the Commission,25 mostly concentrates on traditional conflict 
areas such as Trans Nzoia, Molo, and other parts of the Rift and on gangs such 
as Mungiki operating there and elsewhere. As early as three months before the 
elections, the NSIS warned in its Situation Report of 25 September 2007, that “in 
parts of Uasin Gishu, tension is brewing between the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu and 
the Kisii following the Mugirango skirmishes with some Kalenjin tribesmen 
terming the two communities their political enemies and threatening to evict 
them. It added however with some premonition that “violence could engulf 
different parts of the country if cases of incitement are not legally addressed as 








In its “Hot Spot/Flash Point” Report of 19 October 2007, the NSIS noted that the 
debate around Majimbo was already being used by some politicians in Nairobi, 
Rift Valley and Coast provinces scheming and organizing local youth to attack 
perceived outsiders in order to disenfranchise them and finally have the incident 
blamed on Majimbo campaigns. NSIS added that “generally, the debate has 
elicited a strong anti-Kikuyu sentiment due to the fact that the community is 
also robustly opposed to the system.” The same briefing under the heading “Use 
of Criminal Gangs” noted that as the campaigns intensify, the possibility of 
various leaders/politicians resorting to reactivation and use of such gangs was 
likely in Nairobi, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Gusiiland, Kuria and parts 
of Central Province. 
 
On 23 November 2007, NSIS noted that in Uasin Gishu District, “tension is 
looming between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu within Timboroa Area following the 
arrest of two members of the Kikuyu community for circulating anti ODM 
leaflets.” And on 7 December 2007, NSIS warned that in Nandi North, the Nandi 
and Luhya could clash at Os-Rongai area in Turbo Division where Nandi 
tribesmen torched houses belonging to Luhya to avenge the killing of a Nandi 
over alleged theft of property. 
 
It is unclear from what the Commission has received and from its examination of 
the intelligence reports from Uasin Gishu District whether the NSIS’s analysis, 
and in particular its two case scenario was communicated downward to the 
provinces and the districts or not, and why if the violence was planned and 
organized, the NSIS either did not have this information or did not transmit it to 
the field. Both the D.C. and the OCPD for Uasin Gishu testified to the 
Commission that they did not receive any information about NSIS’s two 
scenarios or potential problems if ODM did not win. 
 
However, the NSIS Uasin Gishu District Co-ordinator who testified in camera 
passed on some intelligence information to the DSIC about the possibility of pre-




generated a security brief on 29 December 2007 which went to the DSIC stating 
that “tension was high within Uasin Gishu district and that there was a 
likelihood of violence targeting the Kikuyu community in a number of specifically 
designated spots in the following divisions: Soy, Kesses, Turbo, Kapsaret, Eldoret 
Town, and Ainabkoi.”26 
 
Nevertheless, most officials from the North Rift, including the D.C. for Uasin 
Gishu who chaired the above 29 December DSIC meeting as well as the OCPD 
for Eldoret, and other officials testifying before the Commission said they did not 
anticipate post-election violence. The Commission finds it surprising that 
provincial administration officials would not anticipate some level of post-
election violence while they were are that the pre-election period had been 
extremely tense, filled with incendiary language, hate speech, innuendoes 
concerning majimboism and the possibility of evicting outsiders, pamphlets 
threatening war, and scattered references to politicians encouraging their 
supporters to “violate the law.” 
 
Having survived the 2005 referendum on the constitution without incident and 
having completed what turned out to be a peaceful December 2007 election, 
including the announcement of the parliamentary results on 27 and 28 
December, officials did not think there would be serious problems after the 
election, leave alone anticipate the debacle that engulfed the country. As 
Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu District Commissioner noted, he had been 
extremely vigilant and had intensified patrols before the election in areas that 
had experienced pre-election violence in the past such as Yamumbi, Turbo, and 
Burnt Forest, but he did not anticipate that violence could be on the scale on 
which it happened. He explained in his testimony to the Commission that 
previously nothing like this ever happened, adding that in the past, immediately 
after elections were over, people would settle down to [their] daily business, but 






thought he could handle any situation, adding, however, that in this case it was 
“enormous”, “nothing like what we expected,” and “spontaneous.”  
 
Nevertheless, he admitted that because of the utterances of some politicians, he 
was aware that there was an expectation of an ODM win and that there might be 
a refusal to accept anything else. However, he said he did not receive any 
information from the NSIS or other agencies of unprecedented upheavals if ODM 
did not win. This partly contradicts the intelligence information said to have 
been relayed to the DSIC on 29 December 2007. 
 
Notwithstanding this reality and similar sentiments conveyed from other officials 
both in Uasin Gishu District and in other parts of the North Rift there were 
reports of violence in the run up to the election indicative of heightened tensions, 
as well as isolated attacks on businesses and burning of houses on farms even 
before the ECK announced the presidential results on 30 December. This 
included three houses allegedly having been burned in Lelmorok farm in Kesses 
on 29 December, an incident about which the OCPD said he was not aware, but 
which a resident who had been evicted four times previously, confirmed when he 
testified to the Commission in camera, also naming some of those he alleged to 
be the attackers.27  
 
Furthermore, a former resident of Outspan Estate in Eldoret, said that the chaos 
there began as early as 27th December, causing her to take refuge in a church 
during the evening. In her statement to the Commission she said that “Kalenjins 
started burning houses belonging to the Kikuyus on 28 December.” On 29 
December, while checking on her property, she was then accosted and raped by 
three men.28 Evidence submitted to the Commission by KNHCR also maintained 
that some Kikuyu buried their possessions before the election in anticipation of 








Kikuyus had already left  the area between 27th and  29th  December to ensure 
their safety. In addition, the D.C. of Uasin Gishu and the OCPD of Eldoret 
Division noted that some public service vehicles stopped coming to town as early 
as 24th  December because of allegations that they were ferrying marked ballots. 
There were also widespread allegations of rigging.  
 
In spite of these incidents, it is not apparent that either administrative officials 
or police refined their intelligence as a result, nor apparently was there any 
sense of the unexpected impending disaster to follow. Furthermore, a witness 
from Nandi Hills told the Commission that “[t]here were already tyres being 
burned on the road from Nandi Hills to Kisumu” as of 26th December.30  
 
Angelus Karuru, OPCD for Eldoret Division during the election told the 
Commission there were four incidents before the election which he had 
effectively contained, something that gave him confidence about handling 
whatever might come up during and after the election. There was a shooting 
incident on 17th November 2007 at Cheptiret Secondary School during the 
ODM’s parliamentary and civic nominations when 200 of the party’s supporters 
blocked the highway to the tallying centre, using logs, big stones, and their own 
motor vehicles. The second was at Ziwa Sirikwa Trading Center on 27th  
November 2007 when 100 ODM youth disrupted a PNU political rally. The third 
was on 26th  December 2007 when local politicians and foreign press stormed 
the divisional headquarters to inspect a Molo Line Company minibus which was 
alleged falsely, it turned out, to have brought administration police and ballot 
boxes to be used to rig the election. Finally, on the same day in the early evening 
at Keiyo Petrol Station, youths burned a pickup truck transferring ballots from 
Keiyo Division to Kaptubei polling center, but the police moved in swiftly to 






arrested, a point that was criticized under cross examination as having 
contributed to a culture of impunity.31 
 
Apart from the lack of anticipation of what might follow, the testimony by the 
D.C. for Uasin Gishu and the OCPD for Eldoret suggests that neither followed up 
on local intelligence and information they knew about. Had they taken the 
initiative to do so, they might have pre-empted some of the post-election violence 
which was experienced. It is not clear to the Commission if this was because of 
the lack of capacity or the result of not wanting to tread on the toes of powerful 
political personalities in the district for fear of retribution, something which had 
been noted in the Akiwumi Report.  
 
Neither the provincial administration nor the police investigated claims of 
incitement by politicians or media stations. They claimed they did not know the 
names of the two prominent athletes who were killed during the post election 
violence. They appeared unwilling to discuss the ethnicity of their staff. They 
said they did not know or follow up on reports concerning politicians engaged in 
hostile acts or speech. They claimed they did not have any information on any 
chiefs or police as having been involved in the violence. They did not look into 
the source of hostile leaflets being distributed. They said they did not have 
reports about which politicians were using the terms “madoadoa” and 
“makwekwe” even though they had “heard about this generally”. They had no 
information that youths were being trained to engage in violence. 
 
In contrast, a witness told the Commission that the following “threatening 
terms” were routinely used against Kikuyu: madoadoa (spots), maharagwe 
(bean), bunyot (enemy), sangara (wild grass) with the additional notation that 
they should be “uprooted”.32 
When asked if he had followed up on some specific information the OCPD said 







general information as opposed to formal reports. The OCPD said that he “could 
not rule out that the violence was planned,” but did not have any information to 
this effect. Concerning incitement and hate speech he told the Commission that 
he did not investigate “rumours” and that “you only investigate what has been 
reported”, noting that “no one came forward to report and say ABCD said XYZ”. 
When asked what he did about allegations that some athletes participated in the 
post election violence, he said he had heard about it but “no one said so and so 
was doing ABCD”, a phrase that was repeated several times following questions 
directed at him when he testified to the Commission. He also did not formally 
investigate the incident where the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital was 
invaded and tear gassed by police, an incident confirmed to the Commission by 
Jonathon K. Barno, head of the Security Department of the Hospital and Julius 
K. Chelimo, the Security Supervisor at the hospital, who had tried to dissuade 
the GSU officer in charge and who described the behavior of police officers at the 
hospital as “merciless.” 
 
This attitude of the OCPD is particularly troubling, but may not be so unusual 
given the testimony of a senior provincial security officer that investigating the 
post-election violence was extremely difficult given that witnesses were very 
reluctant to come forward to give evidence for fear of reprisals,33 something also 
reiterated by a resident of Nandi Hills.34  
 
It is also possible that officials themselves did not want to delve too deeply into 
matters that might come with the names of prominent, given that, as an Eldoret 
resident noted: “[I]n the skirmishes in [the] Rift Valley no leaders from the area 
condemned the violence”. As a Kikuyu from Lerumoruk farm in Nandi Hills 
explained in trying to get the Commission to understand why even the multi-
ethnic composition of the district administration was not a source of comfort to 







“the DO is just two kilometres from the farm but anything can be said, 
anything can be done with or without him there. We have very 
powerful people in this District. The politicians here [in Uasin Gishu 
District] decide what is to be done. It doesn’t matter what you say…”. 
 
Furthermore, according to the provincial criminal investigation officer (PCIO), 
even people like him have difficulty dealing with the “big fish”. As he noted in 
testimony to the Commission:  
“My Lord…when you arrest the so-called politicians, people don’t look 
into the crime. They say the police have arrested one of our own. We 
arrested some councillors in Buret and the council was so rowdy. 
They stormed the whole Buret Police Station so much so that we were 
compelled to release those councillors.”35 
 
In the Commission’s view the lack of robust action by the administration officers 
and the police to pre-empt the possibility of post-election violence can be put 
down to several factors: complacency after peaceful polling given past history of 
pre- rather than post-election violence; fatigue because so many officials from 
both the provincial administration had been up for days either manning polls or 
counting votes; lack of communication from the NSIS to the field; an 
unwillingness to act on the of intelligence received, admittedly belatedly, by the 
DSIC on 29th December; and a “play it safe” attitude on the part of district 
officials who did not want to rock the boat, particularly given the tendency of 
powerful politicians to call the shots at the local level and exact retribution, 











Was the violence planned or spontaneous? 
 
The question whether violence in North Rift was planned or spontaneous has as 
many answers as there are respondents depending on the respondent’s ethnic or 
political inclinations. There was also the view of the provincial administration, 
that the post election violence in Uasin Gishu, indeed in the North Rift in 
general, was spontaneous, was not planned. Thus the Commission heard 
testimony in favour of both the view that the violence was planned and organized  
as well as the view that it was spontaneous. 
 
Those who hold the view that the violence was planned believe that it was a 
contingency plan on the part of ODM politicians and supporters should the 
election results go in favour of the PNU.  
 
Those holding the view that the violence was planned and organized cite four 
factors in support of their view: (i) testimony that information had spread within 
communities prior to the violence that the Kalenjin would attempt attacks; (ii) 
the testimony of witnesses who say they attended meetings or knew of 
individuals who were organizing violence both before and after the 
announcement of the presidential results; (iii) information from NSIS intelligence 
reports which have named key individuals and politicians as having been 
involved; and (iv) circumstantial evidence pointing in the same direction.  We 
shall now examine these four sources in light of evidence we received.  
 
Advance Warning of Violence Conveyed to Communities 
 
The Commission heard numerous testimonies indicating that advance warnings 
were given to people in anticipation of the violence.  In most cases, advance 
warnings are said to have been given to members of the Kikuyu community by 
their Kalenjin friends, tenants, business partners, or relatives in inter-ethnic 
marriages. In other cases, Kalenjin elders or church leaders who disapproved of 




neighbors, congregation colleagues and friends. Statements collected by the 
Commission investigators are illustrative of some of the warnings have been 
given to individuals in advance of 30th  December, including the following: 
-“I wish to state that after the general election, I received information 
from Kalenjin friends that there were some Kalenjin people who were 
holding a meeting and preparing to burn my business. On 29 
December 2007, I was warned to be careful by my tenants. Another 
friend of mine called me on the phone and he informed me that there 
were some people who had been sent with petrol to come and burn 
the building down.” (Businessman from Tambach Trading Center in 
Keiyo North interviewed by CIPEV investigators). 
 
“On December 29th, I received a telephone call from the wife of the 
Pastor at the AIC Church and she told me that young Kalenjin were 
planning to attack the Kamuyu farm. On December 30, 2008 
immediately after the announcement of the election result, homes 
began burning around Kamuyu. The young Kalenjin men started 
attacking and shouting that non-Kalenjin had to go. It all happened at 
the same time in all the areas in Kamuyu”. (Pastor from Burnt Forest 
interviewed by CIPEV investigators). 
 
“A few days (before) the election KASS FM announced that there 
would be rigging and in some of their open forums they encouraged 
people to use the radio to incite people who gave their views. Most 
people used the radio to say that whether PNU or ODM [won], Kikuyu 
would be expelled from Rift Valley. So there was very high tension.” 
(NARC activist from Kapseret Location, Uasin Gishu District, 
interviewed by CIPEV investigators). 
 
Furthermore, a resident of Eldoret town who testified in camera to the 
Commission in Nairobi noted that “[f]rom 27 December all my friends from the 




never happened. On the eve of [the] announcement of Presidential Election 
Results, the killings had already begun in such outlying areas such as Moiben”. 
 
Incitement to and the Organization of Violence 
The Commission heard from a number of witnesses who claimed to have first 
hand information concerning the incitement to and the organization of the 
violence in North Rift. Some of the witnesses were Kalenjin and had participated 
in meetings they claimed were called with the view to organize the violence. 
Others were insiders with information on planning of the attacks. Many were 
Kalenjins who said they were threatened themselves or even attacked for not 
joining or opposing the attacks on Kikuyu. Yet others were Kalenjins working as 
campaign organizers for PNU and thus perceived as traitors to the cause of the 
Kalenjin community. The Commission also heard from witnesses inferring 
evidence of planning or organization from their own observation or personal 
experience of the post-election violence. 
 
A resident of Eldoret town36 maintained that the attacks on residents of the 
outlying residential areas of Eldoret such as Ilula, Chepkoilel, Munyaka, 
Kiambaa, Kambi ya Mumbi, and Turbo were part of “a coordinated attack”. In 
defense of this view he notes that the road blocks were erected by young people 
under the command of some senior and older people. He said that road blocks 
were erected within five minutes of the announcement of the presidential 
election results, making it impossible for his family and others to flee to safer 
places like police stations and the Catholic Church. On the basis of his own 
observations, he felt there had to be “lots of serious coordination and logistics 
put in place for the warriors to approach Eldoret town from all directions at the 
same time”, noting that in his area he observed over 5,000 in one go and that 
they smeared themselves with the blood of the victims they had killed. He said 
that friends who were under attack and called him from other areas observed 






Kaptarakwa, Kesses, Nandi Hills, Kapsabet and Turbo, wondering to himself how 
they could have “travelled … hundreds of miles in five minutes”. He also thought 
that the majority of those involved were from the “Kimnyengei age group” who 
had been part of a massive oathing ceremony in August 2007 which took place 
secretly in Kipkulei forest. This however had been disputed earlier by 
representatives of the Kalenjin Community, including an EMO official, Bill Ruto, 
and a Kalenjin elder, John Kiplagat Arap Koech, both of whom insisted this was 
nothing more than a normal circumcision ceremony. This view was disputed by 
the witness who claimed to have been told by some of his friends who refused to 
take the oath that its purpose was to “conduct a cleanup operation” to “evict 
foreign communities within their areas”.  
 
Another witness, a Kalenjin resident of Nandi North and grassroots community 
activist,37 testified before the Commission and said that the violence was not 
spontaneous, a view which contrasted with the views of most government 
officials interviewed by the Commission. He felt the violence was both well 
coordinated and the actions well organized. He submitted videos of a campaign 
rally on 5 December 2007 to the Commission to illustrate what he described as a 
“systematic and deliberate effort by both the politicians and the media to whip 
emotions both before the election and after[wards]”, also citing KASS FM as a 
perpetrator. He also maintained that the incitement by politicians against the 
Kikuyu explained the intensity of the post-election violence. He argued that the 
politicians had prepared the masses to retaliate if elections did not go their way, 
mentioning by name two sitting MPs, former and sitting councillors and political 
activists. He also noted that as a result of these individuals’ behavior, it was “not 
surprising… that the explosions in the Rift Valley and particular within the 
Kalenjin Community happened almost concurrently and in the same manner’. 
He claimed that “[t]hese activities were coordinated using cell phones, matatu 








Another witness, a Kalenjin resident of Soy Division in Eldoret North Division in 
Uasin Gishu38 told the Commission that even prior to the election there was a 
concerted campaign to evict the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley starting as early as 
1st December 2007. He mentioned a meeting held on 1st December in Eldoret led 
by a lawyer, which strategized on how to deal with the Kikuyu; a meeting held by 
a prominent politician whose name he mentioned on 3rd August 2007 describing 
anyone who voted for PNU as mad; and the destruction of eight houses belonging 
to PNU supporters which were burnt after he had visited the area on 17th 
December 2007. He also claimed that on 23rd December a meeting between some 
athletes and a prominent politician, whose name he mentioned was held “to 
prepare the youth for war” once they knew President Kibaki was winning. He 
said that after this meeting an elder informed them he was going to get guns 
from a friend in Mt. Elgon and that a retired policeman would assist with using 
the guns and that somebody from Marakwet district was sent to purchase bows 
and arrows from there. He also alleged that on 28th December 2007 after the 
election an elder who was a point man for a prominent politician “…went around 
Eldoret North with some athletes and other prominent people calling on youths 
telling them to be ready for war, promising them support from the M.P…” The 
witness also testified that on 27th January 2008, the MP held closed door 
meetings at his house, promising to go on with the violence, after which the road 
to Eldoret town was blocked and the violence went on. He said he was willing to 
mention the names of persons he was referring to and information concerning 
the vehicles that were used to transport the youth. 
 
Furthermore, in a statement taken by Commission investigators, a businessman 
at the Tambach Trading Center in Keiyo North alleged that two individuals, 
whom he named, funded the violence in this area. Another witness interviewed 
by CIPEV’s investigators claimed that “militias were ferried in lorries owned by a 






some councillors who spread propaganda that the church held Mungiki 
adherents from Central Province who were ready to attack the local Nandi 
community.  
 
Information Contained in NSIS Intelligence Reports 
An NSIS official gave a statement to the Commission and also submitted several 
NSIS “Security Briefs” which also had been received by the DSIC at the time.39 
As early as 30 October 2007, there was a brief to the effect that a week earlier a 
former Member for Parliament for Eldoret South, whose constituents were 
threatening to unseat him, toured the Kesses area and told them they should get 
rid of “madoadoa”. It was the assessment of the NSIS that the former MP likely to 
use the Taliban thugs to intimidate his opponents during the campaign. Further, 
on 29 December 2007, the NSIS identified the areas likely to be affected by post-
election violence in Uasin Gishu District if Kibaki was declared the winner. 
 
On 2nd January 2008 the NSIS said that the violence threatened to degenerate 
into anarchy. From then through February they had intelligence concerning the 
presence of gangs of Kalenjin and Nandi youth planning to attack Kikuyus and 
Kisiis seeking refuge in Uasin Gishu District and of youth planning to burn 
houses in Eldoret town belonging to ex MPs and others. They also noted early in 
January that some ODM supporters intended to raid the Ngano factory in 
Eldoret to steal munitions and were planning to seek the assistance of military 
personnel guarding the factory who were sympathetic to ODM. Later on 4 
January they identified an employee of the bullet factory in Eldoret as the leader 
of youth groups involved in the violence there, further claiming that they shared 
a password to be used to mobilize them for attack. On 8 January 2008, the NSIS 
situation report identified an employee of the Eldoret Bullet Factory as a trainer 
of the youth in the handling of firearms, use of grenades, and the destruction of 
buildings, naming some of the training sites as being in the Sigowet Forest and 






Kalenjin youth in Eldoret on 2nd January 2008 to attack Kikuyu at the Kipkaren 
area in Eldoret town.  
 
In a report of 8th January 2008, the NISIS said that “some senior Kalenjin 
personalities were reported to be funding ODM activists to organize youth for 
violence”. The NSIS say further that on 11th January, they received information 
that prominent unnamed businessmen and professionals were financing the 
acquisition of firearms and that Kalenjin youth from some divisions in Nandi 
North District and that they had already had acquired some from Mt. Elgon and 
Marakwet Districts which they planned to use to evict Kikuyu from the Rift 
Valley. NSIS Situation Reports of 25 January maintain that “Kalenjin warriors” 
were reportedly being trained on how to handle firearms within the Segoit area in 
Moiben Divisions of Uasin Gishu District. The warriors were allegedly going to be 
used to prevent internally displaced individuals from returning to their farms 
and to raise funds to purchase land at “throwaway prices.” The NSIS reports 
throughout January also warned of Kalenjin youth from Sima Division in Nandi 
North regrouping to attack IDPs in Eldoret, in Burnt Forest, and elsewhere.  
 
In addition to the above, the NSIS’s report of 8 February 2008, contained in 
exhibit no. 19A to the Commission stated that certain unnamed Kalenjin 
tribesmen were cautioning members of the community against disclosing or 
volunteering information on the post election political violence to any group 
investigating the clashes.40 
 
It can be argued that these NSIS reports point to the possibility that the post 
election violence was concerted and a product of organization and planning, 
although this does not preclude the possibility that some of the violence was 









Most reports from witnesses and others describe large groups of Kalenjin youth 
blocking roads with felled trees, large boulders, tractors, and the use of petrol to 
burn dwellings and farms in numerous non-contiguous areas. For this to have 
occurred, the invaders needed to have cut down trees, moved heavy rocks, and 
obtained petrol, all factors which can be argued to point to some level of 
organization and planning. The extent of this depends in part on the amount of 
petrol used, where and how it was obtained, whether or not chainsaws were 
necessary to fell trees, and what sort of equipment was used to move boulders to 
create barricades in various parts of the North Rift. 
In some other cases, reports describe what appear to have been simultaneously 
coordinated attacks from different points and the need for transport to have 
brought attackers from miles away to gathering points. Although the Kalenjin 
youth engaging in these acts had a good deal of history to draw on given the 
violence of the 1990s, the accounts of the violence do not suggest a breakdown 
of law and order arising solely from spontaneous rioting.  
 
Was the violence spontaneous? 
A number of government officials testifying to the Commission described the 
violence as spontaneous. A senior provincial government security officer who 
testified in camera, told the Commission that “[t]his was not organized crime…[i]t 
was a spontaneous reaction”. In response to suggestions that officials were 
reluctant to investigate “the big guys” the same officer said they had followed up, 
but found there was no concrete evidence. He nevertheless added that “recently 
we got information …and my officers opened up investigations” into three major 
political figures whom witnesses named as having been involved in the 
organization and training of youth.41 
 
Another senior police officer, the former Rift Valley PPO Everett Wasike, after 






pattern of attacks there must have been organized support for attackers in form 
of transportation, provision of food, etc. Evidence of such organization and 
support appeared clear to him when he explained that “[…]of course to run from 
one District to another burning and looting, there [must be] supervisors,” and it 
would be difficult to go around “burning houses, killing people without eating 
something, without the support…” He also told us about a meeting at the Nairobi 
police headquarters in which politicians and other Kalenjin leaders were called 
and told “we have information that you people are inciting your members against 
other people.”42 The witness did not tell us whether there was any response from 
the politicians. 
 
Some of those who hold the view that the violence was spontaneous have sought 
to explain its scale on the basis of what can be described as Kalenjin cultural 
disposition towards war. In testimonies presented to the Commission, a number 
of Kalenjin witnesses and experts used the idea of the so-called Kalenjin culture 
to argue the violence could attain the level of magnitude it did in North Rift and 
still be spontaneous; not planned or organized. Variances of the “Kalenjin 
culture” theory aimed to explaining some cultural predilection of Kalenjins to 
engage in warfare were offered by a former Rift Valley PPO when, answering the 
question whether violence in North Rift was spontaneous or planned. He told the 
Commission that the violence was probably spontaneous because “the Kalenjins 
require just a ... They don’t need to plan. You injure 
 
John Kiplangat Arap Koech, a Kalenjin from Tinderet, Nandi South District, who 
introduced himself as a “Cultural Practitioner and Land Dispute Tribunal elder” 
and “currently involved in carrying out research on the origin and customs of the 
Kalenjin”, also resorted to elements of the Kalenjin culture to explain the 
violence in North Rift. He emphatically stated that violence was spontaneous and 
strongly challenged and dismissed as “false and malicious…the notion that the 






nature of the Kalenjin set up and cultural inculcation, when violence develops 
into a situation akin to war then the entire community rises to defend itself.”43 
Bill Ruto, a writer by profession, said: “The Kalenjins just like many other 
pastoralist communities tend to be militarily organized and can respond to 
perceived threats in an organized manner. This rapid and organized reaction is 
what most people have confused for pre-planning of violence.” 
 
But the “Kalenjin culture” theory as an explanation for the violence in North Rift 
was strongly challenged by a number of Kalenjin lay members and community 
leaders. A Kalenjin religious leader dismissed the theory and instead accused 
political leaders who come up and use the ethnic background and the unity they 
found to instil violence, and suggested that to end the cycles of violence we have 
to break that. He added that “the same applies to the Maasai because they are 
all the Nilotic group. So it is the myths that can be changed but it is this unity 
the politicians are exploiting…”44  
 
In his testimony to the Commission, Hon. William Ruto also dismissed the 
Kalenjin culture theory, remarking “there is no DNA for people to fight.” Instead, 
he blamed the Kalenjin attacks on Kikuyu during the post-election violence on “a 
combination of factors”, including the history of violence since 1992 with 
“friction [having been] higher in Uasin Gishu than any other area” because of the 
cosmopolitan makeup of the district. He dismissed the land issue as a factor in 
the 2007 violence. He told the Commission, “The issue of the PEV is not land, let 
nobody cheat you. Kikuyus always sit on the land and the only problem is at the 
end of 5 years. It is all politics. Land is just an excuse.” He also noted that “our 
politics acquires ethnic dimensions” and communities support parties where 
“their leaders ae at the front and that is one thing we have to change.” He finally 
remarked that the 2007 election was very polarized and “the people in the Rift 
Valley believed that Kibaki oppressed them in the last 5 years. They voted more 







A Kalenjin businessman concurred with the religious leader, noting:  “The issue 
of Kalenjin warriors does not arise here. To me, those are Kalenjin young men 
who idle around and anyone can take advantage of them to be warriors. The 
word “warriors” in the Kalenjin tradition is a respectable term. But nowadays 
there are no warriors. They have just classified these young men as warriors. 
They are not warriors.” He also added, “People hide behind culture….This [the 
post election violence] is nothing to do with culture,” insisting as well that “land 
wasn’t an issue either”, adding that it was just used to “cover what happened”.45 
As to the real cause of violence, a Kalenjin resident of Eldoret offered that “the 
violence was motivated by jealousy” against Kikuyu who had “succeeded in 
business” as opposed to Luhya and Gusii who also owned land, with the post-




In 2007, in contrast to the 1990s the bulk of the violence in the North Rift 
followed rather than preceded the elections. Explanations offered for the timing 
and scale of the 2007 post-election violence include: general spontaneous anger 
by ODM’s Kalenjin candidates and voters at the announcement of a Kibaki win 
amidst allegations of rigging; land hunger and a desire to evict so-called 
outsiders whatever the outcome of the elections; and a desire by Kalenjin ODM 
candidates to overturn the presidential election and assume power. 
 
It is our finding that violence in North Rift caught the police and local 
administration officials totally unprepared. We found this particularly disturbing 
given the fact that intelligence was made (or should have been made) available to 
local administration and police indicating the high likelihood of violence in either 







As a consequence, police reaction to the violence was chaotic, to say the least. 
Some police officers joined the attackers and participated in the violence. Others 
were able to display acts of personal courage that saved lives. In many cases the 
default line was ethnic, along which the police force was divided. In general, 
though, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of attackers and 






Central Rift Region 
Central Rift Valley is to a large extent dominated by the larger Nakuru District 
whose Kikuyu majority raised a feeling of unease and suspicion among Kalenjin 
politicians following the end of the one party system in 1992. They felt that the 
position of Daniel Arap Moi as President was under threat by the Kikuyu who 
were at the forefront of the clamour for multi-party democracy.46 Thus in this 
period, the Central Rift experienced a pattern of clashes where the non Kalenjin 
and non-Maasai tribes were attacked, their houses set on fire and many killed 
with a view to driving them out of the region since they were perceived not to 
support the then ruling party KANU. Narok was one of the three places in the 
Rift Valley where the pro-one party  rallies were held in 1991 and the key 
message emanating from these political meetings was that violence would be 
used to resist multi party politics. A key architect of this school of thought was 
William Ole Ntimama, the MP for Narok North who stated that KANU leaders had 
resolved to fight together and follow President Moi in the clamour to end the 
debate for multi party politics by use of majimbo as the antidote against the re-
introduction of plural politics47.  
The larger Nakuru district due to its high Kikuyu population was the hardest hit 
by the tribal clashes that came to be associated with the region from 1991 to 
1998. Of note is that the larger Nakuru District was later split to create Molo, 
Naivasha, Rongai and Subukia Districts. 
For purposes of this Report, the Central Rift Valley covers the following districts; 
Narok, Molo, Koibatek, Nakuru, Rongai and Naivasha districts. While Nakuru, 
Molo and Naivasha Districts have a clear Kikuyu majority, Narok is 
predominantly Maasai, while Koibatek has a clear Kalenjin majority. In Rongai, 
the population between Kalenjin and Kikuyu is almost even with a slight margin 







informed by the fact that it has been a theatre of internecine ethnic conflict that 
first erupted in 1991 after the re-introduction of multi party politics. Further, it 
is a cosmopolitan and strategic region which has attracted heavy focus from 
different political parties seeking to hold sway.  Nakuru Town, a highly multi-
ethnic town is Kenya’s fourth largest town and the administrative capital of the 
entire Rift Valley Province.  
The politics of the region have been extremely competitive and volatile, no doubt 
informed by the fact that this zone having once formed part of the former white 
highlands saw different ethnic communities purchase land under various 
settlement schemes some of which were set up prior to Independence. As noted 
in the Akiwumi Report, “the different tribes in this area only tolerated each other 
as there were deep seated ethnic ambitions and prejudices which were activated 
by political events preceding the 1992 General Elections”. While political re-
alignments had shifted in 2007-the Kalenjin and Maasai expressing support this 
time round for the ODM and not KANU, nevertheless the patterns of violence in 
2007 closely echoed what had transpired previously with slight differences i.e. 
the use of criminal gangs suspected to be Mungiki by the Kikuyu in Nakuru and 
Naivasha ostensibly to protect the Kikuyu community and largely Kalenjin gangs 
in turn preparing to attack the Kikuyu in Nakuru, but this time without the tacit 
support of the state security machinery that had hitherto aided their cause in 
the 1990s. 
 
Molo District  
We received evidence on violence in Molo District during our hearings in Nakuru 
and Eldoret. We also made site visits to Njoro and Kuresoi and interacted with a 
number of officials from the local police, provincial administration and citizens. 
The visit provided a unique opportunity for the Commission to witness first hand 
some of the scenes affected by violence and hear additional explanation from eye 
witnesses. Commission investigators also recorded statements and depositions 
from displaced persons from Molo and Kuresoi and these accounts have been in 




also published reports by other entities including public bodies. The totality of 
such information pieces together the story of Molo and Kuresoi. 
 
Background: A History of Ethnic Conflict 
Molo District borders the Mau Forest which is one of Kenya's largest forest areas 
comprising about 36% of the total forest cover in the country. The region is 
situated along the Mau Escarpment and is one of the most fertile farmlands in 
the country famous for growing pyrethrum, potatoes and other agricultural 
crops due to its cool climate. 
The District, on the other hand, has also been a theatre of ethnic based conflict 
since the return of multi party politics in 1991. The Akiwumi Commission noted 
that in the then Nakuru District, Molo and Olenguruone Divisions (parts of the 
current Molo District) were the most affected by 1992-1993 clashes and that the 
Molo Division was among the few areas declared security operation zones under 
the Preservation of Public Security Act.48 The district has two constituencies- 
Kuresoi (with a Kalenjin majority, a sizeable number of Kikuyu and a Kisii 
minority) and Molo (with a largely Kikuyu majority and Kalenjin and Kisii 
minority). Both constituencies also host a number of other communities mainly 
the Ogiek (an indigenous hunter/gatherer community), Luhya and Luo 
communities. The Akiwumi reportfurther noted in its findings that this ethnic 
diversity had been a source of tension and ethnic conflict pitting the Kalenjin on 
the one hand and the Kikuyu and Kisii on the other. Evidence tendered by the 
KNCHR also notes that the area experienced ethnic violence in 1992 and 1997 
where the pattern of attacks was Kalenjin raiders attacking and killing members 
of the Kikuyu community and burning their houses and in turn the Kikuyu 
community organizing themselves to launch counter attacks in which they killed 







A witness testified that Kuresoi Constituency was carved out of the old Molo 
constituency in such a way that the majority of the people in Kuresoi were 
Kalenjin. The witness claimed that this was influenced by retired President 
Daniel Arap Moi to ensure that the Kalenjin in that constituency could get a 
representative in Parliament because a Kalenjin candidate could not win in the 
bigger Molo due to the large Kikuyu majority.49 
This history of ethnic tensions in Molo District was confirmed by the Rift Valley 
PC Hassan Noor Hassan who stated that since 1992, elections had been the 
excuse rather than the cause for the violence over land. Other witnesses 
however, provided a broader perspective of the reasons for ethnic infighting 
notably Gordon Ogolla Chairman of the Rift Valley Chapter of the Law Society 
who gave a number of causes; firstly that violence was not over land as such, 
but rather due to a feeling among the Kalenjin that during elections, the Kikuyu 
and other communities opted not to vote according to the wishes of the Kalenjin 
and instead followed the voting patterns of their kinsmen elsewhere which 
general feeling led to animosity between the communities and secondly in the 
areas of Nesuit, Mauche and some places around Njoro, the biggest problem 
appeared to be centered, not on politics, but on allocation of the Mau Forest in 
the 1990s to senior Government officials and well connected individuals which 
enraged the Ogiek community who consider the Western Mau Forest to be their 
ancestral home. 
During cross examination of Mr. Ogolla on the issue of the democratic rights of 
citizens to vote as they wished, he stated that the issue of voting patterns in the 
Rift Valley where there were mixed communities-Kikuyus, Kisiis, Luhyas, Luos 
and the Kalenjin-elicited feelings among Kalenjin that non-Kalenjin communities 
tended to follow the political trends from their ancestral areas of Nyanza, 
Western and Central Provinces which had antagonized the Kalenjin since the 
return of multi party politics hence a feeling that if non-Kalenjins wished to live 






together with them and not with the regions where they were deemed to have 
come from. He did however concede that while such a proposition was patently 
undemocratic, it nevertheless had the potential to realize inter- ethnic 
coexistence in the province. Not surprisingly, Mr. Ogolla was of the view that 
failure to heed the recommendations from the Akiwumi, Kiliku and Ndung’u 
Reports had contributed to the violence since the underlying grievances 
remained unresolved.  
 
The Pre-Election Violence 
The Commission established that before the 2007 Elections, Kuresoi and Molo 
constituencies were experiencing violence between the Kalenjin on one side and 
Kikuyu and Kisii on the other. The Commission was told that the problem in 
Molo District in general and Kuresoi in particular was perennial in nature having 
started in 1992 when the Kikuyu were forcibly evicted from Chepakundi in 
Olenguruone division. The witness claimed that this was viewed by the Kalenjin 
as a success because the Government resettled the displaced Kikuyu at Kapsita 
near Molo town. Thus, according to the witness, there was a feeling among the 
Kalenjin starting from the aftermath of the 2005 Referendum that the 
Olenguruone precedent should be replicated elsewhere in the District since 
Olenguruone was the only division that had managed to bring about the 
complete removal of madoadoas through violence and that if this was repeated 
elsewhere in the District, the Government would similarly resettle the displaced 
Kikuyu as had happened with those from Chepakundi. The witness was 
therefore of the view that the pre-election violence of 2007 had some connectivity 
in one way or another to the violence in 1992. 
During hearings in Eldoret, the Commission was told by the Kipkelion DC that 
Kipkelion District had experienced the spill over effects of the violence in Molo 
and Kuresoi prior to elections as a result of which ethnic animosity built up on 
account of displaced persons fleeing to Kipkelion from Kuresoi. This was 




2007 which noted that the animosity in Molo had spilled over to Belgut and 
Ainamoi Divisions where Kipsigis youths torched kiosks belonging to Kikuyu 
businessmen. 
Mr. Mohamed Salim the DC for Molo informed the Commission that hostilities 
began on September 25th 2007, though as we shall see later, violence had 
already been reported as early as 2006. In fact, evidence produced by the 
(KNCHR) noted that clashes broke out in Kuresoi after the referendum held in 
November 2005 pitting the Kikuyus who were largely in support of the proposed 
draft Constitution and the Kalenjins who had supported the Orange Movement 
that opposed the draft Constitution and that these clashes involved the 
expulsion of Kikuyu and Kisii from Kuresoi. Throughout 2006 and 2007, there 
were attacks on a low scale in Kuresoi by the Kalenjin against those they deemed 
not to have supported the Orange Movement which attacks intensified towards 
November 2007 and rose to their peak on 30th December 2007. The DSIC 
Minutes for Molo District dated 20th December 2007 corroborate this chronology 
in noting that between 22nd November and 4th December 2007, ethnic hostilities 
reached fever pitch and that as a result, deaths, injuries, displacement and 
destruction of property through arson had occurred prompting the PC to visit 
the area on 4th December 2007. 
The Commission was told that violence in Kuresoi had erupted in May 2007 at a 
place called Chepkinoyo where two children were burnt and several houses 
destroyed through arson. This subsided up till September 2007 when Kalenjin 
attackers from Ndoinet Forest raided Kamwaura and killed 2 people. There were 
subsequent attacks in Gathiriga Settlement Scheme, and then Tetagik Scheme 
where members of the Kikuyu burnt Kalenjin houses prompting the Kalenjin to 
attack Karirikania, a farm occupied by former freedom fighters where the Kikuyu 
put up stiff resistance, killing 2 Kalenjin raiders 50. By the time of going to 
elections, the Commission heard, there were already IDP camps in a number of 







The Molo DSIC noted that on 20th October 2007 in Cheptagum Farm in Keringet, 
a house owned by one Wambui John was torched by unknown arsonists in an 
incident whose motive the DSIC believed to be revenge for a Kalenjin man who 
had been killed in mid August 2007 during a suspected robbery at Tebere area. 
Further, on 26th October 2007, the DSIC reported that an unknown number of 
raiders believed to be Kalenjin had killed one Benson Njuguna, a Kikuyu, injured 
four people and stolen livestock at Gathiriga Trading Center in Chemaner 
Location of Keringet. During this period, incidents of widespread looting and 
vandalism of deserted homesteads were reported by the DSIC in Kuresoi. It was 
observed that criminals took advantage of the wanton lawlessness to loot 
household goods, and stole food crops from abandoned farms, raising fears of 
food shortages in 2008. Between 25th October and 4th December 2007, the Molo 
DC stated that 16 people were killed, 67 houses torched and 300 families left 
homeless after their houses were torched51.  
Indeed, similar accounts were provided in detail to Commission investigators by 
a number of witnesses who narrated how the pre-election campaigns were 
characterized by tension with the Kalenjin saying that on election day, they did 
not want to see “madoadoa”. This information was corroborated by the 
testimony of the Chief for Sachangwany Location which we shall revert to 
shortly.  
The Commission further perused reports from the NSIS stating that in October 
2007 a number of ODM leaders from the Kalenjin community were planning to 
instigate killings in Kuresoi, Olenguruone and Molo targeting the Kikuyu 
community domiciled in the area for showing support for President Kibaki. 
Meanwhile in Kuresoi, Commission investigators received a number of 
statements stating that leaflets warning non-Kalenjins to leave the area had 






politician52 had been behind the violence of the previous years and that once 
current MP Zakayo Cheruiyot53 came to the scene promising to end the violence 
if the Kikuyu voted for him, the  supporters of the politician went ahead to beat 
and evict the Kikuyu. The Commission found this information credible since it 
was corroborated by the Minutes of the DSIC meeting for Molo District held on 
22nd November 2007 which noted that intelligence had been received that 
supporters of the fpolitician were “poised to cause clashes to scare non-Kalenjins 
away from Kuresoi for support for Zakayo Cheruiyot”. NSIS also stated that the 
politician and a civic candidate were responsible for organizing and financing 
Kalenjin youth who were reportedly paid Kshs 1,000/- for every house razed 
down belonging to the Kisii and Kikuyu in Kuresoi. 
From records made available to the Commission, it is clear that the district was 
tense. For instance, on 1st December 2007, the DSIC reported that a 
parliamentary candidate for Molo constituency had led a demonstration of about 
3,000 youths in Molo Town to press for the release of 59 Kikuyu and Kisii youth 
arrested on 30th November 2007 for erecting an illegal road block at Muchorwe 
with a view to attacking Kalenjin motorists and passengers. During this 
demonstration, looting of businesses by the demonstrators was reported in Molo 
Town. For the above reasons, the evidence of Mr. Hassan Noor Hassan, Rift 
Valley Provincial Commissioner, that the provincial administration did not 
anticipate the violence in Molo District suggests that the administration was not 
prudent to ignore clear warning signs.  
 
The Post Election Violence 
Just as in other parts of the Rift Valley, the Commission heard from Hassan 
Noor Hassan the PC for Rift Valley that violence erupted in Molo and Kuresoi 
immediately after the election results were announced on 30th December 2007 
                                                            
52 The NSIS furnished information which contains the names of several persons.  





involving attacks on mainly Kikuyu and Kisii many of whom were killed and 
injured, their homes were burnt, animals stolen while roads were barricaded. As 
we discuss elsewhere in this report,54 the PC testified that the Provincial 
Administration had no prior notice of the attacks and did not expect attacks of 
that magnitude in Molo and Kuresoi.  
Evidence received from the NSIS however seems to indicate the contrary. For 
example, an NSIS Security briefing for the week ending 23 November 2007 
indicated that Kalenjin youth were already harbouring plans to attack the 
Kikuyu and Kisii in Murinduko, Bochege, Kaplelach, Muchorwe, Kuresoi Trading 
Center, Githima, Mwaragania, Mwahe Farm, Sondu River, Temuyota and 
Kwawira Farms to disenfranchise the two communities for supporting certain 
politicians. The NSIS security briefing for the week ending 3rd December 2007 
had noted that parliamentary aspirants and their supporters were suspected of 
fanning the hostilities for political expediency. One of the aspirants was alleged 
to be behind the harassment of Kikuyu and Kisii and to have been rewarding 
youth “according to the houses they burn”. The Commission was told that NSIS 
Security briefing reports were provided to the Minister for Internal Security and 
Provincial Administration. 
Even without the benefit of such NSIS reports, it is the Commission’s view that 
the Molo DSIC was in possession of enough intelligence from the ground to act 
more swiftly and more decisively than they did. For example, a Molo District 
Security Intelligence Committee meeting held on 20 December 2007 had 
indicated that there was a likelihood of disruption of voting and that the morale 
of police officers was noted to be low due to disaffection with a paltry pay rise of 
10%. This was a clear early warning signal of a potential security breach. During 
the same DSIC meeting it was highlighted that due to the ongoing insecurity and 
pre-election violence, mobile polling stations had been set up by the electoral 







Town, Chesengere Primary School in Muchorwe, Kamwaura Health Center, 
Kenjogetty in Mungetho Trading Center, Full Gospel Church Muchorwe, 
Kimkasia Primary School in Nyota and Kuresoi Health Center. 
According to the Chief of Sachangwany Location Evans Mageto Kebira, violence 
in Sachangwany erupted immediately results of the presidential elections were 
announced on 30th December 2007 where Kalenjin youths burned houses owned 
by Kisii and Kikuyu prompting him to call a meeting at Mukinyai on 31st 
December. The witness stated that during this meeting, community leaders 
accused a local politician, who was present, of having been behind the 
violence.55 Following this meeting, there was a period of calm but violence 
erupted after the killing of Josephat Kinyanjui, an elder in the area, allegedly by 
the Kalenjin according to statements provided to Commission investigators by 
several witnesses.  
There is consensus from Commission witnesses that a new wave of violence 
erupted in Molo on 30 December 2007. Commission Investigators received a 
number of statements confirming that Kalenjin raiders started attacking and 
burning Kikuyu homes on the night of 30th December 2007 and that the 
attackers received support from some prominent Kalenjins in the area. Evidence 
produced by KNCHR corroborates this information in stating that there were 
reports of Kalenjin youth having been transported from outside the district and 
housed and fed in the homes of well known Kalenjin personalities. KNCHR also 
stated that the Kikuyu and Kisii organized counter attacks in Molo where they 
were a majority and in response, Kalenjin politicians and wealthy Kalenjin 
businessmen provided transport to bring in attackers from outside the district to 
buttress the local Kalenjin population. This information was corroborated by 
evidence received by Commission investigators, including from Kalenjins and 
other sources, that gangs of Kalenjin were transported to Molo from Kericho and 









On 23 January 2008, the Commission heard that Jogoo Center in Mau Summit 
was razed to the ground in an incident where police shot dead 2 people said to 
be behind the attack. The Commission heard that members of the Kalenjin 
community held Mr. Evans Mageto Kebira, Chief of Sachangwany Location, 
responsible for having called the police who shot dead the 2 people, which 
prompted about 200 Kalenjin youth to attack his homestead at Kimanyi Farm on 
24 January 2008, burn down all his houses and escape with his 10 cattle and 
30 sheep which they took to the neighbouring Chesoin Farm. At the time of his 
testimony, Mr. Kebira stated that he was discharging his duties as area Chief of 
Sachangwany Location from Mukinyai Farm since he had been declared 
“persona non grata” by the Kalenjin in his location.  
The Commission received evidence from Mohamed Aman56, Rift Valley PCIO, 
indicating that on 24 January 2008, about 400 Kikuyu youths from Molo Town, 
incensed by the frequent killings meted against their tribesmen by members of 
the Kalenjin community, ganged up and proceeded to Sirikwa farm within 
Kalenjin populated Kuresoi constituency on a revenge attack mission, armed 
with pangas and other crude weapons. However, the Kalenjin got wind of the 
impending attack and ambushed them just before Sirikwa farm. As a result, 13 
Kikuyu were killed and several others escaped with arrows lodged in their 
bodies. 
Evidence was tendered by a witness who said he had attended a meeting of 
Kalenjins held in the area on 28th February 2008 during which local Kalenjin 
leaders discussed how to purchase Kikuyu farms cheaply from the Kikuyu who 
had left. 
The Commission also received video coverage of a demonstration on 16th 
January 2008 in Kimalang village, Keringet Division of Kuresoi where some 






smeared mud on their faces to camouflage themselves as they prepared for 
attacks. When the witness was spotted by the youths he almost lost his life but 
for the intervention of a Member of Parliament.  
A total of 150 people were killed in the District, another 170 injured, 1,564 
houses burnt and 66,000 people displaced by the conflict57 
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration 
Allegations of partisanship among the police and provincial administration in 
responding to the violence were made before the Commission. In Sachangwany, 
for example, police shot in the air on 6th January 2008 to disperse a group of 
Kikuyu who tried to put out a fire that was consuming Janet Mulinga’s Nursery 
School which had been set ablaze by Kalenjin youth.58  
In other instances, the Commission established that police were simply 
overwhelmed by the numbers of Kalenjin attackers. In one such instance, there 
were only 5 police officers confronting a mob of Kalenjin attackers estimated at 
over 2,000. In Kuresoi, allegations were made against the local OCS that he 
refused to intervene to stop Kalenjin raiders dubbing himself “ODM damu” (an 
ODM follower) and that he in fact watched as houses were burnt down at 
Mwaragania next to his police station.59 
There is support for this allegation from the report produced by KNCHR which 
accused the police of complacency and at times complicity in the violence and 
that some police officers were not only seen in the company of Kalenjin raiders 
but that some officers derided Kisii and Kikuyu victims “that they were paying 










Further, allegations of laxity and failure to apprehend attackers caught in the 
act were made which suggested to KNCHR that police were “overwhelmed, did 
not want to stop the violence or were under orders not to do so.” The KNCHR 
Report opines that the raiding gangs must also have had prior reassurance in 
this regard or having observed that the police were simply shooting in the air, 
carried on their attacks undeterred.”  
We find these assertions credible on their own but they find further support from 
evidence produced by Government officials from the area. The Molo District 
Security and Intelligence Committee meeting of 4th February 2008 noted that 
“discipline of uniformed forces had deteriorated a lot” and cases of police officers 
drinking and fighting had been reported which prompted the DSIC to direct the 
area OCPD to ensure strict supervision so that all officers worked as required. 
All the above supports the conclusion that police force was so suborned by 
external factors, including lack of sufficient resources, that it was incapable of 
enforcing the law effectively.  
One recurring feature in the DSIC Minutes was the lamentation that police 
boundaries in Molo did not match the administrative boundaries which in turn 
affected service delivery. This had been noted as early as 22nd November 2007 
when the DSIC recommended the harmonization of Molo Police Division’s 
boundaries to coincide with the administrative boundaries in order to centralize 
operations. The same observation was repeated in the DSIC meeting of 20th 
December 2007 which was of the view that harmonization of the police 
boundaries was a matter of high priority.  There had been no response to this 
plea by the time intense violence broke out ten days later. It begs the question 
whether the failure to implement the recommendation affected police response 
and service delivery to prevent the loss of life and property that occurred. 
The violence seriously affected Government service delivery in the District 
Headquarters of Molo. The post office was completely closed after five Kalenjin 
members of staff ran away leaving only the Kikuyu post master, while in Molo 
District Hospital, operations in some departments were stopped all together after 




District Commissioner’s office were also affected. With the Olenguruone-Molo-
Njoro Road blocked, Kalenjin from Olenguruone could not access vital services 
like medication, access to markets and shops especially in Molo, and Elburgon, 
and conversely the Kikuyu could not access their farms in Muchorwe, Store 
Mbili, Kibunja, Matumaini, Kuresoi, Baraka Farm, Sirikwa, Tombo, Ngenia, 
Kiambiriria and Gacharage61. Further, the Molo DSIC meeting on 11th February 
2008 alluded to the fact that intelligence had been received of some Chiefs 
having been responsible for incitement and recommended their investigation. 
The same Minutes also indicate that the DSIC would seek the help of the Army 
in restoring law and order, a further confirmation that the police were incapable 
of doing so on their own. 
 
Koibatek District: Attempted Ethnic Cleansing   
Koibatek District was carved out from Baringo District and comprises of two 
electoral constituencies, Eldama Ravine and Mogotio. We received evidence on 
violence in Koibatek through district government officials who testified in Eldoret 
as well as through statements by victims and eye witnesses who talked with 
Commission investigators. The pattern if violence in Koibatek is distinguishable 
from that in other parts of the Central Rift Valley Province in that it is the only 
district in which violence was committed mostly by members of the Kalenjin 
community against members of the Kikuyu and Kisii communities, without 
much retaliation. 
The DC for Koibatek Mr. Stephen Ikua stated that the post election violence in 
the District claimed the lives of 31 people, left 1,215 houses burnt and around 
45,000 people displaced from their homes. He traced the causes to the 2005 
referendum that widened the political gulf between the majority Kalenjin and 
minority Kikuyu communities living in the area. In his view, the divisions were 








some politicians not only declaring the area an ODM zone but also asking 
residents to vote as a block for ODM. A statement recorded by Commission 
investigators from Joseph Macharia Nyaga, PNU organizing secretary for 
Koibatek district, alleged that on 6th August 2007, ODM held a meeting which 
the witness attended in Eldama Ravine Town during which Raila Odinga, 
William Ruto, Otieno Kajwang, Martin Shikuku and Najib Balala spoke in favour 
of majimbo. He claimed that one of the speakers asked the Tugen community to 
remove all “madoadoa” from Rift Valley and “to be committed in voting so as to 
remove Kibaki from power and Kikuyus from Rift Valley.” 
 
The same witness claimed that chiefs from the area had organized meetings after 
the referendum during which sentiments were expressed to the effect that 
Kikuyus would have to leave and go back to Central Province. This statement 
suggests that local administration in Koibatek was not able to maintain a level of 
political neutrality during the campaign period, a proposition similarly observed 
by district administration and recorded in the Minutes of the DSIC on 19 
February 2008 which noted that some chiefs were partisan. 
 
Mr. Nyaga’s statement further alleged that as early as 6th August 2007, there 
was already talk by politicians on the campaign trail of bloodshed and 
dispossession of land from Kikuyu which would be given to the young Kalenjin 
men if the election was rigged. Credence to such allegation appeared to be given 
in the DSIC Minutes of 13th February 2008 stating that Kalenjin in Eldama 
Ravine had allegedly vowed not to allow displaced Kikuyu back but would 
instead buy their land at a ceiling price of Kshs 10,000/- per acre and warned 
that if any Kalenjin paid a price beyond this sum, their houses would be burnt. 
 
The pattern of violence in the district mirrored that experienced in other areas of 
the Rift Valley populated by the Kalenjin, where immediately after 
announcement of the election results on 30th December 2007, Kalenjin youth 




and Kisii, blocked roads and issued threats to any Kalenjin deemed to have 
supported PNU62. 
 
The Commission was told during its public hearings in Eldoret that the fact that 
former President Moi declared support for incumbent President Mwai Kibaki did 
not go down well with the Kalenjin and Moi paid the price for this stand as his 
property was one of those that were burned during the violence. We were 
provided with evidence that Kalenjins in Koibatek were forced by their kinsmen 
to join in the attacks against Kikuyu and that those who did not, or were 
perceived to be sympathetic to PNU or to Kikuyu were attacked by their fellow 
Kalenjins. Moreover, the Koibatek District Commissioner told us that 
Government officials were similarly not spared: a son of a Chief from Maji Mazuri 
who was viewed as a PNU sympathizer was killed and in another incident, a 
police officer was seriously injured when responding to a distress call.  
One incident in the district involved the killing of a police officer on escort duty. 
The Commission heard that the officer, who was Kalenjin, was among security 
officers who were taking charge of the equipment of the China Road and Bridges 
Construction Company Ltd which was re-constructing the Eldoret/Nakuru 
Road. On the material day while escorting a lorry to the site, they met some 
Kalenjin youths who were about to burn a lorry. The officer alighted from the 
vehicle and tried to dissuade them in Kalenjin language but they would not 
listen to him.  Instead, the youth beat him up, cut him up with machetes and 
took his gun which they broke. They also took the magazine from his gun with 
20 rounds of ammunition.  The officer, according to the evidence, never even 
shot in the air. The incident, in our view, highlights the helplessness of ordinary 









Most of the violence in Koibatek was concentrated on the border with Uasin 
Gishu, Kericho, Kipkelion and Molo where non Kalenjins were attacked and 
killed, their properties burned and/ or they were forcefully evicted. On 26th 
January 2008,  a catholic priest Father Peter Kamau, a Kikluyu, who was 
coming from Nandi going to Nakuru was stopped at Muserechi Trading centre 
where a gang of youth killed him, in an incident that was widely reported by the 
mainstream media.  
 
 
She Is Raped While Husband Is Being Killed 
On 1 January 2008, 36 years old Elizabeth W. and her husband were attacked in their 
house in Eldama Ravine by a group of Kalenjin, some of whom she knew. She was gang 
raped while her husband was being hacked to death and her shop looted. Following is an 
extract of her testimony: 
 
On 1 January 2008 we were still fearful. We didn’t open our business. I worked 
at the Eldama Ravine shopping centre at Mama Faith’s Shop. We owned the shop. It 
was just next to my house – they are joined together. But I stayed at home that day 
because I was scared. We left the shop locked up. 
At about 3pm that day, people came to my home. At the time there was only my 
husband and me at home. My children had gone to visit their grandparents in 
Nyandarua. There were more than ten people who came. They were all men. They were 
dressed in coats and they had smeared mud on their faces so you could not recognize 
them. The mud was different colors on their faces – white back and red in spots -- 
patches all over their faces. They were armed. They had arrows, pangas and rungus. 
The first I knew they were there was when I heard talking and noises outside. 
They were speaking in Kalenjin. They said “we have come to finish you”. The door was 
not locked so they just came inside. My husband and I were in the sitting room. We 
were sitting down but stood up when the men came in. 
When they came in I started pleading with them because of what I had heard 
them saying outside. I told them why were they doing this when we had lived with them. 
They ordered me to shut up and said that the Kikuyu had migrated to the area and 
taken up their (the Kalenjin’s) property. They said I should keep quiet or they were going 




That is when they started attacking my husband. They were cutting him with 
pangas and piercing him with arrows. They were struggling with my husband and trying 
to get him to the ground. The men were crowding on him – it might have been most of 
them attacking my husband. I was scared. They cut my husband on the neck with a 
panga and that made him fall to the ground. It was a serious blow. After that they were 
cutting every part of his body. 
After my husband was cut, but before he died, one of the men came towards me 
and asked me what I wanted to be done to me. I asked them not to kill me. One said we 
need to know what she is like, now that she never talks to us. 
There was another group of men who were looting my shop. I could see them 
from the door – it was still open. They were going past carrying property from my shop, 
such as sugar, cooking fat and other goods. 
I was wearing trousers with buttons at the waist. The men tore at my trousers 
trying to get them open and the buttons came off. There were about four of them there 
doing this to me at that time. They lifted me up and put me on the ground. They were 
arguing among themselves who was going to be first. Then one said that if I escaped 
from the knife and arrows, I would die of AIDS. Some of them held my legs and some 
held my hands while they raped me. When this was happening my husband and I were 
both still in the sitting room, but by now I was not watching my husband but pleading 
my own case. The last time I had looked, it was like he was dead. He wasn’t moving. 
One man raped me and then the second one and the third. They put their 
penises in my vagina. It was either the second or the third man who said they were not 
able to get in me properly so they cut me. I think it was the panga they were carrying 
that they used. They cut my vagina. When I had my children, the Doctor told me I had a 
narrow opening. Both my children were born by caesarean. 
They continued raping me. It was when the fourth man was raping me that I 
went unconscious…I next remember – and it is vague – that a Kalenjin friend of ours 
called Joseph was there and he was pleading with the men. He was asking them for him 
to be allowed to take the body of my husband and take me to hospital. The men started 
quarrelling with him and told him that he was in partnership with us. They threatened 
to kill him.[…] 
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration 
The NSIS had in their election Security Situation paper noted that the ratio of 




would pose potential problems since the police would be over-stretched by 
election related duties such as escort and guarding of polling stations. With such 
demands being exerted on the police, NSIS was of the view that if there were to 
be an outbreak of violence such as had been witnessed in 1992 and 1997, the 
police would be unable to cope in responding to such emergencies.63 
 
It is therefore not surprising that violence continued in the district until around 
15th February 2008 before the provincial administration was able to assemble 
some of the area leaders to discuss with them the need for the violence to stop. 
This finding is supported by the DSIC Minutes dated 9th February 2008 which 
noted that violence was far from ending and that 2 people were killed with 
arrows at Makutano. The DSIC observed that the Kalenjin appeared determined 
to displace the Kikuyu from their farms and that both communities reportedly 
were arming quietly. 
 
Notwithstanding that the PSIC had mobilized all serviceable public vehicles 
which were handed over to the OCPD to facilitate deployment of security officers 
to the affected areas and also along the highway to ensure the smooth flow of 
traffic, we found the acknowledgement by the DSIC that some chiefs, security 
personnel and other public servants were biased to be a matter of serious 
concern. A Kikuyu lady recorded a statement with the Commission stating that 
she was assaulted by two Kalenjin attackers on 31st December 2007 in Timboroa 
Trading Center sustaining serious head injuries from which she fell unconscious 
and was taken by good Samaritans to Timboroa Dispensary. She was then 
referred to Eldama Ravine Hospital on account of the seriousness of those 
injuries but, she says, the Kalenjin staff at Ravine Hospital refused to attend to 
her because she was Kikuyu and she had to be taken to the Nakuru Provincial 
General Hospital in critical condition where she was operated on and remained 







Similarly a statement by Mr. Nyaga stated that he reported the theft of goods 
from his house to Eldama Ravine Police Station but the officers refused to help 
him in tracing his property. He further stated without providing the source of his 
information that out of 126 Administration Police Officers, only 3 were Kikuyu. 
Further evidence of partisanship and criminal conduct by the police was 
provided by John Mwangi who testified in Naivasha stating that he and his 
family had been displaced from Timboroa after being attacked by a group of 
about 600 Kalenjin warriors-who had smeared their faces with mud and were 
armed with bows, arrows, spears and pangas. The attackers appeared 
coordinated and communicated through signals sent by blowing a horn and 
carried petrol in small bottles which they used to torch houses belonging to 
Kikuyu families. He alleged that they were assisted by a police officer who was in 
charge of Timboroa Police Station whose name the witness was unable to 
provide. 
 
Thus it would appear that partisanship on the part of public service and law 
enforcement agencies strained coordination efforts.64 Indeed, the provincial 
administration recommended an effort to balance the ethnic composition of 
security personnel. 
 
Nakuru District: Organized Attacks and Counter-Attacks 
Introduction 
Nakuru District is an agricultural region best known for Lake Nakuru, famous 
for millions of flamingoes that nest along its shores. Before the larger Nakuru 
District was split, it was one of the biggest districts in Kenya with six 
constituencies-Nakuru Town, Naivasha, Molo, Kuresoi, Rongai and Subukia. 
Nakuru District has been synonymous with ethnic and political conflict and was 







The Akiwumi Report noted that the genesis of the ethnic violence revolved 
around the re-introduction of multi party politics in 1991. Non-Kalenjin 
communities especially the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya and Luo supported the return of 
plural politics but the Kalenjin and Maasai communities, then supporters of the 
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) were opposed to any challenge on 
KANU’s monopoly of Kenya politics.  
The purpose of the clashes in 1992 and 1997 was to evict the so called non-
indigenous communities who were perceived to be unsupportive of KANU. The 
district however still remains one of Kenya’s most cosmopolitan where most of 
Kenya’s ethnic communities are found though the dominant ones are the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin with substantial numbers of Kisii, Luo and Luhya. 
 
Election Related Violence 
As was the case in other sites of violence visited by the Commission, the 
prevailing atmosphere in Nakuru district prior to the eruption of violence was 
described differently by different witnesses who appeared before us. Even 
Government officers who testified gave different versions on almost every aspect 
of the violence, including the date the violence actually erupted in Nakuru 
district, the prevailing atmosphere in the preceding weeks, and the causes of 
violence.  
 
According to Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner, Hassan Noor Hassan, who 
testified before us, violence in Nakuru did not erupt until Thursday, 24 January 
2008 and was caused by “the arrival of thousands of IDPs in Nakuru” which 
“elicited strong emotions and heightened tension in an otherwise peaceful and 
cosmopolitan town”, and by “tensions, suspicions and acts of self preservations” 
fuelled by “rumours of planned and impending attacks and evictions of members 
of some communities […]” On the other hand, Wilson Wanyanga, the Nakuru 
District Commissioner, told us that it was the release of the Presidential election 
results on 30th December 2007 that “marked a turning point in terms of security 




December 2007 in areas of Nakuru bordering Koibatek district. He further 
testified that the clashes could be attributed to existing ethnic tensions and 
repeated allegations of rigging by politicians as well as coverage by the media.  
The Commission established that violence in Nakuru district occurred in two 
phases. The first wave of violence started on 30 December 2007, following the 
announcement of the results of the presidential election, and was largely 
triggered by spontaneous, election related incidents. The second wave of violence 
started on 24 January 2008 and took a more planned and systematic nature, 
pitting well organized ethnic based criminal gangs against each other. 
 
The Commission was able to establish that much of the violence in Nakuru in 
late December 2007 and early January 2008 was the culmination of ethnic 
tensions built up during the electoral campaign and a reaction to perceived 
attempts to rig elections. Commission witnesses were unanimous in 
acknowledging that tension started building up in Nakuru town well before the 
elections, and that the announcement of the results for the presidential elections 
was preceded by a lot of anxiety among members of the public. A succession of 
isolated criminal incidences before and after the elections, and the inadequate 
police response to these incidents contributed to the increasing tension within 
the district. In one such incident, on 28th November 2007 provincial security 
agencies were alerted by members of the public that two individuals suspected to 
be Administration Police officers were on board a vehicle heading towards 
Eldoret from Kabarnet, carrying and distributing anti-ODM leaflets. The vehicle 
was followed by anxious members of the public and was intercepted in Keiyo 
where the two officers were confronted by a mob who were about to burn the 
vehicle when the Keiyo District Criminal Investigation Officer (DCIO) appeared 
and saved their lives from the mob. The two officers were later brought to the 
provincial police headquarters in Nakuru where they were released in mysterious 







As a consequence of these incidents and the perceived unwillingness of the 
police properly to respond to them, tension was heightened in Nakuru district, 
among ODM supporters, largely consisting of members of the Kalenjin, Luo and 
Luhya communities, as well as among members of the Kikuyu community, 
believed to be largely sympathetic to PNU. ODM supporters and members of 
ethnic groups sympathetic to ODM felt that elections were being rigged in favour 
of the incumbent President Kibaki.66 Within the Kikuyu community, rumours 
started circulating that armed Pokot warriors and trained Kalenjin youth 
planned to flush out the IDPs from Nakuru and push them beyond Naivasha 
since Nakuru was deemed to be a Kalenjin territory. All tribes who had not 
supported ODM would also be pushed towards Naivasha. Fears of a Kalenjin 
attack on Kikuyus intensified on 31 December 2007 when Kikuyu IDPs started 
arriving in large numbers in Nakuru from Eldoret, Burnt Forest, Kericho, 
Western Kenya and Nyanza.67 At the same time, rumours were rife that Kikuyus 
were recruiting youths in Naivasha, Laikipia and Dandora to come and protect 
Nakuru town. 
 
It is worth noting that, to contrary to previous election related ethnic clashes 
which were mainly confined rural areas, the December 2007 violence affected 
urban as well as rural areas of Nakuru district. The DC, Wilson Wanyanga, told 
the Commission that on 28 December 2007, a day after the elections, incidents 
of violence involving eviction of Kikuyu and Kisii farmers were reported from the 
Rongai division, particularly in the areas of Kambi ya Moto and Rongai location, 
prompting the DSIC to call an emergency meeting on 29 December 2007. On the 
evening of 29 December 2007, Kalenjins started burning houses belonging to 
                                                            
66 CW 47. 
67 The Commission heard  from a  representative of  the  IDPs  in Nakuru Mr. Peter Kariuki who was displaced  from 
Chepsion in Kipkelion District that the IDP Camp at the Nakuru show ground had processed over 100,000 IDPs who 





Kikuyus and Kisiis and chasing away members of the two communities. Some 
Kikuyus and Kisiis left their houses out of fear before they were burnt. 68  
 
In urban areas, meanwhile, the Commission was told that ODM supporters 
stormed the Nakuru Town Hall on 28th December 2007 demanding the release of 
Presidential results and on 29th December, Luo youths took to the streets of 
Pondamali Estate where they were joined by a losing Parliamentary candidate 
who lent his support to the protests. Businesses and vehicles owned by Kikuyu 
were attacked prompting a violent response by the Kikuyu from Langa Langa 
estate.  
The police had to intervene and create a buffer zone between the two estates. On 
30th December, violence erupted again in the town resulting in the deaths of 7 
persons. Club Lule’s, a restaurant along KANU Street owned by Nahashon Lule, 
a Luo and former professional football player, was burnt by some Kikuyu 
arsonists and the fire spread to the adjoining Summerland Club, another 
restaurant. This precipitated the Kalenjin to burn houses and businesses owned 
by the Kikuyu in Kaptembwa.69  
On January 4th 2008, a member of the Kalenjin community who had brought 
some charcoal to Nakuru for sale was killed by members of the Kikuyu 
community at the Nakuru Bus Park near Ogilgley bar. The following day, 
members of the Kikuyu community removed people from motor vehicles and 
insisted that they identify their ethnicity. This prompted non-Kikuyus to start 
leaving the town and there was open tension between Kikuyus on the one hand 











The Commission was told that a level of calm returned to Nakuru town until the 
end of January 2008 when the district and town experienced the worst acts of 
violence. Members of the Kikuyu community were enraged by stories of fleeing 
Kikuyu IDPs and influential Kikuyu business people allegedly held meetings to 
raise funds for attacks against the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin communities. 
During this period of a tense and uneasy calm, a member of the Kalenjin 
community was killed and to avenge his death, Kalenjin youths from Kaptembwa 
and Kwa Ronda areas attacked Githima Estate-mainly inhabited by Kikuyu on 
24th January 2008, torched their houses and stole property. 
 Kikuyu militias supported by members of the outlawed Mungiki sect and angry 
displaced Kikuyu youth armed with new pangas, knives and petrol bombs were 
assembled and deployed to various estates-Kaptembwa, Kwarhoda, Mwariki, 
Free Area and Kiti to flush out ‘enemy’ communities. They rounded up Luo men 
who were forcefully circumcised using pangas and broken bottles and those who 
resisted were beheaded. The Provincial Medical Officer of Health for Rift Valley 
confirmed that the Nakuru Provincial General Hospital attended to 4 cases of 
Luo men who had been forcefully circumcised while another Luo man had his 
penis amputated by his attackers on 25 January 2008. The Kalenjin community 
living around Nakuru, who had already been mobilized and reportedly paid to 
fight the Kikuyu70, retaliated immediately by attacking the Kikuyu dominated 
areas of Kaptembwa, Mwariki and Githima where they burnt houses, business 
premises and also killed a number of people. According to Commission 
witnesses, the estates of Kaptembwa, Free Area, Kiti and Githima were the 
hardest hit by this violence which lasted from the 24th to 27th January 2008 
while Kiamunyi a middle and upper income neighbourhood was unaffected. The 
Commission heard that in one night alone, the 26 January 2008, 48 people were 







Planning of the violence in Nakuru  
According to provincial and district government officials, the January attacks in 
Nakuru were neither organized nor planned. The Rift Valley Provincial 
Commissioner Hassan Noor Hassan was of the view that since 1992, elections 
were the excuse rather than the cause of ethnic fighting and that a simple 
incident such as a fight in a bar between members of different communities 
could spark serious violence. The retired Rift Valley PPO was of the opinion that 
the violence was not entirely unforeseeable.  Emotions had been raised by the 
high numbers of fleeing IDPs arriving in the town and this made it logical that 
retaliatory violence was bound to occur.  However, the Commission was able to 
determine from compelling testimonies and evidence that the January 2008 
violence in Nakuru was well planned and organized by both Kikuyu gangs 
believed to be Mungiki members and Kalenjin and Luo gangs, and that security 
agencies knew in advance about the planning and organizers of the attacks. The 
Commission established that planning for and anticipation of violence in Nakuru 
by both sides of the ethnic and political divide began in the weeks leading to the 
elections and intensified immediately after elections, in the first week of January 
2008. This view has ample support from evidence produced by NSIS and by 
other witnesses who testified before the Commission.  
 
NSIS Evidence 
Evidence presented to the Commission by NSIS indicated that days and weeks 
prior to these attacks, this security agency had been closely monitoring details of 
planning for and organization of attacks in Nakuru by gangs affiliated to both 
sides of the ethnic and political divide. With regard to the Mungiki/Kikuyu side, 
an NSIS report dated 18 December 2007 noted that two Mungiki leaders of the 
Nakuru chapter were engaging in a recruitment drive aiming at recruiting 300 






Sachangwan trading center along the stretch of highway between Nakuru and 
Molo, Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities were planning to attack each other. On 
9 January 2008, NSIS noted heightening of tension among the Kalenjin, Luhya 
and Luo communities residing in Shabab and Langalanga estates in Nakuru 
following speculations that Mungiki members would attack them between the 9th 
and the 11th January 2008. 
 On 15 January 2008, a week before the most brutal attacks erupted in Nakuru, 
NSIS was able to establish that some Mungiki members were planning to 
discredit the government by instigating chaos in Nakuru, among other places. 
After noting the heightening of tension in the Bahati division of Nakuru between 
the Luo and Kalenjin on one side and the Kikuyu on the other following the 
eviction of 50 Luos from rental houses belonging to the Kikuyu, NSIS concluded 
on 18 January 2008 that “confrontations are likely.” Finally, on 23 January 
2008, NSIS had information that a former Nakuru MP was organizing Mungiki 
members to attack non-Kikuyu people residing within Nakuru town and that the 
intended targets of the Mungiki included former Nakuru parliamentary  
candidate and other ODM provincial and district leaders. Finally, NSIS received 
information on 25 January 2008 that the Mungiki co-ordinator for Nakuru had 
advised Kikuyu businessmen in Nakuru Town to close down their businesses 
and join the sect members in attacking non-Kikuyu to revenge attacks on 
Kikuyus in North Rift.72 
On the Kalenjin and Luo side, NSIS was informed on 2nd January 2008 of a plan 
by a group of Luo and Kalenjin youth from the Kaptembwa area of Nakuru to 
attack the Kikuyu and government supporters and to set ablaze their business 
premises. According to NSIS, Mungiki was informed of this plan and was able to 
deploy its members in the affected areas with a view to counter the intended 
attack. NSIS information on 7 January 2008 was that a Kalenjin chief was 
leading a group of local elders in mobilizing youths from the Kalenjin community 






abandoned farms to Kalenjins. The same day NSIS learned that several Kalenjin 
youths were receiving combat training within the farm of a politician within 
Olenguruone for the purpose of being deployed to attack the Kikuyu and Kisii 
residing in neighboring Molo District.  On 24 January 2008, NSIS learned that 
following an attempt by the Kikuyu to set ablaze a house of a former Councillor 
at Muchorwe area, a former councillor in Nakuru was mobilizing Kalenjin youth 
to attack the Kikuyu residing at Muchorwe and Nyakinyua within the Sirikwa 
location of Nakuru district. In addition, NSIS was informed that on 25 January 
2008 about 200 Kalenjin youth from the greater Kericho District arrived in 
Nakuru where they were regrouping at Sewale in Mwariki B and at the residence 
of a former Member of Parliament.73 
 
Other Commission Witness testimony 
The Commission was given evidence and testimony that corroborated NSIS 
information on planning of violence in Nakuru. The Chairman of the Law Society 
of Kenya, Rift Valley Chapter, told the Commission that sometime before the 24th 
January 2008 had received a call from an MP informing him that attacks were 
planned in Nakuru for the 25th and 26th January 2008 and that, through a third 
person, he passed this information on to the Provincial Police Officer (PPO).74 The 
then PPO, Everett Wasike, confirmed having received this information and 
passed it on to Naivasha and Nakuru OCPDs.75 It is not clear what use was 
made of that information before the attacks on 25 January. A special PSIC 
meeting held on 6 February 2008 directed the Nakuru and the Naivasha DSICs 
“to summon those believed to be funding the illegal sects (Mungiki) activities to 
their respective DSICs for discussion/warning on the same.” Commission 
witnesses, including district and provincial government officials, told the 
Commission that some of the people who funded and organized the attacks in 








Evidence presented by the KNCHR was that local leaders in Nakuru and 
influential Kikuyu business people had held meetings to raise funds for revenge 
attacks against the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin. The retired PPO gave the names he 
received as being behind the retaliatory attacks in Naivasha and Nakuru.76 
  
The involvement of Mungiki gang members in the violence in Nakuru led to the 
continuing monitoring of this gang’s activities in Nakuru by both the Rift Valley 
PSIC and the Nakuru DSIC members from November 2007 through March 2008. 
A  DSIC meeting held on 20th November 2007 noted “with concern the presence 
of Mungiki adherents within Nakuru town” and recommended that intelligence 
reports on Mungiki “be availed to DSIC promptly for immediate action instead of 
having it sent to Nairobi, back to the PSIC and then to them.” At the provincial 
level, the Mungiki menace in Nakuru and Naivasha continued to be discussed in 
PSIC meetings, including meetings on 5th, 7th and 8th February 2008.  On 
February 1st, 2008 the PSIC received information of another imminent Mungiki 
attack on the Kwa Rhonda area and asked the Nakuru DSIC to arrange for pre-
emptive raids in the area.77 
 
Nature and extent of the violence 
The violence in Nakuru District took the form of ethnically targeted killings, 
maiming, forced eviction, burning of houses and business premises. Records 
from health institutions and the Nakuru mortuary produced before the 
Commission indicate that between 31 December 2007 and 3rd March 2008, 214 
persons died as a result of post election violence, including 205 males and 9 
females. According to post-mortems done on the bodies, 148 of the 214 died of 
injuries resulting from sharp/pointed objects; 45 died of injuries resulting from 
blunt objects; 23 died of gun shot wounds; 10 died of burns; and 1 died of 







these people died before 23rd January 2008 during the first wave of violence 
while another 112 were killed after 23rd Jan during the second wave. We were 
however unable to determine from the records available the dates when the other 
28 recorded deaths could have occurred.  
Traumatic (or forced) circumcision, a particularly barbaric form of violence, was 
inflicted on mainly male victims who were Luo. 7 persons were admitted at the 
Provincial General Hospital, Nakuru, where they were treated for traumatic 
circumcision and penile amputation. 5 out of the 7 traumatic circumcisions 
occurred on 25 January 2008.78 29 rape cases were managed at the Provincial 
General Hospital, Nakuru. The Commission was given a complete tabulation of 
post election related deaths and hospital admission cases, as well as post-
mortem references and details.79 
The majority of the deaths were either as a result of arrow and machete wounds 
(sharp/pointed objects) or inflicted by blunt objects, which is a pointer to the 
savagery of the violence and barbarity of the warring gangs. In spite of  a 
National Coordinating Committee established by the Ministry of Health to 
respond to the emergency, such a high number of casualties in a district such as 
Nakuru stretched medical facilities and especially the Rift Valley Provincial and 
General Hospital to the limit.80  
We salute the commendable efforts of Nakuru medical personnel who, while 
facing great odds, managed to maintain an acceptable standard of health within 
the IDP camps in Nakuru including the deployment of clinical officers to these 
camps and establishment of mobile clinics to serve the IDP camps where those 
displaced were unable to reach available health care facilities. We further 
commend the sterling efforts of armed forces health personnel who had to come 
in to help in managing the victims since health workers were overwhelmed 
despite working overtime. As with other hospitals in conflict zones, the Rift 








survivors which was further exacerbated by displacement of staff members and 
requests for transfers by staff who had received threats on the basis of their tribe 
leading to shortage of staff. The Commission further heard that the blockage of 
roads in many places in the interior hindered survivors from accessing the 
facility after being referred from the health centers of first call. Finally, a problem 
that was not unique to the Rift Valley Provincial General Hospital was the 
inadequate mortuary capacity which made it difficult to preserve bodies. In some 
areas, the Kenya Red Cross came in handy and provided refrigerated containers, 
but in Nakuru the unclaimed bodies were disposed of. 
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration 
The Commission established that police and government authorities at 
provincial and district levels were informed of the planned attacks in Nakuru 
sufficiently in advance to be able to plan for adequate response. The Rift Valley 
Provincial Police Officer, Everett Wasike, admitted having received information of 
planned attacks by Kikuyu gangs before they were committed and, as discussed 
earlier, NSIS had similar information which would ordinarily be passed on to 
police and the district authorities. The Commission therefore found testimonies 
by police officials and district authorities to the effect that the violence in Nakuru 
in January took them by surprise unconvincing. 
The Commission was given evidence that the police were very slow to respond 
and some simply refused to enforce the law. Although tension had accumulated 
and intelligence reports were clearly indicating a build up to attacks by both 
sides, it was not until violence broke out and needlessly led to the deaths of 48 
innocent people on 26th of January 2008 that the Provincial Security and 
Intelligence Committee through the Rift Valley PC imposed a restriction of 
movement (curfew) in Nakuru and Gilgil the following day, 27th January. It was 
clear to the Commission that by this time the situation had gone completely out 
of control and perhaps if the so-called “curfew” had been imposed before the 




complaints from members of the Nakuru business community that the 
restriction of movement had severely affected businesses within the town leading 
to huge losses. But preserving life was certainly a much higher priority, and from 
uncontroverted Commission testimonies, the curfew seems to have saved lives in 
Nakuru.81 Yet, even before the curfew imposition, the authorities were already 
aware that tribal gangs had been mobilized to attack certain farms; residents 
and travellers were already being killed by rival gangs on an ethnic basis. We 
were also told that in many cases police officers were deliberately refusing to 
intervene and their enforcement of the law was unbalanced and ethnically 
biased.82 
Failure to plan for adequate deployment of personnel resulted in poor police 
response to the violence in Nakuru district. Immediately following the 
announcement of the presidential elections results, it was obvious to Rift Valley 
provincial security agents that police officers on the ground were overwhelmed 
by the violence that erupted across the province. A PSIC meeting held on 31 
December 2007 decided to call for support from the military. In Nakuru District, 
according to then PPO Wasike, the sheer numbers of the marauding gangs 
heavily outnumbered the police and the Army was called in to assist in policing. 
The Commission heard that there were very few police officers in the troubled 
areas of Kambarari, Kaptembwa, Milima and Kiti, and that those who sought 
help from police stations were told to resort to self help. The Commission was 
further told that there were more than 100 idle police officers in their residential 
houses within the town at Kasarani and thereafter they would be hired privately 
at a going rate of between Ksh. 1,000 to Ksh. 2,000 per officer to assist with the 
rescue of besieged people to safer areas. The inadequate number of police 
officers resulted in individuals engaged in criminal activities not fearing to be 
caught by police or even disobeying police orders to stop those criminal 








when confronted by security personnel who opened fire resulting in 5 of the 
thugs being arrested and the rest escaping with bullet wounds.83  
We were told that in view of the failure of police, a number of private institutions, 
including the Law Society of Kenya Rift Valley Chapter, were able to mount 
commendable and risky operations to rescue individuals and families who were 
at risk of being attacked. Between the 25th, 26th and 27th January, the Law 
Society Rift Valley Chapter rescued approximately 300 to 400 people from Ponda 
Mali, Kaptembwa, Githima and Mwariki areas who were taken to Afraha 
Stadium and to the Nakuru ASK Show Ground. The Chairman of the Law 
Society Rift Valley Chapter, Mr. Ogolla, who extensively interacted with the 
police during the attacks in Nakuru, testified that the police were divided along 
ethnic lines with each group helping their own and at that these divisions 
escalated to the point where the officers were on the verge of turning against one 
another. He further stated that he had learnt that a senior officer who was in 
charge of operations at the Kenya Police Provincial headquarters was only 
deploying Kikuyu officers which left a huge number of police officers idle within 
their residential dwelling place of Kasarani. 
In many instances the police and provincial and district authorities let criminal 
or potential criminal activities go unpunished, thinking that dealing promptly 
with them would worsen the volatile situation. The Commission heard that on 
24th or 25th January 2008, a motor vehicle carrying four civilians armed with 
AK47 rifles was cited in KANU Street and the police were alerted. The Police gave 
chase and managed to stop this vehicle in Langa Langa Estate upon which it 
was impounded but released after two days on instructions of the same high 
ranking police officer. Further, the Commission heard from the PCIO Mohamed 
Amin, that while on patrol within Mahiga area on 28 January 2008, 
Administration Police officers spotted some people burning houses and managed 
to arrest one arsonist whom they were escorting to Kampi ya Moto Chief’s camp 






officers to release the suspects otherwise he would incite his people to attack 
them with bows and arrows as they were harassing his community members. 
The officers arrested the chief and his men and escorted them to Nakuru police 
station where they were placed in cells for interrogation. The Commission heard 
that the following day, the chief was released under instruction of the then OCS 
Nakuru Mohamed Bakuli, with no consideration, to the nature and gravity of the 
offence committed by the suspect. The OCS was himself later placed in cells for 
interrogation, only to be released the following day, 30 January 2008 with no 
further explanation.84 
It is the Commission’s view that the poor handling of these criminal activities by 
the police contributed to reinforcing the atmosphere of lawlessness in Nakuru 
district. Failure to properly investigate and prosecute police officers and political 
leaders involved in these incidents widened the gap between law enforcement 
agencies and members of the public and promoted impunity. Those who 
espoused ODM’s assertion that elections were rigged with the help of Kenyan 
security agencies and local administration authorities were quick to identify the 
mishandling of enforcement of justice as evidence of a politically biased state 
security machinery. On the other hand, the state inability or unwillingness to 
promptly deal with post election criminal activities resonated with the appeals 
for revenge attacks from Kikuyus and other PNU affiliated sections of the public. 
As incidents of mishandling of post election offences accumulated, the 
consequent widening gap between law enforcement agencies and members of the 
public became an increasing security concern, prompting a PSIC meeting on 4 
February 2008 to issue a strong disapproval “of the way the Nakuru DSIO office 
handled the case of the suspect in the shooting of the late MP for Ainamoi.” In 
the PSIC words, “[t]he fact that the Attorney General’s Office Nakuru delayed the 










In addition, the Commission received evidence that police and other security 
personnel were involved with the very criminal gangs who were the authors of 
violence in Nakuru. Some police officers actively sided with Kikuyu/Mungiki 
gangs while other officers were aiding and abetting Kalenjin attackers. Evidence 
presented to the Commission by NSIS was that during the attacks, armed 
Mungiki sect members wearing Administration Police uniforms were moving 
from house to house in Nakuru posing as police officers in search of members of 
non-Kikuyu communities to attack and kill them.86 Allegations were also made 
to the Commission that an officer in charge of special operations at Police 
Provincial headquarters was in fact the secretary of Mungiki in Nakuru.87 NSIS 
also learned that security personnel deployed within Rongai “[were] supporting 
Kalenjin raiders and that weapons used by the raiders [were] being kept at a 
local Councillor’s  homestead with their [security personnel’s] knowledge.”88 
Findings and Recommendations 
From the available evidence placed before us, we are convinced that information 
on the impending wave of violence was available to the relevant authorities early 
enough to prevent the fighting that followed. Furthermore, the fact that the 
violence erupted in the manner predicted, especially by the NSIS, discloses a 
failure on the part of the police and provincial administration who showed no 
signs of being pro-active. Instead they chose to fire fight when the prudent action 
dictated pre-emptive measures against the organizers, planners and instigators 












Naivasha District: Planned Criminal Attacks by Mungiki and 
Kikuyu politicians 
Introduction 
Naivasha is a sprawling town in Rift Valley Province located on the shores of 
Lake Naivasha that is home to a variety of wildlife and a sizeable population of 
hippos. The lake’s name derives from the Maasai name Nai'posha (rough water) 
because of the sudden storms which can arise over the lake. Between 1937 and 
1950 the lake was used as a landing place for flying boats on the Imperial 
Airways passenger and mail route from Southampton in Britain to South Africa. 
The area is well known for its population of European immigrants and settlers 
and is a popular tourist resort and also a weekend haunt for Nairobi residents 
due to its proximity to Hell’s Gate National Park, Longonot National Park and the 
nearby Mount Longonot.  The main industry is agriculture, especially floriculture 
around the lake providing a source of employment and income for the local 
population and CW 33 told us that there were about fifty two flower farms in 
Naivasha area which accounted for almost 74% of all the flower farms in the 
country.  
Naivasha District further hosts Kenya’s geothermal plant at nearby Ol-Karia and 
is therefore of strategic national importance since a significant component of 
Kenya’s electricity generation is located here and the area thus represents the 
future of the geothermal industry in Kenya. The majority of the population is 
Kikuyu with substantial immigrant workers on the flower farms who are mainly 
Luo and Luhya. Formerly a part of Nakuru District before it was hived off as a 
separate district, the area experienced some ethnic violence in 1992 pitting the 
Kikuyu on one hand and Maasai on the other as explained in page 127 of the 
Akiwumi Report. 
The Commission heard from several witnesses that there was no major violence 
in Naivasha before and immediately after the 2007 general elections. According 




ethnic violence, with the exception of the Mahi Mahiu area bordering Narok 
District, where there had been ethnic and land related conflicts between 
members of the Maasai and Kikuyu communities.89 A Naivasha District Security 
and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) meeting held on 6 December 2007 to review 
security plan ahead of the general elections noted that in the past, parts of the 
district that had experienced clashes during general elections included the areas 
of Maella, Mai Mahiu, Oljarai, Longonot and Moi Ndabi. Naivasha town was not 
mentioned. Indeed, several witnesses who appeared before the Commission 
highlighted the history of peaceful co-existence between ethnic groups living in 
Naivasha Town. Peter Otieno, a resident of Naivasha for 18 years and leader of 
the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union representing flower 
plantation workers, told us that,  
 
“Naivasha had been peaceful until the 2007 general elections. With 
the many tribes in Naivasha, they had been co-existing and doing 
business together and they had been co-existing without any 
problem.”90 
 
Another witness who gave her testimony in private described her relations with 
her Luo, Luhya and Kikuyu neighbors as follows: 
 
“Q:  How were you living with your neighbours before you voted? 
Witness:  We used to live very well with my neighbours.  We even 
used to borrow (sic) and help each other.”91 
The Commission was told that incidents of violence registered before the 
elections were of political, rather than ethnic nature, and they occurred in the 
context of a highly charged political rivalry during the campaign period. 








election monitor for the 2007 elections answered as follows to a question about 
political tension during the electoral campaign: 
 
“Q:  I asked you what your assessment was overall in terms of, were there 
political tensions there or was there an environment which was suitable for 
such tensions? 
Witness:  Yes, there was a clear difference between ODM supporters and 
also PNU supporters, but there was no actual violence.  But on 22nd of 
December ODM people were attacked on their way to Suswa, they were 
attacked in Mai Mahiu and some of the people in the team were badly 
beaten up; and one eventually succumbed to the injuries […]”92 
 
As was the case in the rest of the country, however, the political rivalry during 
the campaign soon took a clear ethnic dimension and tension started to build up 
in Naivasha between members of the majority Kikuyu community and those 
from the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya communities, most of whom worked as wage 
earners in the local flower farms. According to a witness, “We were divided, the 
Kikuyus were in PNU and me with my other Luo colleagues were in ODM.”93 
 
This politico-ethnic tension heightened immediately after the results of the 
presidential election were announced on 30 December 2007. As members of the 
public, mostly from the Kikuyu community, were celebrating the Kibaki win they 
were also threatening members of other communities. The Luos in particular 
were threatened with eviction, following stories about the pre-election 
expectation of Luo tenants not to pay anymore rent if Raila Odinga had won the 
elections. According to union leader Peter Otieno, 
“On 30th when the results were announced many people poured on 
the streets celebrating the results and the celebration continued up to 







were uttering words against other tribes which was scaring other 
tribes away from celebrating. […] Some were uttering that the Luos 
should be circumcised, my Lords. Those were the words coming from 
the crowd.” 
 
Other sworn evidence from a Luo resident was as follows: 
“After Kibaki was declared winner, people in my area started 
cheering and saying that those Luos who thought they would not pay 
house rent once Raila was declared winner should be prepared to 
leave – ‘wajaluo wajipange’. There was tension soon after the 
announcement. Our landlord used agents in the house where we used 
to live to collect rent. She ordered the agents to evict all Luos from her 
property because there were rumours that houses hosting Luos would 
be burnt down.”94 
 
Kabati estate in Naivasha town was most affected by the eviction of Luo tenants, 
some of whom started seeking refuge in the compound of the Naivasha 
Maximum Security Prison. Duncan Ogore, then officer in charge of the prison, 
told the Commission that the first group of mostly women and children from the 
nearby Kabati estate arrived to the prison in the evening of 30 December 2007 
and by 3 January 2008, the number of displaced persons in the Naivasha prison 
had reached 112, including 68 children and 44 adults.95 
 
The Eruption of Violence 
By early January 2008 the majority of districts in the Rift Valley province were 
theatres of large scale violence. Naivasha District, however, did not experience 
violence of similar magnitude until the end of January 2008. The Commission 
was told that the violence that broke out on 27 January 2008 in Naivasha was 
as a result of a growing bitterness caused by the massive influx of IDPs from 







the Commission that Naivasha Town had started receiving Kikuyu IDPs from 
other parts of the Rift Valley after announcement of the election results and that 
at its peakthe town accommodated upwards of 22,000 IDPs displaced from 
Eldoret, Kisumu, Kericho, Kipkelion, Kitale, Trans Nzoia District, Narok and 
Molo District. The IDPs, who were mainly Kikuyus, brought painful personal 
stories of ordeals experienced in places from where they had fled and pointed 
accusing finger at members of such communities as the Kalenjin, Luo and 
Luhya. This, combined with the accumulation of minor incidents throughout 
December 2007 and the first half of January 2008, led to an extremely volatile 
situation and laid the ground for the revenge attacks on non-Kikuyus in 
Naivasha between 27 and 30 January 2008. 
 
Consistent witness testimony and evidence tendered to the Commission suggest 
that the attacks on members of the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya communities that 
started on 27 January 2008 were executed in an orderly and well planned 
manner by a coordinated group. The Commission was able to reconstruct the 
events of 27 January 2008 as follows:96  
 
In the morning of Sunday 27 January 2008, large groups of demonstrators 
started congregating in different places in Naivasha, ostensibly to protest the 
killing of Kikuyus in other parts of the province, demonstrate against the 
restriction of movement (“curfew”) earlier imposed by the DSIC, and demand that 
prison warders be withdrawn from the joint security patrols in the streets of 
Naivasha. The District Commissioner acceded to the demand for withdrawal of 
prison officers and a group of prison warders who were proceeding towards the 
OCPD’s office to commence security patrols was called back to the prison. He 
told another group of cheering protestors that the curfew would be lifted and 








Main roads within and through Naivasha were barricaded by the demonstrators,  
including the Nakuru-Nairobi and the Gilgil-Mai Mahiu highways. The 
demonstrations attracted big crowds and happened simultaneously in different 
places of the town, which resulted in security forces and local administration 
authorities spreading all over in attempts to respond to the situation by 
addressing the demonstrators, dispersing the crowds and clearing roadblocks.97 
The same morning, at around 10:00am, the Kikuyu gangs attacked Luo and 
other non-Kikuyu families and burnt their houses in different estates of 
Naivasha. The hardest hit areas were the estates of Kihoto, Kabati, Site, Council 
(Kanjo) Estate and Karagita. 
 
It later became clear that the attackers were organized so that groups of 
“demonstrators” would keep police and administration authorities busy on the 
streets while other groups were chasing Luos and other non-Kikuyus in the 
estates, killing them and burning their houses. As the DC told us: 
“…the time where we were trying to quell these clashes we thought 
of using our normal method of addressing people in public barazas 
and meeting and when we realized that there appeared to have 
been an organized gang as we addressed people here another gang 
was somewhere committing a more serious offence…”98 
 
In at least one case, the same crowd that the DC was addressing at Kariuki 
Chotara Road went on a looting and burning rampage targeting Luo and 
Kalenjin shops as soon as the DC and the police left to go and address another 
group. 
 
The Commission heard that in the ensuing violence the Kikuyu gangs killed forty 











on the afternoon of the 27th when their Kabati house was set on fire while they 
were locked inside. Gangs of young Kikuyu men armed with machetes went 
round the town, forcing other Kikuyu to join them, in search of Luos, Luhyas 
and Kalenjins. The gangs blocked roads and public transport and searched 
vehicles forcing passengers forced to identify their ethnic groups. A Catholic 
social volunteer who involved herself into rescue operations in the morning of 27 
January said she saw “young men…flagging down the vehicles and shouting: 
“kuna mjaluo kwa hii gari!! Tunataka wajaluo!”99 In the evening of 27 January 
one Luo woman was nearly caught at one such road block while on her way back 
from the flower farm where she worked. She told us: 
“I worked till 4:00pm when it was time to go home. At the stage inside 
our place of work, the company drivers informed us that they had just 
left town and there was chaos, that road blocks were being mounted. 
The drivers advised Luos against boarding the vehicles. I decided to 
board. I requested my friends to board with me so that in case we are 
killed we could all die together. On reaching ‘sanctuary’ we found a 
convoy of vehicles lined up. The vehicles were not being allowed to 
pass. We found armed Kikuyus armed (sic) with pangas. The company 
vehicles did not take us to the stage. It dropped us at the field called 
kiwanja ndogo. The Kikuyus were waiting for Luos to alight from the 
company vehicles so that they could run after them and kill them.”100 
 
A Kikuyu woman who interacted with the attackers while rescuing her Luo 
friends described the unfolding of violence as follows: 
“Young men were walking in groups.  Not only young men because it 
was everybody in the society. They were all walking in groups, shoving 
people up and down. In fact, they were chasing the non-Kikuyus like 
rabbits and then when one is captured just hacked to death. They were 
burning properties and the local women were following them, 
looting.”101 
 
The attacks were targeted against mainly members of the Luo community, 
though Luhyas and Kalenjins were also targeted and among the forms of 
violence perpetrated by the mobs was forced circumcision on four members of 









The Ministry of Medical Services through the District Medical Officer of Health 
gave a figure of 48 deaths were recorded between 27th January and 31st January. 
Post-mortems carried out at the Naivasha District Hospital showed the causes of 
PEV deaths to be burns (22), sharp object injuries (19) and gunshot injuries (6). 
In addition, in 2 cases the cause of death was “unknown” while one person died 
of injuries from arrow shot. Of the 50 deaths, 11 were female and 32 were Luos, 
an indication that members of the Luo community were particularly targeted.  
 
The attacks resulted in a serious humanitarian crisis when Luo, Luhya and 
Kalenjin residents of the town took refuge at the Central Police Station-Naivasha 
which was not equipped with sanitation facilities to handle such huge numbers, 
estimated at 8,000 IDPs. Further, the number of non-Kikuyu IDPs seeking 
refuge at the Naivasha Prison eventually rose to 10,000 by 3rd of February 2008 
and by default the Naivasha Prison turned into a camp for IDPs. 
 
The Killing of Eric Ouma Oyieko: An Account by His Sister 
[…] On Monday [28 January 2008], I woke up and started thinking of my business that I 
set up after obtaining a loan at my place of work. Even before I went to work, a 
workmate of mine, a Luhya, came to me… He told me that my brother had been killed 
while taking tea. My brother’s name was Eric Ouma Oyieko. I told the workmate that it 
could not have been my brother because when we were fleeing I passed by my brother’s 
house and I found a padlock. I knew he had also fled. My brother used to live near me 
in the next building known as ‘makao ya amani.’  
At about 10:00am something told me that I should go and check on him. I boarded a 
Securicor car and paid Shs. 50. They were the only vehicles operating. I left to see my 
brother. On arriving there I found a crowd of people including policemen who were 
standing nearby but at a distance from the other people. They did not look bothered. I 
found that his (my brother’s) penis had been cut and placed in his mouth; his testis 
were chopped off and placed in his hand. I found blood was still pouring out of his body 
and he was kicking as he was dying. I talked to the policemen around and requested 
them to take my brother to the hospital so that even if he died, he would die at the 
hospital. The police told me to get away from them, that I should not disturb them, that 
if I insisted I would end up like my brother and that it was not their work. 
I didn’t have anything to do. I decided to go back to Sher where we were seeking refuge. 
I walked to Sher because I did not have bus fare with me. I left karakta at about 




a lot of thought on my mind. By that time my brother had died. I touched him and he 
was no longer moving. He was dead. I informed my husband that my brother was dead. 
He asked me if I had taken my brother to the mortuary and I told him I hadn’t since I 
did not get any assistance from the police. The following day, another workmate of mine 
informed me that my brother had not been moved to the mortuary and was still lying on 
the road, that his head had been chopped off and that dogs were eating his private 
parts. My brother was clobbered to death before he was mutilated. The people who did 
that to him were using spiked clubs. They had fixed nails on the club and as they hit 
his face the nails would pluck flesh from his body. 
I was not able to go to work that day. I just sat on the road. It was then that I saw a 
land rover full of police men. The driver was a Kalenjin because he was speaking in 
Kalenjin. I talked to him and informed him that my brother had been killed in Karakta 
and that his body was not collected. I boarded their vehicle and we went with them to 
where my brother’s body was. I found that the dogs had eaten him just as I had been 
informed. We picked him and took him to the mortuary. By then he was smelling badly 
and he had started rotting because his body had spent two days on the sun before being 
collected. His body had insects that had started to eat him due to rotting… 
I learned that on that Monday my brother was taking tea from his house when some 
Kikuyu told him that I and my husband had been killed. He left the tea and came to our 
shop to look for us. He peeped through the glass window when some people said, ‘there 
he is’. They were actually looking for my husband and when they could not find him 
they killed my brother. 
My late brother was married to Mildred Achieng. They had three children, Ochieng (5 
years), Amam (1½ years) and Linet (4 years). Ochieng was present when his father was 
being clobbered and mutilated. He has since gone mad. He keeps on saying, “baba 
wanakata kichwa yako, wana kata kitu chako…Dad they are chopping off your head, 
they are chopping off your thing (penis).”[…] 
Extracts from Exhibit 36, statement by Judith A. O., 29 years old, taken by Commission 
investigators on 25 July 2008, Naivasha, and submitted in evidence. 
 
Planning of Violence in Naivasha: Political Leaders and Mungiki 
The Commission received credible evidence to the effect that the violence in 
Naivasha between the 27th and the 30th January 2008 was pre-planned and 
executed by Mungiki members who received the support of Naivasha political 
and business leaders. The Commission has also evidence that government and 
political leaders in Nairobi, including key office holders at the highest level of 
government may have directly participated in the preparation of the attacks. 




Safari Club in the run up to the election with the involvement senior members of 
the Government and other prominent Kikuyu personalities.  
 
Evidence produced by NSIS suggests that this agency was collecting information 
on the planning of violence in Naivasha by Mungiki members and politicians, at 
both local and national level.102 As early as 3 January 2008, NSIS had 
information that two former MPs of the Kikuyu community were “said to be 
negotiating with the outlawed Mungiki with a view to have sect members assist 
the community to counter their attackers” and that Mungiki members were 
meeting “in an undisclosed location in Nairobi with a view to carrying revenge 
attacks on Luos/Kalenjins travelling along Nairobi-Naivasha highway on 
undisclosed date.” 
 
On 15 January, NSIS was informed that Mungiki members were planning to 
discredit the Government by instigating chaos in Nairobi and Nakuru “while 
others would raid Kamiti and Naivasha Prisons to rescue their colleagues held 
there among them [Maina] Njenga.” This supported information presented to us 
in camera by a senior police officer in Naivasha who had learned on 9 January 
that “there was a likelihood of the so-called mungiki making a way into prison 
with the intention of whisking away the chairman [Mr. Maina Njenga] who is 
currently held in that particular prison.”103 
 
Following up on this information, the Naivasha District Security and Intelligence 
Committee (DSIC) chaired by the District Commissioner decided on 9th January 
2008 to increase patrols within the town and additional officers were sought 
from the Naivasha Prisons to assist the police. The Naivasha Prisons 







assistance and having furnished some prison warders to the OCPD Naivasha to 
help in patrolling the town up to 27th January 2008.104 
 
On 21 January NSIS received precise information on part of the planned 
operation of violence in Naivasha, to the effect that Kikuyu youth in Naivasha 
“plan to block Nakuru-Naivasha and Gilgil-Mai Mahiu roads, to block/intercept 
vehicles from Western and Nyanza regions to fish out the targeted communities,” 
which is exactly what happened on 27 January. 
 
According to evidence presented by the KNCHR, local politicians received 
support from Kikuyu elite from outside Naivasha to mobilize local jobless youth 
who were bolstered by Mungiki followers from Nairobi and Central Province. 
KNCHR had evidence of two planning meetings held on 23rd and 26th January at 
a local hotel where influential Naivasha business people plotted the violence and 
paid between Kshs 100-200 to the youth who would participate in the attacks 
targeting mainly members of the Luo community.105 Information of these 
planning meetings and participants was corroborated by individual witnesses, 
including two Naivasha social workers and activists. 
 
According to witnesses, evidence that Mungiki were involved in violence in 
Naivasha includes a high level of coordination of the attackers, many of whom 
were not Naivasha residents, as well as inside intelligence obtained from Mungiki 
members involved in the violence. A Kikuyu political activist who testified in 
camera told us that she learned from an aide to Ndura Waruinge, Mungiki 
national Coordinator, that Mungiki was not responsible for all the violence in 
Naivasha, and that one “could differentiate the Mungiki from the locals, because 
where Mungiki went they were not looting they were just destroying properties.  
But with the locals they were looting.” She further testified that the attacks 







Kihooto and Karagita, and so she thought the attackers “were dropped at those 
areas and they had orders [to] start at 9:00am”, which she characterized “as 
having the Mungiki type of organization.” 
 
Acting either on NSIS or on its own intelligence, the Naivasha DSIC gathered 
similar information with regard to a number of politicians and businessmen 
whom it suspected of financing and organizing the gangs they believed to be 
Mungiki, which were responsible for the Naivasha violence. Those who the DSIC 
recommended for arrest for financing and organizing the violence included a 
former MP of the Kikuyu community and other prominent Kikuyu personalities, 
whose names were provided to the Commission. Further information in 
possession of the DSIC was that prior to the attacks, a number of meetings were 
held at a hotel in, Naivasha whose owner was allegedly also involved in the 
planning and that a former MP from the area the master mind. The names of the 
individuals who not only purchased the pangas from a local supermarket for use 
by the attackers who had been transported from outside Naivasha but also 
directed the attacks on the ground were also made available to the Commission.  
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration 
The Commission established that response to the PEV in Naivasha by security 
agencies and district administration reflected the same poor planning and lack of 
professionalism and independence as was evident in other parts of the Rift 
Valley Province. The police were obviously overwhelmed by the magnitude of the 
violence, but breaks in the chain of command and parallel ethnic command 
structures within the police meant that even with the best of planning the police 
were too weak as an institution adequately to respond to the violence in 
Naivasha. 
 
The Commission also received ample evidence to the effect that police and 
administration authorities were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the violence.  
The Naivasha DC and OCPD testified that in the morning of 27 January they 




much time and energy in addressing each group at a time while trying to 
disperse the crowds and clear road blocs, before moving to the next group of 
demonstrators. A community leader who appeared before us in camera and had 
been personally involved with the police in helping rescue persons in danger, 
testified as follows: 
“Q.:  Now, may be you need to go back to the date of 27th.  What can you 
recall about that date that is significant for Commissioners? 
Witness:  There was a lot of violence and I can say, it is like the Police were 
overwhelmed and there was no law in Naivasha on that day and also on 
29th. The Police were just overwhelmed. Like when I went to the Police 
Station trying to get any Police Officer even to talk, when I got there I talked 
to the OCPD and then he started getting calls. I tried to organize the people 
somehow and we tried to call others. I told them to call their friends to know 
if they were all safe. So we started making calls and we found people who 
were trapped in their houses. They couldn’t come to the Police Station or go 
to the GK Prison. I started coordinating with the Police on how to go and 
evacuate those people who were trapped and sometimes it was just difficult 
because the Police vehicles were not enough. It was just chaotic.  Sometimes 
we were getting very desperate.” 
Among the causes of police failure to adequately respond to the violence was the 
breach in the chain of command within the force. The Commission was provided 
with abundant examples of junior officers refusing to take orders from their 
superiors and placing ethnic loyalty before professional ethical conduct. The 
community leader involved in the police operations at the time testified as 
follows:  
“Q.:  Did you get the sense the police who were doing the best they could 
but were overwhelmed or was there incompetence amongst the police 
officers or other security agencies? 
Witness:  On the first day, that was on 27th, I thought that the police 




Police Station camp, because the last person we evacuated was on 
Thursday and I could tell that there was some defiance. The junior 
officers particularly from the Kikuyu tribe were not ready to take 
instructions from their superiors; and I can say, for example there is a 
time we went to evacuate a terminally ill lady who was trapped inside 
an estate and getting the officers to come, they were just defiant, they 
were just running and saying that it is the Deputy OCPD, because it was 
the Deputy OCPD, Grace Kakai who was giving them those instructions. 
They were saying that she is just being bossy.” 
We were presented with ample evidence suggesting that the same ethnic fault 
line that divided the community in Naivasha also affected security agencies. 
Whether for legitimate reasons or not,106 members of the Kikuyu community 
were generally deeply distrustful of officers of the Kenya Prison Department 
whose commanders were believed to be Kalenjin and Luo ODM supporters. On 
their part, Luo victims told stories about the indifference of Kikuyu police officers 
to their suffering. A Luo woman told us that police failed to collect the body of 
her relative and that she was not able to have the body brought to the mortuary 
until a Kalenjin officer came to her rescue two days later.107 
 
In perhaps the most serious security lapse, police and administration authorities 
were too preoccupied with a false notion of peace and tranquillity that they 
completely failed to promptly deal with the real threats to security. It is the 
Commission’s view that on 27 January too much focus was on clearing roads 
and dispersing crowds, which left the police and administration officials spread 
too thin to deploy in estates where persons’ lives were being put in danger and 
where police presence was most needed. In his desire to simply quell the 









mainly Kikuyu crowd that prison warders be called off the street on the very day 
they were most needed in the OCPD’s estimation. For the same reason and on 
his own admission, he also agreed to lift the partial ban on movement (“curfew”), 
a gesture immediately perceived by the demonstrators as an encouragement to 
carry on with their planned attacks. An eye witness recounted the immediate 
consequence of the lift as follows: 
“Q.:  […]You said the meeting was being petitioned by these people, so 
that he could lift the ban. 
Witness:  Yes, on the curfew. 
Q.:  The curfew needs to be lifted.  What was the DC’s reaction? 
Witness: He agreed to lift the ban and people clapped and people 
dispersed and when they dispersed he went with his officers and 
immediately the police left that Kariuki Chotara Road, that is when one 
of the Chemists, it is in the Centre of the town it belongs to a Kalenjin 
was looted and what they could not loot was burned outside the shop, 
immediately the DC left with the police. 
Q.:  About what time of the day was this? 
Witness:  It was between 10.30 and 11.00 a.m., My Lords.”108 
Despite the general chaotic response to PEV, individual police officers were able 
to heroically rise to the occasion and save lives. Peter Otieno, a Luo and a union 
leader, told us how one Mutuku, a police officer, came to his family’s rescue by 
firing in the air to scare off a group of Kikuyus who were about to break into his 
house and kill him and his family.109 
 
The Commission also heard that the security forces – the Kenya Police, the 
Administration Police and the Anti-Stock Theft Unit – received considerable help 
from the Military who not only cleared the roads allowing police officers free 







Karagita township in a helicopter gunship firing from the air and in the air  to 




Narok District has been split into two, Narok North and Narok South districts. 
The administrative divisions are Central, Loita, Mara, Mau, Mulot, Olkurto, 
Ololungua and Osupuko. According to the Akiwumi Report, the area experienced 
ethnic fighting in 1992 between the Maasai and Kikuyu where the Maasai 
complained that the Kikuyu living upstream of areas such as the Enoosupukia 
water catchment area were diverting water preventing it from reaching 
downstream to the Maasai.110 
The area has experienced ethnic related violence in the past, particularly 
between the Kikuyu and the Maasai. The Akiwumi Report notes at page 167 that 
William Ole Ntimama, the area MP since 1988, at that time warned non-Maasais 
that they would be evicted from Enoosupukia since they were residing in a water 
catchment area and the interests of so called non-indigenous communities 
(mainly Kikuyu) were subordinate to those of the indigenous Maasai community. 
At the time, Ntimama was a powerful Government Minister in the ruling party 
KANU and the Akiwumi report went on to note that in October 1993, Maasais 
armed with bows and arrows had started attacks upon Kikuyu and that there 
was no interference from the police and the provincial administration, and 
neither did the police make arrests nor disable the Maasai from attacking the 
Kikuyu even when they had opportunities to do so. 
 
The major causes of previous violence in the area were claims of Kikuyu 
encroachment of Maasai land, Kikuyu domination of retail and transport 






parties enjoying support from the indigenous communities. But evidence was 
given by KNCHR that the post election violence of 2007 was unlike previous 
episodes of violence where the Maasai ganged up with Kalenjin to attack Kikuyu. 
This time round violence fizzled out quickly after Maasai elders prevailed on the 
youth to stop the violence in spite of incitement by politicians and local elites.  
 
The Pre-Election Environment 
The NSIS had indicated in a security briefing dated 27th September 2007 that 
Narok was one of the places it considered a potential flash point likely to witness 
election related violence due to incitement by politicians it did not name. Further 
testimony was provided by Naivasha DC Mr. Katee Lucas Mwanza (later 
transferred to Molo) that trouble was expected between the Maasai and Kikuyu 
community on the border of Narok and Naivasha Districts over the disputed 
Ngati Farmers Cooperative Society and the same evidence was corroborated by 
the NSIS. At the Narok South District Security and Intelligence Committee 
(DSIC) meeting held on 21 December 2007 it was noted that political 
temperature in the District was high and that politicians had resorted to holding 
night meetings contrary to the Electoral Code of Conduct while also engaging in 
door to door campaigns. 
Evidence was provided by the KNCHR that immediately prior to the elections and 
more specifically on 24 December 2007, a local politician had held a meeting in 
Narok Town during which he threatened the Kikuyu and Kisii communities that 
they would be evicted if they did not vote for him, reminding them that Narok 
was not their home. 
The Post Election Violence in Narok 
Serious violence pitting the Maasai on one side and Kikuyu and Kisii on the 
other erupted on 3 January 2008 in Sogoo, Tendwet, Kimogor, Nkopen, 




was reported by the DSIC to be high in Mara Division and Ngoswani in Osupuko 
between Maasai and non-Maasai.  
A witness, Isaac Moipeli, testified in Naivasha that he was displaced from Narok 
Town. He informed the Commission that he had witnessed an occasion where a 
prominent politician had addressed a public meeting about a month before the 
elections and incited the Maasai by asking them to uproot members of the 
Kikuyu community from the area. This is corroborated in evidence by KNCHR 
according to which, allegedly the politician  organized and paid Maasai youths to 
unleash violence in Narok Town and its environs.111 After announcement of the 
results of the presidential election, the witness says the politician went around 
Narok Town and asked that members of the Kikuyu community be evicted. 
Further, the Commission was informed by former Rift Valley PPO Everett Wasike 
that the politician’s name was one of those repeatedly given to police as being 
behind the violence and we heard that a file was opened against him on charges 
of political incitement and a warrant of arrest was procured but he was not 
taken to court. 
The DSIC noted that over 1,000 houses belonging to Kisiis and Kikuyus were 
torched, 2 persons killed, 60 others seriously injured and about 3,000 displaced 
during the violence. On 4 January at Olerai area of Mulot Division, Franklin 
Bett, the newly elected ODM MP for Buret, and Isaac Ruto, ODM MP for 
Chepalungu, addressed about 100 Kipsigis asking them to open the road and 
coexist with the Kisii who had supported ODM but to keep pressuring for 
President Kibaki’s removal and calling for a re-tallying and /or recount of the 
votes alleging that ODM had been robbed of victory. 
Evidence was received from the Narok South DSIC that on 5 January 2008 at 
Mulot Police Station, the late Richard Kipkalya Kones (ODM MP for Bomet), 
Otieno Kajwang (ODM MP for Mbita) and Omingo Magara (ODM MP for West 






residents close to the Kenya-Tanzania and Kenya-Uganda borders to close the 
roads so that Tanzania and Uganda would respectively complain of lack of fuel 
supply through Kenya thus bringing pressure to bear on President Kibaki to 
resign.  
On 8 January 2008 both the DSIC and NSIS reported that handwritten leaflets 
had been found by members of the public at Ololulunga Trading Center (Narok 
South) warning PNU friendly communities operating businesses along the 
Narok-Olulunga Road to close their businesses and vacate the area. The NSIS 
reported that on 16 February 2008, more leaflets aimed at whipping up anti-
Kikuyu sentiments were dropped in Narok reading, 
“We cannot share the same space any longer with thieves who stole 
our votes and rights. We shall fight for our rights to the last. No Peace” 
From the evidence made available by NSIS, it would appear that in Narok South, 
the conflict between the Kipsigis and Kisii from neighbouring Sotik spilled over 
into the area. For instance on 16 February 2008, the Narok South DSIC reported 
that there had been burning of Kisii houses by the Kipsigis and that the Kipsigis 
also started grazing their livestock on Kisii farms. According to NSIS, the Kipsigis 
stated they were unwilling to let any of the Kisii return to their farms and would 
continue to cause havoc if they attempted to return. Further, the conflict in 
neighbouring Transmara District (Kilgoris Constituency)112 between the Maasai 
and Kipsigis threatened to spill over into Narok South District where Kipsigis 
youths on 17 February 2008 at Njipship forcefully grazed their cattle on land 
owned by the Maasai. On 21st February 2008, hand written leaflets were 
circulated at Meleleo warning Maasai of revenge attacks by Kipsigis to avenge the 










Police and Provincial Administration Response 
The Narok South DSIC acknowledged that there was an acute shortage of 
Administration and Regular Police and that this was compounded by a shortage 
of firearms and ammunition. Further, the DSIC observed the need for 
replenishment to enable security officers effectively restore law and order and 
protect the lives of displaced persons. While it is conceivable that the police and 
provincial administration had to make difficult strategic choices to contain much 
more serious situations that were underway in other places, one cannot help but 
wonder what would have happened if the situation in Narok had got out of 
control?  
Further, evidence was received that in order to appease gangs that were bent on 
violating the law, the authorities succumbed to public pressure and blackmail 
where the DSIC unanimously strongly recommended that the OCS for Mulot be 
transferred for his personal safety after he received death threats from the 
Maasai community for causing the death of a person 
 
The South Rift and Kisii Region  
Introduction 
A significant amount of the post election violence took place within the larger 
Kericho district. One strand of the violence in this area involved the 
neighbouring communities of the Kipsigis who live in south Rift Valley and the 
Kisii people (also known as Abagusii) who live in south Nyanza.  The traditional 
homeland of the Kipsigis people, the largest sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community, 
is the original Kericho district. A subdivision of the district has yielded five 
smaller districts: Sotik, Buret, Kipkelion, Bomet and Kericho. The ancestral 
homeland for the Kisii people is Kisii district, which forms a part of Nyanza 
province.  The original Kisii district, after subdivision, yielded South Kisii, 





Following the subdivisions, Sotik district, created out of the original Kericho 
district, borders Buret district to the north, Bomet to the east, Borabu to the 
south and Transmara to the west.  Borabu, on the other hand, borders Masaba, 
Nyamira, Sotik, Buret and Trans Mara districts. 
 
Another dimension of the violence in the larger Kericho district took place within 
and around Kipkelion area, which is now a district on its own. Kipkelion district 
is largely a settlement scheme comprising members from the ethnic communities 
of the Kipsigis, who are the majority, Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Kamba, and Luhya. The 
Kipsigis occupy three administrative divisions, Chilchila (formerly Fort Ternan), 
Londiani and Kipkelion.  
 
The discussion of the post election violence in the South Rift relates to the events 
that occurred in the Kericho area, which in this case used to encompass the 
original Kericho district, unless the intention to the contrary is clearly stated. As 
the ancestral homes of the Kipsigis and the Kisii are contiguous, and as the 
violence in this region also involved the two communities both along the 
Borabu/Sotik common border as well as within Kericho district, it is convenient 
to discuss the violence as a systemic whole. 
 
The Build up towards Violence at the Sotik/Borabu Border 
According to several witnesses, an important explanation for the post election 
conflict between the Kipsigis and Kisii communities lies in an incident that had 
occurred at Nyamarambe area, within the original Kisii district on 22 September 
2007, barely three months before the general elections.  The incident involved a 
well-publicized assault on leading personalities in the main opposition party, the 
Orange Democratic Movement. The assault was alleged to have been 
orchestrated by Simeon Nyachae, a prominent Kisii politician who was at the 
time a Cabinet Minister in the Kibaki government, and who was viewed as one of 





During the incident, William Ruto, a Kalenjin, Omingo Magara, a Kisii, both 
national office holders in ODM, as well as Chris Bichage, a Kisii parliamentary 
candidate in the ODM party, were attacked physically by youths attending a 
public rally which Nyachae had convened in Nyamarambe.  Bichage, who was 
severely beaten, needed hospitalization. According to Grace Kaindi, who was the 
Provincial Police Officer for Nyanza at the time of incident, the attack on the 
three was captured on television and became the subject of considerable 
national outrage. 
 
Another witness, Samuel Omweri, informed the Commission that the attack on 
Ruto, viewed as an affront by the Kisii on the Kalenjin people, triggered revenge 
attacks by members of the Kipsigis community on Kisii people who had bought 
land in the Sondu area, which forms a part of the Kipsigis homeland.  This 
evidence was confirmed by the Kericho District Commissioner, Wilson Njenga, 
who informed the Commission that the violence in Sondu led to the death of 
three people and the injury and displacement of several others.  According to 
Omweri, members of the Kisii community who had bought land in Kipsigis 
territory in Sondu area, where they had lived for up to 30 years were forcibly 
evicted by their Kipsigis hosts, angry over the attack on Ruto. At the time the 
Commission heard this evidence, these people had not returned as yet to where 
they were displaced from. 
 
The Commission sought to know from Kaindi what action, if any, had been taken 
over the well-publicized incident in Nyamarambe. She informed the Commission 
that all the persons who participated in the attack had been identified and 
arrested and were then placed in custody at Kisii Police Station for two or three 
days, as the police finalized arrangements to charge them in court. However, on 
the orders of the Commissioner of Police, they were released unconditionally.  On 
this incident Kaindi testified as follows: 
 
“You find that I get calls from Nairobi, my boss says, “Did you arrest 
these people?”  I say, “Yes, for this and that”. Then he says, “Well, warn 





Other than the Nyamarambe incident, the electioneering process also provided 
opportunity for the building of tensions in the south Rift area. According to the 
information presented to the Commission, several individual occurrences 
contributed to the escalation towards eventual violence between the Kipsigis and 
Kisii people. One of them was the appearance in Kericho town area of 
inflammatory leaflets against members of the Kisii and Kikuyu communities, 
both perceived to be supporters of PNU.  According to, the Kericho DC, the 
leaflets contained such messages as CHOMA KIKUYU CHOMA; SHAMBA MPYA 
ITAPATIKANA; and NOTICE: FACTORY REMAIN ASHES.  
 
Several witnesses informed the Commission that there was much incendiary 
speech by political leaders, in the context of campaigns for the presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Eye witnesses who attended a number of rallies 
appeared before the Commission and gave an account of some of the inciting 
statements that formed part of these campaigns.  For example, a witness 
testified that he attended a rally at Uhuru Garden in Kericho in August 2007 
addressed by two leading ODM politicians.  The witness claimed that the 
politicians exhorted Kipsigis people not to sell land to the Kisii people whose 
number, he complained, was already too large in the town.  According to the 
witness, the politician said that “at the end of the day, the town will remain 
owned by only two tribes, Kisiis and Kikuyus.” Another witness testified that 
although some of the speeches in rallies that took place in cosmopolitan areas 
were delivered in Kiswahili, a language understandable to most of the audience, 
the delivery of incendiary messages would often be done in Kipsigis, to cut off 
other communities present at such rallies.  
 
However, political incitement was not confined to rallies held in the Kericho area.  
At an ODM rally held on 6 December 2007 at Manga in Borabu district, Kisii 




part of the homeland of the Kalenjin.113 According to Omweri, the common 
understanding by people within the Borabu area was that Kisii people  were 
expected to vote in a particular manner for the continued favour of being allowed 
to occupy Borabu district, which might otherwise have to be given up for the 
Kipsigis. 
 
At another rally in November in Kericho, Kipsigis politicians again complained 
that “you cannot even speak because Kisiis bought the land and built”.114 At yet 
another rally at Kapkatet, which a witness115 claimed was addressed by other 
prominent ODM politicians, the Commission heard that the leaders rhetorically 
asked whether any Kipsigis owned land in Kisii area, to which the crowd 
answered “NO”.  They then wondered why Kisii people should be allowed to own 
land among the Kipsigis.  
 
According to witnesses, there was an expectation of the eviction of non-Kalenjin 
people from South Rift long before the elections were held, and this added to the 
tension in the area. The evidence on this is provided by information gathered by 
witnesses in the course of daily interactions with ordinary Kipsigis people before 
the elections.  For example, a Kisii woman who has been married to a Kalenjin 
man for more than 20 years, and whose marriage survived severe pressure 
imposed by the post election violence, informed the Commission that through 
every-day interaction with Kalenjin people, it became clear to her that they 
expected that, as a result of the enforcement of majimbo, other communities 
would have to leave the Rift Valley, and that this included people like her, who 
were non-Kipsigis married to the Kipsigis.  According to the witness “they were 
saying nobody should be left there who is not born into the Kalenjin”.  This was 
also testified to by another witness, a Kisii woman who had settled on the Sotik 








and people had been saying, you know the neighbours, ‘You don’t belong here.  
This is our farm.”  
 
The following account by a witness lends further credence to the view that            
there was widespread expectation on the part of ordinary people that majimbo 
would result in the permanent eviction of certain people from the Rift Valley: 
“Meanwhile the Kalenjin were outside the house. They taunted us and 
told us goodbye. They told us that our magnificent house was theirs 
now as it stands on their soil. I recognized some of them as the sons of 
our neighbour.”116 
 
The final period before the outbreak of violence was marked by tension over the 
outcome of the election results. The Commission heard that there were rumours 
of the planned rigging of the elections in favour of PNU’s Kibaki.  In Kericho, the 
rumours were strong enough to cause a crowd of local people to march onto the 
premises of a local church, Abundant Grace Church, which they suspected was 
holding stuffed ballot papers for the PNU presidential candidate. This compelled 
a police search on the premises. The search, however, yielded nothing.117 
 
The Commission was informed that the theft of livestock from the Borabu area 
into the Sotik district in the height of the tension between the communities 
exacerbated the tension and, according to Borabu District Commissioner, Asha 
Kiva, was the effective trigger for the violence. The DC testified that cross border 
theft of livestock was a common occurrence in the area but because of the 
prevailing tension, this particular incident was considered more aggravating 










Build up towards Violence in Kipkelion 
Kipkelion district borders the districts of Molo (at Kuresoi), Koibatek, Nandi 
South, and Uasin Gishu. This is a volatile region, which has borne the brunt of 
clashes in recent times. The District Commissioner for Kipkelion, Aden Gedow, 
(Commission Witness No. 68), testified that although the area was largely 
peaceful in the run up to the 2007 general elections, there was considerable 
tension resulting from the spill-over effects of the bordering Kuresoi, which 
experienced considerable violence before the elections. Further, the events in the 
neighbouring Molo district, where displaced persons and victims of land clashes 
had sought refuge, had a spill-over effect, and elicited ethnic passion in 
Kipkelion and the desire to retaliate, adding to the tension. 
 
DSIC reports indicate that prior to the elections, leaflets warning Kikuyus and 
Kisiis to vacate Kipkelion were circulated at Fort Ternan within Chilchila division 
and Kasheen. When leaflets appeared, the DOs of the areas in which these were 
found held peace meetings involving all the communities in their areas. However, 
according to Gedow no politician had made inflammatory speeches during the 
campaign period, a fact he attributed to the homogeneous nature of the ethnicity 
of the candidates that were contesting elective office.  
 
NSIS Evidence on the Build up towards Violence 
The Hotspot/Flashpoint report issued by the NSIS for the week ending 28 
September 2007 predicted that election related violence might exacerbate 
misunderstanding between the traditional hotspot areas in, among other places, 
the Rift Valley. Specifically, it was reported that the “area bordering the Kisii 
districts and Rongo, Rachuonyo, Bomet, Kericho, and Trans Mara would 
continue experiencing hostilities following the recent Nyamarambe skirmishes.”  
The reports of the NSIS for the week ending 19th October 2007, reported an 
escalation of the situation noted in the previous report when it noted that “along 
the Kericho, Nyando border, tension persists between Kipsigis and Abagusii 
communities within Sondu area that has led to several houses being set ablaze 




incitement by some Kipsigis leaders coupled with the perception by members of 
the same community that the Kisii were not reciprocating to their hospitality 
despite settling in their area. The ensuing clashes have left several people 
injured, seen an exodus of Luo and Kisii kinsmen from the area for fear of 
further Kipsigis raiders…” 
 
The NSIS fortnightly intelligence report for the period ending 30th October 2007 
narrated that “the Kipsigis-Kisii acrimony remains explosive following utterances 
by some political leaders in Sigowet division of Kericho district that Gusii be 
rooted out of the division.” 
 
The report for the week ending on 23rd November 2008, the last before the 
elections, spoke of a further increase in tension in the Sondu area as a result of 
threats of attacks by Kipsigis people on Kisii people who had returned to Sondu 
following the earlier eviction. 
 
 
Territorial Disputes as a cause of the Tension and Ultimately the Violence 
The Commission learnt that the post-election violence at the Borabu/Sotik 
border was in part the result of conflicting territorial claims by the Kipsigis and 
the Kisiis. Witnesses testified that the Kipsigis consider the land comprising 
Borabu district to be part of their ancestral land and the correct boundary 
between their district and Kisii to be some way into the Kisii side, at a place 
called Metamaywa. 
 
We heard from Samuel Omweri, a community leader and a former Member of 
Parliament, that the Kisii people refute the claim by their Kipsigis neighbours 
and have a territorial claim of their own against the Kipsigis. According to Mr. 
Omweri, the Kisii claim that they occupied not only Borabu but also all the area 
up to a place called Kabianga, which is now a part of Kericho district. They claim 




that the Kisii were the first occupants of the area.118 The Kisii assert that they 
lived on the land up to the rivers Sondu and Oyani to the south and that they 
were evicted from these areas in 1946 to make room for the settlement of 
soldiers returning from the Second World War in Ethiopia and the Uasin Gishu 
Maasai who had been moved from Trans Nzoia.119 As a result of being pushed 
out of their homelands, the Kisii found themselves being administered as part of 
what was called Sotik west during the colonial period. During all this time, the 
Kipsigis and the Kisii were part of Nyanza province. However, the Boundary 
Delimitation Commission acceded to a request by the Kipsigis to join with 
Nandis to form the “Kalenjin Alliance” in the Rift Valley (the areas covered by 
Sotik West, Kipkelion and Londiani), while the Kisii remained with the Luos as 
constituent ethnic communities forming Nyanza Province.120 
 
The former DC for Borabu, Asha Katheri Kiva, told the Commission that the 
Kipsigis hoped that through the post election violence, they would drive their 
Kisii neighbours out of Borabu and establish what they consider to be the 
correct boundary between the two communities. The Commission heard that this 
was not the first time that the Kipsigis had violently asserted their territorial 
claim against the Kisii. They did so throughout the early years following the 
establishment of the settlement schemes for the Kisii in the 1960s and that as 
part of this there was fighting between the two communities in 1964 and again 
in 1969. More recently, there was election-related violence in 1992, 1997, and 
2002 also provided occasion for the violent assertion of this territorial claim. 
The Commission was further informed by Ms Kiva that rivalry, which from time 
to time broke into war, between the Kipsigis and the Kisii is an ancient 
phenomenon, predating the establishment of the colonial state that, on both 
sides, this rivalry has been passed down through folklore from generation to 









The Kiliku Committee traced the conflict between the Kipsigis, the Maasai and 
the Kisii to the post colonial arrangements in relation to land.  The splitting of 
the country into white highlands and native reserves was one of the practices of 
the colonial state. At independence, the white highlands partly forming the 
present border area between the Kipsigis and Kisii were apportioned between the 
Maasai, Kipsigis and Kisii communities and, under the facilitation of the 
Settlement Fund Trustees, members of the three communities bought land that 
was formerly owned by the departing settlers.  Members of the Kisii community 
who had a higher population density settled in larger numbers in the area than 
the Kipsigis and the Maasai. The Committee noted that the Kisii had initially 
moved into the area through settlement schemes but lately they had done so 
through direct purchases and leases. These factors explain the significant 
presence of the Kisii in Bomet and Narok districts.121 
 
In Kipkelion, according to the Kipkelion DSIC (Kipkelion District Security and 
Intelligence Appreciation No. 1/2008 Held on 18th January, 2008) Reports, the 
clashes underlie a history of ethnic animosity and hatred caused by disputes 
over land which the Kipsigis claim to be their ancestral land, but which was 
appropriated by the European settlers in the pre-independence times, and later 
sold to members of other ethnic groups. The Nandis also claim that River 
Kipchorian, which traverses the district, is their true boundary with the Kipsigis 
and is part of Tinderet. The problem manifests itself in an ethnically polarized 
environment and the land issue having been politicized. This explains why 
heightened clashes have almost always coincided with electioneering periods, 
with the question of displacement of the “indigenous” Kipsigis being the reason 










Execution of the Violence: 
(a) In Sotik/Borabu 
The Sotik District Commissioner, Humphrey Nakitare informed the Commission 
that violence in his district began on 28 December 2007.  At this point, the 
violence was confined to the district and had not spread to the border area.  It 
took the form of blockage of roads and, according to Nakitare, “sporadic rioting 
all over the district”.  It was the opinion of the District Commissioner that the 
cause of the violence was “delay in announcing the presidential elections 
results.”   
 
The evidence of Nakitare was that the actors in these skirmishes were armed 
youth from the Kipsigis community. Conflict started on the 28th of December 
2007, with marauding youth barricading roads using stones and trees and 
lighting bonfires. On the following day there was an upsurge of violence with 
much action targeting persons of non-Kalenjin origin perceived to be supporting 
the PNU. Property was destroyed and people hacked with crude weapons. On 
30th December, the youths resorted to massive arson attacks in urban centers, 
and more specifically, Sotik, Kaplong and Chebilat. 
 
Eventually the violence moved to the border area between Borabu and Sotik and 
now involved members of the Kipsigis and Kisii communities fighting at various 
points on different days on the long common border. The Sotik DC was asked 
the question as to who between the two communities started the inter-ethnic 
fighting and he answered that it was the Kipsigis who first attacked the Kisii. 
According to Asha Kiva, the Borabu DC, the first house was burnt by Kipsigis 
raiders at a place called Esise, in Ekerubo location, within her district.  This was 
on 8th January.  Before then, there had been no violence on the Borabu side, 
although the Kisii/Kericho road, which passes through Sotik, had remained 
barricaded.  Kiva and members of her DSIC visited the place where the house 
had been burnt and convened a meeting in the affected area where, she said, 
there was a lot of tension. Even as the meeting went on, more houses were being 




living on the Rift Valley side of the border, as well as sporadic fighting between 
youths on the border. 
 
The Commission was informed by witness number 123 that in the course of the 
violence, a peace meeting was held in Sotik area and addressed by the leading 
members of the ODM including Omingo Magara, a Kisii, and Kipkalya Kones, a 
Kipsigis. According to the evidence, speaking in Kiswahili, Magara implored the 
Kipsigis people to stop the fighting with the Kisii people. In Kiswahili, Kones 
repeated the same message before he switched to speak in Kipsigis. In that 
language, the witness alleges, he told the Kipsigis to continue with the fighting.  
The Commission visited Ribaita Primary School on the Sotik/Borabu border and 
was informed that the school had been burnt by the Kipsigis during the border 
fighting between the Kipsigis and Kisii. Several other schools along the common 
border, including Isoge, Rianyaemo, Saiga-Ngiya, Memusi, Magombo, Kebuse, 
Raitigo Secondary and Gonzagoza suffered varying levels of destruction.        
                                        
In Kericho, it was the testimony of Wilson Njega, the local District Commissioner 
that violence broke out on 30th December, after the announcement of the 
presidential election results. The following day, a large crowd of people armed 
with improvised weapons marched on Kericho town from all directions. They 
invaded the premises of the Co-operative Bank and Equity Bank as well as Stage 
Mart Supermarket, and gained access after shattering windows and breaking 
down doors.  They helped themselves to whatever of value they could lay their 
hands on and, according to the local OCPD Aliwa, some people attempted to 
access cash in the automatic teller machines in the banks. Aliwa added that a 
number of them who were armed with bows and arrows attacked the police with 
arrows. Responding with fire, police killed six people and repulsed the rioters. 
According to Aliwa, the severest violence in Kericho was on 30th and 31st 
December, 2007 and 1st January, 2008.  Thereafter, the violence changed form.  
Whereas, in the first three days or so, rioters confronted the police openly in 
Kericho town, the violence later moved away into the tea estates and the rural 




estimated that the violence lasted from 30th December, 2007 and for the next 
two weeks or so there was intermittent fighting although, according to him, this 
had been contained. 
 
According to Aliwa, whereas the initial violence was committed by armed youth 
in the immediacy of their neighbourhoods, the subsequent violence began to 
display trends of raiders travelling long distances to commit acts of violence 
outside their home areas. For example, the attacks in Kipkelion were carried out 
by raiders coming from other districts. The attack in Mutaragon and Munistry 
were carried out by raiders from outside these areas. In the particular case of 
Mutaragon the raiders came from Nandi district.  In the case of the attacks in 
Kericho, some were carried out by people from the neighbouring Buret district.  
Further, attackers also came from Bomet to attack tea estates which neighbour 
the district. 
 
The Sotik DC, Nakitare, confirmed the existence of this trend when he told the 
Commission that, in the case of Sotik, attackers came from as far as Pokot.  
The evidence of co-ordination of the violence is further supported by the Report 
of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights which related the organized 
manner in which they were carried out.  According to that Report, in areas like 
Kipkelion, in advance of contemplated attacks, Kalenjin attackers would place 
distinctive marks in front of all dwellings that belonged to members of their 
community as a sign to the raiders as to which houses to pass over when they 
carried out the attacks. Traditional calabashes were mentioned as one form of 
such distinctive marks. The report further stated that in the subsequent days, 
attacks on settlements were done from all directions and at the same time with 
clear direction, in a manner indicative of planning.  
 
Another round of serious violence broke out on 31st January 2008, triggered by 
the killing in Eldoret of the Member of Parliament for Ainamoi, David Too. One of 
the outstanding incidents in this violence was the attack by a mob on the 




Ahmed Dado, was killed by the mob and his colleague sustained an arrow shot 
wound. Aliwa described the incident as follows: 
“When the message was received, a group of youths attacked Ainamoi 
DO’s office where PC Omar Dado was stationed. He had a firearm. He 
tried his best to shoot in the air to scare them but they chased him. 
Where he went to hide, they burned that house until he was dragged 
out, killed and burned on the road. They went further and shot another 
Administration Police Officer with an arrow on the head, they snatched 
his firearm and they robbed all the buildings… (Thereafter) the 
criminals who stole the firearms sneaked them in the church where 
they were recovered.” 
 
A Tea Picker Is Violently Attacked by Kipsigis 
One of the saddest personal stories that came out of the Sotik/Borabu violence is that of 
Simeon Atandi Monyancha, who spoke to the Commission in Borabu. Monyancha was 
working for the Sotik Tea Highland Company as a tea picker. On 1 February, while 
picking tea, he was attacked and both his hands were amputated. His story as given to 
the Commission is told below: 
I used to be a tea picker at Sotik Tea until 1st February 2008 when I was attacked by 
Kipsigis raiders who were attacking and burning property belonging to the Kisiis. 
On this day, I was in the tea estate picking tea. At around 9.00 a.m. the head boy Mr. 
Daniel Kimetto, told us that there was violence all over and advised us to go to our 
houses to hide. I went to my house. I lived in Camp Five which consisted of many 
Kipsigis. I heard them saying that Kisiis must move out of Camp Five and join fellow 
Kisiis at Camp Majengo. 
After securing a house at Camp Majengo, I packed my household items together with 
my clothes and began to go to the Camp Majengo…. I saw six armed young men with 
pangas, bows and arrows. They aimed at me with the arrows. I pleaded with them not to 
shoot me. They put the arrows down and started assaulting me with the pangas. I tried 
to block the pangas using both my hands to protect my head. I saw my left hand being 
cut three times. Then they cut my head on the left hand side. Blood spilt all over my 
face and I could not see what was happening. I lost consciousness. 
When I gained consciousness, I found myself in Litein Hospital feeling a lot of pain and 
both my hand had been amputated. 
 
It is during the second wave of violence that Chebilat, a border shopping centre 




investments in a school, located on the Sotik side, was extensively looted 
testified that there were requests by her Kipsigis neighbours that she should 
reconsider her decision to flee to the Kisii side, just before her school was burnt, 
as they feared that her flight would insight the Kisii community and attract 
retaliatory attacks on them. In the end, however, she had to move to the Kisii 
side because of fear for her safety when a gang of attackers arrived in her school, 
and the local people were unable to give her protection. In her view, some of the 
attacks were carried out by people from the inland and without regard to the 
views of the local residents at the border area. The attackers on her school left 
for her a message on one of the writing boards in the classrooms which well 
sums up the feelings that drove the violence. On the board they wrote:  
“KISIIS AND KALENJINS WILL NEVER LIVE TOGETHER” 
 
(b) In Kipkelion 
According to Gedow, the Kipkelion DC, violence erupted on 30th December 2007, 
with the announcement of the final tally in the presidential election results. The 
announcement was immediately followed by widespread incidents of arson. 
Some areas within the district, in particular the areas of Molo, Soget and 
Kamatins, had intense skirmishes. Initially, there was an ethnic angle to the 
arson attacks but this later spilt over to all communities living in the district. 
Illegal roadblocks were mounted by youth at various spots along the highway, 
notably at Kapsoit. 
 
The violence also targeted various government installations and resulted in the 
burning of and vandalism on some buildings and vehicles. The offices of three 
chiefs, 80 schools, 2 zonal offices and 7 dispensaries were vandalized. One forest 
guard was killed and there was illegal logging of forests.  
 
The Commission conducted an extensive tour of the South Rift Valley area and 
was struck by the widespread nature of arson on homes of persons not 





There was evidence of some level of training in preparation to commit violence. 
The Commission received evidence in the form of a digital video disk (DVD) 
recording that was captured in Kuresoi, which borders Kipkelion. The video 
showed attackers being trained at Kimaranya village in Keringet. The evidence as 
to training is supported by the evidence of the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights, which asserted that training and oath-taking took place in 
camps in preparation for the attacks.  The report said: 
“The training reportedly took place in the farms of senior leaders in the 
area or in the region’s forests. One police constable, reportedly trained 
attackers in Kericho Town. The attackers were well equipped with 
weapons and materials that they would need to conduct some of their 
activities, such as power saws used in cutting down huge trees that 
were used to block the roads.” 
 
According to the KNHCR Report the attackers in Kericho, Bureti and Londiani, 
the latter of which is in Kipkelion, reportedly sent warnings to their victims of 
the impending attack, before the attacks were actually carried out. Such 
warnings were delivered by telephone. The Report concludes that on that 
premise, there was a premeditated intent to forcibly evict the victims from the 
region. 
 
Further claims regarding the violence was provided by the testimony of a Kipsigis 
farmer at Sachangwan location, Molo district. The farmer testified regarding a 
review meeting, to asses whether the violence had met its objects, held in his 
area at the end of the fighting. The witness informed the Commission that on 
28th February, 2008, a meeting was convened by the Kalenjins at Baharini to 
discuss the aftermath of the post election violence. The meeting was chaired by a 
retired Assistant Chief, and attended by, among other local leaders. According to 
the witness, the background to this meeting was that non-Kalenjin homes had 
been burnt down and the owners having fled the area, the meeting sought to 
discuss measures for ensuring the ritual cleansing of the area youth, who had 




violence, as the burning of residences is considered an abomination under 
Kalenjin values. He testified that in order to achieve the cleansing of local youths 
who had participated in the burning of homes, the meeting agreed that a goat 
would be slaughtered for use in conducting the cleansing. Secondly, the meeting 
was the occasion for discussing how farms formerly occupied by those who had 
fled, would be purchased or hired out affordably. At the meeting, the witness 
said he disagreed with the idea of sharing out the property of neighbours who 
had fled from the area to escape the violence. As a result of his opposition, he 
was viewed as a traitor, and on 17th March 2008, his house was razed down by 
fellow Kalenjins, most of whom he identified.  
 
Following the killing of the area legislator Too, there was an escalation in the 
level of violence in the area. According to police reports tendered by Gedow, 47 
people died, 27 of them of arrow shots, 7 of injuries using crude weapons, 11 of 
gun shot wounds and two of burning.  Property was also destroyed, with 3568 
buildings totally razed down, 23 buildings partially burnt and 1542 buildings 
vandalized. According to Gedow, a large number of persons participated in acts 
of arson and almost each of them carried a container of petrol for use in the 
burning. The Commission heard that the main method of burning was by 
placing accelerants on sticks which would then be propelled by hand onto the 
targeted buildings. Others would just torch the houses directly.  
 
 
Police and Provincial Administration Response 
All the district commissioners and members of the police force that the 
Commission interviewed pronounced themselves satisfied with their response to 
the post election violence. However the Commission was concerned about a 
number of specific issues raised by the evidence in relation to their response. 
These are discussed below. 
 
The account by government officials in Kericho was they were unaware the there 




scenario for them was the possibility of violence in the lead up to the elections 
especially in the areas that they considered to be prone to violence such as 
Nyagacho and Matobo in Kericho town. There were no contingency arrangements 
in relation to the violence that ended up engulfing the multinational estates in 
Kericho and, therefore, no provision to deal with the violence. 
 
The response by the authorities in Kericho to the violence that they thought may 
happen was to mount peace committee meetings in their areas. Amid the hate 
messages that have been referred to in the evidence, the local administration 
carried on with the establishment of peace committees and the convening several 
meetings in the affected areas. All the officials that the Commission spoke to 
participated in or facilitated these meetings, which were organized by the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya. This was its preferred intervention in dealing 
with the possibility of electoral violence.  
 
The ECK and other government officials who came before the Commission 
appeared to derive much satisfaction from the fact that these peace meetings 
had taken place throughout the country before the elections. They all seemed to 
regard the organization of such meetings as sufficient and exonerated 
themselves from blame for lack of preparation in regard to the violence that 
eventually occurred in the country. Officials seemed to ask this question: “what 
else were we supposed to do if, against our advice, people chose to fight?” With 
the benefit of what is now known, there must be asked serious questions as to 
the whether the peace meetings that were convened by the ECK had enduring 
value or whether they provided the easy option for public officials faced with the 
hate messages that abounded in the period before the post elections and which, 
in the view of the Commission, played a big role in the post election violence. 
When violence broke out in Kericho town, which was invaded by multitudes of 
rioters, the police were unprepared to deal with it. They responded with extreme 
force, killing six people who they claim were among the rioters that had invaded 
the Co-operative and Equity Banks in the town. The area OCPD, Walter Aliwa, 




the police with arrows but there is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. 
On the contrary, Aliwa’s evidence that the police shot the rioters because “these 
were robbers who were breaking banks” is not the real reason why police shot 
into the crowd. In the view of the Commission, this shooting constitutes an 
unwarranted use of force by the police and must be investigated. In Borabu, the 
Commission was told that a policeman in plainclothes shot a man, Joshua 
Nyarunda. Police later claimed that the shooting was accidental, but no action 
was taken against the police officer involved.  
 
The sudden onset of riots in the south Rift required police response to multiple 
situations at the same time. At the beginning of the violence, the strength of 
personnel in Kipkelion and Kericho districts was 350, of whom 100 were APs. 
The OCPD had to request for additional personnel from outside the district.  
These came from the Administration Police, Anti-Stock Theft Unit and the 
General Service Unit, and arrived on 1st January 2008 or soon thereafter.  In 
Sotik, the DCIO sought fortification both from the Rift Valley and Nyanza 
Provinces, and in all, an additional 200 police officers came in as reinforcement. 
Had there been prior planning and appreciation of the possible eventualities, the 
reinforcement would have been available much earlier and might have prevented 
much of the initial violence. An example of the inability by the security agencies 
to make contingency arrangements was provided by Aliwa himself when he 
testified that he refused to even contemplate that ODM had a chance of winning 
the elections and therefore did not provide for the possible consequences of such 
an outcome.  
 
Other than the excessive use of force by police, as exemplified by the Kericho 
town incident, the Commission received information that police response to 
rescue people under attack was slow or altogether absent, although in some 
instances they faced real obstacles.  In one incident in Sotik area, the house of a 
retired couple was surrounded by raiders for nine hours before they were 




“On 5th February, early in the morning my husband woke up and 
went to till the farm.  Shortly after he went out he came running 
back to the house.  He ordered us to close all the doors and 
windows.  He told us that he saw a group of Kalenjin youth coming 
towards our house.  A few minutes later we heard their voices 
outside. They were calling us by our names and they asked us to 
come out.  We recognized their voices.  One of them was our 
neighbour.  
 
At around 9.00 a.m. they started breaking the doors and the 
windows of the house. They could not break into the house because 
of the grill reinforcement. I called the Chief to come and help us. He 
sent a vehicle and administration policemen. They could not reach 
us immediately because all the roads leading to Chepilat were 
barricaded by Kalenjin warriors. They came to us around 6 p.m. and 
they escorted us out of the house.” 
 
Another witness who sustained an injury when his home was surrounded and 
attacked by raiders recounted the following: 
“When I turned I found that I had been speared on the left, where I 
am showing you. At that point, I called the Chief, the Chief told me 
that there is no way he could assist me. The Chief advised me to 
look for other means of assisting myself.” 
 
Fortunately for this witness, police on patrol arrived where he had been attacked 
and took him to hospital. 
 
Police response to people in distress was hindered not only by the inadequacy of 
personnel on the part of the security forces, who were simply overwhelmed by 
the demands on them and were, unable to cope with the situations created by 
the violence but also because those under attack were spread over long 




had provided vital support had hardly been concluded by the time they were 
called upon to deal with the post election violence. A large number of police 
officers were still on the way back to their duty stations when the violence 
erupted. Further, and as the police and other witnesses told the Commission, 
the emergence of illegal roadblocks hindered police movement, or altogether 
blocked off access to some of those in need.  
 
To deal with the problem of blocked roads, the DSIC put in place a plan to clear 
the highway. The police deployed personnel on the major highways to monitor 
spots on the highway prone to blockages and, generally, conduct mobile patrols 
in the potentially volatile areas.  
Further, the Commission received evidence that police sometimes stood 
passively as property was damaged and did nothing to restrain the violence or 
arrest the perpetrators. For example the Commission heard that, “Chebilat was 
not burnt in one day. It was burnt for almost three weeks. There were 
destructions in front of the officers”. 
 
The Commission received reports that, due to bias based on ethnicity, some 
officers were reluctant to prevent the violence or to provide protection to the 
affected persons. As part of such bias, there were reports that a Luo police officer 
was accused of blocking the Kipsigis from reaching the road in their bid to 
escape and instead redirecting them to their homes only for them to be attacked 
by the Kikuyus. Further, Kikuyu officers stood aside as Kalenjins faced violence 
and vice versa. 
 
In some situations police failed to respond to situations of distress even where 
early warning and pleas had been communicated to them. The KNCHR Report 
states that a house was burnt a few metres from the Londiani Police Station in 
spite of prior notification of the police of an impending attack. Where there was 
police intervention, disproportionate force was sometimes applied. For instance, 
the KNCHR Report implicates, a senior police officer, in the killing of several 




further states that an OCS accompanied by other officers shot about 17 civilians 
in Londiani and Kericho during a riot.  
 
After the death of MP Too which led to an upsurge in violence, the DSIC 
reinforced the available security personnel with additional officers drawn from 
the General Service Unit, Regular Police, Administration Police and the Criminal 
Investigations Department. Further, 30 members of the Rapid Deployment Unit 
of the Administration Police Department were sent in to reinforce operations.   
At the Kipkelion DSIC meeting held on 12th February, 2008, the DCIO told the 
meeting that he had instructed personnel to search various premises which he 
believed were where the hate leaflets were being printed.  
 
Response to IDPs 
One of the issues authorities in the South Rift had to deal with, as a result of the 
post election violence, was the emergence of internally displaced persons.  Kisii 
town became one of the largest reception centres for IDPs in the Western part of 
Kenya. According to local DC Augustine Nthiga, the district received IDPs from 
Upper Migori, Rachuonyo, Kericho, Siaya, Homa Bay, Bondo, Nandi, Bureti and 
Kakamega.  At one point, there were 23, 000 IDPs in Kisii town. 
 
In Sotik, the DC said there were 8500 people displaced from the district. Most of 
these were Kisii and Kikuyu. The Kipsigis returnees were absorbed by the local 
community and did not go to displacement camps. A temporary camp was 
established at the Sotik Police Station.  These IDPs were thereafter taken to 
places of safety.  The Kikuyu were taken to Nakuru and Molo and places in 
Central Province.  The Kisiis were taken to Ekerenyo, a camp established in 
North Kisii district.  Although Kiva, the DC in Borabu, told the Commission that 
those displaced by the fighting along the border were absorbed inland and that 
as a result, no camps were set up in her district, the Commission received 
evidence that IDPs displaced from along the border were facing a life of neglect 
from the authorities, including the DC herself, who had refused to even 





The Kericho OCPD told the Commission that that the number of IDPs from 
among tea plantation workers stood at 9,000. Of these 6,808 had been returned 
to their places of work by the time he testified before the Commission. 2000 
business people had been displaced as a result of the violence out of whom 1269 
had returned to their businesses at the time of his testimony. The last category 
of IDPs were persons who owned land in Kericho before the violence. The 
number stood at 250, of whom only 50 had returned to their land.  
 
In relation to Kipkelion, the Commission received evidence that the district 
received IDPs as early as November, 2007 who had escaped the fighting in Molo 
and Kuresoi.  These were received in Chepsion and Londiani.  The District 
Commissioner arranged for meetings with them and they were returned to where 
they had fled from. 
 
The conflict in Kipkelion led to the establishment of 17 IDP camps, with one 
hosting those of Kalenjin descent and the other of mixed ethnic composition. 
There were also heightened relocations of people moving to ethnically 
homogeneous locations, which they considered safe. There were convoys to 
Siaya, Kisii, Nyamira, Nakuru, Molo, Nyahururu, Nyeri and Thika. 
Gedow admitted that initially, the Government did not facilitate these 
movements, ostensibly because “it was not the intention of the government to 
move people from their homes.” He told the Commission that what they put in 
place were measures to protect life and property and not more.  
 
Report of the Law Society of Kenya (South Rift Valley Branch) on Police 
Misconduct in Kericho district 
 
The understanding by the Commission of the nature of violence that took place 
in Kericho district was greatly enhanced by the submission by the Law Society of 
Kenya, South Rift Branch, for which the Commission is grateful.  Through its 
Secretary, Gideon Mutai, the Society submitted to the Commission the 




incidents of violence in the district, which either involved them personally, 
members of their families, persons known to them, or occurrences which they 
had personally witnessed. The first issue to be addressed is the credibility of the 
information provided by the Law Society. Out of the 39 cases of shooting that the 
evidence dealt with, it indicated that 23 people were shot dead while the rest 
sustained severe injuries whose consequences varied greatly. The Commission 
compared the list of the deceased persons provided by the Law Society and 
confirmed that these are already part of the list of deceased persons in Kericho 
which was provided by the MOH for the area, Dr. Ambrose Rotich. The 
information provided by the Law Society is, therefore, highly credible as it 
materially corroborates the evidence from hospital sources which the 
Commission generally considers to be credible. A number of broad matters are 
disclosed by the evidence collected by the Law Society, South Rift Branch, which 
greatly supplements for the inability of the Commission to hold hearings in the 
area. These are discussed below. 
 
Out of the cases of 42 people covered by the evidence of the Society, it is 
indicated that police shot 36 of them. Two of the remaining six persons were 
Kalenjin men severely assaulted by police. As two others were shot by dead by 
“unknown assailants”, there is no evidence that these were the police.  The last 
one was a Kalenjin man shot with an arrow in Chebilat by unknown people.  
 
A review of the cases covered by the evidence of the Law Society indicates that 
the epicentres of the violence in Kericho district included Kericho town, Ainamoi 
shopping centre, the Londiani junction, and Chebilat centre, which between 
them, accounted for 14 of all cases covered.  The rest of the cases were widely 
dispersed through the district, and occurred in such places as Chesinende 
centre, Kapsuser centre and Chelimo estate.  In this regard, the evidence 
confirms other available evidence which indicates Kericho town and Ainamoi to 
have experienced the greatest of the violence in Kericho district. The severest 
violence in Ainamoi coincided with the death of the local Member of Parliament, 





The evidence of the Society brings new insights into what happened in Ainamoi, 
following the death of the M.P. It is alleged that the death of the MP resulted in a 
large crowd of local residents marching on the Ainamoi DO’s office, apparently to 
express their anger. It is indicated that these were met by police officers who 
shot in the air as a way of dissuading them from coming near the office. It is far 
from clear how many policemen were present but these could not have been 
many.  The evidence mentions the name of the ill-fated Omar Dado and another 
policeman, Paul Chum, as having been involved in the unfolding stand-off. It is 
alleged that a policeman shot a person as he bent over the body of his brother, 
who had just been killed by the police and that Dado then gave chase of the shot 
person, who was later arrested. An allegation from the Ainamoi incident is that 
five villagers who were admitted in hospital as a result of gunshot wounds were 
subsequently charged in court with the unbailable offence of robbery with 
violence and were, at the time that the Law Society recorded their evidence, still 
remanded in custody. According to one of them, Francis Kipng’eno, the sole 
means by which they were identified was the fact that they sustained gunshot 
wounds. Kipng’eno said, “I know that the basis for my arrest is because I had 
gunshot wounds as all of us who were at Ainamoi were arrested and charged”. 
Further, the facts constituting the offence that they face in court appear to 
revolve around the violence that took place in Ainamoi. Within the time 
available, it was not made clear to the Commission how an offence of robbery 
could be sustained against the two under the circumstances described, but the 
matter, we are told, is before the court. The regrettable violence in Ainamoi 
would need to be fully investigated and appropriate action, as the evidence will 
warrant, will then need to be taken.    
 
The evidence of the Law Society adds to the already clear picture of arbitrary or 
high-handed conduct on the part of the police. In one case, a man was beaten 
and injured seriously by police who invaded a reconciliation meeting between the 
Kisii and Kipsigis at Chebilat on 5 February 2008. He was then arrested and 




exposure to considerable risk, given the existing ethnic animosity at the time.  
His injuries must have been serous as he was hospitalized at Kaplong Mission 
Hospital for four days. The evidence also relates the story of a man  from Kapsoit 
centre who claims that his place of work, a butchery, was invaded by policemen 
(GSU), who hacked and seriously injured him on the hand, using the 
implements for cutting meat that were within the premises.  The policemen then 
robbed him of Kshs.51,000, belonging to the business, and shortly thereafter 
shot another man as he fled from the scene, having witnessed the hacking 
incident. The man who was shot corroborated the hacking incident as well as 
testifying to his being shot. 
 
It appears that where police used ammunition on the crowd, they did so 
indiscriminately and in many of the situations, the shooting was not preceded by 
any form of warning. This conclusion is supported by the evidence of a 
significant number of the witnesses who recounted that “suddenly the police... 
started shooting at the crowd”, or “police suddenly arrived and started shooting 
at us.” The indiscriminate nature of the shooting is further demonstrated by the 
profile of the victims of the shooting, and the circumstances surrounding the 
shooting. One of these was a teenaged girl shot while coming from the posho 
mill, where she had gone to grind maize meal for the family. Two of the victims 
claim that they were shot in the vicinity of hospitals, where they had gone to see 
patients, and two others claim that they caught in a cross fire between police 
and rioters. 
 
In each of the cases provided by the Law Society, very serious allegations are 
made against the police which, if true, would constitute grave offences on the 
part of the police.  These cases would need to be investigated independently, as 
is discussed elsewhere in this report. 
 
Evidence of Organization of the Violence in Kipkelion 
The Sotik DC, in whose district violence began on 28th December, informed the 




of the election results. The Commission found this difficult to believe, as voting 
had taken place only the previous day. The commencement of violence in Sotik 
so early and at any rate before the disputed election results had become an 
issue, is indicative of the fact that there were reasons for the violence other than 
the delay in announcing the election results, or the announcement of an 
outcome that many people in the south Rift believed to be incorrect and unjust. 
The Commission considered the evidence which suggested that the attacks in 
the Kipkelion area were conducted in a highly co-ordinate manner. As part of 
this, the question of the source of the petrol that was used to burn property in 
Kipkelion was of some interest to the Commission. According to Gedow, 
allegations that a known person had transported petrol that was used to 
conduct arson were discounted by the investigations carried out by the police. 
He, however, admitted that petrol was used but could not trace the particular 
station where it was bought, partly due to the large number of persons who 
participated in the burning. The DC added that the possession of petrol at that 
time of the year (December 10th -23rd) would pass as normal as there was a 
possibility of stocking of fuel by people for fear of possible shortage.  
 
However, the Commission finds it difficult to believe that common people, most 
of whom ordinarily have no use for petrol, would need to stockpile the 
commodity as a contingency against possible shortages in the electioneering 
period. The Commission wonders whether the widespread availability of petrol, 
which was then used in the burning of property in the area, could be a pointer to 
prior preparation.   
 
As to the possibility of the violence having been planned, the DC denied 
knowledge by the District Intelligence Committee of impending violence, and that 
in any event, that was highly unlikely as it was largely a neighbour-against-
neighbour conflict.  
 
According to Gedow, no evidence had come to the knowledge of the DSIC of any 




administration that the violence was not planned must be considered in the 
context of a number of other factors that came to the attention of the 
Commission. 
 
First, as discussed, the testimony referred to earlier that there was warning to 
victims by perpetrators of the violence before this was actually carried out. This 
fact is inconsistent with spontaneous violence and consistent with planning. 
Second, a large number of people would appear to have known that there would 
be violence long before this happened, as the Commission was told by Borabu 
residents. Third, it is the view of the Commission that the scale and extent of the 
violence is itself suggestive of planning. Fourth, there is evidence of some form of 
training having taken place in preparation for violence. Fifth, although the 
Commission was not able to establish the validity of the claim, there were 
allegations that some form of oath-taking also took place in preparation for the 
violence.  Sixth, there is evidence of at least one meeting to review the situation 




It is the view of the Commission, the Kipsigis were unhappy with the presence of 
the Kikuyu and the Kisii in their homeland in large numbers. The tensions 
between the Kipsigis, on the one hand, and the Kisiis and Kikuyus, on the other, 
during the electioneering period resulted from this. It is the view of the 
Commission that an aspect of the violence was spontaneous, and that the 
disaffection with the election results or the perceived illegitimacy of the process 
could have been as the cause of the violence. The targeting of the Kikuyu and 
the Kisii during this initial violence was not only a backlash by the Kipsigis for 
the unjustified loss that they felt had been inflicted on them, but also an attempt 
to exact retribution against those in their neighbourhood who they felt 
contributed to that loss by voting in a manner inconsistent with their own voting 
patterns. Further, the violence was a form of vicarious vengeance against those 




victory. As supporters of a political system that they believed had deeply 
wronged them, the Kisii and Kikuyu were targeted in the violence that the 
Kipsigis unleashed following the announcement of the election results. The 
targeting of government property and businesses owned by Kikuyu and Kisii was 
consistent with this feeling. This phase of the violence was spontaneous, broke 
out immediately after the announcement of the results, was mainly 
opportunistic in nature, and found its greatest expression in urban areas.  
 
However, it would be an oversimplification of the problem to say that the post 
election violence in the south Rift was solely caused by dissatisfaction over the 
presidential results, much as this was an important problem. Clearly, other 
factors were at work as well. As indicated by a discussion of the evidence the 
violence, initially spontaneous, increasingly showed signs of organisation, the 
longer it went on.  
 
Further, in parts of the Rift Valley, violence began on 29th December, before the 
election results were announced. The Commission cannot therefore rule out that 
some of the violence was planned. The reasons for this would not have been 
dissatisfaction over the election results. It had to do with the interpretation of 
the “majimbo system” that some members of the Kalenjin community, the host 
community to a large number of other ethnic communities, had, which was that 
these other communities would be made to leave the Rift Valley once the 
majimbo system was put in place. Rising up in arms, in the context of the post 
election violence, therefore was a self-driven imposition of this version of 
majimbo, through the forceful removal of people from places that were not 
considered to be their homeland.  
 
As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Commission finds that there was 
deplorable behaviour on the part of the police in the country, including in the 
Rift Valley, but the problems of the Kalenjin-dominated parts of the Rift Valley 




violence, which accounted for the bulk of the killings that happened in that part 
of the country.  
 
One of the explanations to the conflict in the south Rift is the competing claims 
over ethnic territory between the Kipsigis and Kisii. The coincidence of this 
conflict with the electioneering process, however, suggests, that whatever the 
merits of the dispute, it is manipulated into becoming an electoral issue, and an 
excuse for violence. The Commission did not receive sufficient information to 
determine the relative merits of these historical claims. However, the 
Commission was struck by the lack of a formalised articulation of this dispute in 
any form other than through violence. For example, the Commission did not 
receive evidence that there has been a process of political engagement by the 
leaders of the two communities that was aimed at discussing the existence of a 
border dispute and its possible resolution. In the circumstances, the border 
dispute is an occasional problem, manifesting itself when the two communities 
have different points of view on a matter that is important to them like elections 
and then vanishing until the next season of disagreement. The Commission does 
not have the confidence to make a finding that a legitimate border grievance 









Violence in Western and Nyanza Provinces 
Western Province 
Introduction  
Western Province borders Uganda to the West, Nyanza Province to the South and 
Rift Valley to the East. The province is home to the Luhya ethnic group who are 
divided into various sub-groups. Though the rural parts are largely 
homogeneous, there are parts of the province which have settlement schemes 
inhabited by people from diverse ethnic origins. The urban centres are also 
ethnically mixed. 
The Province comprises 19 districts, namely, Bungoma East, Bungoma West, 
Bungoma North, Bungoma South, Busia, Samia, Bunyala, Butere, Mumias, 
Kakamega South, Kakamega North, Kakamega East, Kakamega Central, Lugari, 
Mt. Elgon, Teso, Vihiga, Hamisi and Emuhaya. 
Western Province is home to the mountainous and agriculturally-rich Mt. Elgon 
district, which is at the centre of a long standing dispute over land and cattle 
rustling between the Sabaot and other ethnic communities – Bukusu, Ndorobo, 
Teso, Kikuyu and the Luo. The dispute has pitted security forces of the 
Government of Kenya against a proscribed militia group, the Sabaot Land 
Defence Force (SLDF).  
Because the problems associated with violence in Mt. Elgon predated the 
elections, the Commission was unable to establish any link with the 2007 PEV 
and therefore did not integrate it into investigation of PEV in the region.  It was 
the evidence of General Mutinda Kianga, the Chief of General Staff of the Kenya 
Armed Forces, that the conflict in Mt. Elgon started long before the elections and 
continued even after the post-election violence. We were of the view that the 
issues concerning Mt. Elgon were of such magnitude that the Commission could 





Western Province has not been spared of the scourge of previous incidents of 
tribal clashes occurring particularly in 1992 and 1997. The Kiliku Report and 
Akiwumi Report identified some of the areas that were the subject of previous 
clashes in the Province. 
In the Kiliku Report, the then Mt. Elgon sub-district in Bungoma was cited as 
having been rocked by ethnic clashes. The Report attributed the clashes to a 
number of factors including hunger for land by the Sabaot who felt neglected by 
the Government in that they had not, as a tribe, been considered for settlement 
schemes like other communities. The region affected by the clashes during the 
period covered by the Report now lies in Mt. Elgon District, which, for the 
reasons stated above is not within the ambit of this Report.122  
The Akiwumi Report indicated that the clashes in Western Province occurred in 
the old Bungoma District, and to a very large extent in the old Kakamega 
District, along the Nandi Escarpment which constitutes the boundary between 
Kakamega and Nandi Districts. The causes comprised the incessant disputes 
over land, which was then exploited by politicians at the introduction of 
multiparty politics in Kenya. There was also violence as a result of the spill-over 
effects of the neighbouring conflict-prone Trans Nzoia District in the Rift 
Valley.123 
Information presented to the Commission revealed a longstanding history of 
resentment against the Kikuyu ostensibly because of their perceived hegemony 
in political and economic areas at the expense of the indigenous communities.124 
When a heavy deployment of security officers, who were perceived to be agents of 
the PNU party, was noticed in the Province ahead of the elections, it only served 
to accentuate the rumours that the PNU party was planning to rig the elections, 








results was therefore seen against this light and later, against that of the events 
occurring at the election tallying centre at the Kenyatta International Conference 
Centre, which served to heighten tensions. 
 
Patterns of Post-election Violence in Western Province 
The period before the elections was generally considered peaceful apart from 
incidences relating to political rivalry between candidates and their 
supporters.125From the evidence presented these incidents were within the 
competence of the security forces to control and were dealt with accordingly. 
Evidence was submitted to the effect that the violence in Western province 
predated the general elections. 
On 18 December 2007 at Harambee market, East Kabras Location in Kakamega 
District, campaign vehicles belonging to Malava ODM parliamentary candidate 
Musavini Nambwa were burnt down when his convoy was ambushed at a 
roadblock created by youth allegedly allied to New Ford Kenya.126 The angry 
youth also set ablaze a sugar plantation in search of Nambwa whom they 
believed had taken refuge in it.127   
On 23rd December, 2007, youths shouting PNU slogans stoned vehicles on the 
Eldoret-Bungoma highway as they tried to block ODM supporters from travelling 
from Bungoma to Webuye. This prompted intervention by police officers and 
running battles ensued. 
Post election violence in Western province was characterised by burning, looting 
and vandalising of property belonging to the Kikuyu community and by those 
                                                            
125 One such  incident was  in Khwisero Constituency where supporters of Mr. Bulimo of ODM Party and Hon. Julius 







perceived to be sympathetic to PNU. The most affected towns were Kakamega, 
Mumias, Bungoma, Mbale, Lugari, Busia and Vihiga. The Provincial 
Commissioner, Mr Abdul Khalfan Mwasera,128 noted in his evidence that during 
pre-election planning his team was mainly concerned about the violence 
erupting in the urban centres of Busia, Mumias and Kakamega as there had 
been pre-election tension. 
The PC testified that post-election violence started in Mumias District on 27th 
December, 2008 following suspicion of ballot boxes having been hidden in the 
house of Joseph Mbacio Thiru, a businessman in Mumias town.129   Members of 
the public proceeded to his premises, searched the house but found nothing.  
The public, composed of rowdy, stone wielding youths, chanting anti PNU 
slogans, began looting the house and in no time the rioters damaged his pick-up 
car and burnt down another one and set ablaze his house after emptying it of its 
contents.130  According to the PC, the police managed to quell the disorder. 
Tension and anxiety grew as the election results continued to trickle in. The 
Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer, Patrick Mugo Muhuni131 told the 
Commission that on 28 December 2007 youths assembled into groups and run 
along the streets of Kakamega town shouting ODM party slogans and praising 
the ODM party Presidential candidate, every time the television stations 
announced results in which their Party or candidate had emerged victorious. 
The Commission was told that the violence in Budalangi, Busia District,   
erupted on 29 December 2007 where it is alleged that armed supporters of the 
PNU candidate Raphael Wanjala shot one civilian in the area dead. This was 
followed by a retaliatory attack by supporters of the rival candidate, Ababu 
Namwamba, but police managed to control the latter’s supporters and restore 
order. However, the patterns shifted on 30th December when it became obvious 









mass evictions. At Site and Service Scheme Plot No. 100, in Mumias, a group of 
rowdy youths invaded the home of Joel Ng’ang’a Wairire, and burnt two of 
vehicles before looting his house and setting it ablaze. They also gutted a 
supermarket he owned at Shibale market, and had his 35 acres of sugarcane 
and 5 acres of eucalyptus trees smothered.132 
The road infrastructure in the province was affected as protesters burnt tyres on 
the roads and mounted illegal roadblocks. The major roads affected were 
Kisumu-Kakamega; Kakamega-Mumias; Kakamega-Eldoret. The road destined to 
Uganda was also greatly affected. The areas located near the Lugari/Uasin Gishu 
border were greatly and directly affected by the violence occurring in Uasin 
Gishu, hence  when on 30th December, 2007, public transport at Kakamega-
Turbo highway got paralysed with a large trench dug at Jua Kali in Turbo, the 
impact was felt in Lugari. 
We were informed that Nambale recorded its first incident of violence on 27 
December 2007. NARC candidate, a Mr. John Bunyasi (who was later arrested) 
was found with crude weapons in his car at a polling station. Earlier on, 
supporters of Bunyasi and those of his ODM rival clashed in Nambale’s Urban 
Primary School polling centre, at which several people were injured.133 
On the 27th December 2007, a pick-up vehicle belonging to a Mr. Taabu Joingo 
was burnt in Budalangi Constituency and pushed into River Nzoia following a 
mix-up of Budalangi parliamentary ballot papers with those of Bura in Tana 
River District. The vehicle was heading towards Bumadeya Primary School when 
the driver ran into a crowd supporting the main parties.134 
In Kakamega North, a man was killed and another seriously injured when New 
Ford Kenya supporters and those of ODM clashed during a raid on the home of 
an ODM supporter.135  According to information presented to the Commission by 









Township before and during the period of the post-election violence, his property 
was looted and vandalized. Stanley Ng’ang’a Gathirwa, a resident of Mumias 
Township and a victim of the skirmishes, also stated that the police did very 
little to rescue and protect his property, which was broken into and looted. On 
31st December, 2007 when his property was being consumed in flames, the 
police just stood by and watched as the arsonists went on. 
The violence in Lugari took a different character in its organisation and target. 
Lugari is generally a settled area occupied by several ethnic groups among them 
the Luhya, Kalenjin and Kikuyu. Violence in Lugari was affected by events in the 
neighbouring Uasin Gishu District where the attackers targeted and burnt 
property of persons belonging to the Kikuyu community. It is alleged that the 
attackers were armed with pangas and arrows and used matches to burn grass-
thatched house  
According to the PC the violence that engulfed Western Province, “started on 27th 
[December 2007] in Mumias and then reached its climax on 31st [December 
2007] and that was the end of our violence. The climax of this violence spread all 
over the province, most parts of the province except Bungoma North, Bungoma 
West and Bungoma East.” 
The Commission received evidence of opportunistic attacks by the youth who 
engaged in wanton looting and destruction of property. One victim told us that 
youths took advantage of the situation. She testified that before the elections, 
she together with her parents used to live in Kefinco Estate in Kakamega town. 
They had received eviction notices through anonymous calls and reported the 
incidents to the police. However, she was told that due to insufficiency of 
personnel, she could not get any protection, and was advised to seek refuge at 
the premises near Mama Watoto Supermarket, owned by a Mr. Tharao. On 28 
December 2007, at around 6 p.m. a group of young men numbering about 
twenty forced themselves into their compound and demanded keys to the house, 
claiming to have taken possession of it. She was ordered to leave as others 
shouted her father’s name. She ran and took refuge at a house where local brew 




ostensibly on the pretext that Kikuyus had unfairly acquired wealth at the 
expense of the members of the Luhya community. After the departure of the 
patrons, the lady host called the witness’s mother, who herself was hiding in a 
friend’s shop. Mother and daughter proceeded to take refuge in a hostel. On 28 
December 2007, the hostel was raided and they fled to a home adjacent to theirs 
and owned by a person called Jeremiah. Before they reached, they were however 
identified by  two men. They managed to get into the house, but soon thereafter, 
Jeremiah’s house was also the subject of attack for the reason that he had 
hosted unwanted people. 
Additionally, the Commission was told that the violence in other parts of the 
country had a direct impact on the entire region. On 31 January 2008 a group of 
youths blockaded the highway between Timboroa and Turbo Trading Centre, a 
general shortage of commodities was felt in the province as supply lines had 
been cut.136 
 
Internally Displaced Persons 
Most of the IDPs were members of the Kikuyu community and those sympathetic 
to PNU and its affiliate parties. An estimated 55, 862 people were displaced in 
Western Province. They sought refuge in police stations, schools, churches, 
district commission offices, district officers’ offices, chief’s offices and 
administration police camps. Initially, the IDPs were hosted in 32 temporary 
camps distributed among affected Districts-Kakamega North, Kakamega South, 
Butere, Lugari, Bungoma South, Teso, Hamisi, Emuhaya, Vihiga, Mumias and 
Busia. 
The Mumias Special District Security Intelligence Summary No. 11/ 2008 for the 
period between 24/12/2007 and 2/1/2008 indicated that persons willing to 







of real threat of attack on IDPS at the police stations, and recommended 
deployment of security personnel at the stations to beef up security.  
1,916 Kenyans crossed the border and sought refuge in Uganda, 500 of whom 
were children. As at the time of receiving his testimony, 342 refugees who had 
been camping at Mulanda and Kiryandogo had come back to Kenya.  
Displacement of persons typically flowed as a consequence of the post-election 
violence, and was characterised by movement of people to ethnically 
homogeneous areas to which they were linked either because of their community 
lineage or their ancestral homelands. The region also witnessed the influx of 
returnees from other parts of the country, most notably, Kericho, Nakuru and 
Naivasha. Most of these returnees were absorbed back into the families of the 
locals or their kin. Apart from facilitation of their transport to their ancestral 
homes, we were not informed of any intervention from the Government or from 
any of the agencies that were concerned with the welfare of the returnees, save 
for the testimony of PC who informed us that the Government had been 
distributing relief supplies to those IDPs who had assembled at the IDP camps.  
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration 
The Provincial Commissioner testified that the security agents responded against 
charged mobs with restraint in a bid to reduce the number of casualties. He 
recounted how at Sigalagala in Kakamega South and Lutonyi in Kakamega 
Central the security officers used civilian vehicles to arrest youths who were 
harassing motorists on the highway.  
However, there was ample evidence from the data gathered at hospitals and from 
the police to suggest that the  police used excessive force, and in particular, 
firearms, in dealing with the demonstrations to control crowds which, in some 
cases, had turned violent. Information on casualties and deaths submitted by 
Dr. Caleb Olang’o Onudi, the Provincial Medical Officer, provides sufficient 




as a result of injuries secondary to gunshots, or those as a result of assault by 
the police.  
The records which were collected and collated from 9 major hospitals in the 
Province and harmonized with the figures from the police indicated that there 
were 98 died as a result of PEV in the Province as follows; 
• Kakamega  31 deaths;  
• Webuye, 21;  
• Vihiga, 18; 
• Mumias, 12;  
• Busia, 9; 
• Bungoma 7. 
Post-mortems carried out on the 98 bodies revealed that 74 of them died of 
gunshots. Thus gunshot comprised 73% of all fatalities in the province.  We were 
informed that inquest files in these matters have been opened but no further 
steps have been taken to investigate the killings.  We find this state of affairs 
wholly unsatisfactory. 
According to the Western PCIO Patrick Mugo Muhuni, as early as October 2007, 
Provincial Police Headquarters had formed a Committee to monitor all election-
related events. The committee was expected to collect information from the eight 
police divisions and report to the Provincial Police Officer and other senior police 
officials, who would then evaluate and analyse the information before directing 
on the right cause of action. The security officers in the Province had been 
instructed to be on high alert for any possible disorder during the electioneering 
period. All the eight Officers Commanding Police Divisions in the Province were 
to conduct rehearsals on control of riots and generally, in maintaining law and 
order during the period. While the content of this training was not revealed to 
the Commission, the expectation was that it ought to have reflected in the 





The totality of evidence suggests that the police were overwhelmed and 
unreasonably resorted to the use of firearms. It further reveals insufficient 
manpower and facilities available to the police to counter the magnitude of 
demonstrations witnessed in the period after the elections. Information from the 
minutes of Butere District Security and Intelligence Committee Summary No. 
07/2007 for the period between 14 November and 24 December 2007 indicated 
that adequate security measures had been put in place and the polling stations 
sufficiently policed. However, of concern was that with only a few days to the 
elections and in the light of the anxiety that had gripped the region, concrete 
plans were yet to be finalized with regard to fuelling and servicing of the vehicles 
to be used. This pointed to the insufficiency of vehicles to respond to any 
distress call during that period, hence making it easy to conduct 
demonstrations, looting and destruction of property. 
The PC testified that the peace building and reconciliation campaigns 
spearheaded by the Provincial Administration in the province yielded quick 
results. As a result of the reconciliation efforts of the PSIC and DSICs, 26,861 
households moved out of the temporary IDP camps, with some returning to their 
farms and others opting to stay with relatives and friends. 
Additionally, Peace and Reconciliation Committees were set up in all districts 
comprising elders from the various communities, religious leaders and civil 
servants in Vihiga, Busia, Teso and Kakamega Central Districts. Workshops 
were also held on diverse dates to address the issues of hostilities at the onset of 
the conflict. 
The Provincial Administration also established six temporary AP posts in Lugari 
to assist in the resettlement exercise. 
Planning and Organisation 
From the evidence, it appeared that the violence in Western Province was 
spontaneous, save for Lugari, which bore the hallmark of a planned and 
carefully organised onslaught against their victims and their property. The 




that rocked Busia, Bungoma and Mumias and takes the view that the violence in 
these areas was a direct result of disaffection with the final tally of the 
Presidential election results. 
In the case of Lugari, an inference of planning is buttressed by the evidence that 
the attackers were under a central command. Additionally, the attacks came 
from one direction, off the neighbouring Uasin Gishu District. There was also 
some uniformity in the outfit of the attckers and the mode of attacks. The youths 
were clad in black balaclavas and had their faces painted in white and divided 
themselves into smaller groups once they entered a targeted area. However 
beyond this, we did not receive any credible evidence pointing to the culpability 
of any individual or group and we therefore recommend further investigations be 
conducted to establish who the perpetrators and executors of the violence were. 
Conclusion 
The Commission established that the violence experienced in Western Province 
was distinct from that experienced in other parts of the country in the sense that 
it was a direct consequence of political differences.   These differences led to riots 
which were quelled by the law enforcement agencies thus resulting in a high 
number of deaths.  From the totality of the evidence received by the Commission, 
the wave of violence, apart from Lugari, was spontaneous and directly flowed 
from disaffection with the final tally of the presidential results.  
The evidence the Commission received reasonably supports an inference of 
planning in the case of Lugari However, the plotters, financiers and individuals 
engaged in whatever stage of the planning and execution process and where the 
attackers were trained, could not be identified from it, and remain obscure, 





 Nyanza Province  
Introduction  
“Luo Nyanza”, as it is popularly known, neighbours Lake Victoria, one of the 
Great Lakes of Africa; the continent’s largest lake, the largest tropical lake in the 
world, and the second widest fresh water lake in the world. It is the source of the 
longest branch of the River Nile and is a biological hotspot with great biodiversity 
which plays a vital role in supporting the millions of people living around its 
shores. While Nyanza Province is inhabited predominantly by the Luo, there are 
Bantu speaking tribes including the Kisii, Kuria and a few Luhya living in the 
province. The Province derives its name from the Sukuma, a Bantu-speaking 
tribe living on the Tanzanian side to whom the word Nyanza means a large mass 
of water. The provincial capital is Kisumu, Kenya’s third largest city. The climate 
in the area is tropical and humid. 
Nyanza Province consists of 21 Districts of which 11 are predominantly Luo and 
which are the subject of this part of the report. The main economic activities in 
the region are crop farming focusing mainly on sugarcane, tea, coffee and 
bananas, animal husbandry and fishing. Luo Nyanza has been politically active 
since pre-independence times and tends to vote as a block for its candidate of 
choice, especially since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991. 
  
Raila Odinga, a presidential candidate during the 2007 Election though a 
parliamentarian representing Nairobi’s Langata constituency,  has his roots in 
Bondo District and is the son of the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The fact that 
Raila Odinga was the preferred candidate in the region and that the voters in the 
region believed that the results of the presidential elections had been rigged 
against him also contributed greatly to the wave of violence in Luo Nyanza that 
we shall shortly explore. As we shall see, Luo Nyanza rose up to protest what 
was seen as a rigged presidential election. Protestors thus suffered the brunt of 




in the post election period, the majority of the deaths recorded in Luo Nyanza 
were as a result of shootings attributed to police. 
 
Immediate Pre-Election and Election Period 
Nyanza Province had been generally peaceful during the electoral period, 
although the ODM nominations were characterized by widespread violence. The 
Commission was informed by Grace Kaindi, former Nyanza Provincial Police 
Officer that as early as August 2007, reports of ethnic tension between the 
mainly Luo residents, who “unanimously” supported ODM, and non Luo 
residents, who were perceived to be sympathetic to PNU, had began filtering in to 
the authorities. They were sparked by an incident in Karatina in Central 
Province where the ODM presidential candidate Raila Odinga and his entourage 
had been unceremoniously thrown out of the Karatina Tourist Lodge (an 
establishment owned and run by an in-law of President Kibaki) in an incident 
that was widely reported in the media. In response, intelligence sources 
indicated that tension was building up in Rangwe, Siaya and Migori where ODM 
supporters vowed that politicians affiliated to NARC-K (PNU was yet to be 
formed) or any other party aligned to incumbent President Mwai Kibaki  would 
face hostilities if they dared campaign in the ODM strongholds of Luo Nyanza. 
One such report indicated that a local ODM official had threatened to mobilize 
Homa Bay residents to evict the Kikuyu from the area should such an incident 
recur137. 
The Nyanza Provincial Commissioner informed the Commission that campaigns 
in Luo Nyanza were intense and the dominant ODM party was not keen to allow 
members from other political parties to campaign in the region. The Commission 
was told that from the month of October 2007, tension was heightened due to 






March, along the Kisii/Rongo border, some youth torched several sugarcane 
plantations belonging to both Kisii and Luo farmers. According to Ms.Kaindi,  
“ as the polling day approached, we continued to receive intelligence 
reports to the effect that some Luo youths in Kisumu had threatened 
to take unspecified action against the Kikuyu who had registered as 
voters in the area should they exhibit any form of support for or 
attempt to vote against ODM candidates”.  
 
On his part, Simon Kiragu, the Kisumu OCPD, stated that he did not notice any 
tension and therefore apparently made no preparation in anticipation of violence:  
“We experienced no problems during the campaigns. We did not 
anticipate any problems after the general elections. It took us by 
surprise when on [29th] December 2007 a riotous mob stormed the 
provincial works offices and burnt the main office block and nine 
Government of Kenya Vehicles. Another riotous mob stormed the KBC 
office and burnt five motor vehicles. By then the political temperatures 
were very high, people demanding for immediate release of the 
presidential election results by the chairman of the ECK138” 
The Nyanza Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Paul Poland Olando, stated that the 
Provincial Administration had put in place mechanisms to ensure peaceful 
campaigns and through the police had  
“made preparations for effective management of the campaign 
calendar  up to just before polling day and on 24th of Dec 2007, the 
Provincial security team met under my Chairmanship to make sure 
that plans were complete for effective management of the polling day 
and thereafter the District Commanders were equally instructed to do 
the same”. 
We heard that the elections in the province including announcement of 
parliamentary results and presidential tallies were conducted in a generally 
peaceful manner and that when the Provincial Security and Intelligence 
Committee (PSIC) team met under the PC’s chairmanship on 28 December 2007, 
they were satisfied that polling had been successful139. While voting was 
peaceful, the PC stated that the PSIC received intelligence from NSIS on 28th 
December 2007 predicting that there could be high levels of excitement if the 







The NSIS had forwarded the information to the authroties for “information and 
necessary action” and the PSIC accordingly instructed all Provincial Police 
officers to mobilize the police to be alert and also made arrangements to ensure 
law and order was maintained. 
 
Eruption of Violence 
The Commission heard diametrically opposing views as to the catalyst of the 
violence in Luo Nyanza. The testimony of most Government witnesses can be 
summed up thus, that the authorities were suddenly confronted by of rampaging 
crowds and they had to restore law and order using all available means at their 
disposal. On the other hand a Catholic priest who testified before us expressed 
the view that “there were no indications of violence. As elections approached, 
more Police and security forces were deployed” and that the general feeling 
among the residents was that they had cast their votes peacefully and deserved 
an outcome amenable to their reasonable expectations namely a Raila Odinga 
win. The perceived delay to release the presidential results was therefore  
interpreted as a pointer towards rigging and the Luo community thus acted to 
pre-empt rigging but the police and the state machinery moved with 
recklessness and disregard to their lives in suppressing their freedom of 
expression during which serious crimes were perpetrated against the people 
fighting for recognition of their democratic rights. 
 
These two discordant views were  repeatedly enunciated by the authorities on 
one hand and the citizenry on the other. The priest told us that in his view, the 
demonstrations in Nyanza were peaceful but the police disrupted them leading to 
unnecessary violence. According to him, people went to the streets to 
demonstrate without violence or stone throwing but that police shootings 
provoked the residents who then turned violent as a way of expressing their 
displeasure with the police for using live ammunition. Throughout our hearings 
in Kisumu, we were confronted by these divergent views and we shall endeavour 




The Commission heard that the violence in Nyanza occurred in 3 distinct 
phases. The first was directly related to the context of elections and took place 
between 29 and 31 December 2007. It was characterized by demonstrations, 
riots, acrimony and discontent. The second phase occurred in the New Year and 
was reactionary apparently in protest against what was viewed as excessive use 
of force by police and also in response to calls for mass action by the ODM 
leadership which lasted until mid January 2008. The third phase was associated 
with two unrelated events, first the targeting of Luo by Kikuyu gangs in Nakuru 
and Naivasha leading to an influx of Luo IDPs from outside Nyanza and the 
murders, towards the end of January 2008, of two ODM politicians, Mr. Mugabe 
Were, MP for Embakasi and Mr. David Kimutai Too. Similar evidence was in fact 
tendered by the KNCHR in their report.  
 
The Provincial Commissioner stated that while violence began on 29 December 
in Kisumu town, reports of violence were also received by the PSIC from 
Rachuonyo, Migori, Siaya, and Nyando districts. He informed us that most of 
this violence was particularly urban based and also concentrated along the 
highways in the Province. The PC added that there was a perception among the 
Luo community that the announcement of the presidential results had been 
delayed, which raised suspicion that the delay could lead to mixing up and 
rigging of the results.  
The PSIC therefore instructed the provincial police officers to mobilize the 
security personnel to be on the ready, to ensure that officers who had been used 
on the polling day were available and that those who had been on leave were 
recalled. Pertinently, the PC stated that it was not possible to engage political 
leaders since at the time they were not on the ground. By 30 December 2007, we 
heard that many business people and families had moved out of Nyanza and 
virtually the whole of Luo Nyanza was engulfed in violence and security 
personnel had been deployed everywhere. Mr. Olando further told us, 
 “All government offices were closed, communication channels were 




dismantled.  It was just practically impossible to assemble any people 
for any kind of discussion and as a security committee; we were 
concerned with bringing down the situation because you need to bring 
down the situation before you can go into discussions...” 
 
One of the main targets of the violence was the Government on the perception 
that the polls had been rigged by Government agents and the feeling against the 
institution of government, government facilities, and Government personnel was 
extremely intense and hostile. According to the PC, it became difficult for 
Government officials to discharge their duty:  
“My Lord, at that time it was practically difficult to engage the people 
in this Province about their perception because first of all, accessibility 
was difficult.  Our main mode of conduct with the people which is 
public barazas was not possible, was not functioning, the people 
could not turn up and so it would have been difficult at that point, My 
Lord, the results have just been announced, people are taking great 
exception…The leaders are not there, you want to bring them together 
and according to them, you are the personification of the Government 
in the area, My Lord, it was difficult.” 
 
While the PC regretted the loss of life and property especially in Kisumu, we were 
surprised when he told us that there had been no indication there would be 
violence of the magnitude that arose after 29 December 2007. There was 
intelligence which he acknowledged to have received from the NSIS had already 
been made available to him indicating the possibility of an explosion of violence. 
Evidence was received that the Nyanza PSIC sought reinforcements because the 
magnitude of the violence and the time it was taking to suppress it had exerted 
fatigue on police officers. Further, as a result of the violence many idle youth 
resorted to criminal activities and at one point in time, the rioters and hooligans 
overwhelmed the security officers.  
 
In spite of the security forces being stretched, the PC emphatically stated that 
there were no foreign soldiers called in to assist and that indeed there never was 
need to bring in foreign assistance to Nyanza. This was confirmed by the Kisumu 
OCPD, Mr. Simon Kiragu. The perception of there being foreign soldiers 
according to the PC and OCPD resulted from the deployment of the Rapid 




uniforms and gear (red helmets with an upper green coats both back and front) 
the area residents were not accustomed to, doubting instead that these were 
indeed Kenyan police officers. We established that the rumours about the 
presence of foreign soldiers in the country were unfounded; instead it was the 
appearance of the Rapid Deployment Unit of the AP whose uniform the local 
population had not hitherto seen and thus wrongly tionally assumed to be 
detachments of Uganda’s People Defense Force (UPDF). 
  
The PC was of the view that the magnitude of violence that erupted after the 
disputed elections pointed to the need for Government to consider preparedness 
for large disasters that may occur in future. 
 
Kisumu 
Mr. Simon Kiragu, the Kisumu OCPD told the Commission that on 29 December 
2007 a mob stormed the Public Works office, burning the main block and nine 
GK vehicles. Another group attacked the Kenya Broadcasting Cooperation (KBC) 
office and burnt five motor vehicles as tensions rose over awaited presidential 
election results prompting the police to move in and disperse the crowds using 
teargas. In the course of this violence, the Grand Kimwa Hotel was attacked. The 
next day, on December 30th, violence erupted again in the entire city of Kisumu. 
More than 4,000 people converged at Kondele market as early as 8.00 a.m 
demanding the immediate release of national presidential results while 
disturbances also erupted in other parts of the town with riotous mobs 
vandalizing and looting from shops perceived to belong to people who were “non-
indigenous”. Mr. Kiragu informed the Commission that riots then spread to 
Kondele, Nyalenda, Otongolo, Nyamasaria and Manyatta. The rioters were 
initially dispersed but they regrouped and violently stormed into the center of 
the city where they engaged in vandalism and looting of property. On the same 
day 7 people were burnt to death inside Minoki Building when there was massive 





Mr. Kiragu’s evidence concurs with the PC’s testimony that from 30 December 
2007, violence would start during the day and the rioting mobs would retreat at 
night and assemble the following day to start again.  According to the PC, 
Kisumu City was targeted from three directions where the rioting mobs blocked 
the main entry points to the city: Kisumu-Nairobi highway at Karoki; Kisumu-
Kakamega at Kondele; and Kisumu-Busia at the railway junction. Violence was 
then directed to Kondele area and the other outskirts of Kisumu.  
 
The violence then assumed an ethnic dimension where it was targeted at 
residential buildings, commercial buildings, business centres and enterprises 
particularly belonging to the Kikuyu and Meru and later the Kamba and Kisii 
communities. Similar evidence was also given by KNCHR. The burning and 
looting of business premises belonging to some non-Luo individuals and also 
companies that were deemed as foreign affected Crater Auto Motors, Minoki 
House, Ramgharia Singh Rabha, Ukwala Supermarket, Imani Cycle Hardware, 
Bata shoe shops, Alpha House, Gamorager Singh Server, Imani Cycle Hardware, 
East African Cables Stockist, Njari Enterprises, Allkohols, Brontex House and 
the ground floor of Swan Center.140 
 
By 30 December 2007, with presidential results yet to be announced the 
Government, according to Father Charles Oloo K’ Ochiel of the Catholic Peace 
and Justice Commission, became a target for ventilation of public anger since  
“ the people felt that the only language that they could speak  was by 
acting against the system that did not address their plight, their kind 
of suffering, their kind of pain and I would say that it is not that the 
people were prepared to destroy any Government institutions but I 








There were attempts to immobilize Government operations through the digging of 
trenches and barricading of roads, burning and overturning of Government 
vehicles. The Commission heard that rioters invaded the water company’s offices 
where they looted, set ablaze the main office and burnt 17 motor vehicles and 
one motor cycle. Police managed to disperse the rioters before they could set the 
entire building on fire.  
The Commission heard that the police kept chasing the crowds and using tear 
gas until they eventually realized they could not contain them without using live 
fire, and Mr. Kiragu took the decision that live ammunition was to be used:  
“This is the time we now decided to use live fire to ensure that 
buildings do not continue being burnt and by so doing, we managed 
to chase the rioters out of the town and they retreated to the 
estates…” 
 
The PC stated that instructions to the Administration Police were channelled 
from Nairobi through him and in the course of 30 December, a GSU platoon, 50 
regular police and 50 officers from the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) of the 
Administration Police were jointly deployed under the command of the OCPD Mr. 
Simon Kiragu, bringing his total manpower to more than 300 security personnel 
supported by ten vehicles. The RDU and GSU were assigned specific sectors to 
cover and worked independently while the Administration Police officers were 
put together with the regular police. After the lessons of the previous day’s 
running battles and the difficulty of controlling the huge crowds, the OCPD 
embarked on a deployment pattern which would lock the people from entering 
the main city and containing them within the slum estates of Nyalenda, 
Manyatta, Nyamasaria, Kondele, Mamboleo, Otongolo, Bandani and Kanyakuor. 
 
In order to ensure that the crowds did not enter the central business district,  
the OCPD placed “lock-ups” to prevent people from passing and going on into the 
town center at various entry points, including Obunga next to Kenya Breweries 
depot, Busia road at the railway crossing to contain the people from Bandani 




centre (which was targeted and burnt by rioting mobs on December 29th), 
Kamasi, Makasembo Road, Meru, the main bus stop, Kashok Junction, Tuskys 
Supermarket, Kibuye and at Kondele city clock. According to the OCPD, ten 
vehicles supported the lockups and patrolled the roads within the estates to 
monitor the situation. 
 
In the meantime, the roads heading to Kakamega, Busia and Nairobi were 
heavily barricaded by rioters who used big rocks, posts and burning tyres which 
made it difficult for anybody to pass through unless under police escort. Mr. 
Kiragu stated that the orders on the use of lethal force remained applicable. On 
30 December, Mr. Kiragu informed the Commission that over 1,000 rioters 
armed with pangas and rungus forced their way into the Lake Basin Authority 
offices within Migosi area near Kondele where they stole unknown quantities of 
rice, beans and maize.  Police were forced to use live ammunition so that these 
stores could be protected from being burned and 3 rioters were shot dead.   
 
Later, more than 3,000 rioters attempted to storm Mega City Supermarket where 
they burnt a Kenol petrol station located along Nairobi Road while also 
attempting to storm the offices of the water company but were dispersed by 
officers under the OCPD’s command using live ammunition and though none 
died at the scene several were believed to have been wounded by the bullets. Mr. 
Kiragu further stated that some victims of the above shootings were shot 
accidentally by stray bullets and killed while in the safety of their houses. 
Kisumu Central Police Station recorded 38 cases of shooting, Kondele Police 
Station 20 while 6 cases were from outside Kisumu municipality. Several of the 
victims had multiple gunshot wounds. The appropriateness or otherwise of the 
police tactics are dealt with at length in volume 2 of this report. 
According to Mr. Kiragu, Kisumu experienced the worst violence on 31 December 
2007 which was of extremely high magnitude and 25 rioters were consequently 
shot dead by police. The witness described the mobs as being “very aggressive”, 




This, he said, prompted the police to use live ammunition to disperse the rioters 
and to make sure that the roads were passable:  
“This included ensuring that the fuel meant for Uganda…had to pass 
through the Busia road which was heavily barricaded with burning 
tyres, posts and even sometimes shells of motor vehicles. The 
Government of Kenya was also under pressure to ensure that fuel 
meant for Uganda reaches the destination safely…it was very difficult 
for us.” 
 
Part of the Kenya Uganda railway within the town was also uprooted. Mr. Kiragu 
stated that at the time and while the police had anticipated a scenario of 
celebration which could have turned violent, the crowds which engaged the 
police in running battles from street to street were so huge such that the police 
were overwhelmed. It was the OCPD’s testimony that the situation did not ease 
and riots continued on a daily basis from 31 December with mobs retreating 
each evening and re-converging on the following day which became a daily 
routine only ebbing on 21 January 2008 when an Ecumenical prayer meeting 
was held in Kisumu city stadium where religious and political leaders appealed 
for peace. With the mediation talks proceeding in Nairobi, calm was slowly 
returning to Kisumu and the situation only subsided after the National Accord 
was signed. In total, police acknowledged having shot dead 48 people in Kisumu 
though Father K’ Ochiel took the view that the number of alleged police 
shootings were under-reported. We agree with that assessment since the 
Commission received reports and post mortems confirming that at least 69 
people were shot dead in Kisumu in this period. Mr. Kiragu informed the 
Commission that police had arrested and charged a total of 98 suspects. 
 
Homa Bay 
Mr. Jimmy Munene a Senior Superintendent of police in charge of Homa Bay 
divisional police headquarters stated that prior to elections; he had received a 
total of 50 new officers from a total of 78. He stated that violence in Homa Bay 
commenced on 29th December, 2007 at 6.00 p.m. and took the police by 




onset of conflict that was to rock this part of Luo Nyanza lasted more than a 
month. On this day, the protesters were dispersed using tear gas though the 
OCPD admitted receiving information that one person, Samuel Otieno Okungu, 
was shot dead by police at Shauri Moyo Estate141.  
 
The OCPD stated that on 30th December, 2007 he deployed all his available 
officers to all vital places- the Bank, Hospitals, Cereal Board, Water Sections, 
petrol stations and two supermarkets within the town. That notwithstanding, 
violence erupted in all corners of the town, with a crowd of more than 5,000 
people barricading roads, looting and vandalizing business premises owned by 
Kikuyu, Kisii and Kamba.  After announcement of the presidential election 
result, rioters stormed the Divisional offices and burned the main office block, 3 
GK vehicles and a motor cycle. Another mob stormed the fisheries’ offices where 
they burned three vehicles and the main office and one person was reportedly 
killed. 
 
All available 300 regular police officers also drawn from the rural areas and 
prison warders from Homa Bay Prison were deployed within the town centre 
where violence was concentrated with a view to securing the main town from 
total destruction. The Commission was told that violence continued in the town 
virtually each and every day until the National Accord was signed in late 
February 2008.  
 
The witness further stated that he had instructed all the officers not to use live 
ammunition and at first only tear gas was used but once the situation 
deteriorated, police were forced to use live ammunition to scare the mobs though 









air. In spite of these instructions 3 deaths were reported as a result of gunshot 
wounds and Mr. Munene agreed that his orders were disobeyed.  
 
Migori / Rongo 
On his part, Mr. Edward Mwamburi the Senior Superintendent of Police in 
charge of Migori – Rongo police divisions stated that he was involved in pre 
election security arrangements from August 2007.  He said he was required to 
provide 2 police officers each to a total of some 1,238 polling stations within his 
division for the polling day on 27th December 2007. Since he only had at his 
disposal 174 police officers, he requested for additional reinforcements and 
received some 400 National Youth Service men and women from Nairobi, 204 
Administration policemen from Migori and Rongo Districts, 122 Prison Warders 
from Migori GK Prison and 8 forest guards from the District Forest Office who 
were all appointed special police officers in accordance with the powers conferred 
on the Commissioner of Police; which gave him a total of 1,274 police officers. 
It was his testimony that he had prepared an operation order with regard to 
some precautionary measures in anticipation of what could happen after the 
elections mainly involving guarding of vital installations such as Hospitals, 
Banks and Commercial undertakings within Migori District. After peaceful 
polling and receipt of results, he stated that the 29th of December 2007 brought 
a rude shock with a huge crowd of people descending first on the Migori-
Isebania-Kisii Highway and then on Migori Township chanting ODM slogans. 
The Commission heard that this crowd swelled within a short time and started 
looting within the shopping center. The police tried to use teargas but the crowds 
would not relent and that around the same time, similar events were taking 
place in Awendo and Rongo Districts. Since tear gas was not effective, Mr. 
Mwamburi stated that he issued an order for the officers to use firearms142. 
                                                            
142 The Operation order directed that first, officers were to use teargas and if that was not effective, then they were to 







While the OCPD had anticipated dealing with lawful demonstrations he was 
shocked once the initially peaceful demonstrators numbering about 4,000 
attempted to move to the Migori Prison. Some in the crowd were carrying sticks, 
pangas and stones and Mr. Mwamburi decided he would not let them reach the 
GK Prison in Migori upon which he intervened. As the violence progressed, he 
stated that he found it absolutely necessary to use live ammunition to fire in the 
air if only to scare the demonstrators whose magnitude threatened to overwhelm 
the 300 officers at his disposal. In his view, the situation was so unusual that a 
baton charge was inapplicable since the crowd was almost overwhelming the 
police and some fatalities eventually resulted when live fire was used.  
 
The Commission heard that this first demonstration triggered off a series of 
demonstrations from 29 December onwards including the barricading of the 
Migori/Awendo/Rongo/Kisii Highway which is a major gateway to the Tanzanian 
border town of Isebania. According to the OCPD,  
“My Lords, they kept on going every day and barricading the road 
everyday and whenever we made some moves to remove the stones, 
the place that we had cleared, when we go to the other direction on 
coming back those stones were back in place if not more than the 
initial ones that were placed on the roads” 
Mr. Mwamburi informed the Commission that 11 people were killed143 in the 
process of quelling these riots. A total of 612 IDPs, majority of them business 
people in the area, camping in police stations were threatened with attack by the 
locals and a decision to move them to Nakuru was taken after mobs attempted 
to invade Kamagambo Police Station with this intention. The Commission heard 







him to be from a particular tribe. A total of 62 people, mainly youth, were 
arrested but most were released except for 18 who were arraigned in Court.  
On 3 January 2008, at St. Camilla’s patrol base, demonstrators attacked police 
officers and snatched a G3 rifle from one of the officers who was injured. The 
firearm was recovered 5 days afterwards without the ammunition. Further, four 
police officers were injured during the period of the violence. Mr. Mwamburi told 
us that he was transferred to another station on 4th February 2008.  
 
Impact of the Violence 
We heard from the Nyanza PC that by 11th February 2008, 102 people were 
reported dead and 685 people injured in the province while 40,000 non-Luos 
had exited the province. 9 government offices, 73 business premises and 415 
residential houses were looted or burnt across the Province. 50 government 
vehicles were destroyed, 16 public service vehicles damaged mainly on the roads 
or where they had been parked and another 16 vehicles were damaged144. 2,886 
people sought refuge as IDPs within the town. The Commission heard that the 
province received 126,821 returnees from outside Nyanza because they had been 
ejected from other provinces or they feared continuing to stay in those places 
most of who were taken in by friends and relatives or hired places to stay within 
the province. 
 
The PC did not dispute the fact that a large percentage of the people who lost 
their lives did so through gun shots and/ or bullet wounds which was confirmed 
by the Provincial Medical Officer of Health Dr. Jackson Kioko who gave evidence 
that 90% of the deaths in New Nyanza General Hospital were from gun shots.  
We further heard that three security personnel were killed in the course of 







Dr. Jackson Kioko stated that though the Province had put in place systems in 
the health facilities for disaster preparedness, they had not anticipated violence 
of the magnitude that occurred in the post-election period. He also provided a 
breakdown of casualties from the various districts145. According to him, the total 
number of deaths recorded at the New Nyanza Provincial General Hospital was 
64 while another 53 bodies were brought in from outside the hospital. He further 
stated that 129 people bearing gunshot wounds were brought in. However, in the 
Masaba Borabu area, he stated that most of the casualties received bore lodged 
arrow heads and were referred to Kisii. Doctor Kioko therefore acknowledged 
that medical facilities in Nyanza were overstretched and overwhelmed during 
this period and the number of cases that needed attention was such that there 
was not sufficient human resources to attend to the cases forcing surgeons to 
spend hours on end in theatres, “because in some situations we had only one 
theatre and one operation was taking close to twelve hours…” 
 
He further presented statistics containing data from 33 public health 
institutions in the province but did not include data from over 200 private health 
facilities in the province clarifying that his records may not have been very 
reliable during the period of post election violence as record keeping in public 
health institutions was not conclusive and as such statistics given to the 
Commission may not represent the complete picture. We can nevertheless 
summarize his presentation as follows; 






Gucha 7 2  
Homa Bay 27 35 6 
Rongo 21 3 - 
Nyamira 29  - 













Kisumu 47 -  
Siaya - 6 10 
Rachuonyo 18 3 - 
Kisii 58 12 6 
Bondo 12 9 - 
Masaba-Borabu 63  6 
Suba 6 6 1 
Provincial Gen. Hospital-Kisumu 256 71 64 
Migori 47 28 1 
 
The Commission was told by Dr. Margaret Oduor, a pathologist based at the 
Kisumu Provincial and General Hospital, that 56 bodies and 8 body parts were 
taken to the Nyanza Provincial General Hospital out of which 50 bodies had 
indications on the cause of death as gunshot wounds. 53 out of the 56 bodies 
were male, 3 were female while 3 were of children aged less than 14 years. Out of 
the 56 bodies, 50 were Luo. According to Dr. Oduor 53.6 % of the gunshot 
casualties had been shot from the back pointing to the inference that police shot 
people who were already in flight and not with an aim to immobilize but for 
purposes of killing and maiming. After examining the bodies she was able to 
recover 5 bullets.  
Mr. Isaac Okero, a representative of the West Kenya Law Society, stated that his 
organisation was galvanized into action sometime in mid January 2008 following 
the killing of one George William Onyango whose shooting was broadcast on the 
KTN news.  Following that event and the police reaction through Police 
spokesman Eric Kiraithe suggesting that this incident was a concoction, they 
contacted the deceased family members’ and facilitated media access to highlight 
that this incident was not a ‘movie’ as alleged by police.   
 
The Society furnished evidence comprising of depositions from affected members 
and informed us that there was a marked reluctance from victims to come 
forward and tell their stories. They attributed this to a very strong suspicion 




noted apathy from many victims who did not feel confident that recording 
statements would result in any justice.  Further, victims especially of sexual 
violence were too fearful to seek the help of the police because not only were the 
police otherwise engaged but also due to a feeling of discomfort filing complaints 
with the institutions that they felt were associated with the perpetrators of the 
violence.  
 
Among the depositions presented by the Society were some highlighting the 
crimes perpetrated by gangs of youths who were taking advantage of the 
lawlessness that prevailed. Other depositions related to attacks characterized by 
ethnic identification of the victims in various locales in Central and Rift Valley 
provinces. Mr. Okero indicted Government institutions charged with maintaining 
internal security for the failure to contain the post-election violence in Kisumu, 
“Well, more I think could have been done to arrest the escalation of violence at 
that time.  There seemed to have been other priorities that they seemed keen to 
be engaged rather than to stop the violence and to protect those who are exposed 
to violence”. 
 
Notwithstanding the police version of events that they were confronted by violent 
mobs prompting them to use live fire, Gregory Onyuro Ngoche testified that he 
was shot outside his home and that when he went to report the issue, the police 
officer on duty declined to record the incident at first on account of the 
complaint being a gunshot wound. A senior police officer however intervened and 
authorized the officer on duty at the report desk to take and record that 
information. Similarly, Alice Atieno, a former security guard, was shot in the 
head after arriving home from her place of work. She had as a result lost hearing 










It would appear to us that the indiscriminate use of live ammunition by police by 
design or default targeted vital organs, for instance John Opiyo Ondiek a 
security officer with the Kisumu Municipal Council at Kibuye Market informed 
the Commission that he was shot by police from behind at his place of work 
sustaining injuries on his private parts. It would also appear that little or no 
effort was made at all to use non lethal means in riot control. Live ammunition 
was used indiscriminately to disperse peaceful crowds and /or demonstrators 
armed only with crude weapons. As described by Father K’Ochiel,  
“The situation was terrible. Whichever place I passed through there 
were bodies and you could see the police everywhere and a lot of 
people and chasing of people by police, shooting there was looting 
going on.147” 
 
Ms. Grace Kaindi the former Nyanza PPO stated that the security forces were 
overwhelmed and that is why they sought reinforcements. Though many 
Government witnesses did not mention the use of live ammunition and where 
they did they pointed out that gunfire was used with the intention of scaring 
rowdy mobs bent on looting, the catastrophic humanitarian effects of this type of 
crowd dispersal tactics speaks volumes for itself and is a pointer to the 
dysfunction within the police.  
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration  
The Nyanza PC informed us that once the violence erupted, the PSIC issued 
instructions to District commanders to stop the violence but the guidelines on 
how this was to be achieved was left to the individual commanders to manage 
the security situation. To sum up the view of the police and provincial 
administration, they were under a duty to maintain law and order and to protect 
life and property and as such, the rioting mobs had to be kept at bay and the 
vandalism they orchestrated from the 29th December 2007 had to be contained 






When the Kisumu OCPD was asked whether he had issued warnings before 
using live ammunition, he answered that the situation was so chaotic and the 
circumstances could not allow such a procedure and further, the situation was 
neither conducive to issuing any warnings neither would anybody in his view 
have abided by such proclamations. In such circumstances, he considered that 
the law allowed police to obviate the need for issuing a proclamation and proceed 
to use lethal force without even attempting a baton charge which he deemed to 
be impossible:  
“People in thousands trooped in the town in the morning engaged in 
looting, breaking people’s premises…we were trying to chase them 
using tear gas until when they became chaotic and started burning 
buildings, that is the time we decided that we should use any lethal 
fire…” 
 
Allegations were made before the Commission that the police had been 
responsible for burning some of the buildings recorded to have been burnt 
through the indiscriminate use of live ammunition and tear gas that could have 
come into contact with inflammable material in some of these buildings. But this 
was denied by the OCPD Kisumu who was categorical that neither the use of 
tear gas nor live ammunition could have been a possible cause of a fire in the 
event that they landed on inflammable matter. He did, however, concede that 
there were inflammable substances in Ukwala Supermarket which were 
exploding when the building was burning.  
The Commission noted that most police officers had to work 10-12-hour shifts in 
particularly very difficult circumstances which tested their quality, training, 
discipline, experience and ability in what were clearly very difficult operations.  
Though Mr Kiragu agreed that where there was no threat to life-either of citizens 
or police officers by rioting mobs-or a threat to property, then there was no 
justification for using firearms, it is difficult to explain why over half of the 
gunshot casualties had wounds from the back which suggests to us that they 
were in flight and could not in such circumstances be construed as presenting 





Violence in Nairobi, Central and Coast Provinces 
Nairobi 
Introduction  
The City of Nairobi has through the years provided the barometer for Kenya’s 
volatile politics from colonial times to the present. It began as a temporary camp 
at the turn of the twentieth century upon a chance decision by George 
Whitehouse the engineer in charge of construction of the Uganda Railway who 
chose this location as the springboard for embarking on the challenging phase of 
laying the railway tracks across the Rift Valley. This temporary camp-the most 
unlikely of locations- by default became Kenya’s capital city and a commercial 
hub for the East and Horn of Africa region.  
 
The city which currently covers 684 square kilometres is divided into four 
districts- Nairobi North, Nairobi West, Nairobi South and Nairobi East with the 
main administrative divisions being Central, Dagoretti, Embakasi, Kasarani, 
Kibera, Makadara, Pumwani and Westlands. Nearly 2 million of Nairobi’s 
residents (estimates put Nairobi’s population at somewhere between 4-6 
million148) live in low income residential neighbourhoods and informal 
settlements like Kibera, Mathare, Dandora, Huruma, Korogocho, Kariobangi,  
Kangemi and Mukuru where crime and daily violence- including extortion, 
murder, illegal taxation and rape- has become something that ordinary citizens 








The above areas which feature extremely high population densities and yet 
occupy less than one fifth of Nairobi’s geographic area are of great significance to 
the city’s politics and as we shall see, the ethnic differentiation in various 
quarters would become a defining feature of the character of violence in the post 
election period. Due to the neglect of most of these areas by the Central 
Government and the Nairobi City Council, organized criminal gangs have come 
in to fill the void left by the absence of the State and attendant services. Election 
contests are to a large extent influenced by these outfits whose members are 
available for hire by powerful political actors as instruments of intimidation 
against opponents. It is not surprising therefore that the NSIS in its security 
briefing of 24th December 2007 noted that all of Nairobi’s 8 constituencies were 
potential flashpoints due to the fact that the stakes in the 2007 General 
Elections were extremely high and some politicians had consequently enlisted 
the support of multiple gangs like Mungiki to intimidate opponents.149  
 
Mungiki (a largely Kikuyu gang active in almost all of Nairobi’s informal 
settlements), Siafu, Bukhungu and Jeshi la Darajani (active in various 
neighbourhoods of Kibera) and the Taleban (a Luo gang based in Mathare) had 
before the elections, gradually taken over and were administering parts of the 
city’s informal settlements where they created extreme fear. They argue that they 
maintain security where the State has failed and in this way levy fees thus 
dominating the population through the intentional use of terror as a means and 
strategy to instill fear in the society, control matatu (public transport) routes, 
changa’a (an illicit alcoholic beverage) brewing, sanitation facilities, water and 









As noted in evidence produced by the KNCHR, the above dynamics, tribal 
loyalties and the ethnic mix of politics in the city’s poor neighbourhoods strongly 
contributed to the pattern of violence that Nairobi witnessed.  
The rent disputes between mostly Kikuyu landlords and largely non-Kikuyu 
tenants are among the most serious underlying causes of ethnic conflicts in the 
poor neighbourhoods of Nairobi.  
 
The Immediate Pre-Election Environment 
The situation report dated 19th October 2007 showed that Kikuyu landlords in 
Mathare and Kayole had issued eviction notices to Luo tenants under the pretext 
of renovating their houses. According to NSIS, the landlords feared that the 
tenants could become uncooperative if the ODM presidential aspirant Raila 
Odinga won since he had reportedly promised that an ODM Government would 
regulate house rents. NSIS correctly pointed out that this issue was likely to 
foment ethnic tension in the area and undermine security in the post-election 
period. This alone should have forewarned police to make arrangements to 
prevent commission of crimes and maintain law and order in Mathare, which as 
we shall see later was never done. 
Similar suspicion and acrimony among Kikuyu landlords on the one hand and 
Luo and Luhya tenants on the other was also reported in Kibera, Kawangware, 
Dandora and Pipeline Estate in Embakasi where tenants were likewise issued 
with quit notices out of fear from the landlords that the tenants would gang up 
and refuse to pay rent151. Further, talks of possible plans to rig the outcome of 
the election in Langata constituency against Raila Odinga, the area MP, had 
created anxiety and NSIS advised that the slightest suspicion towards that end 







The Post Election Violence in Nairobi 
Witnesses who spoke to Commission investigators narrated how the violence 
started in Kibera, Mathare, Dandora, Kariobangi and Kawangware upon 
announcement of the Presidential results and the subsequent swearing in of 
President Kibaki on 30th December 2007. From information gathered, violence in 
Nairobi occurred in 3 major phases; the first immediately after the 
announcement of the Presidential election results on 30th December which 
continued into the New Year as police prevented ODM supporters from holding a 
“million people” march to Uhuru Park within Nairobi’s Central Business District 
to protest what ODM and its supporters believed was a stolen election victory; 
the second wave of violence followed the announcement of a partial cabinet by 
President Kibaki and appointment of the ODM-Kenya presidential candidate 
Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka as Vice President on  9 January 2008  and the third 
phase occurred upon the killing of the late Embakasi MP-Hon Melitus Mugabe 
Were on 29th January 2008 in Nairobi’s Woodley Estate. 
The Commission received evidence from many witnesses who suffered terribly 
during the violence both in terms of their own ordeals and in dealing with the 
devastating consequences especially the deaths of family members, trauma, and 
stress for families, displacement from their homes, the loss of income, 
businesses and property as well as coming to terms with living within IDP 
camps. Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (SGBV) encompassing a 
wide range of human rights violations in the chaos of the post election period 
reached epidemic proportions in Nairobi and this area proved the most 
problematic in terms of determining the extent of violations. These issues are 
discussed at length elsewhere in this report. It is enough for now to note here 
that the sexual violence experienced demands immediate responses through the 
provision of more effective physical protection especially in the poorer environs of 





A common thread in many of the accounts of the post election violence that we 
heard is the wanton destruction of property and the severe effect arson has had 
on people’s lives. For instance, a witness narrated to the Commission 
investigators how she was forced to move from her house in Mathare 4A by a 
gang of Luo men who were evicting Kikuyu on the night of 30th December 2007 
and she was forced to take refuge at the Mathare/Huruma’s Chief’s Camp. When 
she went to check on her property the next day, she found that all her 
belongings had been stolen and another person had already occupied her house 
which she had obtained through the Amani Housing Trust Mathare 4A 
Development Program. Another witness informed the Commission investigators 
that on 29th December 2007, gangs of Luo youth went around the Mathare 4A 
area yelling that Kikuyu must leave and fearing for her own and her family’s 
safety they fled the next morning leaving all possessions behind during which 
many houses were set ablaze. She sought refuge at the Eastleigh Air Force Base 
and when she went back to her house on 3rd January 2008, she found that it 
had been razed to the ground. 
A yong man from Mathare 4A told our investigators how two of his relatives were 
killed on 30th December 2007 in Dandora by gangs of Kikuyu (Mungiki) youth 
who were moving from door to door flushing out and killing non-Kikuyu. He 
stated that in Huruma where he moved to, rival zones were created where one 
zone dubbed Othaya had pro-PNU Kikuyus while two other zones housed pro 
ODM Luo and Luhyas with each area being a no go zone for the opposing tribes. 
Information made available to the Commission indicates that initial violence in 
Nairobi appeared to target the Kikuyu in areas where they were a minority and 
they in turn organized attacks in areas where they were a majority. We noted 
one insidious form of violence that was visited on members of the Luo 
community, the forced circumcision reportedly attributed to members of the 
Mungiki Sect. Dr Jotham Micheni confirmed that Kenyatta National Hospital 
attended to 2 such cases of forced or traumatic circumcision. Evidence was 
received from a Luo lady who was raped in Huruma by a gang of 10 men on 29 




the Government trouble and that they wanted to circumcise them. After being 
violated she was forced to watch as the hooded men cut off her husband’s penis 
with a panga (see chapter 6 on gender and sexual violence). According to 
evidence from KNCHR, on 1 January 2008 a 15 year old Luo boy was forcibly 
circumcised during fighting at Kiamaiko. On 21 January 2008, eight Luo men 
had their genitals chopped off and even young boys, some as young as 11 and 5 
years, had their genitalia cut with blunt objects such as broken glass.152 
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, Nairobi’s informal settlement 
areas are balkanized largely along tribal lines and specific ethnic groups are 
dominant in specific areas within the slums. We received information from 
KNCHR that in Kibera for instance, the Luo are the majority in Kianda, Raila 
village, Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo areas; Makina is mainly populated by 
Nubians while Laini Saba and Soweto are dominated by Kikuyus. Luhyas 
dominate in Mashimoni and Lindi areas. We were able to establish some of these 
facts during our site visit to Kibera on 11th July 2008. 
Once the violence broke out, looting, destruction of property and arson became 
rampant forcing people to move to the “ethnic enclaves” they perceived as safe as 
tribally aligned gangs took over and exercised total control. Toi Market in Makina 
area  which prior to elections had housed over 3,000 traders was burnt down. 
During our site visit to Kibera we were informed by local residents and 
community organizers that this market provided employment to perhaps a 
similar number of people while thousands of suppliers depended on it for 
livelihood not to mention the tens of thousand of customers it served.  
The violence was also characterized by forceful displacement and evictions while 
areas such as Dandora and Mathare North saw deep seated rent disputes 
escalating to violence. As earlier explained, there was a perception that landlords 
(mainly Kikuyu) over-charged in rent and discriminated tenancy on ethnic lines 






won. Some tenants therefore took the opportunity provided by the catechism of 
post election chaos to evict landlords and started charging reduced rents while a 
new round of violence ensued when the owners hired gangs to reclaim their 
property153.  
Information was provided by the NSIS security briefing dated 21st February 2008 
that tension was high between the Kikuyu and the Luo residing in Mathare 
following a police operation to evict people who had illegally occupied other 
peoples’ houses. The briefing went on to state that Luo youth were preparing to 
resist future attempts to evict them and threatened to blow up such buildings. In 
this state of affairs, the NSIS noted that the Mungiki had “taken advantage to 
settle their differences with the Taliban largely composed of Luo and thus violent 
confrontations were predicted to continue with devastating effects”. NSIS further 
noted that Mungiki adherents were assembling at Lucky Summer Quarry, 
Gituamba, Gitare Marigo and Dandora Dumpsite in preparation to attack 
residents of Babadogo, Glue Collar, Kariadudu, Mugure and Kasabuni areas.154 
Other areas that NSIS received intelligence as being targets for Mungiki attacks 
were Mathare North, Kariadudu and Ngomongo where the objective was to evict 
those who had forcefully occupied houses and refused to pay rent. Incidentally, 
an NSIS briefing after the violence broke out points out that jailed Mungiki sect 
leader Maina Njenga warned Mungiki members against being misused by 
politicians in response to their being hired in Mathare, Kariobangi, Kibera and 
Huruma to cause terror155 
Noting that NSIS had forewarned on the potential conflict that was set to be 
sparked by the rent disputes prior to elections, we fail to see why the police did 
not take measures to prevent this from happening. The chaos in these informal 
settlements could have been avoided if the police had taken contingency 










those the police were meant to protect depicts a force that was perhaps 
incognisant that their motto is “utumishi kwa wote” (service to all). Instead, the 
police chose to deploy massively, not where they were most needed, but 
concentrated at Uhuru Park to prevent the ODM rallies. In this respect, we agree 
with the conclusion by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) Executive 
Director Ms. Muthoni Wanyeki who told us that “It’s our summation that 
prioritization should have been more in line to the responsibility to protect”. 
Issues related to policing priorities and strategy during the post election violence 
are discussed in more details elsewhere in this Report. It will be enough to 
observe here that it would appear that, based on available intelligence which was 
already in possession of the Commissioner of Police, the obvious choice ought to 
have been quick containment of the violence in the slums for protection of life 
and limb and freeing more police officers for deployment to the Rift Valley where 
carnage of extreme cruelty was unfolding with the police numbers unable to 
contain the situation. 
In mid January 2008, NSIS reported that non-Kikuyu residents of Mathare 
slums were alarmed by the migration of the Kikuyu community from the area 
which made them apprehensive that this movement out of Mathare could be a 
precursor of attack by Mungiki members156. In the meantime, as the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process went on, tension remained high 
and NSIS noted that ODM councillors were mobilizing for mass action in case 
the Kofi Annan led talks collapsed157 
Dr Jotham Micheni the Director of Kenyatta National Hospital told the 
Commission that they had not anticipated the kind of violence that gripped 
Nairobi and the country. Though they were prepared for some element of 
violence, the scale and form it took was unexpected which was compounded by 
the fact that a good number of staff had travelled upcountry to vote and those 








for a whole month due to blockage of roads. Moreover, some staff members 
became IDPs and in general the hospital staff was not immune from what was 
happening to other members of public.  
While it was the Police Commissioner’s testimony that 28 people died in Nairobi 
from election related violence, the statistics the Commission was able to compile 
tell a different story. It is incomprehensible that the Commissioner of Police 
should state with finality that the police were the only source of facts in terms of 
accurate figures when he produced statistics that purported to be the definitive 
figures of deaths. The figures were contradicted by other figures obtained from 
Government sources. For example, Dr. Daniel Mulwa Nguku head of the Nairobi 
City Mortuary158 provided information showing that between 30 December 2007 
and 30 January 2008 a total of 111 bodies were booked in by police who 
categorised them as “Post Election Violence Bodies.”  As we discuss elsewhere in 
this report, we find it problematic that it is the police themselves who 
determined that some deaths were due to the election violence without a formal 
announcement to this effect other than the advice from the officer who booked in 
a body. Incidentally, no body brought in by the police after 30th January was 
designated as having died from post election violence and no reason was given 
   
Response by Police 
With ODM calling for countrywide mass action to protest what they deemed as 
theft of their election victory, police were deployed to cordon off Uhuru Park to 
prevent the ODM and its leader Raila Odinga from holding its meeting there. 
This effort to prevent ODM’s meeting took a severe toll on the police and had 
devastating consequences on law enforcement and maintenance of law and order 








duties at Uhuru Park complained of being overworked, delay in payment of 
allowances and being unable to bathe or change uniforms and thus NSIS 
recommended that police welfare be addressed in appreciation of their role in 
maintaining law and order. 
We received evidence that police action in various locales appeared uneven and 
disjointed. As early as 13th December 2007, NSIS had warned that police officers 
planned a go slow on voting day to protest the Government’s failure to award 
them salary and allowances increments. This security briefing further noted that 
police planned to report to assigned polling stations and do nothing more and 
thus the NSIS warned that such action was likely to compromise security during 
the election period. It is not understandable why this information was not acted 
upon and it is not surprising therefore that a number of victims perceived the 
police as either indifferent or missing in action when they were most needed. For 
instance, a businessman in Huruma told our investigators that 
“There was no police presence in the estates…The Kikuyu tribe most 
of whom owned businesses started organizing themselves to defend 
their businesses. There were Kikuyu zones and Luo zones and no one 
was allowed to venture into others “territory”…The Kikuyu eventually 
vacated their  premises and left the houses to the Luo who started 
renting out the houses for as little as Kshs 500/-. Some of them are 
still occupying the houses to date. Most of those who perpetrated the 
violence were gangs who took advantage of the situation” 
On the other hand where the police were present, we received evidence that 
citizens going about their business suffered just as much at the hands of police. 
A pastor in Kibera (Darajani/Makina) stated how on 17th January 2007 within 
Kibera, he had witnessed a police officer kicking some goods left behind by some 
women one of whom was arguing with the officer asking him to stop destroying 
her wares. He explained: 
“As the argument ensued, I saw the policeman beating the woman 
with the butt of his gun. The woman fell down and the policeman 
stepped on her neck and started firing his gun upwards…since I 
knew her I rushed out towards them”  
When he tried to intervene, the police officer “asked whether I was the messiah 




tried to help the fallen woman but all of a sudden fell down and woke up to find 
himself in hospital where he was told he has been shot and had been in a coma 
for 2 days. This story was corroborated by the victim who narrated how this 
particular police officer hit her with the butt of his gun when she went to ask 
him not to destroy her goods,  
“It was a very hard blow. It made me fall down…I was very 
frightened and shocked. When I was on the ground, this policeman 
stepped on my neck. He was wearing boots. He had his weight down 
on me…I saw the pastor coming towards me. I know this man…Even 
though I was yelling and begging the policeman not to kill me, he 
didn’t stop with the boot hard on my neck…I could hear him [pastor] 
calling out as he came-asking the policeman why he was destroying 
[my] things… I lost consciousness then… Next I remember a [woman] 
was trying to pick me off the ground…I looked and saw the pastor 
lying on the ground…The [woman] told me the pastor had been shot”  
Likewise, a resident of Kibera stated that she was in her house in Kibera Laini 
Saba on Monday 31st of December 2007 when she felt something hit her on the 
left breast and she fell down bleeding. It was only then that she realized she had 
been shot. She stated that good Samaritans were unable to take her to hospital 
immediately since there were gunshots everywhere but she was eventually taken 
to Mbagathi Hospital and referred to Kenyatta National Hospital where she 
remained for a week after having been operated on to remove the bullet lodged in 
her breast. Upon discharge from hospital, she found her house had been looted. 
 
The Director of Kenyatta National Hospital told the Commission that 61 people 
were treated for gun shot wounds at the facility, adding: 
“what I can say is that a lot of gunshot wounds came from Kibera… 
Mathare, Kariobangi and Dandora. Those are the areas that had a 
great number of patients. But as I said, 61 patients out of 462 
contributed to a percentage that was 13%.” 
We therefore find that during the post election violence, the brunt of the 
suffering in Nairobi was borne by poor people living in low income 
neighbourhoods. It is the obligation of the State to ensure that all its citizens, 




from the fear of crime and it is the duty of the Government to ensure that this 
right is not infringed by State neglect or acts of extreme cruelty perpetrated by 
its agents on a segment of society. The citizens of some of Nairobi’s poorest 
neighbourhoods found themselves in a quandary since those who were entrusted 
to protect them were either not present, did not seem to care and in the cases 
where they were present, they were just as brutal as the marauding gangs 
causing the violence. This is particularly worrying since the Police Commissioner 
when asked if, with wisdom of hindsight, there was anything he would have 
handled differently, he retorted without hesitation or any iota of embarrassment 
or regret that,  
“If similar situations occurred today, I would do exactly what I did. 
I would not change a thing my Lords that is the honest truth 
because in the enforcement of law and ensuring that law and 
order is brought about in the protection of lives and properties, 
there is nothing that we shouldn’t do to ensure that our people are 
safe. That is the incidences as to why there is police in the first 
place. And in doing so my Lord we take pride in ensuring that we 
have protected lives and taken all measures necessary to ensure 
that people are safe. If anything was to happen like it did last 
time, we would do it exactly the same way”. 
A Luo man who ran an electronic business in Kijiji cha Chewa (a predominantly 
Kikuyu settlement), told us that on 29th December 2007, the OCS Muthaiga had 
posted 2 lorry loads of police to guard the area:  
“but the youth were so many they overpowered the police who ran 
away from the scene. After the election was announced ODM youth 
overpowered PNU youth and the police…They came with paraffin and 
[set fire to] the whole estate...The estate was burnt by idle youth in 
the estate…I was targeted by the Youth because I was trying to 
restrain them from doing bad things like looting and stripping women 
naked…I lost business worth Ksh 70,000/-…I reported everything to 
the police at Muthaiga Police Station, after recognizing the Youth [but] 
nothing was done. The police said they were busy with post election 
work and to date nothing has been done” 
Not only did the police appear overwhelmed, but we were given evidence that 
police were divided along ethnic lines and victims confessed to having received 
assistance from police officers from their ethnic groups while facing hostility 




“Some officers from the Kalenjin and Luo communities when asked to 
stop the looting are reported to have told the victims ‘wacha kazi 
iendelee’ (let work go on, drawing from the PNU slogan). Some police 
officers also took advantage of the situation to charge victims for safe 
passage. This was fairly widespread in Dandora Phase 4, Mathare 
and Ghetto. Police officers demanded money from people who wanted 
to escape hostile environments or who had fled and were returning to 
retrieve property…”  
In hearings before the Commission, the police adopted an unduly defensive 
attitude which in our view clouded any objectivity expected of them in assisting 
the Commission in its investigating public inquiry. From the totality of the 
evidence tendered before us, we find on a balance of probability that the 
institution of the police failed the citizens of Nairobi at large and the residents of 
the less privileged neighbourhoods in particular. 
While there will be no doubt protests that we had no right to condemn the police 
without conducting trials during which the police could defend themselves in 
detail against all charges made, it is our considered view that full due process 
protections of the type that are required in criminal trials were not necessary for 
the purpose of stating whether or not the police as a public institution performed 
to the expectation of Kenyans in their hour of need. In Nairobi, it is our view that 




Central Province is located in Central Kenya, bordering Rift Valley Province to 
the North West, Nairobi province to the South and Eastern Province to the West. 
It covers an area of about 13,220 sq. kms. and has a population of 





The province comprises 11 districts: Nyeri South, Nyeri North, Nyandarua North, 
Kirinyaga, Thika, Muranga North, Muranga South, Kiambu West, Kiambu East, 
Nyandarua South and Gatundu.  
Central Province is the ancestral home to the Kikuyu community and has in the 
past not experienced the ravages of election-related violence owing to its 
ethnically homogeneous composition. The urban areas, particularly those close 
to Nairobi, tea, coffee and sisal estates in the larger Kiambu and Thika Districts 
have a large number of non-Kikuyu. The province voted overwhelmingly for the 
PNU candidate and incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, during the 2007 General 
elections.159 
 
Build up to the Violence 
Information submitted by the Provincial Commissioner, Japheth Rugut,160 
reveals that the period leading to the elections was peaceful but highly charged 
both at parliamentary and civic levels, with the majority overtly in support of the 
PNU and its affiliate parties. Candidates from the other parties conducted their 
campaigns in a non-confrontational and peaceful environment.  
There were incidents of violence  reported to have taken place in period leading 
to the elections.  One such case is an incident took place on 24th November, 
2007 at around 6.00p.m when supporters of Ephraim Maina Mwangi and those 
of James Nderitu Gachagua, both of whom were contesting the Mathira 
Constituency seat, clashed at Muberethi area. Many people were injured and one 
person died as a result.161  In yet another incident which occurred on 10th 










injured one of the supporters of Peter Ngibuini Kuguru, an aspirant for the 
Mathira parliamentary seat.162 Other reports reveal incidences of harassment of 
persons sympathetic to Raila Odinga and the ODM party.163 
 
Patterns of Post Election Violence in Central Province 
The Provincial Commissioner gave evidence to the effect that the news of the 
final tally of the presidential results, which declared PNU candidate Mwai Kibaki 
the winner, was received with jubilation and fanfare. However, soon thereafter, 
this was replaced with gloom as information started trickling in to the effect that 
violence had erupted in other parts of the country and members of the Kikuyu 
community had been targeted. This news was given a human face when the 
province started receiving IDPs from other parts of the country and from within. 
Thirty people, majority of whom were of Luhya and Luo descent had pitched 
camp at Karuri Police Station in Kiambaa Division. As the wave of violence in 
other parts of the country billowed, Kiambaa division hosted a total of 8000 
IDPs. Kiambu Municipality Division received a total of 1435 IDPs while 
Githunguri Division hosted 2100 IDPs.  
The Provincial Commissioner informed us that during the first three weeks of 
January 2008, there was a state of anxiety, uncertainty and worry in the entire 
province. This state of affairs had been caused by, “reports that things were 
moving from bad to worse.”164  The PC recounted how around 18th January 
2008, rumours started circulating that by Monday, 21st January 2008, 
“members of other communities resident in Central Province would be attacked  
to avenge the atrocities meted out on Kikuyus in Nyanza, Rift Valley and 










narrated by the IDPs, who had fled from those regions and had arrived in the 
Province.166 
It is in these circumstances, the Commission was told, that the local Kikuyu 
community started threatening people from other communities. These prompted 
members of those communities, mainly Luos, Luhyas, Kalenjins and Kisiis to 
vacate their houses and camp in the various police stations. 
On 3rd January 2008, rioting mobs blockaded the Nairobi-Nakuru Highway, but 
the barricades were removed after the intervention by the Limuru DO, who 
convened and addressed a public meeting at Ngarariga.167 
On 4thJanuary, 2008 at Gakeu Village, Kirima sub-location, Nyandarua North 
District, 12 houses belonging to persons from the Kalenjin community were 
torched. The police arrested seven suspects and charged them with the offence of 
arson.168 On the same night, persons of Kikuyu descent displaced from the Rift 
Valley, notably Molo and Nakuru, started arriving in Limuru Town and the D.O. 
earmarked Kirathimo Red Cross Centre as a camp where they would be 
accommodated. 
In some cases, the centres holding IDPs from other communities were 
threatened with burning by members of the Kikuyu community who demanded 
that the camps should be broken up and those in the camps should leave and go 
to their homeland. On 5th January 2008, fracas started in Limuru town outside 
Bata Shoe Company gate and outside Kirathimo Red Cross Centre which was 
accommodating the IDPs. Security personnel dispersed the riotous mobs who 
were angered by the presence of the IDPs. It was the intention of the mob to 












The attack on 5th January 2008 instilled fear on people of non-Kikuyu descent, 
prompting them to camp at the Railways Go-Down, opposite the Bata Shoe 
Company. The next day, fracas erupted after youths clashed with the persons 
taking refuge at the Railway Station. Once again it took the intervention of the 
DO and the OCS Tigoni Police Station to quell the violence. However, the DC 
assessed the gravity of the situation and directed them to evacuate all non-
Kikuyus to Tigoni Police Station. 
Information from the DSIC reports indicates that in Limuru Town, about fifty 
rowdy youths armed with crude weapons set ablaze business premises owned by 
Nelson Oluoch Owegi, the Limuru ODM coordinator. Later the youths attempted 
to attack members of the Luo community who had fled their homes and were 
camping at the Tigoni Police Station, but were repulsed by police. 
There were cases where business enterprises belonging to non-Kikuyus were 
targeted for looting and destruction. In Kiambu West District, a commercial 
building estimated to be worth Kshs. 800,000 and whose tenant was Odhiambo 
Oluoch, the ODM Chair, Limuru, was gutted on 16th of January 2008. 
On 22nd January, 2008 in the same district,170 a group of unknown arsonists 
razed down 3 houses belonging to members of the Kalenjin community and one 
belonging to a Turkana. The case, we were informed, was still pending under 
investigations at Ol Kalou Police Station by the time of the testimony. 
On 23rd January, 2008, PC Joseph Kiplangat of Tigoni Police Station was shot by 
an unknown gunman from a roof top. He broke his leg and was taken to Kiambu 
District Hospital. At around 7 p.m. on the same day, three men were shot by 
police while in the act of looting the Limuru Bata Shoe Company display shop.171 
On 23rd January, 2008 youths assembled outside Bata Shoe Company 
demanding that the non-Kikuyus being accommodated by the Company be 








to budge. The intervention of the MP-elect did not bear fruits as the youths, 
armed with crude weapons and numbering about 2,000  positioned themselves 
on a fly-over , on top of buildings  and in the area outside the factory. About 60 
security officers established a buffer zone between the Company’s premises  and 
the youths.  
At some point, the surging youths set ablaze the security guards’ office and 
broke into the Bata Shoe Factory shop, looting the shoes inside. A scuffle ensued 
and seven police officers sustained minor injuries and were treated at Tigoni 
sub-district hospital and discharged. In the process of trying to control the 
crowd, three people died. 
On 24thJanuary, 2008, one Peter Odhiambo, a member of the Luo community 
from Bondo was found slashed to death along a foot path within Karanjili area, 
Limuru.172 On the same day, 2 people were forcefully circumcised using a blunt 
tool, and were taken to Tigoni Sub-District Hospital where they were treated and 
discharged. 
On 30th January, 2008, a group of youths numbering about 100 from the 
Holding Estate, Kiambu East, armed with crude weapons barricaded the roads 
to the Estate intending to attack persons belonging to other communities. They 
were however dispersed by Administration Police personnel.173  
Previously on 28thJanuary 2008, within Nyandarua South District, a group of 
persons set on fire 104 houses, 1 tractor, 1 harrow, 10 sheep and 6 cows 
belonging to persons from the Kalenjin community. On the same day, a mob 
lynched Lukas Matete, a Luhya casual labourer to death. Information from the 
DSIC reports indicates that in Kiambaa and Nderi areas a group, mostly of youth 
staged a demonstration to the DO’s office in Kikuyu town, demanding among 
other things, the immediate stoppage of the Rift Valley killings and evictions and 
destructions targeting their people; the immediate evacuation of the Kikuyu 







they were. The demonstrators also demanded that the Government issues them 
with vehicles to transport their kin back to the Central Province away from the 
conflict areas. 
On 7th February, 2008, youths barricaded the Nairobi-Nakuru highway, but it 
was opened by a joint operation by the regular police and Administration Police. 
Three people were injured by the mob but were rushed by good Samaritans to 
Thogoto Hospital where they were treated and discharged.  On 8th February 
2008, two semi-permanent houses were burnt in Nderi, Kiambu West and the 
fence surrounding the compound of Steel Rolling Mills partially destroyed.  
According to the KNCHR report produced to the Commission as evidence, there 
were threats and actual evictions of non-Kikuyu people in Nyeri in early 
February. The report states that unsigned notices were circulated in Nyeri town 
in estates occupied by non-Kikuyu such as Majengo, ordering non-Kikuyu 
people to leave. This led to the exodus of non-Kikuyu people out of Nyeri, 
especially when more leaflets started circulating. One of the leaflets read: “No 
more clashes but war. Luo, Luhya, Nandi, we give you 24 hrs you pack and go, 
failure to that we need 200 heads before peace holds once more.” 
 
Internally Displaced Persons 
The Commission was informed that the inflow of the IDPs was received with 
mixed reactions, with some residents empathising with the incomers and 
providing food and shelter. In areas such as Kikuyu township, the incoming 
persons would be absorbed into the society by the local residents. This explains 
the absence of major camps in the Kikuyu township area and other areas of the 
province such as Muranga North.  In other places, they would be left to fend for 
themselves or settle in the camps, for example, in Ruringu, Nyeri. Yet still, there 




media a woman hosted around 90 IDPs in her two-bedroomed house in 
Othaya.174 
Further, there were instances when youths within Central Province took 
advantage of the unrest to engage in unlawful activities. There were instances 
when non-Kikuyu employees working in various companies were targeted for 
attacks and eviction so as to create employment opportunities for themselves in 
those companies. Such companies included Universal Corporation Limited (UCL) 
and Steel Rolling Mills, both in Kikuyu; KARI and KEFRI and other research 
institutions also situate in Kikuyu; Tea Estates and Bata Shoe Company in 
Limuru; BIDCO and other industries in Thika; flower farms in Ol Kalou.175 
Nyeri Police station hosted 900 IDPs; Tigoni Police Station, 5,390; Ruiru Police 
Station, 620; Juja Police Station, 600; Thika Police Station 552; Maragua Police 
Station 68; Kinangop Police Station, 66; Karatina Police Station, 193; and, 
Kikuyu Police Station, 500. The cumulative total was 8,889.  Those persons 
willing to leave were facilitated by the Kenya Red Cross to their ancestral homes 
which they considered safer, although many others were left to fend for 
themselves and received no assistance or other support.  
Meanwhile the number of IDPs ejected from Rift Valley, Nyanza Provinces 
increased, with the figure of 18,406 recorded on January 31st, 2008 rising to 
86,314 by the 5th day of March, 2998. The PC also tendered figures indicating 
the number of IDPs hosted by each of the districts in the Province, Kiambu West 
hosted 19,096 IDPs; Thika 5,437;Kiambu East,8,164; Nyeri South, 2,236; Nyeri 
North, 3,872; Murang’a South, 2,503; Murang’a North, 2,910; Gatundu, 3,452; 
Nyandarua South, 16,800; Nyandarua North, 19,605; and Kirinyaga, 149. 
It was the PC’s evidence that the majority of the IDPs remained within the 








Response by Police and Provincial Administration  
The heightened tensions at the time and episodic violence before the elections 
reported pointed to the potential eruption of violence in isolated parts of the 
Province. The expectation therefore was that the police and provincial authorities 
would put in place adequate security measures to pre-empt any breach of peace 
and order. However, it is our assessment that they were ill prepared to 
satisfactorily handle the overwhelming influx of IDPs.  The security 
arrangements seemed to be trained on elections and more. The PC told the 
Commission that in the light of the rising tensions in the Province, and in view of 
the need to prevent the eruption of violence, he mobilised all security agencies 
and local leaders in the district to be on high alert. From the security intelligence 
reports, the DSIC had planned coverage of election campaigns as early as 
September and attended each and every political rally within the district. 
The PC testified that he also convened several meetings in the districts with the 
members of the public with a view to promoting peaceful coexistence and 
appealing against retaliation. He held meetings on 25th January 2008 in 
Nyandarua North, Ol Kalou, Ngorika and Limuru. On 1st February, 2008 he 
attended a peace meeting in Nyeri South and on 5th February, he convened a 
similar meeting in Kiambu West.  
There were peace meetings convened by the DSIC on 1st February 2008 in 
Limuru town and Wangige town of Kikuyu division, and  attended by several 
MPs including Fred Gumo (Westlands), Uhuru Kenyatta (Gatundu South), Lewis 
Nguyai (Kikuyu), Peter Mwathi (Limuru), Elias Mbau (Maragwa), Johnstone 
Muthama (Kangundo), Eugene Wamalwa (Saboti), and Momoima Onyonka 
(Kitutu Chache). This may have pacified the situation. In total, the PC said 37 
peace and reconciliation meetings were held across the Province. 
According to him, these meetings down-scaled the hostilities towards other 
communities.  As a result, a significant number of them were able to report to 






Witnesses informed the Commission that there had been several planning 
meetings that had been convened in the Kikuyu-dominated parts of the Central 
Province/Rift Valley Province border. These meetings had been used to recruit 
fighters, to coordinate communal violence and to organize funding. There have 
been reports that a pastor, a former MP and sitting one urged people to take up 
arms in self-defense in the Limuru area.176The allegation is corroborated by the 
intelligence reports covering the period between 15th January to 15th February, 
2008, in a mammoth rally attended by some Kikuyu MPs and politicians. They  
blamed the killing of youths on police officers hailing from Rift Valley and 
Nyanza and called for their transfer from the area. The report states thus: “One 
politician  called on the Kikuyu community to be ready to defend themselves and 
urged the rich to contribute money towards the cause. Another politician  alleged 
that ODM was being backed by Western countries to destabilize the 
Government.”177  
There were claims of prior planning of the violence in some parts of Central 
Province. The Commission received reports alleging that a group of business 
persons met on 26th January 2008 at Kikuyu Country Club to fundraise for the 
eviction of non-Kikuyu residents. Weapons to be used in raids were supplied by 
persons whose names were made available to the Commission. Small businesses 
all in Kikuyu, supplied weapons such as machetes.178  
The reaction from the security agencies to the crisis had been ad hoc and lacking 
in direction. From the reports, it could be discerned that the DSIC did not see 
any need to follow up on what appeared to be an overt call to arms, and instead 










leaders were reacting out of anger following the killing of three youths who were 
protesting the displacement of their kinsmen from Rift Valley”.179 
The Central Province Security and Intelligence Committee Appreciation for the 
period between 15th January to 14th February, 2008, reports that there was hate 
mail circulated by unknown persons on the Kenya Power and Lighting Company 
Limited web mail in Nyeri, calling upon the Kalenjins to rise and defend their 
ancestral land, and to deliver them from the Kikuyu dominance.  
 
The Resurgence of Mungiki  
The resurgence of the Mungiki could be seen as a form of encouragement to 
retaliatory attacks or, in the alternative, a response to the call to arms by the 
politicians to defend the Kikuyu community against aggression by non-Kikuyus. 
Further, despite noting the resurgence of the outlawed militia grouping, Mungiki, 
there is little else in the appreciation by the Central Province Security and 
Intelligence Committee indicating a decisive response to the threat to security 
posed by the proscribed sect.180  
The Kikuyu community seems to be slowly accepting the Mungiki sect 
following aspersions that the government was unable to protect them 
against hostile communities during the post election violence. This 
could pose a challenge to security agencies, hence calls for concerted 
efforts to stem the same.181 
The resurgence is consistent with the claim as to the politicization of militia as a 
vehicle through which ethnic hatred and animosity could be driven. Many of the 
acts of violence perpetrated by this militia outfit at the time may be explained as 













communities perceived to be supportive of the ODM Party, and against whom 
accusations had been made for targeting members of the Kikuyu community in 
other parts of the country.   
Some of the encouragement to attacks also had a coercive aspect to them. A 
report titled Special Brief on Civil Society Response and submitted to the 
Commission as Exhibit 21J cites a witness as saying that, 
there [sic] have also been reports of intra-ethnic violence in the 
Wangige area of Kiambu District where Kikuyu men have been 
attacked by gangs for “failing” to “defend” their own community from 
“aggressors”. Local human rights defenders are being “screened” and 
the security and safety of those of Kikuyu origin are at risk.”182 
 There were reports that landlords also became targets of the attackers. They 
were forced to give notices to their non-Kikuyu tenants to vacate.183 
 
Hate Speech 
There were reports of the circulation of malicious cell-phone text messages that 
propagated hate speech and alarming rumours. This had the effect of poisoning 
an already tense political environment. The statements revolved around the 
denigration of individual political actors and their affiliate political parties. 
Examples are the hate leaflets on Raila Odinga found at Ndaragua, Nyandarua 
North District. The leaflets read: “Raila is planning a revolution christened 
December 28 Orange Revolution” with the assistance of Dick Morris and Prof. 
George Ayittey of Ghana.” Similar leaflets found at Kahuro in Muranga, accused 
Raila of being a terrorist, devil worshipper, communist, expert in overthrowing 









Additionally, there were also reports of demeaning references by the Kikuyus to 
persons of other tribes as nduriri (an imperious reference within  the context of 
the speech to people of non-Kikuyu descent)  and specific references to the ODM 
presidential candidate and the Luos as kihii (loosely translated as an 
uncircumcised man in the Kikuyu language). The KNCHR reports one prominent 
Kikuyu politician and former MP as having said that the Kikuyus cannot be led 
by a kihii.185  
The Commission also received information to the effect that religious leaders in 
areas such as Limuru and Nyeri used the pulpit to convey messages amounting 
to hate speech against non-Kikuyu communities, ODM and generally whipping 
up Kikuyu ethno-nationalist passion. The leaders uttered phrases such as 
“ciaigana ni ciaigana” (enough is enough), suggesting that the Kikuyu 
community should no longer simply stand by while attacks against them 
continued. The report continues, “In Kirathimo IDP Camp in Limuru, which 
hosted returnees from other provinces, one religious leader urged the people 
that, “The Kikuyu should be armed the way I am armed with the Bible.”  Gospel 
artistes performed in Limuru at rallies attended by the local community where 
hate messages were disseminated.”186 
KNHCR reported as follows on hate speech: 
Local language media also disseminated hate speech to Kikuyu 
audiences in Central Province and in the diaspora. Call-in shows on 
radio stations enabled individuals to make unregulated hateful 
statements. Inooro FM put on air highly emotional and distraught 
victims of violence, a factor that tended to whip up the emotions of its 
audience. Music in the Kikuyu language played on Kameme and 
Inooro radio stations also engendered or raised ethnic tensions. One 
such song variously played by Inooro FM, lyricised about Raila 











The totality of evidence received by the Commission suggests that the violence in 
Central Province was mainly targeted against persons perceived to be 
unsympathetic to the PNU presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, and therefore 
responsible for the evictions of non-Kikuyu from conflict-stricken areas across 
the country.  
The re-emergence of Mungiki and associated criminal gangs followed the killings 
and evictions Kikuyus in ODM party strongholds in western Kenya.  The 
turbulence, in our view, provided a perfect opportunity for these proscribed 
militia to reinvent and package themselves as instruments for the advancement 
of political and ethnically motivated violence. 
The Commission also notes the distinct nature of the post-election violence with 
respect to Central Province. In the past ethnic clashes, the major protagonists 
were the Kikuyus and other the other tribes on the one side and the Kalenjin on 
the other. This was a reflection of the political alignments of the day when the 
Kalenjin who enjoyed the patronage of the regime of the time. Subsequent 
political events saw the Kikuyu community isolated by the other ethnic groups 
hence when post 2007 elections violence erupted in Central Province, the 
communities from other parts of the country bore the brunt of violence in the 
Province. 
 
Coast Province  
Introduction 
Coast Province consists of 13 Districts and 21 Constituencies with a population 
of slightly over 3 million people according to the Kenya Bureau of Statistics 
projections of 2007. The main ethnic groups are the Mijikenda comprised of nine 
culturally and linguistically inter related sub groups among them the Rabai, 
Chonyi, Giriama, Mjibana, Kauma, Kambe, Digo and Duruma. Most of them 




Mijikenda in the province are the Taita – Taveta, Orma, Pokomo, Munyoyaya, 
Malokote, Bajuni, Swahili and people of Arab descent; the last 3 of whom mainly 
inhabit the Coastal towns. In total there are 15 Coastal ethnic groups and 
members of Caucasian communities living in the Province.  
However, over the years there has been a significant migration of Kenyan citizens 
from upcountry regions drawn to the Coast in search of better economic 
prospects. The region has therefore become a mosaic of various identities. This 
has had a profound bearing on the socio-economic and political relations within 
the Province. Some ethnic groups have been classified as ‘insiders’ or indigenous 
communities, while other communities are routinely referred to as ‘outsiders’. 
These are the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and other upcountry people resident at the 
Coast. 
Mombasa town is the capital of the province whose mainstay is tourism and 
related activities. Fishing and agriculture also offer livelihoods to a substantial 
part of the residents. Over the years the indigenous communities residing in the 
Coast have consistently complained of exclusion from the hinterland and 
exploitation of their resources without reward which issues explain some of the 
political dynamics. The persistent claims and allegations of exploitation and 
exclusion are blamed on the so called non indigenous communities commonly 
referred to in the Province as ‘watoka bara’ or wabara. Since the re-introduction 
of multi – party politics in 1991, the politics in the region has become polarized 
along tribal lines and politicians have exploited the existing latent tribal 
animosity to intimidate certain communities giving rise to violence against other 
communities depending on the prevailing political climate.  For example, the 
Likoni and Kwale violence of 1997 was premised on the stereotyping of 
upcountry people as having appropriated to themselves local resources and 
having benefited unfairly at the expense of the indigenous residents and they 
were thus targeted in the violence whose sole aim was to drive them from the 






by this episode remain evident between the so called local ‘insiders’ and 
upcountry ‘outsiders’.  
As we shall see, these parameters surfaced in 2007 only that this time round, 
the indigenous communities joined hands with some upcountry communities 
like the Luo (themselves targets of the 1997 violence) to target the so-called 
GEMA communities – composed of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru. The Kamba who 
have a significant presence in the province were also targeted. Many GEMA 
community members thus suffered a double blow since they had been victims of 
election violence in 1997 and had barely recovered from their losses when they 
were again targeted and attacked in the 2007. 
Local communities have for years decried the perceived marginalization and 
under development of the region without tangible action being taken by 
successive Governments since independence to deal with these deep rooted 
feelings. The issue of land at the Coast has specially been problematic and has 
been described as a ticking time bomb. More recently other factors like perceived 
mistreatment of residents at the hands of police in the name of fighting 
terrorism, poor education levels and bad infrastructure have all served to fuel 
feelings that successive Governments do not care about the region.   
While the perceived manipulation of the presidential results was the trigger for 
the 2007 violence in the Province, it is clear that there is deep underlying 
resentment which has never been addressed by the State over the years. The 
situation is further complicated by economic competition for resources with 
migrant upcountry communities seen as benefiting at the expense of the 
indigenous people and this background explains the salient issues, causes and 
manifestation of the violence in the region as will be expounded in detail 
hereinafter. As noted by King'ori Mwangi Coast PPO,  
“My Lords, our assessment of the Coast Province was that there was 
a potential violence much higher than any other part of the country 
because of the underlying issues of poverty, their political feeling of 




history of the Coast… we felt the issues here, the threats were higher 
than other parts of the country”.189  
 
Pre-Election Period 
The Commission heard from various witnesses that Coast Province was generally 
peaceful in the run up to the elections and residents eagerly waited to cast their 
votes. Many arrived at their respective polling stations as early as 4.00am on the 
morning of 27 December 2007. The only hitch reported by voters was the 
discovery at the last minute that voter registers had been split alphabetically and 
this unannounced change created a lot of confusion and delays. Surprisingly, 
and also commendably, this did not lead to any violence.  In Garsen 
constituency of Tana River District the Commission was told of some low level 
violence on 27th December after voting which was confirmed by Mr. Wilfred 
Mbithi, ACP. In that incident, a police helicopter had brought in ballot papers for 
tallying purposes sparking rumours that the incumbent MP Hon. Danson 
Mungatana of PNU had flown in foreign ballot boxes with marked ballot papers. 
There was clear evidence of a high level of competition between the two leading 
presidential candidates, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga and therefore a palpable 
divide between PNU and ODM supporters in the Coast. Witness testified that  
the pre-election period had been characterized by a political environment that 
was greatly polarized since the Constitutional Referendum of November 2005. 
We heard that the Referendum had created very high expectations and the 
majority of the Coastal people saw real hope for positive change in the ODM 
party and its presidential candidate Raila Odinga who was widely expected to 
win the presidential poll. The common belief in the region was that Raila could 
only lose if the poll was rigged.  
In the meantime, the NSIS was apprehensive and viewed the Coastal area as a 






ignited violence in the past190. Another fear cited by NSIS was the land problem 
between squatters and landlords where sentiments were high that the Coastal 
people had been marginalized by outsiders. Tana River District featured 
consistently in Intelligence reports where there was an ongoing conflict between 
the Orma and Wardei communities within Bura and Galole Divisions and also 
between the Pokomo and Somali over a disputed 3-mile strip along the banks of 
River Tana. Finally, intelligence was furnished by NSIS regarding the activities of 
an outfit by the name Revolutionary Republican Council (RRC) that was 
reportedly training its militia within Mwagulu Forest of Kwale District with the 
help of ex-military servicemen allegedly with the aim to “disenfranchise 
upcountry people and later reclaim land owned by perceived outsiders”.  
It was noted in Intelligence reports that the RRC had identified a training ground 
for Digo, Duruma, Taita and Taveta communities in Kilibasi area of Kinango 
Division, Kwale District. Indeed the Coast PPO did confirm the existence of the 
RRC which he stated, “claims that they would like to have the Coast Province 
declared as a republic, independent from the rest of Kenya…we did consider them 
to be a threat to our security operation and we had taken measures to make sure 
that they did not disrupt the election or wage violence against other people after 
the election, my Lords.” Accordingly the authorities had neutralized the group by 
the time of elections.   
NSIS also noted that there were threats of eviction of upcountry people especially 
Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba residing within Kipini Settlement Scheme in Malindi 
District. NSIS reported that the majimbo debate had elicited a strong anti-Kikuyu 
sentiment in Coast Province and that some unnamed politicians planned to use 
majimboism as an excuse to mobilize local youth to attack perceived outsiders. 
Consequently, the Kikuyu community inside and outside the province robustly 







“In the way it was being put was that Majimbo would ensure that 
local people would benefit from the resources accrued from local 
enterprises the revenue generated in Coast province would be for the 
benefit of Coastals. I think this is how they were looking at Majimbo. 
That key positions, revenue accrued from tourism, from the ports, 
would be- will remain at the Coast here and benefit the Coastal 
people” 
Given the Intelligence that was available, we discern that there was reason to 
prompt the authorities to make sufficient security arrangements early enough to 
address these security concerns and perhaps this was done which is why the 
Coastal region remained peaceful during the campaign period. This was also 
alluded to by the Coast Provincial Commissioner Ernest Munyi when he stated 
that due to the high level of competition during the campaign period, he had 
found it “proper and imperative to put in place precautionary measures just to 
ensure that his office could be in better control of the situation in the Province in 
the event of any violence”. The PC further stated that in making these 
arrangements, he had relied on NSIS security reports which information was 
supported by the Coast PPO Kingori Mwangi and Wilfred Mbithi the Mombasa 
Urban OCPD.   
After the completion of voting, the Commission heard that people in the province 
keenly followed the vote counting peacefully from various places through 
television and radio broadcasts. Exhibit 149 was tendered containing 
information showing that initial tallies indicated Raila Odinga in a clear and 
widening lead over Mwai Kibaki before 30 December 2007. It was expected 
therefore that this trend would continue and ODM supporters who were the 
majority in the region started early celebration for the expected victory of their 
candidate. 
 
The Election Results Trigger 
The Commission was then told that tension, anxiety and fear started gripping 
the region and particularly Mombasa on the 28th and 29th December 2007 when 




margin over Mwai Kibaki was suddenly drastically reduced. From the various 
witnesses, we were able to establish that the trigger for the chaos that rocked the 
region was the declaration of President Mwai Kibaki as the winner coupled with 
the suspicious manner in which the Electoral Commission handled the 
situation. Indeed there were early signs of trouble when on the 29th December 
2007 groups of young men gathered from 3.00 pm along Kenyatta Avenue, Abdul 
Nassir road and Digo road roundabouts chanting slogans and expressing 
disquiet. This early trouble appeared intended to share their feelings on the 
prevailing political situation as it then was.  
In the meantime, there was a lot of tension in many other places at the Coast as 
people waited peacefully for the final presidential tally results. For instance, in 
Kisauni, tension was reported to be very high with the youths contemplating to 
hold a public protest on 29th December 2007 against the delay by ECK in 
releasing the presidential poll result. We heard that many youth gathered in 
various spots eagerly awaiting the announcement of the presidential results and 
some in their conversations tried to envisage what a Raila Odinga win would 
portend and how his Government would be.  
Hussein Khalid, Programmes Coordinator for a Mombasa based NGO Muslims 
for Human Rights (MUHURI), testified that violence in the region was triggered 
by the announcement of the presidential results against a background of long 
standing underlying issues which had not been addressed over the years and by 
the conviction of many people at the Coast who happened to be ODM supporters 
that they had been robbed of victory. After ECK announced Kibaki as the winner, 
extremely disappointed, angry and frustrated youth were primed for violence 
since the general feeling was that Raila Odinga had been robbed of a victory and 
this bitterness was expressed in slogans such as,  “Haiwezekani”  ( it is not 
possible ), “Haki Yetu” (our right ), “No Raila No Peace”, “Tutamaliza wacky” ( We 
shall finish the Kikuyus), “Maisha Bora” (Better Life), “Wakikuyu ni waizi” 
(Kikuyus are thieves); as avenues to express anger while also singing in praise of 




A religious leader however told the Commission that the violence appeared to 
have been planned prior to elections. He gave reasons for his belief that a 
Member of Parliament from the Coast Province was responsible for organization 
of the violence that rocked the area. This sentiment was further echoed by other 
witnesses; for instance, a witness told us:  
“I witnessed the violence that was going on at that time within Bokole. 
At a shop we call Safaricom Building owned by a Kamba known as 
Philip Kiluko, I found a group of youths trying to break in. They were 
all former security guards for a politician during the campaign period. 
I talked to them. I enquired from then why they were doing that and 
one of them told me that each of them had been paid Kshs 300/- to 
cause the mayhem to express disgust at the election results and that 
even if ODM could have been declared the winner, the violence would 
still have (happened)…I met a friend of mine and he told me that since 
he had seen me during the ODM nomination, we should go to the 
politician’s home with him at Mikindani to get funds for the violence...” 
.  
Another witness, appeared to lend credence to those accusations. He stated:  
“I was told that the MP funded the youth to loot and burn all 
businesses belonging to non ODM members so that they remain as 
poor as themselves. One time during the violence, I accompanied some 
to the MP’s home … he addressed us and told us that he is happy 
with our actions meaning the violence and further told us that it 
should continue until President Kibaki relinquishes the presidency. 
Therefore, I believe the MP fully supported the youth’s action” 
The foregoing are important leads to further investigations into the role played 
by a local politician in the post-election violence considering that there were 
intelligence reports from NSIS about the potential of violence in the area. 
According to Hussein Khalid, some of the violence at the Coast was actually 
caused by the police. He produced exhibit 149 stating that  
“there were instances where we felt some of the skirmishes that were 
witnessed could have been avoided, for instance had the police acted 
in a more civil manner, where they dispersed meetings or processions 
that were legally organized, where notices had been issued and they 
had to come in to disrupt peaceful processions. We also felt that a 
number of issues that came to the fore were ethnic in nature. There 
were people or a certain community that were being targeted by 




the Government. The Provincial Administration was calling meetings 
to discuss and deliberate issues with local leaders, women leaders, it 
was a bit disappointing to actually note that the police were actually 
out shooting people, killing, sometimes injuring individuals to the 
extent of even having them admitted to the hospital”.  
His evidence was tested in cross examination, and he maintained that violence 
broke out on 30th December 2007 at various points in the Province 
simultaneously and that a particular community was targeted though, in his 
view, there was no planning. People simply captured the moment and decided 
there and then what to do with absolutely no prior arrangements. This 
contradicted what the PC Earnest Munyi told the Commission, that during the 
violence leaflets were circulated saying that "The Kikuyu community should leave 
their properties and their lands and go back to where they came from". It was thus 
the PC’s view that  
“there was an element of feeling… that this could have been planned. 
Because on 31st (December 2007) at exactly 11 in the morning  groups 
of people were converging simultaneously at that particular time in 
Kisauni, Changamwe  and were trying also to cross from the Likoni 
side of the ferry trying to come to Island …so that kind of situation 
one can conclude that there was some element of planning”.   
 
Nature and Extent of Violence 
As we have seen, the violence in Mombasa Town erupted on 30th December 2007 
and continued unabated for 3 days. We were told that huge groups of youth 
armed with crude weapons engaged the police in running battles including 
stoning police in Mishomoroni and Changamwe’s Bangladesh area. The main 
highway to Nairobi was blocked at Mikindani and the OCPD reported that riots 
also broke out in Chaani, Bokole, Magongo Mwisho and Miritini. In the 
meantime, the whole of Likoni was engulfed in violence. 
According to the Police, 25 deaths occurred though Dr. Anderson Kahindi the 




killed192. Of these one died of arrow wounds, 5 from gunshots, 11 died in a 
house fire, another 11 had multiple injuries, 2 were indicated to have been 
lynched by a mob while it was not possible to ascertain the cause of death in 2 
cases.  
Further, we heard from the OCPD that 24 vehicles were burnt, 29 residential 
houses destroyed and 240 commercial buildings, including kiosks and other 
temporary structures were destroyed. The youth targeted property belonging to 
the Kikuyu community as an expression of anger against them for allegedly 
supporting Mwai Kibaki. In order to escape the onslaught, many residents found 
it prudent to paint the letters ‘ODM’ on their property and motor vehicles as a 
measure to avoid being attacked193 .  
We were informed by several witnesses that most of the youths appeared to be 
intoxicated.194 The PC observed that the Coast had a drug problem especially 
among the youth and it was probable, therefore, that drugs were bought for the 
youth to engage in violence. The further presumption is that the youth had the 
benefit of leadership and coordination.  
The Commission was told that demonstrators first vented their anger pulling 
down unoccupied structures then lit bonfires and tyres and then barricaded 
roads thereby paralyzing transport and leading to most people staying indoors. 
What had started as protest demonstrations over the presidential outcome took 
an ethnic twist with demonstrators targeting for destruction property belonging 
to the GEMA communities, especially the Kikuyus whom they felt had 
contributed to their marginalization.  
By Monday 31st December 2007 about 20 shops had been broken into and 4 
houses had been burnt in Changamwe. Most of them belonged to members of 
the Kikuyu and the Meru communities who by this time were fleeing to safety 








opportunity to criminals to engage in an orgy of looting and destruction. We 
heard that crowds shouting slogans of “Maisha Bora” (Better Life) and No “Raila 
No Peace” invaded business premises belonging the Kikuyu and Meru 
communities where they looted all the stock. The extent of the violence was also 
felt as far as the Mombasa mainland shopping centre and Soweto where 4 public 
Motor Vehicles were burnt and bars were looted. The orgy of looting was dubbed 
“ODM shopping”. 
Likoni, a largely peri-urban area bordering Kwale District and inhabited 
predominantly by the Digo and other Mijikenda communities and a small 
number of upcountry GEMA residents was not spared. Testimony was furnished 
that 2 petrol stations were burnt down while Mt. Sinai Primary School and some 
businesses owned by Kikuyu were destroyed. In this area, the Ngombeni Chief’s 
camp was attacked and razed down on 5 January 2008 evoking memories of the 
1997 pre-election violence where the Likoni Police station had similarly been 
invaded.195 The Kenya Ferry services business stalls were vandalized and looted 
and for 3 days the South Coast was cut off from Mombasa town which is linked 
by the ferry service that was rendered un-operational due to the prevailing 
mayhem. 
In Kisauni, the Commission heard that there was low level violence on 30th 
December 2007 where youths burnt tyres at the roadside at Mlaleo and GEMA 
community members started to move out. We were further told that the police 
did absolutely nothing to contain the situation and these protests continued in 
Mlaleo, Mtopanga and in Bamburi Mwisho. Between 30th and 31st December 
2007, Mshomoroni, Kadogo, Mtopanga, Bombolulu, Mwandoni, Kiembeni, 
Bamburi, Mtongwe, Shikaadabu, Miritini, Bomu and Migadini areas remained 
no go zones. On 31st December 2007 and subsequent days, there was massive 
destruction of property especially those belonging to members of the Kikuyu 
community. Furniture shops, supermarkets and select bars were attacked and 






January 2008 in Mshomoroni, Changamwe, Likoni and Kisauni there was 
massive destruction of property, looting and burning of houses and kiosks. 20 
shops were reported looted in Changamwe, four houses burnt and a young boy 
reportedly shot by a ‘stray’ bullet. 
Similarly, some violence was experienced in Taita and Taveta districts where on 
2nd January 2008, ODM youths angered by the presidential poll result went on 
rampage in Taveta, Mwatate and Voi towns. In Taveta, 15 shops were broken 
into, goods stolen and or looted and some of these shops burnt amongst them a 
popular establishment known as ‘Makuti’. Several people were injured in the 
skirmishes and one person was killed.  
Some Coastal areas did not experience any level of violence in spite of earlier 
NSIS fears. For instance, though Malindi District remained tense following 
announcement of the presidential poll result, no incidents of violence were 
reported at all. In Lamu district, we received evidence that people merely 
expressed their anger and disappointment through discussions and no violence 
was experienced.   
While Government witnesses stated that violence had been brought under 
control by 1 January 2008, we did hear testimony that the situation only 
became controlled sometime in mid January 2008.196 For instance, we heard 
that on 3 January 2008 violence was reported in Kisauni, Maweni, Bombolulu 
and Changamwe areas where kiosks were destroyed and used to block roads. 
The demonstrators were dispersed by police using tear gas and shooting in the 
air. In this incident, one man was reportedly shot in the head and many others 
were seriously injured. On 5 January 2008 youth leaders in Mvita organized a 
demonstration which disrupted shops, markets and matatu transport. The 
Commission further heard that in Ukunda, shops were burnt while others were 
marked with an ‘x’ as a sign that they would be attacked and 2 German tourists 






On 10th January 2008 in Mvita, demonstrations were called after the Friday 
prayers leading to the closure of shops as police dispersed the demonstrators 
who then resorted to running battles with the police. This was repeated again on 
18th January 2008 and we heard that organized demonstrations by youth and 
some civil society organizations became the order of the day. One youth was 
reported to have been shot dead in this mayhem and many people were injured, 
shops remained closed while police fired in the air and employed tear gas to 
disperse the demonstrators.  Overall, we heard that a measure of calm returned 
to Mombasa by 25th January 2008 as the Koffi Annan mediation process gave 
many people hope of lasting peace. 
The post election violence left 303 families homeless in Kisauni, Changamwe and 
Likoni. 6 people were burnt to death in a house in Miritini and Dr. Anderson 
Kahindi CW 143 informed us that the Coast Provincial General hospital handled 
109 casualties while Jocham Hospital attended to 16 cases. 5 people died of the 
bullet wounds in the province. 
 
Response by Police and Provincial Administration  
The PC stated that security forces who were deployed to quell the skirmishes did 
their level best and that he was “satisfied because the violence was quite intense 
in the two days and especially the second day and were it not because of the 
presence of security personnel, then the violence could not have been controlled 
within that limited period of time.” While we shall shortly revert to this issue, we 
commend the PC’s decision to call a meeting of local leaders who appealed to the 
public through the 5 FM stations in Mombasa to help bring peace back to 
Mombasa and Kilindini. This action made a big contribution in bringing peace in 




added that the voice of a bishop and particularly that of the Chief Kadhi197 was 
very important in appealing to people to maintain peace.  
The PPO felt that the police had dealt with the situation to his satisfaction and 
that by 1st January 2008 the violence had largely been contained. He also 
acknowledged that he had received a lot of complaints from citizens lamenting 
that “our officers were not protecting their premises adequately enough”. He 
explained that in response to the looting, the police had resorted to the use of 
Albadiri, which in local terms is “giving people a number of days to return what 
they had taken and they will not be prosecuted; a lot of property was returned.”  
We heard that almost 10,000 people were displaced on the first night of violence 
and sought refuge in various police stations. Not surprisingly, the police through 
the PPO and the OCPD Wilson Mbithi told us that though they expected election 
related problems at the Coast they had not imagined violence of the magnitude 
that occurred. It is our finding that serious efforts were put to securing vital 
public installations such as the Kenya pipeline depots, the port of Mombasa, the 
Kenya Petroleum Refinery and fuel depots in Shimanzi which meant that with 
the available security personnel, it was not possible to provide reasonable 
protection to others’ property. This is borne by cross-examination of the OCPD, 
Q.: Bwana OCPD, you're almost telling this Commission that the 
police will be there to protect the bigger assets, the bigger 
installations and that is why the pipeline - nobody - I mean the oil 
depots, the ports, the banks were not touched, But mwananchi's 
kiosk their shops were broken into. And you explain the logic behind 
guarding that and not the mwananchi's kiosk. 
Witness: My Lords without giving any other details, it was not 
possible for the police to provide security to every individual's 
business premises. 
While obviously appreciating that police could not be everywhere all the time, we 
were repeatedly told that police took too long to come to the rescue of citizens 
                                                            
197 The PPO further stated that on a night when people had come out with pangas, he had talked to the Chief Kadhi 





and property under threat and sometimes did not appear at all, in spite of giving 
assurances that everything was under control. For example, a witness testified 
that: 
“The same day on the 31st December in the evening around 6 p.m, I 
was called again by neighbours in Likoni, who told me that shops of 
Kikuyus were being broken into and things were being looted. I also 
called the police there and they assured me things are okay there 
(are) no problems but within a short while I was told the shop was 
broken into but they were even unable to open the doors so they had 
to break the concrete. The steel door they were unable to open it so 
they broke the walls.”  
When he received news that another of his shops was under attack, he called 
“the Nyali police Station and they told me everything was okay but within 
minutes the shop was broken into and everything taken away.” He lost property 
and goods estimated at Kshs 3 million. The witness furnished the Commission 
with video footage capturing the looting of one of his shops which evidence he 
also stated he had put in the hands of the police together with posters which 
clearly depicted the faces of people who were looting his shops.198 By the time he 
appeared before us on 1 September 2008, he said no action had been taken by 
police against the perpetrators, some of whom could clearly be identified from 
the footage and posters.  
The lethargy and incompetence experienced by the witness and others depict 
another hallmark of poor policing in addition to other negative allegations 
including taking part in the violence and even worse, of having taken sides. The 
evidence points to a serious degree of inefficiency and dysfunction within the 
police, and we cannot therefore in such circumstances help but come to the 
conclusion that either the police did not bother to prevent the commission of 
crimes in this region or if they were willing to, then they were obviously 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the unfolding chaos. Surprisingly there was no 






Further, we heard from two witnesses that prior to elections, it was openly 
discussed amongst the Coastal people that they would attack Kikuyu and 
Kamba business premises if the election results were flawed. One would 
therefore have expected that the administrative arm of the Government in 
collaboration with the police and other security agencies would have verified 
such warning signs and moved very swiftly to put in place some measures to 
ensure that such eventuality did not occur. Of course no precautionary 
measures were put in place despite the acknowledgement that some areas were 
dubbed as hot spots. The information produced in Exhibit 150 is therefore 
credible that security forces did not make any preparations to address the 
anticipated violence, to forestall looting, destruction and other forms of chaos.  
We were concerned by evidence tendered before us that there was a big presence 
of GSU officers in Likoni but that they were only visible and not active. This gave 
the impression to the residents that these particular officers were there with 
specific instructions to protect tourists along the main routes but had no brief to 
quell the violence and so they just watched as the tragedy unfolded. However as 
stated by Hussein Khalid, the Provincial Administration led by the PC Ernest 
Munyi made an effort at some point to meet the local leaders with a view to 
finding a solution to the situation if only to avoid the escalation of violence. That 
aside given the attitude of the security forces at this point in time we are not 
surprised that a fairly manageable situation escalated into full blown violence 
that took an ethnic angle and that not only were security forces caught 
unawares but they were completely overwhelmed. Further, it emerged that the 
riot drill pamphlet providing guidelines to the suppression of riots “was last 
issued in October 1962 and if there is any one that came after this one I may not 
be aware about it my Lord199”.  
The OCPD said it was: 
“just a show of force meaning that your presence at a scene of 
disturbance is assumed to be enough to make the rioters disperse, 






force then you are required to use the teargas. The third one if they 
would not disperse after you throw teargas to them then the pamphlet 
allows the use of the button, the truncheon now. And finally if they do 
not oblige and the situation is so bad that is the only time you can 
resort to the use of firearms my Lord”. 
Another troubling aspect regards the evidence we received that in numerous 
instances where the police arrived on time, “they allowed these people to loot 
items but implored them not to cause any bodily harm to other persons”200.  The 
PC, the PPO and the Mombasa Urban OCPD categorically denied being aware of 
a ‘loot but not kill’ order. They also rejected the suggestion that they were 
overwhelmed for lack of adequate preparation, which would justify them seeking 
to appease the mobs by allegedly telling them to loot but not to kill. However, 
testimony was consistent from a number of witnesses that police who were 
patrolling in Land Rovers gave the protesting crowds a go ahead to loot but not 











Extent and Impact of Post Election Violence 
This part of the Report deals with cross cutting issues arising out of the violence 
which the Commission came across in the course of its investigations. These are: 
• Sexual Violence; 
• Internally Displaced Persons 
• The Media and the Post Election Violence 
• Extent and Consequences of PEV: Figures on Deaths, Injuries and 








One of the well known and regrettable tragedies of major conflicts and 
breakdowns of law and order is sexual violence. This has happened around the 
world. Sadly enough, it also was a consequence of the 2007 post election 
violence in Kenya. Like others who either lived through or followed this terrible 
period of Kenya’s history, the Commission heard anecdotally and from the media 
about sexual violence against both women and men. These reports, admittedly 
informal, included heart wrenching tales of rape, gang rape, sexual mutilation, 
loss of body parts, and hideous deaths. In addition, the Commission also 
gradually learned that the various forms of genital violence against innocent 
victims were not just one-off tragedies but major life-changing events. Among 
others, the Commission heard tales of family members being forced to stand by 
and witness their mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, and little children being 
raped, killed, and maimed: innocent victims contracting HIV AIDS after being 
sexually assaulted because the breakdown of law and order and the 
deteriorating security situation kept them from accessing medical care soon 
enough to prevent it: husbands abandoning their wives who had been defiled, 
and the inevitable psychological burden of powerlessness and hopelessness that 
left individuals who had experienced sexual violence feeling alone, isolated, and 
unable to cope, not just for one moment in time, but possibly forever. Worse still, 
the Commission also heard that some individuals who had lost family members 
and property, and who had been chased away from the only homes they had 
ever known, also had experienced multiple forms of violence that included sexual 
violence. 
 
Hearing bits and pieces of these life shattering experiences alerted the 
Commission to the need to make its inquiries into the sexual violence that 




election violence. At the very least the Commission thought it would be 
appropriate to look in depth into the sexual violence that had occurred. Its 
reasoning was twofold. First, sexual violence is a form of violence and as the 
Commission was about violence, it felt strongly that there should be a focus on it 
in the Commission’s investigations. Secondly, being ordinary lay people from 
various walks of life, the members of the Commission also were personally 
horrified by the stories of sexual violence that came to our attention. Like others, 
members of the Commission too felt compassion for the victims of post election 
sexual violence and wanted to learn and expose what had happened. The 
Commission also felt that it  should do something to make sure that the scourge 
of sexual violence that happened after the election did not become an endemic in 
Kenyan life that, could be  one day could recur in the lives of ordinary people. 
 
The Commission felt it needed to explore the situation given that like others it 
only heard isolated stories and did not know anything concrete about the sexual 
violence that happened. The Commission sought to the best of its ability to 
answer four basic questions to fulfil its mandate to explore the full extent of 
violence that Kenya had experienced, including sexual violence. First, the 
Commission wanted to know whether sexual violence actually had taken place. 
Secondly, the Commission wanted to know exactly what had occurred, how it 
manifested, and its extent. Third, the Commission wanted to understand, how 
and why it happened, and fourth what evidence there was for all of the above. 
 
Being lay people rather than specialists in the subject of sexual violence, 
members of the Commission understood that not only did they not have the 
answers to the above questions, but that they also did not know how to go about 
getting them. The Commission realized that while armed with reasonable 
questions and good intentions, it could not embark on this inquiry alone. The 
Commission needed assistance from specialists who knew Kenya’s social and 
political landscape, were familiar with the history, causes and nature of sexual 
violence in general, and who had worked with victims of such violence. The 




violence when order breaks down, men too had experienced horrid types of 
sexual violence after the Kenyan election. These included sodomy, forced 
circumcision, and even mutilation of their penises. Between hearing of women 
who had been gang raped and mutilated, the accounts of ethnically driven 
sexual violence against certain men was also horrifying. Furthermore, the 
Commission also understood that any inquiries it might make into sexual 
violence would also involve interacting with victims. The Commission 
appreciated all the sensitivities associated with doing so, including the usual 
problem of finding victims who would agree to discuss what had happened to 
them. 
 
The Commission wanted to make its inquiries into sexual violence part and 
parcel of all of its investigations into the post election violence that engulfed 
Kenya after the 2007 election. The Commission knew, however, that to do so it 
would need the help of experts. Fortunately, there are a number of groups in 
Kenya who work around the theme of sexual violence. These agreed to assist in 
all parts of the Commission’s work, both before the Commission took evidence in 
Nairobi and while gathering testimony in the countryside. In Nairobi, the 
Commission held three planning meetings with civil society organizations that 
address sexual violence, including those who had worked on these matters after 
the elections in Kenya. In the middle of the crisis, forty organizations in Kenya 
came together to reach out to women and others who had experienced sexual 
violence following the 2007 elections. They gathered under the auspices of the 
Inter-Agency Gender Based Violence sub-cluster co-chaired by the United 
Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the National Commission on 
Gender and Development. This umbrella group included a variety of different 
groups from departments in the ministries of gender and  health, and the 
judiciary,  various UN agencies (e.g. UNFPA, the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM)),  the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and 
from various local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOS). 
Even before the Commission began its sessions, the sub-cluster had responded 




providing victims with medical, psycho-social and other counselling services. 
Hence the sub-cluster was in a unique position to help the Commission with its 
work and did so. 
 
During consultations with the SGBV sub-cluster, the Commission was able to 
ask them questions about how sexual violence manifested, where the 
Commission might find evidence of it, and how it should go about collecting this 
evidence. The Commission also decided internally that matters relating to sexual 
violence would be an integral part of its inquiry into the post-election violence. 
As Justice Philip Waki, the Chairman of the Commission noted on the first day 
of the Commission’s hearings, sexual violence is “silent” and “preying”  because 
it is “underreported, under-investigated and …insufficiently addressed”, also 
adding that the Commission would focus on it in all parts of our investigation, 
declaring ourselves open to “receive any credible information and evidence from 
survivors”.201  
 
The Commission realized that it probably would be easier to find out what had 
happened in Nairobi than in the countryside, where lack of anonymity and fear 
of speaking to the Commission might be a greater problem. The Commission also 
understood that if all testimony from victims of post-electoral sexual violence 
was taken in private rather than in public, the issue of sexual violence against 
women in the post-election period might get lost and never be discussed or 
flagged to the general public. To pre-empt these and other potential problems, 
the Commission took five major steps. First, to help locate and speak to victims 
of post-election sexual violence in various parts of Kenya, the Commission 
enlisted assistance from UNFPA and UNIFEM as well as from four sub-cluster 
members. They included CARE Kenya, FIDA Kenya, the Kenya Women 
Empowerment Link, and the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru. As a part of this effort, 
CARE did a study in the slums of Kibera and Mathare, while the Centre for 






documentary about sexual violence in the Rift Valley. CARE Kenya also held a 
workshop for victims of sexual violence to explain what the Commission was 
doing and to find out who among them might be willing to testify before. Further, 
they provided counselling services to women and prepared them to testify before 
the Commission in addition to giving the Commission some recommendations to 
be followed when victims, most of whom were women, appeared before the 
Commission. Secondly, to ensure that the work on sexual violence was culturally 
sensitive and to allow the Commission to contact specialists as needed, the Sub-
Cluster set up a committee, including a resident gender expert from UNIFEM, to 
work with the Commission’s investigators, and to identify and prepare victims 
who wanted to testify to the Commission.  
 
Thirdly, to encourage victims of sexual violence to come before the Commission 
and to make it less painful for them to speak to investigators and to the 
Commission, the Commission hired two female investigators who had experience 
in dealing with sexual violence against women in particular. They included one 
international police investigator and one Kenyan lawyer. Fourthly, the 
Commission made it a point to allow two lawyers to take part in its proceedings, 
who had experience in dealing with gender issues, the Federation of Women 
Lawyers (FIDA) and the Centre for Advancement of Women and Children202. They 
had opportunity to examine every witness appearing before the Commission, 
including government officials, the police, victims, and other interested parties, 
throughout our meetings all over the country. Their questions added another 
dimension to the Commission’s understanding of what had happened to women 
and other victims of sexual violence and the extent to which the government and 
others had assisted or failed to assist those in need. Fifthly, fully cognizant of the 
potential challenge of   asking someone who had experienced sexual violence to 








psychologist to interact with and assist victims both before, during, and after 
they testified to the Commission.  
 
Collecting Evidence 
This Commission is the first investigation of electoral violence to focus on sexual 
violence. This contrasts with the Kiliku and Akiwumi Commissions which did 
not address it. As such, the Commission was in uncharted territory. Not only did 
it seek advice as noted above, but also tried to take account of the difficulty 
victims faced in coming forward. Some told the cluster group or investigators 
that they were ashamed of what had happened to them and did not want to 
discuss their experiences in public, fearing further humiliation. Others worried 
that if they testified in the open, their attackers might retaliate against them, as 
this increased the possibility of them being identified. 
 
Understanding that potential witnesses had suffered incalculable physical and 
psychological horrors from which they might never recover, the Commission 
arranged for private hearings, which also allowed victims to describe what had 
happened to them and enabled them to open up, in some cases to the point of 
naming their attackers. In short, the Commission and the Kenyan victims of 
sexual violence encountered issues similar to those faced elsewhere in the world 
when dealing with its aftermath. Even then, with all of the efforts to sensitize 
members of the Commission and provide a safe environment in which victims 
could testify, it was still difficult for victims to steel themselves and come forth to 
meet with the Commission. This accounts for the relatively small number of 
victims, 31 in all, who testified before the Commission or submitted statements, 
something the Commission understood and appreciated, but nevertheless regret 
given the strong belief by the Commission  that the problem of sexual and 
gender based violence in the post election period merited more time in the 
Commission hearings. This not so unusual problem may also have been 
accentuated by the sad history of Kenya’s past electoral violence and the reality 
that perpetrators have not only gone unpunished, but have continued afterwards 




powerlessness of Kenyan women in many areas of life may have made potential 
witnesses shy away after considering that the potential cost of their testimony 
far outweighed any perceived expectations that they may have had for obtaining 
justice.  
 
Furthermore, some cases of sexual violence against men that took place after the 
2007 elections were hitherto unheard of and new to the Commission and to 
Kenya. The tragic novelty of this experience meant that there were even fewer 
support groups available to men than to women. That, added to the humiliation 
of the violations meant that no male victims came forward to testify to the 
Commission, something the Commission understood, but nevertheless found 
regrettable. 
The Commission heard from witnesses, some of whom were specialists or had 
treated victims of sexual violence, and others who were victims. The former 
testified in public about the character, magnitude, and extent of the violence. 
This permitted the Commission to learn much about what had happened, 
approximately how many people were affected, and how various organizations 
had responded in the face of this crisis. Others, mainly victims, testified mostly 
in private. The private hearings began in Nairobi after which the Commission 
heard from victims of sexual violence in Naivasha, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu, and 
Mombasa, but not in Kisii where no victims came forth. 
 
Public Testimony by Expert Witnesses 
The Commission received testimony from three specialists on sexually based 
violence, most of whose work has been with female victims. These were: Millicent 
Obaso,203 a Sexual and Gender Based Violence Advisor for CARE International 
who also is an HIV/AIDS Advisor for East and Central Africa; Jane Onyango, the 
Executive Director of FIDA Kenya; and Dr. Sam Thenya, an obstetrician 
gynaecologist, and Chief Executive Officer of the Nairobi Women’s Hospital which 






Mecca for women. They discussed the post election sexual violence in Kenya 
between December 2007 and March 2008 and their encounters with it. They told 
the Commission that sexual violence was rampant during this period consisting 
mainly of rape and gang rape, defilement, genital mutilation, sodomy, forced 
circumcision, and sexual exploitation. 
 
Millicent Obaso’s testimony discussed the horrific experiences of women in 
Kibera and Mathare where her organization had worked. There her organization 
collected information from 40 victims, and analysed in depth the cases of 13 of 
these victims. She the Commission that most victims were poor women who had 
been raped in their own homes by youth, gangs of up to 20 men, GSU  personnel 
,and some police officers.  The victims  ranged in age from 25-68 with over 62% 
being married, widowed or divorced, and 38%  single. Slightly over 61% had 
attended primary school, 15 % secondary school, and 23% had never been to 
school at all. Most were still homeless or living in IDP camps, having lost their 
possessions, livelihoods, and homes. Ms. Obaso recounted several terrible tales 
from victims of sexual violence which not only hit women worst but which she 
told the Commission, was the direct consequence of existing inequalities 
between men and women in Kenya, and something that affected the way in 
which husbands responded to the rapes of their wives and daughters. She 
explained that over 75% of the individuals her group interviewed said they had 
been raped at home in front of their spouses and children, causing a great deal 
of stress that resulted in their being abandoned by their husbands. As she 
explained, “the man came, the father of the house and when he found that his 
wife had been raped and the same man raped his daughter and rapes his 
daughter-in law, he said I am finished with [this]; I cannot deal with this. I am 
going to find myself another woman, [b]ecause this is the biggest taboo in my 







The witness told the Commission that abandonment after being raped, 
sometimes by up to 20 men, was just the beginning of the horror visited on these 
women. Most who were left had no place to go, the majority did not report what 
had happened with the police or their chiefs, and when they did many were 
received with hostility or turned away. Some contracted HIV AIDs because they 
could not get to hospital in time to receive post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), a 
drug which the Commission was informed prevents HIV infection if administered 
in time, while others who were already infected with HIV/AIDS were unable to 
get their daily doses of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVS) to manage the disease, 
others became pregnant as a result of the violations. Furthermore, the witness 
told the Commission that some women were disabled and when they were being 
interviewed they could not walk properly while others who did not receive proper 
treatment, still had blood streaming down their legs which was visible to their 
children. 
 
Ms. Obaso told the Commission that she felt these terrible violations against 
women needed to be taken very seriously and made recommendations  including 
implementing the Sexual Offences Act, developing guidelines for police, 
compensating women, providing psychosocial support to them and their families, 
“looking at these women as human beings while...finding their perpetrators”, and 
passing on the experiences  of what happened to women to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
 
Jane Onyango205, testified about the work of FIDA in IDP camps in Nairobi, 
Nakuru, Eldoret, Mombasa, and Kisumu Kenya that included legal aid, 
counselling and humanitarian services which they provided to women and 
children living in very poor, congested and insecure conditions. She told the 
Commission that these conditions encouraged further sexual violence. She 
reiterated similar experiences as those recounted by Ms Obaso: gang rapes, fear 






police stations, loss of property, homes, legal documents and possessions, and 
abandonment by their husbands. One woman in Mathare, who  was already HIV 
positive, who had returned home to stay safe after being chased by a gang, she  
experienced the terror of her house being knocked down by another mob who 
proceeded to gang raped her before she passed out. In another case, a Luhya 
woman married to a Kikuyu was abandoned by her husband on 30 December. 
He returned two days later and threatened to kill her, and sodomize her, saying 
he regretted marrying a Luhya, he threw her belongings out of their house, and 
refused to let her see her children. Ms. Onyango also told the Commission that 
women are traditionally  seen as lesser human beings  something that propels 
sexual violence and the insensitive response of the police which leads to victims’ 
fears of reporting, believing they could be turned away or even killed for doing 
so. 
 
The Commission also received testimony from Dr. Regina Karega206, the 
chairwoman of Kenya’s National Commission on Gender and Development, 
which came into existence in 2004. She made a number of suggestions about 
measures which she felt would increase the likelihood of perpetrators of sexual 
violence being charged. These included having mobile courts and increasing the 
number of centres for victims of conflict both to assist and protect them. Michael 
Gachanja Wachira207,  a program officer with the Centre for Rights, Education, 
and Awareness (CREAW) presented a DVD of women in the Rift Valley who 
voiced their experiences concerning sexual violence after the 2007 election. He 
also gave the Commission a presentation based on an in depth study 
undertaken in Nairobi, Nakuru, Burnt Forest and Eldoret from the end of 
January through 25 April 2008.  The Commission was interested to learn that 
82% of the victims did not formally report their experiences of sexual violence, 
especially to the police. The Commission was told that the reasons for non-
reporting ranged from having been attacked by the police (32%), fear of being 







to identify the rapist (31%). Others, the Commission was told, did not know 
where to report the incident, had been asked not to report the matter (34%), or 
did not know how to do so (27%). The witness told the Commission that some 
respondents, especially those raped by powerful figures in authority, including 
police, who had sexually assaulted women, were effectively untouchable. This 
finding mirrored other testimony given to the Commission concerning the 
response both by government and security personnel to other types of post-
election violence. The very individuals who might have helped them were people 
to whom they could not go for help: perpetrators at the worse and otherwise 
often indifferent bystanders to the plight of ordinary citizens whom they should 
have assisted. The witness also testified that some women in IDP camps in 
Naivasha were reduced to trading sex for money to buy food for their families 
while others were raped by individuals who invaded IDP camps as was the case 
in Nakuru, or did not have access to medical services.208 
 
Dr. Sam Thenya209, the CEO of the Nairobi Women’s Hospital, which provides 
free services to female and male victims of sexual violence, explained to the 
Commission that his hospital offers comprehensive treatment to survivors of 
sexual violence, including administering a drug, known as Post Exposure 
Prophylaxes (PEP) medication which if given within 72 hours of rape reduces the 
chances of the victim being infected with HIVAIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs). He also relayed to the Commission the other types 
of services offered by his hospital including psychological and mental health and 
other services. 
 
Dr. Sam Thenya told the Commission that his hospital was inundated with 
patients during the post election period. It treated 653 individuals to whom it 
was able to offer comprehensive services, including the administration of PEP. 
This number excludes others who came to the hospital after the 72 hour period 







receive its “comprehensive services”, therefore to some extent not fully taking 
account of the total number of individuals who came to the hospital to be treated 
for sexual violence. Adding in those treated at other hospitals in other parts of 
the country with whom he partners, Dr. Thenya testified to us that at least 900 
individuals were treated, noting this was the just the “tip of the iceberg”. Many 
more victims of sexual violence could not get to his or other hospitals to obtain 
treatment given the lack of security and means of transport when law and order 
broke down. This was an additional tragedy Dr. Thenya relayed to the 
Commission, adding to the Commission’s understanding of the ways in which 
sexual violence and the results of post election violence intersected. For those on 
whom Dr. Thenya had collected data, 524 or 80%  suffered from rape and 
defilement, 65 or 10% from domestic violence with the remaining 10%  from 
other types of physical and sexual assault. The majority of the patients were 
women, even though the hospital treated a small number of males who had been 
sodomized and subjected to other form of sexual brutalization. About half of the 
524 were adults and the other half were children with 207 knowing their 
attackers. The majority of the attackers were known but not named, followed by 
neighbors, relatives, and friends. Of the patients coming to the Nairobi Women’s 
Hospital, 58% were from Nairobi, with the rest coming from Kiambu, Nakuru, 
Naivasha, Eldoret, Makueni, Machakos, and Ongata Rongai.210 
 
Dr. Margaret Makanyengo, a Consultant Psychiatrist and Head of the 
Department of Mental Health Services and the Gender Based Violence Recovery 
Centre (GBVRC), 211also testified and said that their GBVRC acted as a “one stop 
shop” offering psychological and mental health services to victims of sexual 
violence. From December 2007 to June 2008 they recorded 184 cases of sexual 
violence, 80% of which stemmed from the post election situation. Ironically, the 
Commission heard that in January and February, at the height of the violence, 







attributed to the lack of transport and the general level of insecurity in the city. 
Here she echoed the statements of other witnesses. 
 
Notwithstanding the abundance of information the Commission received about 
the nature, numbers, and manifestations of post election sexual violence from 
the above organizations and from other witnesses, the Commissioner of Police, 
Major General Hassan Ali212  had told the Commission the police had not 
collected any information or statistics on crimes such as rapes.213 Given the 
evidence adduced  by the witnesses above and the  victims of sexual violence 
against the police, the Commission was concerned over the apparent lack of 
interest of  the police in sexual violence in general and particularly in not taking 
action against their own officers who perpetrated the crimes.   
 
Testimony from Victims 
The Commission received testimony from victims of sexual violence in public, in 
private, from statements collected by investigators, including those from victims 
who did not wish to appear before the Commission but nevertheless wanted their 
stories heard. The Commission also obtained records of interviews given to other 
organizations including those headed by the specialists above, who testified 
before the Commission. This included evidence from women, men, girls and boys 
who were raped, sodomized, and had their genitals mutilated. It is noted that 
women and girls were the majority of those affected. 
 
The Commission and its investigators collected testimonies and statements from 
many different parts of Kenya even though was difficult to access victims in IDP 
camps, particularly once the government began its program of to resettle IDPs, 
“Operation Rudi Nyumbani” which made  it more difficult for the Commission to 








The people whom the Commission heard from in direct evidence and from 
statements to investigators are real people with real lives. The combined horror 
of post election and sexual violence they experience has destroyed their lives. 
What began as one horror and one loss was quickly compounded into many. 
These experiences continue to overwhelm those who heard them, including the 
Commission. Mass violence can easily be reduced to anomic numbers. While 
numbers are necessary to profile the sexual violence that occurred after the 
2007 election, they also can turn tragic histories of normal people into a sea of 
faceless anonymity if viewed in isolation. To avoid this and to retain the human 
face of the post election sexual violence experienced by its victims, the 
Commisison did its best to encourage victims of sexual violence to come and tell 
about their experiences. 
 
Hence, following the presentation of figures compiled by the Commission to help 
in synthesizing what happened, the rest of this chapter tells the story of post 
election violence through the eyes of the victims who testified to  the 
Commission, mostly in camera. The chapter consists in either summarizing what 
they told the Commission or using direct quotes from their testimonies and 
statements to the Commission to illustrate broader points. 
 
 
Who Were the Victims of Sexual Violence? 
The demographic characteristics of the victims of post-election sexual violence 
who testified and whom the Commission’s investigators interviewed are as 
follows.214 The Commission received statements from a total of 31 women 
ranging in age from 17-55 years old, some of whom testified in private and 
others of whom just gave statements the Commission’s investigators, but did not 
appear before the Commission. Many were victims of other aspects of post 







property destroyed, losing their family members, and suffering from other types 
of violence. Twelve of the thirty came from Nairobi, two from Naivasha, six from 
Nakuru, four from Eldoret, six from Kisumu, one from Mombasa, but none from 
Kisii, even though sexual violence occurred there too. While the Commission 
feels that much of what it heard was broadly indicative of what happened, its 
assessment comes from a small group of people who do not constitute a 
statistically representative sample. For reasons noted earlier, victims of sexual 
violence are often reluctant to testify.  
 
The Commission was able to find thirty women who agreed to testify. However, 
while men and male children were also targets of sexual violence, none were 
willing to be interviewed by the Commission’s investigators or to testify before 
the Commission. This was the situation in Naivasha where there were many 
forced male circumcisions, including on a teenaged boy who was near where the 
Commission’s investigators were taking statements, but was too traumatized to 
record his story.  
 
Of those testifying to the Commission or whose statements were recorded, the 
majority were not well off, if not poor. Before the post election violence many 
were engaged in small business activities. These included selling cereals, 
vegetables, and second-hand clothes, working in beauty shops and bars, 
engaging in subsistence farming, and working as casual labourers on farms or 
as house maids. In Nairobi, all those interviewed lived in the slums of Mathare 
and Kibera, while the victims in Nakuru, Naivasha, Eldoret, Kisumu, and 
Mombasa lived on the outskirts of the towns or in the rural areas. Eighteen of 
the women interviewed were attacked in their homes, seven while fleeing from  
violence, three while looking for food or children lost as a result of the prevailing 
mayhem in their neighbourhoods, one while being dragged out of her house by 
someone she knew, with the remaining suffering other experiences. Twenty four 
of the thirty victims who gave statements to the Commission or to its 
investigators were gang raped. Seventeen rapes were committed by civilians 




involving the 4 by the GSU, 2 by Administrative Police, and one by the Kenya 
police. The gang rapes perpetrated by the GSU involved 2 to 4 officers, 3 to 7 in 
the case of the Administrative Police (AP) and 2 in the cases of the Kenya Police. 
Six other cases of rape were committed by individuals rather than gangs, with 
four cases involving civilians and another two officers from the GSU and one who 
was an AP. Only one case involved forced circumcision. In Nairobi, six of the 
twelve cases of sexual violence were HIV positive before being attacked, two were 
infected after being raped, one was infected with an STD during the attack, while 
the remaining three had not been tested and did not know their status. Seven of 
these same individuals had been gang raped, five of which were committed by 
GSU officers. As mentioned earlier, the Commission also heard from Kenyan 
experts that the majority of the victims of sexual violence were either unable to 
or did not seek out medical care. 
 
Who Were the Perpetrators? 
From testimony witnesses gave to the Commission and that received from 
specialists who worked with victims of sexual violence, the Commission learned 
that the perpetrators of the post election sexual violence included the following: 
state security agents (e.g. administrative police, regular police, and members of 
the General Service Unit (GSU)), members of organized gangs (e.g. Mungiki, 
Kalenjin warriors, and others), neighbors, relatives, supposed friends, and 
individuals working in IDP camps. 
 
It is always impossible to get into the minds of perpetrators of violence 
particularly those engaged in sexual violence. However, the testimony given to 
the Commission suggests certain underlying themes, however irrational they 
may seem to outsiders or to victims themselves. It appears to the Commission 
different perpetrators acted for different reasons. In some areas, sexual violence 
was a means used to pressure people to leave their homes, to retaliate against 
them for having voted for the wrong candidate, tribe, or party and in tandem 
with that to dominate, humiliate and degrade them and their communities into a 




other areas, sexual violence was an opportunistic act played out against a 
background of lawlessness and a vacuum of power that created disorder 
bordering on anarchy. In other cases, sexual violence was used to coerce and 
control helpless IDPs who traded sex unwillingly for basic needs with the 
perpetrators being individuals in the camp, individuals from surrounding 
communities (e.g. when women went out to collect food and water), or security 
personnel, and humanitarian workers in the camps each of whom preyed upon 
helpless women in different macabre ways. 
 
Security Forces 
In discussing their attackers, victims of sexual violence singled out members of 
various security forces who were meant to have protected them. Two victims, a 
50 year old widow,215 resident of Kibera who had lived there for ten years and 
who had  children and 216a 46 year old married woman with ten children, who 
ran a shop selling vegetables and charcoal described their experiences of being 
gang raped by GSU officers to the Commission. They told the Commission the 
officers entered their houses under the pretext of looking for the weapons and 
young men that were barricading roads and the railway line in Kibera. Another 
55 year old woman from Kibera Laini Saba interviewed by investigators recalled 
a similar horrendous experience. In her statement she told of looking outside, 
seeing that there were security officers, and therefore not bothering to lock her 
house. Worse still, as they were security officers, she let them in after which, 
they ransacked her house while pretending to look for the members of the illegal 
group, Mungiki, and gang raped her when they could not find the group they 
were working for . She narrated her life altering story as follows: 
“I went to my house. The GSU followed me and said they were looking 
for young men who were involved in the violence. They were 3(three) 
G.S.U men who got into my house. I had not locked my house and 
when they came in I did not bother to lock because they were security 







at the door, the other two got in. They told me they were going door to 
door looking for the young men who were involved in the violence. I 
told them that they would check since I was not hiding anyone. I told 
them that I was alone. By that time I was alone in the house. They 
told me that we, women, were the ones encouraging the young men 
because we were preparing food for the “Mungiki”. They were using 
Swahili language.  I insisted I was alone and I have never seen 
Mungiki. They told me that if they could not find Mungiki at least I 
was available. I asked them “what have I done.” One G.S.U grabbed 
me and said “we can’t leave you alone.” He then threw me on the bed 
and hit me on the face. He tore my inner pants and then raped me. 
Then the second one raped me....”217  
 
Another 34 year old woman, also from Kibera Laini Saba had a similar 
experience which was captured in a statement she gave to the Commission’s 
investigators. She described the horrors visited upon her as follows: 
“The army men started running after the young men who were said to 
be “Mungiki” and had killed other people along the railway line. 
Having seen that they were army men, I just went to my house and 
locked the house. I had gone out of my house just to know what was 
happening. The army men then came and found me in my house. 
They were three (3) men. It was 5:00pm. They asked me ‘mama wapi 
mzee-mother where is your husband’ I told them I don’t have a 
husband. I only have one child and I have taken her... to my parent’s 
home in Meru. They told me to give them my identity card and ‘the 
weapon that my husband uses’. I insisted that I don’t have a 
husband. They saw a PNU calendar hanging on my wall. They then 
told me ‘nyinyi ndio wale watu tulikuwa tukitafuta-you are the people 
we were looking for.’ One of the army men ordered me to climb on the 






ransacking the house looking for weapons or the people hiding in my 
house. One of the army men told me ‘climb on the bed and remove 
your inner pants’ I got shocked him being a security officer. He 
pushed me on the bed and started raping me. The army man who 
was ransacking the house was the second one to rape me and the 
army man guarding the door was the third to rape me”.218  
 
A 50 year old woman and a resident of Kibera testified in camera to the 
Commission recounting to the Commission what had happened to her in the 
following statement: 
“…..[A]t around 6:30 pm two (2) motor vehicles came with GSU 
policemen in uniform, green (with patches) and they had a cap the 
same colour. Thinking that they were coming to assist us, we were 
very happy but that was not the case. They hit a jiko that had fire 
and it fell on my daughter Juliana and she got burnt on her 
feet……one policeman hit my eyes. I fell down and my blood pressure 
rose. He tore my clothes. He raped me I got unconscious as the other 
ransacked the house. The same man raped my daughter J. She 
became pregnant though on 5/7/08, she had a miscarriage”219.   
 
In some cases, the security agents attacked individuals, including teenagers, 
during flight. According to the statement of a 17 years old girl from Eldoret 
currently living in a children’s home in Nakuru, she was attacked by 7 
Administrative Police Officers who gang raped her. At the time of the attack, she 
was running away from her sister’s house which had been attacked by some 
raiders during the post election violence.220 
 
Not only did the Commission hear of commissions by security officers, who 








themselves, but also of deliberate omissions on their part. The Commission 
received information that some security officers refused to record cases having to 
do with sexual violence.  According to a married woman living in Mathare, 
221who was able to identify some of her attackers by name, she went to Pangani 
Police Station and the police “told me that they do not want to listen to cases 
about rape. If it is about robbery I should report and I reported and they gave me 
an OB number.” In addition, when a married female resident of Kibera who had 
been gang raped, CW 18, went to report at the Kilimani Police Station, she was 
told “to choose between the two, either the issue of the house being burned or 
being raped.”222  
 
The woman explained to the Commission that although she had identified the 
men who gang d raped her and looted her property; the police at the Pangani 
Police Station released the perpetrators without offering her an explanation. The 
police only said that “this [was] about politics and that [she] should leave”.  A Mr. 
Magara, a police officer at the Pangani Police Station even went to the extent of 
asking for a bribe. He asked the woman to pay him “shs.6,000 before he takes up 
the case and [she] told him [she]could not afford that.” 
 
Although security agents are expected to be neutral in the course of their work, 
the Commission received information from witnesses that some of security 
agents were ethnically biased, if not hostile, to individuals not from their own 
ethnic groups or others that  they perceived to belong to political parties that 
they themselves did not support, According to a 29 year old married mother of 
two, a Luo from Naivasha, who worked for a flower company223,the police 
officers, who were from another ethnic group, failed to help her take her injured 
brother to hospital and when he died, they refused to collect his body and take it 
to the mortuary. A Kikuyu gang had been looking for the woman’s husband and 









and his penis. Not only did they refuse, but they warned his wife that if she 
insisted, she “would end up like [her brother] and that it was not their work”. The 
body thus remained uncollected for two days, started rotting and was eaten by 
dogs.  It was only later that she got help from other police officers who were 
Kalenjin.  
 
It is the Commission’s view that the involvement of state security agents in the 
perpetration of sexual violence and the fear of incriminating themselves may 
partly explain why the police omitted data on sexual violence in the reports they 
presented to the Commission. The Commission also felt that it was unfortunate 
that the Commissioner of Police testified that he could not determine whether 
sexual violence was fit to be reported and was unaware that anyone had been 
arrested and charged for commission of such crimes.224 Furthermore, the 
horrendous experiences of the women who testified before the Commission 
illustrated the same broad concerns with the security forces. The Commission 
also learnt about this from other witnesses speaking about the post election 
violence in Kenya. These included those who were supposed to be keeping order 
and protecting citizens but were rather  perpetrators themselves, a refusal to 
help citizens who came directly to officers for help or to report crimes, a 
breakdown along ethnic lines mirroring the way in which violence as a whole  
manifested after the election, and a callous indifference if not outright hostility to 
victims who often had experienced multiple tragedies and had their lives turned 
upside down, sometimes in minutes and sometimes in days.  
 
Furthermore, what the Commission heard from these witnesses once again 
reminded the Commission about the precariousness of both state and society in 
Kenya. The testimony the Commission received brought the realization once 
again that if the current state of impunity and the belief that individuals in 
authority and their followers have a license to maim and kill without being held 






violence would easily happen again. In short, while different in some respects, in 
others the sexual violence after the election also mirrored many facets of the post 
election violence in general.   
 
Organized Gangs 
According to statements received by the Commission, the victims of sexual 
violence from some areas told us that they were attacked by members of 
organized gangs. In Nairobi, Naivasha and Nakuru, there were claims that 
Mungiki was involved, with their members targeting men as opposed to women. 
This might explain why there were no reported cases of rape and defilement in 
Naivasha, but instead there were cases of men being targeted and being forcibly 
circumcised. 
 
Dr Kariuki Gichuki, the current Medical Officer of Health for 
Nakuru225confirmed having received 6 cases of forced circumcision which he 
described as  ‘traumatic circumcision….because usually circumcision, either you 
are in the hospital or in a traditional setting that is clean and boundary kind of 
surgical procedure but this one was a bit crude and not orderly’.  The doctor 
further referred to the cases as ones of ‘pilary amputation’ and explained that 
‘usually, circumcision is the surgical removal of foreskin but in [a particular case] a 
22 year old male [had his] whole penis actually cut’. 
 
In addition to destroying property, killing and maiming, the members of the 
Mungiki gang were said to target men from specific communities believed not to 
practice circumcision and also believed to be in support of a particular political 
party with a view to circumcising them. The cruelty of what transpired differed 
from victim to victim. A married Luo woman with two children, originally from 








“…I heard many people outside saying that “even here there are some 
ODM people we want to circumcise”. ….’they were many and were 
making a lot of noise. They pushed the door saying that ‘Kihii-kikuyu 
for uncircumcised man’ you are the ones troubling us……I saw my 
husband lying… down. They opened his zip, lifted his penis and cut it 
with a panga…. I managed to slip away and one alerted them and 
they said it is okay I would go away and that it is my husband they 
wanted to teach a lesson and circumcise.”227   
 
As a result of this attack her husband died due to the injuries sustained during 
this hideous incident. 
In explaining the extent to which some victims suffered in the hands of such 
gangs, a woman, whose testimony has been referred to previously in camera 
that, 
“I found that his [my brother’s] penis had been cut and placed on his 
mouth, his testis were chopped off and placed on his hand. I found 
that blood was still pouring out of his body and he was kicking as he 
was dying…..the following day, another workmate of mine informed 
me that his [my brother’s] head had been chopped of and that dogs 
were eating his private parts. My brother was clobbered before he 
was mutilated. The people who did that to him were using spiked 
clubs. They had fixed nails on the club and as they hit his face, the 
nails would pluck flesh from his body”.228  
 
Neighbours and Others individual Criminals 
The Commission also heard from witnesses that in some areas, the victims of 
sexual violence were attacked by their own neighbours or by individuals from 
neighbouring villages. Hence, most of these victims were able to identify their 
assailants. In the cases where sexual violence was perpetrated by civilians, this 







violence. As a 40 year old married Kikuyu woman from Mombasa229, told the 
Commission she was able to identify one of her assailants while being gang 
raped because he had worked at the same place. Among her attackers, who 
screamed “ODM, ODM” as they stoned and entered the couple’s house she was 
able to identify some individuals who also stole both her household and business 
properties, torched a sitting shade .., burnt beddings, and slaughtered her three 
goats. She subsequently made a police report. None of the looters were arrested 
and the rapist was “set free shortly thereafter.”230 
 
Humanitarian Workers and IDP Service Providers  
The Commission was told by experts that some women were exposed to sexual 
exploitation during their stay at IDP camps. Desperate and vulnerable women 
were forced into prostitution to fulfil the need to feed their children, doing 
whatever was necessary to do so. The testimony of Millicent Obaso, mentioned 
earlier, told the Commission that that some women were subjected to sexual 
exploitation by some persons managing the IDP camps in order to access basic 
commodities such as food, tents, medicines and beddings. She testified 
Commission that: 
“Sexual exploitation …is really, using power and authority over 
vulnerable people for sexual favours in exchange for services. Here in 
Kenya, we saw a lot of that in terms of food distribution. [It is a form 
of] forced prostitution of course when women are vulnerable, when 
they have to feed their children. So if a man asks them to have sex 
even though they may not want to, they will say yes to get the money 
and feed their children”.231  
 
It is unfortunate that the Commission did not hear testimonies of the victims of 
such types of sexual violence. This could be explained by various factors. There 








Commission would jeopardize their situation further. In addition, by the time the 
Commission was at the heart of its hearings, many of the victims residing at the 
camps and who would have had evidence to that effect, may have been relocated 
to other areas under the government programme ‘Operation Rudi Nyumbani’. 
 
Unintended Sexual Consequences of General Violence 
The Commission obtained evidence from two men, both residents of Kisumu, 
who were victims of police shooting. Although these did not present themselves 
as victims of sexual violence, the general violence of which they were victims had 
incidental sexual effects. In one case, Gregory Ngoche232 testified that he was 
shot by the police while resting in his home with members of his family in 
Kisumu. He sustained injuries on his leg and was hospitalized for several days. 
As a result of the shooting, he suffered a sexual dysfunction. Another witness, 
John Apiyo,233 testified that he worked as an askari in Kisumu and was shot 
from behind by a stray police bullet as they tried to deal with a riot within his 
place of work. He sustained an injury on his testicles from the shooting and now 
has a sexual dysfunction. 
 
Impact of the Victims’ Health and Socio-Economic Conditions  
Victims of the post election sexual violence experienced a number of unintended 
consequences in the aftermath of being attacked which the Commission heard 
about from witnesses who testified and from those who did not but nevertheless 
gave statements to its investigators. These consequences included infection with 
HIV/Aids, physical injury and psychological  trauma,  desertion by their 
spouses,  unwanted pregnancy, and loss of trust that they might have had 
previously in state security agencies.   
Some victims of sexual violence already had HIV/ AIDs and others contracted it 
as a result of being raped and being unable to access medical services in time to 
reduce the chances of or prevent infection. In addition, witnesses told the 







status and showed them their medication, their attackers went on to rape or 
gang rape them, thereby perversely choosing to risk becoming infected 
themselves. As Millicent Obaso, of Care Kenya explained, 
“Some of the women declared to the perpetrators that they were HIV 
positive, but the men ignored and went ahead and raped them. My 
Lord, this is very dangerous because most of the perpetrators, the 
youth gang, were between 20 and 25 years. They have spouses or 
they are planning to marry or have wives and they may be spreading 
this virus, but who knows, maybe some of these perpetrators 
themselves were HIV+ and they also infected the women they raped 
who were not HIV+. I would urge my lord that you monitor the 
HIV/AIDS prevalence in Mathare and Kibera over the next one year or 
two years to see to what extent the prevalence is going up”. 234 
 
This same point was reinforced by Dr. Samuel Thenya, who explained that there  
“are those who are on HIV treatment or who [were] HIV positive and 
they were sexually assaulted. Now call it poetic justice or what you 
may, but it means that the person who assaulted them then has also 
been exposed to HIV/AIDS. And of course the perpetrators did not 
come to us. So you have a group of people out there who assaulted 
others who are HIV positive and therefore have been infected with 
HIV/AIDS”.235  
 
Many victims of sexual violence were injured extensively and suffered enormous 
psychological trauma.  A Mathare resident told the Commission that those who 
circumcised her also cut her vagina to the extent that the attending doctors told 
her it was impossible to stitch her and instead gave her a drug. A 36 year old 
woman from Eldama Ravine told the Commission that when she was gang raped:  
“it was either the second or the third man who said that he was not 







they were carrying that they used. They cut my vagina.”236In 
explaining the extent of the injuries she sustained after being gang 
raped by GSU officers, told the Commission237, “...these people hurt 
me because at my age I had stopped getting monthly periods. These 
days I bleed a lot. I have a smelly watery discharge and I have heavy 
bleeding and have sores around my private parts.......I feel a lot of 
pain in my private parts especially when I am having periods and I 
stopped having periods. This was caused by the men who attacked 
me....”238 
 
In describing the psychological r effects of sexual violence, Ms Obaso explained 
the encounters of other women who did not appear before the Commission 
because of fear and humiliation, as follows:  
“This [sexual violence] happened to many. Some women were 
seriously violated. They had bottles pushed up their private parts and 
others had sticks pushed up into their private parts”239 After 
witnessing the extent of the injury that her brother sustained, his 
subsequent death and the fact that his remains had been eaten by 
dogs 240told the Commission, “I am traumatised. I usually have bad 
dreams. I keep seeing how my brother died in my dreams. Even as I 
speak, I fear getting nightmares. I get them every time I narrate the 
story. …the day my brother was killed, I wished I could die. I walked 
on the road and I was almost knocked by a car”.  
 
The witness also indicated that her nephew (the late brother’s son), one ‘Ochieng 
was present when his father was being clobbered and mutilated. He has since 










penis]’”.241Some victims of sexual violence were raped in the presence of their 
family members a situation that traumatised them as well as the members of 
their families present during the ordeal. After both she and her daughter were 
gang raped with her daughter becoming pregnant and later having a 
miscarriage, a witness told the Commission that “[her] children were 
traumatized,” something which the Commission reviewed as a huge 
understatement given the depth of the multiple tragedies visited on victims of 
Kenya’s post election sexual violence. 
 
Another horror awaiting victims was the fear of and actual abandonment of rape 
victims by their husbands and even other family members which occasioned a 
breakdown of families at a time when the very least a victim needed from those 
close to her was comfort instead of castigation and additional loss. A witness 
from Eldoret who recorded a statement with investigators in Eldoret on 6 August 
2008, did not report or seek medical attention after being gang raped for fear 
that her husband would beat and abandon her, which he did anyway. Other 
witnesses who testified reported being kicked out of their homes or abandoned 
when their spouses heard they had been raped.242, Furthermore, when the 
parents of a 36 year old married Kikuyu woman originally from Eldama Ravine 
with four children, who had been raped by the Kalenjin men who also killed her 
husband, heard she had been gang raped and had contracted HIV AIDs, she told 
the Commission in testimony and in her statement that her immediate family, 
“… started separating themselves from me, “kujitenga”. My parents would not 
even use the same utensils that I used. [They] extended the same sort of treatment 
to my children…[M]y brother, [name withheld] even sharpened a knife and 
threatened to kill me and my children because we (my children and I) were 
suffering from AIDS’….. ‘after I got separated from my family members I had been 
very lonely. I decided to get myself a partner, a person of similar (HIV) status so 








In addition, the Commission heard from other witnesses about unwanted 
pregnancies, including the cases of two 14 and 16 year old girls who had been 
raped after which they found themselves doubly burdened.244 
 
These are a just a few examples of the unbearable and lingering consequences of 
the post election sexual violence that witnesses were courageous enough to 
recount and explain to the Commission. These same victims of gang rapes, 
mutilation, HIV/AIDs, abandonment, psychological trauma, homelessness, loss 
of property, and violence-induced poverty are in a state of utter misery, feeling 
isolated and lonely. Some still are in constant contact with this Commission’s 
psychological counsellor who assisted them when they spoke to its investigators 
and testified before the Commission. Furthermore, a culture of distrust in state 
security agencies has been heightened now that their role as perpetrators is 
more widely known. This also has contributed to the broader culture of impunity 
surrounding election related violence in Kenya since the 1990s. Furthermore, it 
means that victims of sexual violence are now probably even less likely to report 
the crimes against them given the response they received from some of the 
security agencies which were supposed to help them rather than attack or abuse 
them. 
 
Institutional and Legal Challenges to Responding to Sexual Violence 
Other matters affected the proliferation of sexual violence after the 2007 election, 
coupled with the seemingly endless spread of post election violence in general, 
thereby contributing to a large  and unnecessary number of deaths and injuries, 
including injuries resulting from sexual violence. 
 
As mentioned elsewhere in the Commission’s report, the delay by government in 
responding to the violence when it began, the failure to anticipate it, the 
admission by officers in the public administration and security forces of being 







meant that law and order increasingly broke down, thereby inviting a further 
spread of violence, including sexual violence. As the proprietor of the Pepper Tree 
Restaurant in Naivasha noted, violence might have been controlled if security 
had been enhanced as it was in Gilgil town where there was a heavy army 
presence. This contrasted with neighbouring Naivasha and Nakuru, where there 
was no intervention of security agents leading to a resulting free-for-all of 
uncontrolled violence. The consequent spillover of the lack of government control 
manifested in, roadblocks, lack of security, and lack of transport, all of which 
kept victims of sexual violence from getting timely medical care. Furthermore, 
this had a spillover effect in that many medical staff personnel were unable to 
get to work, there were not enough trained individuals to assist victims, and 
drugs often were in short supply.  
 
In addition, the lack of a coordinated government policy, whether agreeing to 
keep systematic figures concerning casualties and incidences of sexual violence 
rather than ignoring it, as well as not communicating instructions to hospitals 
and citizens that medical fees had been waived, meant that some victims of 
sexual violence who could have received medical attention did not do so because 
they thought they would have to pay with money they did not have. 
 
In spite of the above, many institutions who had no official responsibility to 
assist victims of post-election sexual violence offered invaluable humanitarian 
assistance. The Commission received evidence of the remarkable work of the 
Kenya Red Cross Society, Médecins Sans Frontières, the Nairobi Women’s 
Hospital, a number of churches, organizations who came to testify and others 
about which the Commission still may be unaware. Some of these groups such 
as the Kenya Red Cross provided first aid, tents, food, clothing and helped 
survivors reunite with their families, while others, such as the Nairobi Women’s 
Hospital served as a front line facility, which gave medical care and psychological 
support to victims of sexual violence and engaged in fundraising so that they 




Aside from the above and the Commission’s desire to dig deep into the horrifying 
and life altering sexual violence that affected Kenyan women as well as some 
men, the Commission itself was challenged stymied by a number of factors. By 
definition, its work depended on the information that victims and institutions 
were willing to share. However, for the reasons mentioned earlier, many women 
and men did not want to speak about what had happened to them either in 
public or private whether because of shame, fear, distrust of authorities 
including us, their inability to identify perpetrators, or in contrast because of 
possible retaliation by those who had attacked them, including people whom 
they knew. Others who had never received medical treatment or counselling 
worried about being traumatized again if they spoke of what had happened to 
them. Even some individuals, who were courageous enough to come forth, 
sometimes broke down in the course of testifying. Still others did not want to 
give evidence because of cultural sensitivities that included discussing rape in 
public.  A case in point is Mombasa, where victims feared that they could be 
shunned and ostracized by their communities for having lost their virginity 
before marriage.  The Commission also faced logistical problems in finding 
victims especially those who had fled to other areas or had left for unknown 
places after some IDP camps were closed when government began its “Operation 
Rudi Nyumbani” resettlement program. Furthermore, given the limited time we 
had to collect evidence about sexual violence from victims, the Commission did 
not have enough time to verify whether some of what was heard was specifically 
related to post-election violence or part of other crimes outside the Commission’s 
mandate, an issue that was compounded because most victims did not report 
about the sexual violations that they suffered and most did not receive medical 
treatment, Reports  would have been a means of verifying their evidence. A 
further issue was that most women had little or no information about what to do 
or where to go to report violations against them, something compounded by the 






Legal issues arising from sexual violence in conflict situations also present 
another set of challenges in terms of appropriate responses by government and 
others. There is a general agreement that sexual violence has been used as a 
weapon of war in most conflict situations. While Kenya has ratified a number of 
treaties prohibiting violence against women, it either has not incorporated them 
into its laws or acted on those parts of the law that reflect them including 
Chapter V of the Constitution or the Sexual Offences Act of 2006. Others speak 
about other areas where there is an alleged legal lacuna concerning AIDS and 
family protection, areas where bills pending before Parliament may assist. 
However, the Commission is not of the opinion that sexual violence stemming 
from the post election breakdown occurred because of unresolved legal matters. 
Rather it is the result, in part, of the failure to enforce laws that have already 




As a result of the Commission’s focus on the sexual violence stemming from the 
post electoral violence following the 2007 election, it recommends the following: 
In the course of its inquiries, the Commission found that, although the 
government hospitals had established Gender Violence Recovery Centers 
(GVRCs) offering free medical services to victims of sexual violence, victims of 
sexual violence mostly did not know they existed. Hence, at the minimum the 
Commission takes the view that citizens should be informed about them in 
awareness campaigns, something that is going on already in places like 
Mombasa and which will need to be replicated in other parts of the country.  
The Commission also believes there a need to establish GVRCs as departments 
in every public hospital with their own staff, facilities, and budget. Currently, the 
GVRCs fall under other departments and rely on them for funding as well as 






In addition, with some reservations, the Commission proposes the creation of 
gender unit/sections within every police station where victims of sexual violence 
can be treated with sensitivity and where their cases will be properly recorded 
and investigated. Currently the existing units are limited and do not entail any 
more than having a female officer available to deal with female victims. However, 
for any such unit to be effective would require a complete change in attitude 
within the security forces themselves, including the police. Training the police 
how to handle cases of sexual violence and in first aid would be of use only if 
mechanisms for accountability within the security forces themselves are 
established and acted upon. At the very least, this would include police and 
other security personnel being severely punished for perpetrating crimes of 
sexual violence and being dismissed if they mishandled victims of sexual 
violence. In short, new units without new patterns of behaviour and new 
sanctions would be utterly useless. 
 
The Commission also encourage Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
working in the health sector to partner with medical institutions and share 
information to ensure a swifter and improved response to sexual violence.  
The Commission considers there is low level of awareness about the possibility of 
help that victims of sexual violence can receive. Further, there no pressure on 
the part of law enforcement to do the right thing when dealing with cases of 
sexual violence. The Commission, therefore, recommends the establishment, 
under Kenyan law, of the office of rapporteur on sexual violence. The 
responsibility of the rapporteur will be to highlight, on a continuous basis, the 
fact that sexual violence is a serious crime and needs an equally serious 
response on the part of law enforcement authorities. The rapportuer should have 
an appropriate staff to assist in the discharge of the functions of the office. The 
rapportuer should be required and empowered to work with existing government 
institutions that address sexual violence, including the courts, the police, and 
the National Commission on Gender. The rapporteur should be required to 
present, on an annual basis, a report to the National Assembly, outlining a view 




That said, in all societies sexual violence and how it is handled is reflective of the 
broader social and political culture. In Kenya, the issue has been magnified 
because of the diffusion of electoral violence since the 1990s. Hence, ordinary 
citizens, including women but also men have been victims of the cannon fodder 
of violence perpetrated by politicians. Violence as a whole consequently has 
grown unchecked, has become increasingly dispersed, and is a product of a 
larger breakdown of order and lawlessness that came to a head after the 2007 
election. In this context, the Commission was dismayed and shocked to hear in 
graphic detail about the unspeakable horrors of sexual violence visited on the 
witnesses who spoke to it as well as the many women and girls and the men and 
boys who did not. But, in the end the Commission was also not surprised as the 
sexual violence after the election was just one more unspeakable aspect of the 
violence that engulfed Kenya following the 2007 election and could do so again 






Internally Displaced Persons 
Introduction 
The point of discussing the plight of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) here is 
to make recommendations to promote and enhance their future protection. IDPs 
have been defined as, “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as 
a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disaster, 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border245”  
IDPs are the human face of the problem caused by PEV.  The extent to which the 
problem is or is not addressed will be the barometer by which the government 
will be judged in addressing problems and effects of PEV.   Hence, where 
possible the Commission visited IDP camps and talked to IDPs specifically about 
their problems and experiences.   Moreover, most of the witnesses who 
interacted with the Commission had some experience with some form or other of 
displacement hence the importance of addressing the issue.   The Commission 
went out of its way to hear the evidence from residents of IDP camps and others 
who were displaced. However, given the mandate of the Commission, its scope 
was limited to IDPs from the PEV. 
 
The Commission was made aware of the fact that internal displacement has 
been a permanent feature of Kenya history from colonial times onwards.  
Starting with the eviction of natives from their ancestral land to make way for 
settlers in colonial Kenya to recent violent evictions accompanying the 1992, 
1997 and 2002 election, IDPs have been a constant feature of the country’s 
political landscape.  Even before the 2007 General Elections there was already a 








(a)  Pre-election violence in Molo district.246 
 
(b) Border and land disputes in places like the Sondu which is the 
confluence of three districts; Nyamira, Nyando and Kericho 
occupied by the Kisii, Luo and Kipsigis respectively.247 
 
(c) Cattle rustling and banditry in the Pokot/Transnzoia, 
Transnzoia/Marakwet District border. 
 
(d) Natural disasters such as drought in large parts of Northern Kenya 
that often lead to conflicts over natural resources like water 
leading to displacement.248 
These multiple causes of displacement make it very difficult to come up with 
accurate statistics concerning causs of displacement, gender, age, social and 
economic standing. This makes it difficult for both the government to devise 
comprehensive policies and interventions to deal effectively with IDPs.   
According to the government there were 350,000 persons displaced as a result of 
PEV after the 2007 elections.249 
Some of these already existing causes of population displacement were 
exacerbated by the PEV.  A particularly disturbing feature of the PEV brought to 
our attention is that some of the IDPs have suffered successive displacements as 
a result of previous election related violence. Several witnesses testified that they 
had suffered multiple evictions in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. 
 
Extent of Displacement Resulting From the 2007 Election Related Violence  
The Commission toured various hotspots of violence and IDP camps to get a 
firsthand view of the extent of displacement as well to hear from the IDPs 











struggles endured at the camps.  It was sadly clear to the Commission that 
internal displacement as a form of violence has been a permanent feature of the 
conflicts in Kenya that have accompanied the transition from a single party to a 
multi party system.   
 
The election related 1992 and 1997 “ethnic” clashes resulted in displacement of 
thousands of people.  According to the Kiliku Report, an estimated 54,000 people 
were displaced in the 1992 clashes.250  The Justice Akiwumi led Commission, 
which was appointed in 1998 to inquire into the tribal clashes that rocked the 
country since 1991 did not make any findings as to the number of persons 
displaced as a result of the clashes either in 1992 or 1997.251 
 
The internal displacements following the widespread violence that hit the 
country after the announcement of the 2007 presidential election results were, 
however, unprecedented in terms of the number of victims and the widespread 
nature of the phenomenon. While previous conflicts led to internal 
displacements concentrated in the multi ethnic regions of Western, Rift Valley 
and Coast, the 2007 PEV resulted in massive country wide forced displacements, 
which were urban as well as rural in contrast to the past.   
 
Violent and sudden displacement from a place one considers their home is often 
the worst form of loss entailing, as it does, a sense of loss of self.  Most of the 
IDPs the Commissioners interacted with had no other home apart from the place 
they were evicted.  Displacement meant not only the loss of a home but loss of 
friendships and other relationships, economic and personal, built over many 
years, dispersal of relatives, a loss of memories that constituted one’s being.  
That most of the displacement was violent in nature aggravated the loss.  
Whatever interventions this Commission purposes to alleviate the suffering of 
IDPs, it regrettably cannot make up for the mental and psychological trauma 








The sudden departure and flight by IDPs was necessary to protect lives. In very 
exceptional but isolated cases IDPs succeeded in salvaging property or other 
valuable possessions.  IDPs were subjected to violence and in extreme cases 
members of families were split up and even a mother lost her child during flight.   
“AB was a 46 year old married woman with 9 children.  They 
were aged 19 years old to 2 ½ years old.   She originally lived 
in Kipkaren and was a businesswoman in Eldoret town while 
her husband was in the matatu business.   In 1992, as a 
result of the clashes, her house was burnt and she lost all her 
merchandise and belongings.  Despite this, she managed to 
recover form the ordeal and rebuilt her life once again.   In 
2002 she was attacked again and unfortunately her right 
hand and breast were burnt.    In 2007, her family was once 
again attacked.   Her husband and older children managed to 
flee once the violence began on 28th December 2007.  She 
stayed behind with her six younger children.   At night some 
men broke into her house, raped her and beat her.  She was 
once again burnt when the raiders poured on her the food she 
was cooking. The following day, she left her house with her 
six children but one got lost in the ordeal.  She had to walk up 
Eldoret town where she was re-united with her three elder 
children.  She is now residing at the Eldoret Showground IDP 
Camp. 
When asked what recommendations she had for the 
government, AB said;  “We would plead to the government to 
assist us because right now we have nowhere else to go, we 
have nothing.   I don’t have land; I don’t have any money to 
start a business.  I cannot support myself in any way.   I have 
no direction, sometimes I wish I could just die but I remember 
that I have children and if I die I do not know who I would leave 




strength, they are the one who make me live in this earth.   If I 
was alone right now, I would be dead by now.” 
 
In some other cases the departure of individuals stemmed from threats or the 
anticipation of violence. However, in most cases IDPs were forcefully evicted 
physically through violence against them and the destruction of their property. 
 
Most IDPs left their homes under emergency conditions not knowing where to go 
or their ultimate destination. In certain circumstances the IDPs left while under 
attack from marauding gangs of youth. The most common destination was a 
police station or administration police or chief’s camp, church or trading centre 
which were considered secure.   Other persons in distress hid in the bushes and 
forests until they felt it was safe to proceed to a place of relative safety. 
 
The Commission was also told of instances where the general public and the 
police were fully involved in the evacuation and protection of IDPs.   Individuals 
and institutions involved in protecting IDPs should to be commended since this 
was fraught with risk particularly during the time of intense violence.  According 
to Bishop Cornelius Korir, the Catholic Bishop of Eldoret Diocese; 
 ...... [I] asked the watchman (of the church compound) to open the 
door in case somebody needs to be rescued so we opened the door 
and the people started coming in. I did not know there was fire all 
over the place so by evening there was no space here. The church 
was packed they slept inside we had the closing prayer on 31st 
evening which is 10 o’clock to midnight. There was no space for us 
but we said the prayers inside. There was no fighting outside. ....... 
By 1st [January] more people were coming, 2nd there was no space 
here even outside. Even where we were passing there was no space. 
People kept on coming and it was tough but it is now ODM and PNU 
......... [W]e were getting information, people had been trapped so we 
did a lot of evacuation. We were evacuating people using our lorries. 




especially after this church was burnt with people inside. So of the 
people had gone in our churches in the interior parts and the elders 
could look after them, feed them and there was a fight between the 
youths and elders. The youth want to finish the other group. So the 
Kalenjin elders had to look after them. They were really harsh so we 
had to do evacuation as far as Plateau, far in and we were using 
ourselves and the Kenya Red Cross and the Government.  
 
Duncan Okore, who was the Officer in Charge of the Naivasha Maximum Prison, 
instructed his officers to open the doors of the prison compound on 31st 
December 2007, to women and children from Naivasha town who came as a 
result of threats of violence received. It is important to note that at this stage no 
incidents of violence had been reported in Naivasha Town.  According to the 
witness, there were no arrangements made to receive IDPs but despite this, the 
original 40 to 50 IDPs, mostly women and children, were duly accommodated 
within the prison staff canteen and church. From the 27th January 2008, the 
prison began to receive more IDPS whose number peaked to about 10,000 on 2nd 
February 2008.  Subsequently, the Kenya Red Cross Society, the Catholic 
Church, Medicin Sans Frontiers, World Vision came to make an assessment and 
provided humanitarian assistance. 
 
IDPs had to find a safe means of transport as well as safe passage to the camps.  
Once again ordinary individuals and public officers acted admirably in providing 
safe passage for IDPs.  Of special mention is the role of the Kenya Armed Forces, 
who in their statutory duty of ‘aid to civilian authority”252 provided safe passage 
by clearing roads, providing security and ferrying IDPs to safe and secure places. 
 
Settlement Conditions in IDP Camps 
The IDPs fled to the nearest places which they considered safe. These were 






camps and police stations. In many areas the camps in which the IDPs initially 
settled were the subject of attack or threats of attack by criminal gangs and 
marauding youth. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the North Rift 
Valley and in Nakuru.   
 
A further characteristic of these camps was that they were ethnically divided 
reflecting the ethnic divisions at the time. In Nakuru, when the violence erupted, 
the IDPs were initially taken to the police quarters at Kasarani and the Central 
Police Station and thereafter relocated to one of two camps. The DC testified that 
when the non Kikuyu IDPs were taken to the Nakuru ASK Showground Camp, 
they were rejected by the IDPs there and had to be moved.  Depending on their 
ethnicity, IDPs opted to go to one of two camps. The Luos, Luhyas, Kisiis and a 
few Kalenjin were accommodated at the Afraha Stadium IDP camp while the 
mostly Kikuyu IDPs chose to proceed to the Nakuru ASK grounds.  Only Kisiis 
ended up in both camps. The former camp comprised mainly Nakuru town 
residents while in the latter IDPs came in from other parts of the Rift Valley.  
Coincidentally, this situation mirrored the prevailing political situation.253 
 
In Naivasha, the two main camps established were also ethnically divided. The 
Kedong camp consisted mainly of Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjins who were mainly 
displaced flower farm workers working in Naivasha while the Naivasha Stadium 
camp consisted of Kikuyu’s displaced from other parts of Rift Valley.254  
 
Security 
Initially, IDP camps were set up on an ad hoc basis without any planning. The 
first port of call was in areas which were considered secure for settlement.  
These included police stations, administration camps, trading centres and 








security soon became a major concern, with numerous threats of attack coming 
from the outside.255 Illustrative of this situation is the testimony of Angelus 
Karuru, the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) of Eldoret; 
“..... during the skirmishes we were ferrying people from the interior to 
various Police Stations and churches.   There were various IDP Camps 
at the time, we had one at the Divisional headquarters which is at the 
Police Station, Holy family Catholic Church we had another one, Soi 
Police Station there was also another one, Kipkabus there was 
another one and also at Iten Police Station.  When we realized that 
these people were almost being attacked in these camps, they 
requested to be moved to a safer place and that is when we started 
moving them to one central place for ease of protection.” 
 
The former Rift Valley Provincial Police Officer told us, the locals around 
Kaptagat wanted to attack the IDPs who had sought safety at Kaptagat Police 
Station.   The OCS broke all protocol and called the PPO directly and told him, 
“Afande, send me reinforcement, these people are going to kill us here.”   The OCS 
managed to negotiate with the gangs surrounding the station who allowed the 
OCS to give safe passage to the IDPs camped at the station. 
 
IDPs in most camps organised themselves into representative committees to 
access services, security and other matters.   Young men were mobilised in what 
is commonly referred to as vigilante groups to provide security within the 
camps.256   Another security problem was that individuals who had to seek food, 
water or other services outside the camps.  Here, we received reports that some 












Survival and Sustenance 
As stated earlier, most IDPs had to leave their home with nothing except the 
clothes on their back.   The situation was aggravated during the height of the 
violence when basic services were not available and the supply lines were 
blocked.   The IDPs depended mainly on relief food and basically had no way of 
earning a living.  
 
During the initial stages of the violence, there were concerted efforts by both 
local and international NGO’s and well wishers to provide food, water and other 
basic needs to the residents in IDP camps. However, as the violence subsided, 
the burden of providing sustenance to the IDPs was left mainly to the 
Government and the Red Cross. The IDPs complained that the food rations were 
drastically reduced.258  
 
Access to other facilities 
Evidence presented indicated that access to basic facilities such as 
medical/health services, education, social and economic services, was generally 
more difficult for IDPs and their families than it was in general  due to the 
violence being experienced at the time. A lot of rape victims and those who were 
HIV+ did not have access to essential medical services.  
 
Initially, IDPs had to settle at Police Stations, DOs offices and Administration 
Police and Chief’s camps which, while secure, were ill suited in other ways.  A 
witness described the situation at the Naivasha Police Station on 29th January 
2008, in the following terms; 
“When we arrived at the police station, what I saw was a sea of 
people. It was packed with so many people on arrival everybody was 
calling me, “ Sister, we are here, we have been here for the last two 






was a cry from all over. You can imagine the crowd and everybody is 
trying to state their needs. I also decided to also talk to the Deputy 
OCS and the first thing which I saw was children who were so 
dehydrated and I learnt that there was no water because the tank 
which was there was empty. I don’t know when water had been 
brought to the camp. 
So, the first thing was to try to find out who owned that so that we 
can mobilize to get water. I was told it belonged to Oserian Flower 
Farm which is around the lake and I got some contacts to call. Later I 
got a driver and the police promised me security so that we can b able 
to get water. So, I asked the parish whether they can allow us to 
draw water from the borehole to bring to the police station because 
what I saw was so pathetic. So, that is what we did, I got security to 
escort the truck and then the driver arrived to go and bring us water. 
I also called the DC that same morning and asked for a meeting with 
him because I wanted to find out who were the actors on the ground 
trying to bring humanitarian services and how can we come in and if 
there was anything we could do to ease the suffering of those people. 
So, when we met with him he said that the Red Cross were already 
on the ground. We told him that we were concerned about the women 
and children and we have a hall in the parish and if we could 
evacuate the women and children to the Catholic Parish Hall where 
there is water and sanitation because the situation at the police 
station was deplorable. At that point there were no toilets and you 
can imagine with so many people”.  
 
At the camp centres, ad hoc schools were set up for displaced children but they 
were hardly equipped to handle students.  Most camps had education facilities 
for young children but the older primary and secondary school children 






education, it was easier to have children admitted to the nearest primary 
schools. Hence, for example, children from the Nakuru ASK grounds were readily 
admitted to the neighbouring Lenana, Moi and Prison primary schools.260   
 
Police Response 
As the influx of IDPs was neither anticipated nor foreseen, there were very few 
officers, police or administrative, to guard the IDPs. Hence, decisions had to be 
made to move the IDPs to larger more secure camps in urban areas.  In any 
event, it is understandable that during the time most security officers had been 
involved in election and related duties as one witness states;  
“Our officers were a bit tired because the campaign period had been 
long and they were covering and again there was a holiday in 
between which they were alert especially the Christmas and boxing 
day and they were also covering the election day at polling stations, 
they were there at the counting and tallying of parliamentary and 
presidential votes in all polling stations within the district and their 
efforts were mainly diverted towards evacuation and saving lived 
immediately after the incident”.261 
 
Quite apart from the lack of security to protect convoys of IDPs, the initial 
movement of IDPs was hindered by blockage of roads, by menacing gangs and a 
lack of adequate means transport.  
 
As we have noted earlier, initial IDP camps were set up within Police Stations 
which were wholly unsuited for holding large groups of people.262  Subsequently, 
more formal camps were set up as the violence stabilised.  Perimeter fences and 
security lights were provided in most of the camps with a number of police 









complaint was that there were an inadequate number of police officers to provide 
sufficient security to the IDPs in camps.263  
 
Government Organisation 
On 4th February 2008, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation mediated 
by H. E Kofi Annan with the Panel of Eminent African Personalities issued a 
statement which set out, amongst others, immediate measures to deal with the 
humanitarian crisis gripping the country.  The statement set out the framework 
for dealing with displaced persons in the following terms; 
The final goal of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation is to achieve 
sustainable peace, stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of 
law and respect for human rights. 
 
1. With Respect to Immediate Measures to Address the 
Humanitarian Crisis: 
a) Assist and encourage displaced persons to go back to their 
homes or other areas and to have safe passage and security 
throughout 
b)  Provide adequate security and protection, particularly for 
vulnerable groups, including women and children in the camps. 
c)  Provision of basic services for people in displaced camps: 
 Ensure that there is adequate food, water, sanitation and 
shelter within the affected communities – both those in 
displaced camps and those remaining in their 
communities. 
 Provide medical assistance with a special focus for 
women, children, people living with HIV and AIDS and 






 Ensure all children have access to education. This will 
involve reconstruction of schools; encouraging return of 
teaching staff and provision of teaching materials, and 
assistance for children to return to their learning 
institutions. 
d)  Provide information centres where the affected can get easy 
access to information regarding the assistance that is available 
to them and how to access it, for example, support for 
reconstruction of livelihoods, or tracing of family members. 
e)  Operationalise the Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects 
and Resettlement of Victims of Post 2007 Election Violence 
expeditiously by establishing a bipartisan, multi-sectoral Board 
with streamlined procedures to disburse funds rapidly. 
f)  The Fund is open to public contributions and all citizens and 
friendly countries, governments and international institutions 
to donate generously. 
g)  Ensure close linkages with the ongoing national and 
international assistance to enhance the effectiveness of delivery. 
h)  Ensure that victims of violence in urban areas are not neglected 
in the implementation of the above. 
i)  In order to promote food security, displaced farmers should be 
assisted to return to their farms. All farmers affected by the 
crisis should be assisted and encouraged to safely resume their 
farming activities. 
 
The coordinating agency for matters concerning IDPs in Kenya is the Ministry of 
State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security through the Disaster 
and Emergency Response Co-ordination Department. There is also the Ministry 
of State for Special Programmes (MSP).264  While Kenya has specific policies and 







governing the issue of IDPs.  Hence, a number of issues are dealt with in an ad 
hoc manner. 
In January 2008, the Ministry for Special Programmes established the 
Mitigations and Resettlement Department. The department assists IDPs in 
resettling and return to their former livelihoods. This involves amongst others, 
the following activities; reconstructions and rehabilitation of destroyed homes, 
profiling, provision of transportation, construction of social amenities, and 
provision of food. 
The Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of 
Post-2007 Election Violence265 is also managed by the MSP. The government 
formed the advisory Board for the National Humanitarian Fund for the 
Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of Post -2007 Election 
Violence.266 The government injected an initial amount of Kshs 1 billion in to the 
fund and is expected to raise money from other donors. The purpose of the fund 
is to, among other things, provide ex-gratia funding for:- 
1. As part of its work, the Resettlement of persons displaced as a result of 
post-2007 election violence; 
2. The replacement of basic household effects destroyed as a result of 2007 
PEV. 
3. Enabling the victims of the post 2007 election violence re-start their basic 
livelihood. 
4. The reconstruction of basic housing, rehabilitation of communities utilities 
and institutions destroyed as a result of the 2007 PEV. 
 
MSP drafted the National Disaster Management Policy in April 2007. The policy 
deals with a myriad of disasters and is not specifically focused on the problems 
of IDPs. There is currently a National Disaster Operations Centre whose role is to 









Dr Sam Thenya, the Director of Nairobi Women’s Hospital, speaking of his 
interaction with the centre stated as follows; 
“Without giving excuses, the post election violence caught us all 
unawares, but the general response was that when we called on the 
National Disaster Management Committee or whatever they are called 
….. they asked us what did we expect them to do and my 
understanding would be they would be telling us what to do”. 
 
The obvious conclusion from that interaction is that there exists a gap in the 
level of response to disasters including one that makes specific reference to 
problems related to IDPs.  
 
At the district level, we found that most areas had a Disaster Management 
Committee constituted to deal with the humanitarian issues related to PEV.  
While initial arrangements were usually made by the DC and the DSCI, they also 
set up committees to deal with IDPs but the membership of those committees 
was fluid and varied from district to district.  Augustine Kimantirie Nthiga, the 
OCPD Kisii Central District gave an account of how arrangements were made; 
“When we started receiving IDPs, the DSIC met and we discovered we 
needed to have the people close ranks in Kisii. So we called the 
businessmen, the medical practitioners and the disaster management 
committee. We also called church elders for those who could have 
knowledge of counselling because those who were arriving were giving 
different stories and we felt that they required counselling.   So we 
called and formed lots of committees, also sub-committees to feed IDPs 
who were arriving with nothing”.  
 
In Nakuru, the District Commissioner gave evidence that the Disaster Committee 
was composed of government officials, the Nakuru Business Association 
membership, local and international NGOs led by the Kenya Red Cross Society, 





Special mention must be made of the Kenya Red Cross Society.  The Kenya Red 
Cross Society was the lead co-ordinating agency for relief and humanitarian 
efforts throughout the PEV period. Set up by an Act of Parliament, it 
nevertheless operates independently and in conformity with the principles of the 
Red Cross Movement.268  Their efforts and those of their volunteers must be 
recognised and commended.  We also wish to commend the efforts of various 
international and local NGOs who stepped up to the call to assist Kenyans in 
distress. 
 
Government Response to IDP Crisis 
The intensity of the PEV, confronted the government with a rare dilemma about 
how to approach the displacements that were occurring. There were reports, 
exhibits and testimonies from authorities on the government’s lack of 
preparedness to deal with the initial IDP crisis.  The general consensus among 
government officials was that whereas violence after the general election was 
anticipated, the magnitude of the violence was not and was overwhelming.  This 
problem notwithstanding, the government success or failure to deal with the PEV 
crisis will be judged by the number of IDP camps standing.   
 
During the Commission’s consultations and hearings, two groups of IDPs with 
competing or divergent interests emerged; those in camps and those who had 
been reintegrated within various communities.  Because of their visibility, the 
problems of those in camps could easily be identified and dealt with. Further, 
mobilisation among those in camps was much easier as evidenced by the fact 
that most camps we visited had constituted representative groups. On the other 
hand, the re-integrated IDPs were dispersed, not easily identifiable and because 









The government asserted the constitutional right of every Kenyan to acquire 
property and live in any part of the country. Hence its policy on resettlement was 
largely governed by this principle. For example, the DC of Kipkelion testified 
that, “it was not the intention of the government to move people from their homes 
or from their farms.”269  A clearer statement of the government policy came from 
the DC of Naivasha, Mr Katee. In the following verbatim exchange; 
Mr David Majanja:   ............ There was information that it is no 
government policy to transport people back to their ancestral homes.  Is 
that the position? 
 
Mr Katee Mwanza: Yes, my Lord, at least at the time although the 
transport was not there.  We were saying that as Government we will 
look like we have been defeated by the situation, by saying A says 
move out, then we assist person B to move out.   We are saying as a 
Government we are agreeing with what the A says.  So in this we 
would have looked very bad and we start now transporting people from 
outside Naivasha while these people, my Lord, you know some of them 
have been here for more than 20, 30 years.  They have been working 
here they earn their livelihood.  No to kick these people out to take them 
to a rural area where there is no source of livelihood, then you are 
pushing them into a grave without any alternative. 
Mr David Majanja: So it is the Government policy to take them 
back where they were removed. 
 
Mr Katee Mwanza: It is the Government policy to take them back 
where they were removed. Indeed that is why my Lord, I requested 
Kedong Ranch which is a private organisation to give us part of their 






these people provided labour for the flower farms.  They also earn some 
revenue.  Now to take them to Kisumu, would mean the end of the road. 
 
The general perception amongst the IDPs was that the government was keen to 
resettle those who had land hence there was a great expectation that IDPs would 
be resettled by being given land. This is captured by the sentiments of the 
Nakuru ASK IDPs who recommended that, ‘the government firstly relocates the 
IDPs to some safe area until a lasting solution is found. The government should 
use the Ksh. 10,000 it is offering to IDPs to purchase a piece of land for them as 
stop gap measure.”270  
 
The main challenge for re-settlement is to guarantee security in areas from 
which IDPs were displaced and help them reconstruct of their lives. One witness 
stated that that the reasons IDPs do not want to go back is that, “if they went 
back, their neighbours are the same people who killed them. They cannot go and 
stay in a tent because an arrow can penetrate the tent.”271 The success of this 
effort would largely depend on peace and reconciliation efforts.   
 
For the IDPs who remain in camps, the problem of re-settlement continues even 
upto now. According to a witness, Mr Peter Kariuki, who was at the material 
time the chairman of ASK Ground Nakuru IDP camp, the camp had about 
10,200 people comprising the following; 10% were land owners, 60% were tenant 
farmers; 25% businessmen and women and 5% squatters.272   Obviously, it 
would be easy to identify and assist individuals needing to be resettled on their 
own property once a level of security was guaranteed.  However, finding 
solutions for the remaining 90% is more difficult. Other than paying them 
outright, the government would need to find ways to assist them including 









The reintegrated IDPs also face problems as illustrated by the evidence of   Ms 
Asha Katheri Kiva,273 who was the Borabu District Commissioner just after the 
election. She testified her district, situated along the volatile Kisii-Sotik border 
received a few IDPs who went to camps in Keroka.  However, it was clear from 
subsequent witnesses that most IDPs from the Sotik side of the border, who 
were predominantly Kisii, were easily accommodated by family and friends.274 
They were initially given food rations by the government when the violence 
started but no further interventions were made despite various entreaties to the 
government to look into their plight. Similarly, the most of the Kipsigis displaced 
during the skirmishes along the Sotik-Borabu border did not proceed to camps 
but were housed by their neighbours and relatives.275   
 
At the peak of the PEV, Nyanza province received 129,821 IDPs.  The Provincial 
Commissioner told the us that, “ they were popularly known as returnees, that is, 
people from Nyanza Province who were coming back to Nyanza presumably 
because they had been ejected from other provinces or they feared to continue 
staying in other provinces. They are not in camps; they are living with their 
relatives and friends.  Some have hired places to stay in the province.”  The PC 
gave testimony that to assist these returnees he had to give blanket orders that 
their children be admitted to school immediately. 
 
In April 2008, the government engaged in operation rudi nyumbani (operation 
return home). The aim of the operation was to encourage the IDPs to return to 
their homes. As part of operation rudi nyumbani the following interventions were 
made;276 
 Payment of Kshs. 10,000.00 to persons leaving the camp. 










 Relocation to transitional camps nearer farms and areas of displacement 
while awaiting provision of proper housing. 
 Provision of building materials. 
 Provision of seed, fertilizer and ploughing services. 
 
The Commissioners visited North Kisii farm in Geta Sub sub-location of 
Cherengany Division of Trans Nzoia East District.277 According to evidence 
received, on 2nd January 2008, hundreds of armed youth invaded the farm and 
burnt over 100 houses.  Two people were also shot dead with poisoned arrows.   
The farm residents abandoned their homes for temporary encampment at the 
neighbouring trading centre.278 By the time the Commissioners visited the farm, 
most of the residents had been resettled by the government which provided 
construction materials, ploughing facilities, fertilizers and seed.  They residents 
were expecting the sum of Kshs. 10,000.00 to be paid shortly thereafter.  The 
residents of that farm were on the wholly satisfied with the measures taken by 
the government to deal with their plight. 
 
According to the government, as at 8th July 2008, 210,594 IDPs had been 
resettled leaving 21,431 in camps. The resettlement programme cost the 
government an estimated Kshs. 30 billion. 
 
Because of time limitations, we were unable to assess the overall success, 
efficacy and other matters related to Operation Rudi Nyumbani. However, certain 
complaints stand out.  Firstly, the sum of Kshs. 10,000 given per family is too 
little given the losses suffered by the IDPs. We also received reports from IDPs 
that they had no choice but accept the resettlement. They also indicated that 
this was used as a means of getting the IDPs to leave the camps. This took the 







amenities such as water and the intention and scheduled closure of camps have 
left IDPs no choice but accept the government handouts.279   
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
As we have stated previously, the subject of IDPs is not a new phenomenon in 
Kenya, it is not one that neither lacks political recognition nor prescribed 
solutions. Indeed the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Country Report 
of the Republic of Kenya280 prepared in May 2006 recognised the problem. We 
quote the relevant paragraphs of the report: 
APRM: Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya  
[.....]  
3.1.9. OBJECTIVE 9: TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS 
OF VULNERABLE GROUPS, INCLUDING INTERNALLY 
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND DISABLED PERSONS  
   
   
i. Summary of the Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR)  
   
Internally Displaced Persons  
Regarding the internally displaced persons who are forced to migrate 
from their natural locations due to clashes, the report reveals that, 
in contrast to refugees, they lack adequate relief support and 
security, and only receive occasional food and blankets from 
politicians without any follow up. In addition, there is no 
resettlement or economic programmes to aid them.  
   
Vulnerable groups in the report were characterized as those groups 
marginalised from the mainstream society and, due to years of 
neglect, do not fit into society at a political, economic or social level. 
The report asserts that this group is numerically a minority, and 
identifies the Yaaku, Galjeel, Ogiek and Endoris in this regard. The 
Yakus were evicted from the forest where they had been better 
protected. During the screening of Somalis, the Galjeel had their 
identity cards confiscated, were asked by police to leave for Somalia 
, and, as the report indicates, were also attacked by security forces 
in August 2005. The Ogiek have lodged a lawsuit to resist the 








report states that little protection or special polices have been 
designed to address the needs of these vulnerable groups.  
[…]  
   
ii. Findings of the Country Review Mechanism (CRM)  
[…]  
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)  
The CRM visit to Nyeri Provincial Headquarters confirmed that IDPS 
were scattered in the Rift Valley districts of Kirinyaga, Thika and 
Muranga and resided in the slums. No government resettlement 
policy or development programmes had been put in place at 
Provincial level, and after the clashes, the district leaders had 
encouraged the IDPs, in the absence of any resettlement measures, 
to go back to their former dwellings. The inaction displayed by the 
district leadership in integrating the IDPs into the mainstream 
society has implications for long-term reconciliation of ethnic groups 
in Kenya, and poses a challenge for unity and nation building. The 
lack of concerted central Government policies and interventions to 
alleviate the plight of certain segments of society following conflict is 
likely to be taken advantage of at the local level to the detriment of 
vulnerable groups like IDPs.  
   
iii. Recommendations  
The Panel recommends the following:  
• The Government of Kenya to enact and implement a clear policy on 
refugees and internally displaced persons [Government of Kenya].  
[…]  
 
A further review of the implementation of the APRM for the period June 2006 – 
June 2008,281 in respect of promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable 
groups including internally displace persons and refugees addressed the issue as 
follows;   
[...] 
3.10 Objective Nine: Promotion and Protection of the Rights of   Vulnerable Groups 
Including Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees 
The Government, through various poverty reduction programmes such as HIV/AIDS, ASAL 
programmes and educational bursary funds has focused on mainstreaming the vulnerable 
groups (including orphans of HIV/AIDS, the youth, women, the physically challenged, older 







This objective called for mechanisms to protect the rights of the vulnerable groups through: 
i. Enactment and implementation of policies and programmes aimed at 
empowering and protecting the rights of vulnerable groups; 
ii. Stepping up security and strengthening response capacity of law 
enforcement agencies in conflict prone areas; 
iii. Streamlining immigration, screening procedures and eliminating 
discriminatory screening practises. 
The Government has also achieved the following: 
• It has introduced Development Interventions Programme in the North Rift districts to 
compliment the disarmament programme during the year 2006/07 
• It has promulgated the Refugees Act, 2006 into law on 30th December, 2006. This 
provides for the recognition, protection and management of refugees within the 
country 
• It has given the concern about the problem of squatters and internally displaced 
persons, and as a follow-up of the planning in the period 2006/07; Ksh 1.3 billion 
has been set aside in the 2007/08 fiscal year to acquire land for settling them. With 
allocation of land parcels, those affected are expected to improve their living 
standards, increase food safety and be able to share in the growth of the country. 
Following the post election crisis, Kenya found itself with an unprecedented number of IDPs 
including children, women and people with disabilities. The Government in response to this 
established 181 IDP camps located in various parts of the country to accommodate the 
350,000 displaced persons. 
The following measures have been undertaken in respect to the post-election IDPs: 
• With the help of the Red Cross, the Government provided food, drugs including 
ARVs, clothing, blankets and other requirements to the IDPs. 
• The President, the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet visited the IDPs 
• Restoration of security in the affected areas 
• Resettlement of 106,651 of IDPs by mid May 2008 
• The Government has raised Kshs 457 Million out of the required Ksh 31 Billion for 
the resettlement of IDPs as proposed in the National Reconciliation and Emergency 
Social and Economic Recovery (NRESER) Plan. 
• The Government has urged members of parliament and local leaders to preach and 
promote peace among affected communities 
 
From the evidence we have gathered so far, there exists sufficient basis for 
enacting a clear policy and legal framework for dealing with the IDPs.282  
Moreover, the UN Guiding Principles on IDPs provide the necessary parameters 
for such policy and legislative interventions. The guidelines oblige state parties to 
ensure protection of and assistance to IDPs in all phases of displacement. While 







imperative to put the problem of IDPs on a sound statutory footing where lines of 
authority and responsibilities are assigned.  There is no reason why such an 
enactment cannot be put in place within the next four months, and we so 
recommend.   
Secondly, we think that the statement issued by the Kenya Dialogue and 
Reconciliation on 4th April 2008 provides a sufficient basis for providing a 
benchmark for the needs of those displaced by PEV. An urgent evaluation needs 
to be carried out to assess the effectiveness of the current programs in place to 
address the plight of IDPs. Such a process needs to be carried out in an open 
and transparent manner involving all the stakeholders. We recommend the 
process commences immediately. 
As the problem of IDPs has been with us for ages and is not going to be wiped 
out with a magic wand, we recommend that the issue be submitted to the 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission for follow up. 
Lastly, we conclude that the successful return of IDPs will be based on three 
outcomes namely the safety of returnees, restitution and return of property to 
the displaced and the creation of an economic, social and political environment 
that sustains them.   There is clearly a consensus that unless the root causes 
that led to internal displacement are resolved, the problem of displacement will 





The Media and the Post Election Violence 
Before, during, and after the elections, politicians, government, NGOs, members 
of the media itself, and parts of the public, all had views about whether and how 
the spread of information through the print and broadcast media had 
contributed to the 2007 post election violence. The Commission asked a number 
of individuals to testify before it concerning the role of the media in the post-
election violence.  
 
The Commission therefore invited the Permanent Secretary from the Ministry of 
Information and Communications, the Attorney General, and the Chair of the 
Editors’ Guild, who also is the Managing Editor of the Nation Group, to testify 
before it to solicit their views. Furthermore, a number of members of the public 
who were victims or witnesses to the post-election violence outlined their 
experiences to the Commission both in formal testimony and in other statements 
to its investigators.  
 
Many recalled with horror, fear, and disgust the negative and inflammatory role 
of vernacular radio stations in their testimony and statements to the 
Commission. In particular, they singled out KASS FM as having contributed to a 
climate of hate, negative ethnicity, and having incited violence in the Rift Valley. 
However there were also similar complaints in other parts of the country even 
though they did not come directly to the attention of the Commission. These 
included the vernacular music and negative ethnicity allegedly coming from 
Kikuyu FM stations including Kameme, Inooro, Coro, and others in other 
different parts of the country. This was mentioned critically in various sections of 
Exhibit no. 125, the KNCHR’s report on Kenya’s post 2007 election violence. 
Dr. Bitange Ndemo, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information and 
Communications testified before us. He told the Commission that the media had 
been controlled by the state formally from the 1930s until the mid- 1990s. He 




continued to be subject to harassment, torture, imprisonment, and fines for 
expressing their views. Censorship and self censorship also ensued, stemming 
from fear of reprisals by the state.  Dr. Ndemo told us that various media outlets 
continued to voice the views of the ruling party KANU as late as the 1990s even 
following the 1991 repeal of section 2A of the constitution and the return to 
multi party democracy in Kenya. The witness noted that only after the 2002 
election did the Government engage in a process of liberalization. This included 
licensing many new stations, something he told us that positively affected all 
parts of the media.  
 
However, the witness mentioned that these changes took place in the absence of 
a new regulatory and legislative framework, leading to something of an 
uncontrolled free for all. In Dr. Ndemo’s view some media took advantage of this 
lacuna and began to “operate freely and sometimes recklessly and irresponsibly” 
including using individuals who were not trained journalists, who were partisan, 
and sometimes were politically biased. In his statement to us he argued that 
media houses took sides in the run up to the 2007 election, that there were 
complaints that “most editors had been compromised”, and that “some media 
houses became sensational and unnecessarily alarmed their audiences and 
inflamed their passions”. He told the Commission that the live broadcast of vote 
tallying of the 2007 election results at the KICC and the visible acrimony of 
political leaders inflamed tensions, bringing “the country to the brink”. Faced 
with an unprecedented outbreak of violence following the announcement of the 
presidential results and threats of more violence, the witness said the Ministry 
asked the media houses to desist from live broadcasts concerning politics even 
though the Ministry itself had no way of fully enforcing its demand legally. 
Instead, in the end, it was the Ministry of Internal Security which told the 
Ministry of Information it wanted to invoke Section 88 of the Kenyan 
Communications Act, to which the latter complied. In his testimony to the 
Commission, Amos Wako, Kenya’s Attorney General stated emphatically that 
“the ban was not proper”, was unconstitutional, and “definitely illegal”, an 




The Commission also heard from the PS of the Ministry of Information and 
Communications that it “found itself constrained to control FM media content at 
the height of the post-election violence” as reputable media outlets around the 
world used headlines like “Hate radio spreads new wave of violence in Kenya”. 
After banning live political broadcasts by the media” on 31 December 2007, the 
PS told the Commission they were criticized and resisted by the newspapers. The 
witness explained to the Commission that the Ministry felt it was being criticized 
unfairly on all sides: initially for not having done anything to “curb all the hate 
radio” (later admitting the Ministry has the “power to license and cancel them”) 
even though the Ministry had reprimanded “some of the worst offenders”, and 
then later for banning live political broadcasts, which the Ministry also felt was 
fuelling violence.  
Dr. Ndemo told the Commission that he believed the actions taken by his 
Ministry were in “good faith” and with the “overriding national interest in mind.” 
He also said that there was “a need for a legislative framework governing the 
media…underscored by media misconduct during the post-election violence”. 
Nevertheless, he noted that the Ministry has continued to work with the existing 
Media Council established under the Media Act and also has a variety of 
informal forums through which it interacts with the media. 
In addition, the Commission heard testimony from Macharia Gaitho, Chairman 
of the Kenya Editors’ Guild. He told us that while the media had been “accused 
of playing a part in fanning the [post election] violence” the accusations were not 
specific and in his opinion came from various sides of the political spectrum 
which were aggrieved because they felt they were not supported by the media. He 
disagreed with Dr. Ndemo concerning the alleged partisanship of the media, 
claiming it was very diverse, also stating that there was nothing wrong in taking 
sides or positions as long as that was made clear to the reader. Contrary to the 
PS, he thought the “media [had] played a very critical role in lessening tensions”. 
In fact, he told us that in his opinion the media had acted very responsibly by 
not airing the many inflammatory statements made by politicians designed to 




aired more rather than fewer inflammatory statements by politicians who then 
would have been exposed to the public for who they were. 
Mr. Gaitho also reminded us that the media had used discretion in what it 
printed and also noted that the ban, advocated by the PS of Information and 
Communications against the media was eventually declared illegal, noting: 
“People were talking about going to war, people were talking opening 
about resisting and a civil war and all those kinds of things. Some of 
those statements from very senior political leaders may have slipped 
thought but I would say 90% of them were caught before they were 
aired or published….We are seeing a situation where politicians 
create a problem, politicians promote violence, politicians incite the 
people and then when things do not go their way they start to blame 
the media. That ban as we all know was unconstitutional, it was 
illegal; the Editor’s Guild joined up with the Media Institute and went 
to court and just before the hearing the Attorney General, the 
government, revoked the ban and we went back to live broadcasting 
and what was not acknowledged during that period is the role, very 
positive role the media played in calming tensions.”  
In contrast to the PS of Information and Communications, Mr. Gaitho argued 
that cutting off live broadcasts from the KICC concerning the results of the 
election “contributed much more to raising tension than continuing those 
broadcasts, because then people started wondering what is happening”. The 
witness explained to the Commission that the Editors’ Guild also supported 
legislation against hate speech although he was not in favor of clamping down 
totally against FM stations. 
The Commission received testimony and other statements from a number of 
individuals who included government officials, victims of the violence, and 
witnesses to it. In particular, they singled out KASS FM, a Kalenjin language fm 
station, for escalating the climate of hate and inciting violence, a phenomenon 
that apparently occurred on other FM stations in other parts of the country too. 
Witnesses made specific reference to KASS FM. They claimed KASS FM in 




hate speech, and routinely called for their eviction, thereby helping to build up 
tensions that eventually exploded in violence.  
Dr. Bitange Ndemo submitted to the Commission of letters and internal memos 
his Ministry had received from two pastors, one voicing concern about the KASS 
FM breakfast show “Lee Nee Emeet” on 19 February 2007and another on 29 
November 2007, complaining about various aspects of Kiss FM, Classic FM, and 
Easy FM, including their promotion of “ethnic tension”. On 26 November 2007, 
Dr. Ndemo wrote back to the first letter writer with a c/c to the Media Council of 
Kenya, stating that “We are equally appalled by the presentations in various FM 
stations and as per the law we can only complain to the Media Council. We have 
therefore forwarded your letter to the Media Council”. Later on 12 February 2008, 
the Media Monitoring Unit in the Ministry alerted him “that some individuals are 
circulating e- mail messages which are a threat to law and order as well as 
peaceful co-existence between Kalenjins and Kikuyus”. The email of 18 January 
2008, attached to the memo called the law which allows all Kenyans to live in 
any part of the country a “legal error in our [the Kalenjin’s] history”. It also argued 
that Kalenjin have been systematically marginalized in terms of education, the 
distribution of social services and infrastructure, unemployment and called for 
the community to “defend ourselves to the bitter end” “urg[ing] our people to 
ensure that every family is fully equipped with our normal tools; if we can afford, 
ferry two warriors from upcountry fully armed and house them until we have this 
thing sorted out”.  
 
Correspondence submitted to the Commission by the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting from May-August 2008, containing a few letters between the 
Ministry and the Media Council, internal memos within the Ministry and 
between the Ministry and the National Peace Forum  principally focuses on 
KASS FM, but also mention a Luo station named Nam Lolwe and a Kikuyu FM 
vernacular radio station, Inooro FM, which the Ministry thought could “entice 
more youth to join the sect [Mungiki] that continues to pose security challenges to 
the country”. With respect to KASS FM the Ministry found the international 




communicated its views to the Media Council. In August, after having used a 
firm, also hired by UNDP earlier to monitor KASS FM in the run up to the 
December 27, 2007 election, the Media Council decided that Kass FM was 
innocent of the charges of airing and inciting and inflammatory live broadcasts 
on 31 May and 16 June 2008, but was found to be “negligent” in the way it 
handled its discussions with its callers”. The Attorney General wrote to the PS in 
the Ministry of Information and Planning on 17 July saying that it believed KASS 
FM had “breached the provisions of the Media Act 2007 and specifically clause II 
Section (a) of the Second Schedule”. 
 
At the local level, the District Commissioner for Koibatek in the Central Rift 
Valley testified to the Commission that “the vernacular radio stations did not do 
a service to this country” and said “I have not heard any vernacular station 
condemning the violence we had in this country. He told us he knew the 
“message was not very good”, but “admitted not having monitored the radio 
stations to find out what they were actually saying” since he did not understand 
Kalenjin. He admitted that he did not have specific examples of what actually 
was said either by KASS FM or by Changey FM, the two vernacular stations in 
his area, nevertheless adding that “it is common knowledge that this is what 
happened”, referring to the hate and incitement allegedly propagated by Kass 
FM. In our view the D.C.’s failure to monitor the stations and obtain transcripts 
from them to substantiate allegations made concerning what they said and what 
activities they were engaged in meant that we were unable to substantiate his 
views. 
 
Bernard Kinyua, the D.C. for Uasin Gishu in the North Rift described a similar 
scenario. When asked under cross examination whether any inciters were 
arrested, any complaints were made, or any action taken once he became aware 
of the problem, he told us, “I think the inciters were many. We had the media, 
radios and such are not institutions that we were in a position to deal with,” 




general incitement that was there because it was obvious, it was very clear that 
there were outbursts by politicians during campaigns.”   
 
To compensate for the above lack of hard data, the Commission itself attempted 
to obtain tapes of some FM radio stations from a variety of sources beginning 
with the Ministry of Information and Communications. In his testimony to the 
Commission, Dr. Ndemo said he would provide the Commission with tapes from 
the Ministry’s monitoring from KASS FM from October 2007 until March 2008.  
The Commission did receive some selected tapes from the Ministry, but only 
starting from 18 February 2008. Our various attempts to obtain tapes from other 
sources were also unsuccessful. These included unmet requests for tapes or 
transcripts from FM vernacular stations to Strategic Relations and Research 
Limited, a firm contracted by the UNDP to monitor the media during the 2007 
election, the Communication’s Council of Kenya (CCK), and the KNCHR. The 
result is  that the Commission was unable to acquire any tapes or transcripts by 
KASS FM or other FM vernacular stations from before, during, or immediately 
after the 2007 election. Hence, to some extent the Commission’s situation is not 
dissimilar to that of the DC for Koibatek: it heard many allegations of what was 
said, but it does not have the actual transcripts of who said exactly what during 
this very critical period. 
 
Beyond this, one transcript the Commission received from the Ministry of 
Information and Communication KASS FM’s Broadcast on 18 February 2008, 
said various organizations were already conducting investigations into the post-
election violence.  It exhorted listeners to be cautious to whom they spoke about 
these matters. It suggested that just speaking to anyone without knowing who 
they are might cause them problems or be incriminating and that it might be 
better for them to tell those who wanted information to see the chief or some 
other opinion leader rather than answering questions themselves. As it noted, 
“You may answer [a] question whose answer will in future spell doom for you” 
“Be very careful and refer the investigators to political leaders, chiefs or church 




explain how a neighbour of yours left his farm or property and then you answer 
in a manner that will later place you in an awkward position. I am not saying 
you conceal the truth, but tell the truth if you have been appointed to undertake 
that particular duty because not everybody should talk” “Some of you may be 
offered money for information and then tomorrow you are in a very difficult 
situation”. It added that given “the way the country is now, nobody likes you”, 
pleading with listeners to “be careful”, noting that “not everybody who is 
investigating is doing so in good faith, some will be doing so to incriminate some 
particular people or community in the…violence”.  
 
The Media Monitoring Unit in the Ministry of Information and Communication in 
a memo it passed on to the Commission recommended that “Kass FM should be 
held to explain why they are barring members of the community from disclosing 
whatever they know about the post election violence.” They also noted that “The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other agencies interested in knowing 
the truth on what happened in the run-up to the December general election and 
the resultant post elections violence will not receive co-operation of the members 
of the community at all” adding, “So what is the station hiding”.  
 
Some few exceptions to the above generalization of no concrete information are 
two examples of FM hate speech the Commission received. One from Bahasha 
FM in Nakuru , recorded at 8 a.m. on 30 January 2008 and received by the 
KNCHR notes, “Kikuyu are like mongoose which is ready to eat chickens. All 
other tribes, i.e. Luo, Kisii, Luhyas are all animals in the forest. They cannot be 
able to lead this country like Kikuyus”. Second, Nam Lolwe Station in Kisumu 
broadcast the following from an anonymous caller “Our people are dying in 
Naivasha and Nakuru and some other tribes are living with us. They should be 
flashed (sic) out those who don’t belong to this town.” 
 
The Commission would have liked to have thoroughly analyzed a full body of 
transcripts from Kenya’s vernacular FM stations given the allegations against 




In his testimony to the Commission, Kenya’s Attorney General, Amos Wako 
stated that in his opinion “the recent post- election violence” “w[as]coming very 
close to…crimes against humanity”, a point he told us he made elsewhere as 
early as 3 January 2008. The KNCHR goes one step further than the Attorney 
General, arguing that “the violence following the 2007 General Election meets 
the criteria of crimes against humanity under Customary International Law in so 
far as it involved conduct including the multiple commission of acts of 
inhumanity against civilian populations, pursuant to or in furtherance of an 
organizational policy to commit such attacks in the theatres of violence.”283 
 
That said, and with the full recognition of how close to the edge Kenya came 
during the 2007 post election violence, the Commission would not recommend a 
free for all monitoring of the press and other media. This would have the 
negative potential of taking the country back to the draconian days of a state 
controlled media, from which it has so recently just barely escaped. However, the 
Commission does believe that speech in the media, including in vernacular FM 
radio stations, aiming to foment ethnic hatred and/or incite, organize, or plan 







Extent and Consequences of the Post-Election Violence: 
Deaths, Injuries and Destruction of Property 
 
Deaths and Injuries 
Loss of life through conflict is a measure of the scale of conflict hence the need to 
ascertain the number and causes of death. Further, it is a recognition that 
conflict is basically about human life and all else is secondary.  The Commission 
also understood its terms of reference as requiring it to “establish the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the post election violence”. This means that we had 
to establish the number of persons who died and those who were injured as a 
result of the post election violence. 
The Akiwumi Commission, which investigated the tribal clashes occurring in 
country since 1991, did not aggregate data in respect of the clashes. The Kiliku 
Report which also investigated ethnic clashes in 1992 documented 779 deaths 
and 654 injuries in the districts that were the subject of the inquiry.284 
 
Dr. Hezron Nyangito, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Medical Services,  
gave evidence to the effect that his Ministry established several committees to 
deal with, among other issues, the preservation and disposal of bodies and to 
ensure that that post mortems were carried out.  He emphasized that, “in the 
case of post election violence, we gave instructions that we have to record it.  This 
is because we appreciated the fact that the violence of this nature and therefore 
we had to do all we could to document those whose indications were victims of 
post election violence.”  Most of the medical officers who testified confirmed that 






was normal practice to take the history of the victim, his or her relatives to 
determine the circumstances of death and therefore determine whether the 
death or injury was as a result of PEV. 
The multiple-cause-of-death information from 1,133 deaths was in respect of the 
period between 27th December 2007 and 29th February 2008 which is the period 
that the Commission has considered covering reflected the post election violence. 
The period was merely indicative of the period when the PEV began and ended.  
In seeking this evidence, the Commission relied upon information provided by 
respective hospitals in the five provinces under inquiry. These were: Western, 
Rift Valley, Nyanza, Nairobi and Coast. 
The twenty nine districts covered are Bomet, Bungoma, Bureti, Busia, 
Eldamaravine, Homabay, Kakamega, Kericho, Kiambu West, Kipkelion, Kisii, 
Kisumu, Litein, Migori/Rongo, Mombasa, Mumias, Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, 
Nandi North Narok, Nyandarua South, Siaya, Sotik, Suba, Trans Nzoia, Uasin 
Gishu, Vihiga and Webuye. 
In analyzing the deaths, the Commission relied on specific sources of data, 
including:  
• Medical and post-mortem reports submitted to the Commission by various 
medical officers and government doctors and the Ministry of Medical 
Services. 
• Various police returns, reports and statements submitted by Officers 
Commanding Police Divisions (OCPDs). 
• Reports received from private hospitals and institutions. 
• Various witness statements, depositions and oral testimony. 
In order to compile this report, multiple-cause records cited above were reviewed 
and then linked with various other records on the corresponding individual 
death records. Thus, data on age at death, sex and other variables, where 




The Police, according to Commissioner of Police, Maj. Gen. Hussein Ali, 
documented 616 deaths as having occurred during post- election violence period 
at the date of his evidence..285 The Commissioner of Police was emphatic that 
only the police could give authoritative figures for those who died as a result of 
PEV.286 
While Commission has tried to establish the true extent of deaths and injuries 
we recognize that for various reasons not all deaths that occurred as a result of 
the post election violence may have been captured for various reasons.   Some of 
the these reasons include the following: 
a) Some deaths may not have been reported to the hospitals or to police 
stations due to the prevailing security concerns situation at the time. 
b) In many cases those who were injured did not report to hospital or health 
centres for fear of their safety or because in the ordinary scheme of things 
the injuries were considered minor compared to other problems being 
experienced at the time; 
c) In some cases injuries were not properly documented due to the fact that 
hospitals were understaffed and supply of drugs and other medical 
supplies were disrupted.287 
d) In some instances, patient referrals were problematic as some roads were 
blocked paralyzing efficiency in documentation of injuries. and violence. 288 
e) Injured persons may have sought alternative medical attention, for 
example, through traditional healers or unlicensed practitioners. 
After considering all the available evidence before us as a whole, the Commission 
concludes that it is unlikely that there would be any more or less deaths than 
those reported to the Commission. It is unlikely that given the publicity given to 
this Commission, existing evidence and information of undocumented deaths 









Because of the lack of uniform reporting requirements, some of the 
documentation the Commission examined lacked all the details relating to the 
person injured or deceased. For example, the age of the person would be 
missing, or because of the situation prevailing at the time, the precise date or 
time or place of death could not be ascertained.   In some cases, only a 
preliminary cause of death could only be determined without the confirmation of 
a properly conducted post mortem.  For example, in Migori relatives of persons 






District breakdown of deaths 
  District No. of deaths 
1 Bomet  4 
2 Bungoma 7 
3 Bureti 24 
4 Busia 9 
5 Eldamaravine 23 
6 Homabay 7 
7 Kakamega 31 
8 Kericho 42 
9 Kiambu West 4 
10 Kipkelion 23 
11 Kisii 9 
12 Kisumu 81 
13 Migori/Rongo 26 
14 Mombasa 27 
15 Mumias 12 
16 Nairobi 125 
17 Naivasha 50 
18 Nakuru 213 
19 Nandi North 7 
20 Narok 19 
21 Nyandarua South 1 
22 Siaya 10 
23 Sotik 5 
24 Suba 1 
25 Trans Nzoia 104 
26 Uasin Gishu 230 
27 Vihiga  18 
28 Webuye 21 
  TOTAL 1,133 
 
SUMMARY OF DEATHS PER 
PROVINCE 













Of the total deaths, there were 11 children, 74 females and 1,048 males killed. 
The distribution of documented females and children who died as a result of PEV 
is indicated in the table below.  
Women and Children Deaths who died as a Result of PEV 
Item District Female Children 
1 Naivasha 11 0 
2 Nakuru 8 0 
3 Trans Nzoia 14 0 
4 Uasin Gishu 9 10 
5 Kericho 1 0 
6 Bureti 1 1 
7 Kipkelion 1 0 




9 Mumias 1 0 
10 Webuye 7 0 
11 Homabay 1 0 
12 Kisumu 5 0 
13 Migori/Rongo 1 0 
14 Mombasa 7 0 
15 Nairobi 4 0 
Total  74 11 
The table below summarizes the deaths that were recorded in some districts as 
unknown persons.  Some bodies were too decomposed for any reasonable 
identification to be done while others were collected on the streets by police who 
could not positively identify them. There were cases where bodies were burnt 
beyond recognition.  
Summary of Unidentified bodies per District 
Item District Unidentified 
Bodies 
1 Nakuru 25 
2 Nandi North 1 
3 Trans Nzoia 18 
4 Uasin Gishu 33 
5 Eldama Ravine 1 
6 Bureti 1 
7 Sotik 1 
8 Narok 2 
9 Kakamega 1 
10 Bungoma 1 
11 Vihiga 8 
12 Kisumu 7 




14 Migori/Rongo 5 
15 Kisii 2 
16 Mombasa 2 
17 Nairobi 10 
Total  119 
We were the Commission was informed by the Director of Medical Services, that 
the Government’s DNA machine had broken down and was being repaired hence 
the identification of bodies was in the process of being done in conjunction with 
the Kenya Red Cross Society. 
Causes of death 
The causes of deaths as documented were burns, arrow shots, mob- injustice, 
blunt object, severe wounds, sharp pointed object, assault, drowning, 
hypothermia, suffocation injury, stoning, shock, hanging, gunshots and 
unknown causes. 
In cases where gun shot wounds were the underlying cause of death, the total 
number of people killed as a result of this was 405, distributed in all the 
districts. This represented 35.7% of the total deaths and stood at 405 out of the 
total 1,133 deaths. It was followed with deaths through injuries sustained as a 
result of sharp pointed objects at 28.2%. The third category were the killings 
through burns which recorded 85 deaths representing 7.5% of the deaths. 
Unknown causes caused 75 deaths representing 6.6% while 5% of the deaths 
were as a result of injuries sustained through blunt objects which stood at 57. 
The other causes of deaths were distributed amongst different causes as 











  Analysis of Causes of Death Per District                     
   District  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Total 
1. Bomet                  2                          2     4 
2. Bungoma                                            7     7 
3. Bureti      1      1  6     1              2        11  2  24 
4. Busia        1                                   8     9 
5. Eldamaravine     3  1     7                 3           7  2  23 
6. Homabay                                1           6     7 
7. Kakamega                    3           2           26     31 
8. Kericho  2              2                 1        33  4  42 
9. Kiambu West                                            3  1  4 
10. Kipkelion     17           2                          4     23 
11. Kisii     1                          1           4  3  9 
12. Kisumu  7  1     5  2                 1     1     64     81 
13. Migori/Rongo                                1           24  1  26 
14. Mombasa  8  1  3     4        1     1  4           4  1  27 
15. Mumias        1                                   11     12 
16. Nairobi        21 9     29                    1     23  42 125 
17. Naivasha  22  1           1              17          7  2  50 
18. Nakuru  10        24    148          1              22  8  213 
19. Nandi North  1  1  1        1  2                       1     7 
20. Narok                 18                          1     19 
21. Suba                 1                                1 
22. Siaya                                            9  1  10 
23. Sotik     1           1                          1  2  5 
24. Nyandarua South                                               1  1 
25. Trans Nzoia  3        1     21                          77  2  104 
26. Uasin Gishu  32  4     16 42 92        1  1  11          28  3  230 
27. Vihiga            1     1     1                    15     18 
28. Webuye                 1  2                    11  7     21 
   TOTAL  85  31  28 57 61 320 8  2  1  3  41 3  2  11  405  75     1,133 
                                       
   KEY                                     
A Burns                    
B Arrow shot                    
C Mob- Injustice                    
D Blunt Object                    
E Severe Wounds                    
F Sharp Pointed Object                    
G Assault                    
H Drowning                    
I Hypothermia                    
J Suffocation                    
K Injury                    
L Stoning                    
M Shock                    
N Hanging                    
O Gunshot                    












































The causes of deaths as documented were burns, arrow shots, mob- justice, 
blunt object, severe wounds, sharp pointed object, assault, drowning, 
hypothermia, suffocation injury, stoning, shock, hanging, gunshots and 
unknown causes. 
In cases where gunshot wounds were the underlying cause of death, the total 
number of people killed as a result of this was 405, distributed in all the 
districts. 
This represented 35.7% of the total deaths out of the total 1,133 deaths. It was 
followed by deaths through injuries sustained as a result of sharp pointed 
objects at 28.2%. The third category were the killings through burns which 
recorded 85 deaths representing 7.5% of the deaths, unknown causes resulted 
in 75 deaths representing 6.6% while 5% of the deaths were as a result of 
injuries sustained  through blunt objects which stood at 57. The other deaths 
were distributed amongst different causes as indicated in the data below. 
Provincial and district breakdown for causes of death 
District A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Total 
Rift Valley                                   
Bomet            2                 2   4 
Bureti   1   1 6   1         2     11 2 24 
Eldamaravine   3 1   7           3       7 2 23 
Kericho 2         2           1     33 4 42 
Kipkelion   17       2                 4   23 
Naivasha 22 1       1         17       7 2 50 
Nakuru 10     24   148       1         22 8 213 
Nandi North 1 1 1     1 2               1   7 
Narok           18                 1   19 
Sotik   1       1                 1 2 5 
Trans Nzoia 3     1   21                 77 2 104 
Uasin Gishu 32 4   16 42 92     1 1 11       28 3 230 
Sub Total 70 28 2 42 55 288 3 0 1 2 31 3 0 0 194 25 744 
Western                                   
Busia     1                       8   9 




District A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Total 
Bungoma                             7   7 
Mumias     1                       11   12 
Vihiga        1   1   1             15   18 
Webuye           1 2             11 7   21 
Sub Total 0 0 2 1 0 2 5 1 0 0 2 0 0 11 74 0 98 
Nyanza                  
Suba           1                     1 
Siaya                             9 1 10 
Kisii   1                 1       4 3 9 
Kisumu 7 1   5 2           1   1   64   81 
Migori/Rongo                     1       24 1 26 
Homabay                     1       6   7 
Sub Total 7 2 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 107 5 134 
Central                  
Kiambu West                             3 1 4 
Nyandarua 
South                               1 1 
Sub Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 
Coast                  
Mombasa 8 1 3   4     1   1 4       4 1 27 
Nairobi     21 9   29             1   23 42 125 






B Arrow shot 
C Mob- Injustice 
D Blunt Object 
E Severe Wounds 




























































































































































 The gun shot wounds represented 35.7% of the total deaths that stood at 
405 out of the total 1,133 deaths.  
 Most shootings took place in Trans-Nzoia district recording 77 deaths, 
followed by Kisumu with 64 deaths and Kericho with 33 deaths. 
 Nakuru recorded the highest number of victims who died of injuries 
inflicted by sharp pointed objects with the number standing at 148 while 
Uasin Gishu recorded 92 deaths. 
 Most burns were documented in Uasin Gishu district with 32 deaths 
followed by Naivasha with 22 deaths. 
 Uasin Gishu recorded the highest number of deaths as a result of fatal 
injuries which cased 42 deaths, while blunt objects caused 24 deaths in 
Nakuru followed by Uasin Gishu at 16. Fatal arrow wounds were mostly 
used in Kipkelion standing at 17.  
 Webuye district recorded 11 deaths as a result of hanging. 
According to the statistics, most deaths in each given district took an ethnic 
dimension in which, apart from killings by the police, most of those killed did not 
belong to the ethnic tribe in the district. Apart from the 405 killings directly 
linked to the police, the remaining 732 deaths were as a result of citizens killing 
fellow citizens due to the political stand-off at the time of the killings or for other 
unknown reasons.  
Injuries 
The table below illustrates an overview and is a summary of injuries sustained 
by various individuals in 32 districts. These injuries did not result in death. 
Individuals who sustained such injuries reported to various hospitals and 
sought treatment.  In the time available, details as to the degree and effects of 
injury were not made available to the Commission. It is possible that while some 





Provincial breakdown of reported injuries 


















1 Bondo  0  0  0 5  0 5  0  0  0 1 9 20 
2 Bungoma  0  0  0  0  0 4  0 3 1 1 5 14 
3 Rachuonyo  0  0  0  0  0  0 8  0 1 1 3 13 
4 Busia  0  0  0  0  0 11 16 1 6 14 4 52 
5 Nyando  0  0  0 16  0 9  0  0  0  0 30 55 
6 Homa Bay  0  0  0 7  0 10  0  0  0  0 35 52 
7 Kakamega  0  0  0  0  0  0 3 3  0 1 15 22 
8 Kericho/ 
Kipkelion 
1 7  0 5  0 17  0   0  0 5 10 45 
9 Gucha  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 2 2 
10 Siaya  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 6 6 
11 Kisii  0 23  0 1  0 4  0  0  0 18 12 58 
12 Kisumu 8  0  0 101  0 103  0  0  0 60 71 343 
13 Masaba/Bora
bu 
 0  0  0  0  0 56  0  0  0  0 7 63 
14 
Migori/ 























15 Mombasa 13 2  0 2  0 94  0  0  0 12 10 133 
16 Mumias  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 23 23 
17 Nairobi 5 5  0  0 2 122  0 41 64 42 61 342 
18 Naivasha 1  0  0  0 4 37  0  0  0  0 11 53 
19 Nakuru   163   49   131         16 359 
20 Nandi North  0  0  0 60  0 151  0 9  0  0 8 228 
21 Uasin Gishu 73 29  0  0  0 173  0 14 28 117 71 505 
22 Kuria  0  0  0 7  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 7 
23 Nyamira 11 3  0 7  0 20 2  0  0 1  0 44 
24 Nandi south 6  0  0  0  0 66 167 1 2 50 45 337 
25 Trans Nzoia 36  0  0 329  0 137  0  0  0  0 9 511 
26 Suba  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 6 6 
27 Vihiga   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 18 18 
28 Webuye  0  0  0  0  0 1  0  0  0 9 7 17 
























 0 7  0  0  0 8  0 2  0 11  0 28 
31 Bureti  0 10  0  0  0 10  0  0  0 6 25 51 
32 Narok North   0 18  0 4  0 17  0  0  0  0 4 43 
  TOTAL 164 267 0 604 6 1229 196 74 104 360 557 
 
3,561  
As indicated previously, the injuries documented here in respect of persons who were attended to in hospitals and 
other established institutions. Thus, this is only an indication of the persons who were injured during the PEV. 
Highlights 




Rift Valley 2193 
Mombasa 133 
Nairobi  342 
TOTAL 









 The total injuries documented during the post-election violence were 
3,561, of which, majority of the injuries occurred as a result of sharp 
pointed objects. These injuries were recorded in most of the districts apart 
from Vihiga, Suba, Kuria, Siaya, Gucha, Kakamega and Rachuonyo.  
Uasin Gishu district recorded the highest number of injuries at 173, Nandi 
North 151, Trans-Nzoia 137 while Nakuru recorded 1,341 injuries in this 
category. 
 Injuries sustained as a result of use of various blunt objects came second 
overall with 604. In this category, Trans-Nzoia district recorded the highest 
number of casualties with 329 injuries, Kisumu 101 injuries while Nandi 
North district came third with 60 injuries in this category. 
 Gunshot injuries that were not lethal to life.  Kisumu and Uasin Gishu 
districts recorded the highest gun shot injuries at 71 injuries each.  





 Traumatic circumcisions which are commonly referred to as forced 
circumcisions were also recorded.  2 cases were recorded in Nairobi while 
Naivasha recorded 4 similar cases. 
 Most arrow shot injuries occurred in Nakuru with 163 shots followed by 
Uasin Gishu at 29 and Kisii at 23. 
 Uasin Gishu recorded the highest number of injuries as a result of burns 
at 73 followed by Trans-Nzoia at 36 burns.  
Overall, injuries sustained by citizens against fellow citizens were the highest at 
3,004 while those caused by state agents- i.e the police stood at 557. In 
analyzing the injuries, the Commission looked at the evidence submitted to it 
from various medical officers, Kenyatta National Hospital statistics, Moi Referral 
Hospital statistics and the Ministry of Health statistics. 
 
Private and Government Properties Destroyed 
The table below illustrates two major categories of property destroyed by civilians 
during post-election violence period. The source of this information is from police 
and administration records. The information is therefore classified into two 
categories; private property and Government property. 
Private properties destroyed, we opine that the number of private property may 
only be in respect of what was reported and documented by the official sources. 
The information is therefore classified into two categories; private property and 
Government property. 
Private Properties destroyed 
There was destruction of motor vehicles reported in Nyandarua, Homa Bay, 
Kipkelion, Uasin Gishu, Nandi North, Trans Nzoia West, Trans Nzoia East and 
Kericho Districts. A total of 160 vehicles were reported destroyed as follows: 128 
saloon cars, 8 buses, 6 tractors 15 trucks and 3 PSV matatus. Kipkelion district 
recorded the highest number of destroyed motor vehicles at 44 followed by 




destroyed, Koibatek 7, Nandi North 4, Trans Nzoia West 3, Homa Bay 3 and 
Nyandarua 1. 
Destruction of properties in Western Province was recorded in Busia, Vihiga, 
Kakamega, Lugari, Mumias, Butere and Mt. Elgon districts. In most of these 
districts, both residential and commercial buildings were destroyed. A total of 
1,060 such properties were destroyed. Kakamega recorded the highest in 
Western province with 444 destroyed properties, Lugari 431, Busia 66, Mumias 
41, Butere 38, Mount Elgon 35 while Vihiga documented 5. 
There was widespread destruction of residential home in the following districts: 
Nyandarua, Migori, Kisumu, Kipkelion, Molo, Uasin Gishu, Koibatek, Marakwet, 
Mombasa, Trans Nzoia West, Trans Nzoia East, Borabu and Sotik. A total of 
64,832 houses were destroyed. Uasin Gishu recorded the highest destruction at 
52,611, Kipkelion at 6,642 while Trans Nzoia recorded 860. The other districts 
recorded significant destructions destruction as illustrated in the table below. 
Kisumu, Nandi North, Mombasa and Kericho recorded the destruction of 
commercial buildings. Kisumu had 50, Nandi North 335, Mombasa 240 while 
Kericho recorded the highest destruction with 1,960. The total number of 
commercial buildings destroyed stood at 2,256.  In Borabu district, 1 public 
school and 10 farm machineries were destroyed. 60 kiosks and 30 shops were 
burn in Sotik district. 
Destruction of livestock was not widespread. It was recorded in Nyandarua and 
Kericho. In Kericho, 85 livestock were killed while 10 goats and 6 cows were 
killed in Nyandarua. Kipkelion was the only district that recorded massive 
destruction of crops. 36, 566 bags of maize, 8,100 bags of beans, 800 bags of 
Irish potatoes, 40 tones of cabbages, 30 tonnes of kales, 20 hectares of sugar 
cane and 3,219 plants of coffee were destroyed. 
Government Properties Destroyed 
There was burning of Government vehicles in Homa Bay, Uasin Gishu and Nandi 
North. A total of 12 vehicles were burnt made up as follows, Homa Bay district 




There was widespread destruction of government offices in Homa Bay, Kisumu, 
Kipkelion and Nandi North. In Homa Bay, offices and equipment estimated at 10 
million shillings was destroyed including the District Works office and Fisheries 
department offices. In Kisumu the water company offices, Provincial Public 
Works offices, Kondelle Chief’s office, and 32 government offices were destroyed.  
Two zonal education offices were destroyed in Kipkelion and the chief’s office and 
Kimondi forest offices in Nandi North were also destroyed. In Migori, 20 National 
Cereals Produce Board buildings were destroyed, 1 Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation building was destroyed in Kisumu; 2 Administration Police posts in 
Kipkelion; 3 government buildings in Nandi North; 16 government buildings in 
Trans Nzoia East; and 3 government houses in Sotik district. 
There was vandalism recorded in Kipkelion district where 8 dispensaries and 3 
forest stations were totally vandalized. Forests and plantations were not spared 
either. 367 trees were cut in Kipkelion, the Nyayo Tea Zone Nursery was 
destroyed and Kimondi Forest plantation was destroyed in Nandi North district. 
A total of 8 Government schools were destroyed in Kipkelion district while 
Burende Primary School was destroyed in Nandi North district.   
Properties destroyed per District during PEV period 










i) 23 permanent houses Nil 
ii) 
104 Semi Permanent 
houses   
iii) 1 tractor   
iv) 6 cows   
v) 10 goats   
Vihiga 5 properties 1 property 
Busia 66 properties Nil 
Kakamega 444properties Nil 
Lugari 431 properties Nil 




Butere 38 properties Nil 





1 tractor; 1 saloon 




offices; District works 
office; 1 office; 8 
Government vehicles; 1 
motorcycle; office and 
equipment worth Ksh. 10 
million;   
i) 1 tractor District works office 
ii) 1 saloon car 1 office 
iii) 1 lorry 8 Government vehicles 
    1 motorcycle 
    
office and equipment 
worth Ksh. 10 million 














South Lake Water Offices 
Provincial public works 
offices 
Kondelle chiefs office 












44 vehicles burnt 
36566 bags of maize  
8100 bags of beans 
800 bags of Irish 
potatoes 
40 tones of cabbages 
30 tones of kales 
20 ha of sugarcane 
3219 plant of coffee 
South Lake Water Offices3 
Chiefs offices 




1 Dispensary staff house 
destroyed 
2 Zonal education office 
destroyed 
3 Forest stations 
vandalized 
8 Schools destroyed 
367 Trees cut 
  
    
Provincial public works 
offices 
    Kondelle chiefs office 
    32 Government offices 
Kipkelion 6642 houses burnt 3 Chiefs offices 
  44 vehicles burnt 
2 Administration Post 
Posts 
  
36566 bags of maize 
des 7 Dispensaries vandalized 
  8100 bags of beans 
1 Dispensary staff house 
destroyed 





  40 tones of cabbages 
3 Forest stations 
vandalized 
  30 tones of kales 8 Schools destroyed 
  20 ha of sugarcane 367 Trees cut 




Uasin Gishu 52611 houses 2 GK vehicles 
  56 civilian vehicles  Nil 
Koibatek 
  
1215 houses torched 













329 private buildings 






 3 Government buildings 
1 GOK vehicles 
DO Residence Kosirai 
Chief's office 
Nyayo tea zones nursery 
Burende primary school 














1 GOK vehicles 
 
Trans Nzoia West 
  
4350 houses torched 
3 vehicles burned DO Residence Kosirai 
Trans Nzoia East 
  
 860 houses burnt 













 1960 Commercial 
building  
85 Livestock 
6 Easy coach buses 
14 James Finley 
trucks 
2 Akamba buses 
4 Unknown tractors 
10 private 
3 PSV Matatus 










 310 houses torched 
1 public school 
destroyed 
Burende primary school  
 Nil 




    Kimondi forest plantations 
Marakwet 401 homes torched NIL 




Trans Nzoia West 350 houses torched NIL 
  3 vehicles burned NIL 
Trans Nzoia East 860 houses burnt 
16 Government building 
destroyed 
  3 vehicles burned   
Kericho 
1960 Commercial 
building    
  85 Livestock   
  6 Easy coach buses   
  14 James Finley trucks   
  2 Akamba buses   
  4 Unknown tractors   
  10 private   
  3 PSV Matatus   
Borabu 310 houses torched   
  
1 public school 
destroyed   
  
10 farm machines 








60 kiosks burnt 








  Nil 
  
  
  60 kiosks burnt   
  
Conclusion 
The information on the deaths that occurred during the post election violence 
tells a number of stories.  The Rift Valley Province accounted for 744 deaths that 
is, 66% of all the deaths that occurred during the post election violence period.  
The Commission’s conclusion is that Rift Valley was the epicentre of the post 
election violence. Nyanza with 134 deaths, constituted 12% of the deaths  
experienced, while Nairobi with 125 deaths constituted 11% of all the deaths, the 




The causes of death in the provinces lead to a number of broad conclusions. In 
Western province, gunshots accounted for 74 deaths out of a total of 98 
representing 72.5% of all the deaths in that province.  In Nyanza 107 deaths out 
of 134 or 79.9% were the result of gun shots.  In Nairobi 23 out of 125 deaths or 
18.4% were the result of gun shots and in Rift Valley gun shots accounted for 
194 out of 744 or 26% of those killed. Coast Province recorded 4 out of 27 
deaths or 14% as a result of gun shooting and in Central 3 out of 5 deaths were 
reported representing 60% of the total gunshot deaths. 
 
Summary of Deaths from Gunshots 
Province No. of deaths Percentage  
 Western  74 72.5% 
 Nyanza 107 79.9% 
Rift Valley 194 26% 
Nairobi 23 18.4% 
Coast 4 14% 
Central 3 60% 
TOTAL 405  





















It is the view of the Commission that since no evidence to the contrary was ever 




concludes that the disparity in percentage terms of the number of those shot, as 
a fraction of the total deaths in each province, may have a correlation with the 
preparedness the police had to use ammunition on people. Evidently, this varied 
from province to province, with Western province exhibiting the most robust use 
of ammunition, followed by Nyanza. It appears that police in different provinces 
did not respond uniformly with regard to the use of force, even when faced with 
similar situations. 
Further, it is the view of the Commission that all deaths other than those by 
gunshot were caused by civilians. The number of deaths in the Rift Valley as a 
result of arrow shots and sharp objects is very high. The picture that emerges 
from these figures is that the Rift Valley faced an extraordinary amount of 
violence between ordinary citizens. Bows and arrows as well as machetes played 
a defining role in that violence.  For these improvised weapons to have achieved 
such a large number of fatalities demonstrates the concentration of the violence, 
and is consistent with the testimonies received by the Commission. 
The evidence received by the Commission was that in Nyanza and Western 
Provinces, there were relatively low levels of fatality resulting from citizen-on-
citizen violence. If it is assumed that gunshot deaths in these provinces were 
caused by police and that non-gunshot deaths represent civilian-on-civilian 
violence, the relatively low figures of 27 deaths representing 20% of the total 
deaths in Nyanza province while in Western 24 deaths representing 24.5% of the 
98 deaths corroborate the testimony. It follows, then that police shot and killed a 
large number of people in these two provinces. If so this is inexcusable and 
highly regrettable. 
The Commission also examined the ethnicity of those who died where such 
information was available from the evidence presented. The Commission decided 
to disaggregate information on the ethnic identities of those killed in the post 
election violence for the reason that it demonstrates that all ethnic communities 
that were involved in the violence sustained losses of life. This conclusion 
counteracts the notion which all the ethnic communities that were involved in 




community were the sole victims. The information shows that all sides sustained 
significant losses. 
























CHAPTER TEN  
Findings  
 
The findings we make in this Chapter are derived from the facts collated and 
analysed from oral and documentary evidence submitted before the Commission.  
There are 4773 pages of recorded sworn testimony from 156 witnesses and 144 
other witnesses who submitted depositions and recorded statements. There are 
nine volumes of exhibits running into more than 3500 pages and we had at our 
disposal, in terms of our terms of reference, official reports of previous 
investigations, investigations from other institutions or organizations and 
research material from our own researchers and investigators. It must be said 
that the Commission had only a limited period to carry out exhaustive 
investigations and we do not doubt therefore that there may be information out 
there which did not reach the Commission. We were nevertheless encouraged by 
the enthusiastic support and response we received from members of the public 
and we believe the information gathered enables us to state with confidence that 
our findings are made fairly and fully. 
The preceding chapters make various findings in relation to the topics discussed 
and those findings remain valid.  What follows is a summary of the broad 
findings as distilled by the Commission.  On the basis of those findings the 
Commission has made its recommendations as required in the terms of 
reference. 
Findings in Relation to the Extent of Violence 
6.• A total of 1,133 people died as a consequence of the post-election violence. 
The geographical distribution of the deaths was unequal, with most of the 
post-election violence related deaths concentrated in the provinces of Rift 
Valley (744), Nyanza (134) and Nairobi (125). The districts of Uasin Gishu 
(230), Nakuru (213) and Trans Nzoia (104) in the Rift Valley Province 





7.• A total of 3,561 people suffered injuries inflicted by or resulting from  sharp 
pointed objects - 1229, blunt objects -604, Soft tissue injury - 360, Gunshot 
- 557, Arrow shots - 267, Burns -164, Assault - 196, etc. 
 
8.• A total of 117,216 private properties (including residential houses, 
commercial premises, vehicles, farm produce) were destroyed, while 491 
Government owned properties (offices, vehicles, health centres, schools and 
trees) were destroyed. 
 
9.• Gunshots accounted for 962 casualties out of whom 405 died. This 
represented 35.7% of the total deaths, making gunshot the single most 
frequent cause of deaths during post-election violence. It was followed by 
deaths caused through injuries sustained as a result of sharp pointed 
objects at 28.2%. The Commission has received no evidence to suggest that 
where gunshot was recorded as the cause of death or injury, it was from a 
source other than the police. This calls into question the contention that 
post-election violence was a citizen-to-citizen violence, and it validates the 
view that police action accounted for a good part of the post-election 
violence. 
 
Findings In Relation to the Causes and Patterns of the Post-
Election Violence 
1. In contrast to the pre-election violence, which was mainly between 
candidates and their supporters, the post-election violence had a distinct ethnic 
dimension. 
2. Initially, the violence witnessed was spontaneous and was in part a 
reaction to the perceived rigging of elections. In areas like the Rift Valley and the 




associated with the PNU party and with President Kibaki who were seen as the 
beneficiaries of the “rigged” election, while in Nyanza and Western, the 
spontaneous violence was mostly directed towards government facilities and 
gradually took the form of looting and destruction, and while it also targeted 
Kikuyus and Kisiis, the intention appeared to be not to kill them but rather to be 
expel them and destroy their property. 
3. Subsequently the pattern of violence showed planning and organization by 
politicians, businessmen and others who enlisted criminal gangs to execute the 
violence. That was the case particularly in Rift Valley and Nairobi. In places like 
Naivasha, Nakuru and the slum areas of Nairobi, Kikuyu gangs were mobilised 
and used to unleash violence against Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjins and to expel 
them from their rented residences and, similarly, organised Kalenjin youth 
particularly in the North Rift attacked and drove out Kikuyus living there. 
4. Some of the pointers to the organisation include the fact that: 
 
• In instances, warnings were issued to the victims before the attacks;  
• The violence involved  large numbers of attackers, often mobilized from 
areas outside the location of the violence; 
• Petrol and weapons were used in various places to carry out the attacks 
and destruction, which required arrangements as regards acquisition, 
concealment and transport; and  
• Sometimes the attacks specifically targeted only members of given ethnic 
groups to the exclusion of others. 
 
5. Some responsibility for the violence must also be laid at the feet of the 
country’s politicians who precipitated the violence by among other actions 
and omissions: 
(i) Conducting the election campaigns in a strident and 





(ii) For party political ends, casting the majimbo debate in 
ethnically divisive terms;  and 
(iii) Failing to create confidence among voters around the electoral 
processes and institutions. 
 
6.  The administrative authorities, including the police, the security forces 
and the provincial administration, must also take responsibility for various 
omissions and commissions in regard to the violence arising from: 
• Failure to act on intelligence regarding the possibility of violence following 
the elections; 
• Failure properly to respond appropriately and adequately to the violence 
and its effects, thereby aggravating the suffering of the victims; 
• In the case of the security agents and the police, resorting to an 
unjustified use of force and causing death and injury unnecessarily; and 
• Failure to act with discipline and impartiality and at times descending into 
acts of serious crime against civilians. 
 
Findings In Relation to Sexual Violence 
General 
7. Because of the context in which it took place, the sexual violence 
experienced took the form of gang and individual rapes, many of which were 
ethnically driven, as well as horrendous female and male genital mutilation. 
Women and children’s labia and vaginas were cut using sharp objects and 
bottles were stuffed into them. Men and boys, in turn, had their penises cut off 
and were traumatically circumcised, in some cases using cut glass. 
Furthermore, entire families, including children often were forced to watch their 
parents, brothers and sisters being sexually violated. 
8. Aside from the above life shattering events, many victims of sexual 




had no place to go or to turn for help,  and have ended up alone or in IDP camps 
without a means of earning a living. 
Perpetrators 
9. The Commission found that perpetrators of sexual violence were not just 
ordinary citizens, neighbours, and gang members, but also significant numbers 
of security forces. These included members of the General Service Unit (GSU) as 
well as regular and administration police. Many victims let members of the 
security forces into their houses assuming they would help them. Instead, they 
found themselves being attacked by those they thought would help them. This 
entailed a gross betrayal of trust. 
10. Members of the security forces also participated in gang rapes. In addition, 
they colluded with each other, including having some of their own standing 
guard outside victims’ houses while they raped and mutilated inside victims’ 
dwellings.  
11. Even when victims told perpetrators (whether members of the security 
forces, gangs or individuals) that they were HIV positive, perpetrators chose to 
rape. This is likely to result in an increase in HIV AIDs in Kenya. 
12. Perpetrators often told victims the sexual violence inflicted upon them was 
punishment for belonging to a specific ethnic group or purportedly having 
supported a particular political party. 
Victims 
13. For a variety of reasons, many victims were not able to access timely 
medical care, including obtaining the drug PEP, which if taken within 72 hours, 
prevents HIV AIDS and sexually transmitted infections. The reasons for not 
obtaining medical care included the following: a breakdown in security and the 
fear of leaving home, lack of transport, ignorance about PEP and not knowing 
they would not have to pay and could receive free medical care, fear of being 




protect, feed, and shelter their children and family members at their own 
expense. 
Response by Authorities 
14. Authorities in general were totally unprepared to respond to sexual 
violence. Although the police took many victims of sexual violence to hospitals, 
the Commission also received evidence that in other instances they were 
unprepared either to record or investigate criminal complaints of sexual violence. 
This was exemplified by the Commissioner of Police, Hussein Ali’s testimony to 
the Commission, where he stated “We will determine whether those crimes are fit 
and whether the people have been arrested and charged”. 
15. The void created by the lack of official response to sexual violence was 
partly filled by private hospitals, including the Nairobi Women’s Hospital, some 
government facilities, and a number of NGOs, including the Kenya Red Cross. 
Effects 
16. Other than the extraordinary physical and psychological trauma stemming 
from being a victim of sexual violence, victims also suffered acute injuries, 
permanent disabilities, contracting incurable diseases like HIV AIDs and 
hepatitis B, ostracism, abandonment by their husbands and parents, loss of 
abode and income, as well as extreme feelings of humiliation. 
17. The Commission learned from its own psychologist that many female 
victims still are alone, unable to cope with the above traumas and in need of 
help which is not available to them. A number of victims who had not received 
medical attention by the time they came before the Commission only managed to 







Findings In relation to Internally Displaced Persons 
18. As a result of the PEV approximately 350,000 persons were displaced from 
their normal abodes of residence and or business. IDPs were concentrated in 
Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Central, Nairobi and Coast Province. About 1,916 
Kenyans sought refuge in Uganda. 
19. People were displaced as a result of violence and threats of violence. They 
moved from their places of residence and business to places considered safe like 
police stations, administrative posts, churches and trading centres.  20.
 Thereafter they moved to formal camps or were integrated with their 
relatives and friends in urban centres or their ancestral homes.   
21. Conditions in the IDP camps were less than satisfactory. We found that 
security was wanting as IDPs were always subjected to threats by criminal 
gangs.  We also found complaints about the inadequacy of food, shelter and 
sanitation. Most of the inhabitants of IDP camps were women and children. 
22. Government and administrative response to the problems of IDPS was 
initially slow and ad hoc. The Kenya Red Cross Society, local and international 
NGOs and CSOs, faith based groups and individual volunteers played an 
important role in alleviating the suffering of IDPs by offering refuge, food, shelter, 
security, education, medicine, counselling and other needs. 
23. The Government initiated “Operation Rudi Nyumbani” in April 2008 aimed 
at removing IDPs from camps and where possible resettling them back to their 
homes. Due to constraints of time and resources, the Commission could not fully 
make an assessment of the efficacy of this programme but found the following 
inadequacies; 
(i) The sum of Kshs. 10,000.00 was considered inadequate by the 
IDPs to meet their need once they left the camps. 
(ii) The so called “integrated” IDPs (i.e. returnees who went to live 
within the community) felt neglected as the program concentrated 




(iii) Security for those who wish to return to their farms and homes, 
particularly in the Rift Valley, is not fully assured and is therefore 
a hindrance to resettlement. 
24.  The IDP problem is likely to persist phenomenon until the Government 
and people of Kenya address the political problems that led to eviction of 
















CHAPTER ELEVEN  




The Commission was given a special role in relation to the State Security 
Agencies (SSAs) and their involvement in the Post Election Violence.  Articulated 
clearly in the Terms of Reference (ToRs) it was mandated to “investigate the 
actions or omissions of State security agencies during the course of the violence, 
and make recommendations as necessary.”  A broad interpretation of this task 
was applied to include the actions of these agencies in the lead up to polling day 
was a necessary step to take in determining the level of preparation and 
planning undertaken.  Also individual members, officers and employees of these 
agencies were considered to be within the scope of the investigation. 
The investigation drew from a range of reports from international organisations 
and Kenyan civil society, independent witnesses and representatives of the 
agencies themselves in determining just what these entities did or did not do in 
discharging their various mandates in the months preceding the elections, 
during the election process, and of course during the time of Post Election 
Violence (PEV). 
In discharging its mandate this Commission has been able to open doors 
previously closed and to hear from the most senior government officials both in 
public and in camera.  Many Kenyans were hearing from these office holders for 
the first time and the nature of their work would have been a revelation to many. 
Key witnesses who appeared included the Chief of General Staff of the Kenyan 







Commandant of the Administration Police292, the Director General of the 
National Security Intelligence Service293, the Permanent Secretary for the 
Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security294, the 
Commissioner of Prisons295, a number of Provincial and District Administration 
officers and other Police personnel.  The testimony of these witnesses has been 
complemented by that of independent citizens and civil society organisations. 
This approach has enabled the Commission to examine and make findings on 
many aspects of SSA’s work that will effectively carve out new territory for the 
Republic.  Indeed the finding relating to preparatory arrangements was as 
insightful as those relating to the action and reaction of these agencies to the 
violence when it did occur.  
This volume of the Commission’s report is divided into three chapters dealing 
with Preparation, Responses and the aftermath and a Rationale for 
Recommended Action (including major recommendations). 
 
Identifying the key issues 
The investigation focused on three main timeframes.  The pre-election period 
primarily looks at the preparedness of SSAs, the period of the post election 
violence itself to see just how agencies responded (between 27th December 2007 
when the presidential results were announced and the 29th of February 2008) 
and the time since then in terms of how they have dealt with the aftermath. 
The examination of these matters was guided by a number of key elements 
regarded as being minimum requirements for dealing with events of this type 









• Information and intelligence – the methodology of information 
gathering, analysis and dissemination within agencies and across 
the security sector. 
• Operational planning – The comprehensiveness of preparation 
including the use of intelligence, risk analysis, scenario 
development, desk top exercises, contingency building, the timing of 
overall preparation and communication.  The execution of planning 
arrangements including specialist training and drills, and orders 
groups.   
• Command and control structures – the development of specific 
arrangements to take account of the special nature of the 2007 
elections operation and the clarity and decisiveness of lines of 
command and communication ensuring officers and staff 
understand and acknowledge their roles in the exercise. 
• Use of force – the appropriateness of response tactics including the 
use of lethal force, tear gas and other methods of dealing with 
crowds 
• Dealing with complaints – including the systems utilised to receive 
and respond to calls for service and sensitivity in dealing with 
traumatised citizens 
• Investigations – the capability of police investigations  including 
issues of dealing with the behaviour of police officers 
• Resourcing – the level of resources acquired and applied to the 
operation, how resource management was handled during the crisis 
• The utility of Police Statutes, Force Standing Orders, standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) and other guidelines  
• The review processes, including de-briefings and a comprehensive 







How Prepared were the Agencies? 
 
Our assessment of this aspect of the State Security Agencies activities falls into 
two principal categories.  Firstly the activities, services and outturn of the 
intelligence machinery were examined including national, provincial and district 
components.  Secondly the readiness of operational agencies was investigated in 
terms of their own state of preparedness. 
 
Kenya Security Intelligence Machinery (KSIM)296 
 
The KSIM consists of a number of committees that are designed to keep security 
issues in front of those who make the decisions at the top level through to 
frequent interaction between delivery agencies on the ground at the provincial 
and district level.  The machinery is made up of the Cabinet Security Committee 
(CSC), the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), the Joint Security 
Intelligence Secretariat (JSIS), the Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee 
(PSIC) and the District Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC).  The 
respective roles and accountabilities are reproduced in appendix “B”. 
The KSIM largely discharges its role in ensuring the development and delivery of 
intelligence to inform an appreciation and understanding of the risks to internal 
security amongst other roles.  At the national level the key committee is the 
NSAC.  Consisting of senior officials from the security services and some 
ministries its main role is to advise the CSC on internal security issues and to 









At the outset the Commission learned that there is no established National 
Security Policy to guide the development of operational strategies and tactics to 
prevent or at least prepare adequately for such events as the PEV.297 
Despite the lack of a national policy base or a high level strategic framework the 
Commission heard evidence that the KSIM, especially the NSAC, had in its 
possession a wealth of knowledge and intelligence around the great potential for 
significant violence in and around the 2007 General Elections and that through 
its role this knowledge was shared between security agencies. 
The Commission also received no evidence as to the use made of the material 
created and supplied to the members of the NSAC.  It could not be established 
that this intelligence was shared in a timely or appropriate way with the 
government through the CSC or if it was, whether it influenced decision making 
at that level.  Nor could it be established whether the NSAC disseminated the 
intelligence to the provincial and district committees.   
Whilst it is clear that the Commissioner of Police was privy to this information it 
is less clear how full and detailed intelligence reports were or should have been 
provided to the provincial and district committees.  The Commission was able to 
establish that communications in the form of facsimiles were forwarded from the 
Police Commissioner’s office to Provincial Police Officers from time to time in the 
lead up to and after the general elections.  These communications, sent between 
August 2007, and the end of January 2008 contained a mix of information 
relating to potential security issues. 
Many Provincial Administration officers and police officers, however, stated to 
the Commission that they had not, for example, received special guidelines and 









Whilst the structure, roles and mandate of the KSIM is sound operationalising it 
in times of great need is the test of its robustness and in the case of the 2007 
elections there was a definite breakdown in its operation in terms of a top down 
delivery of intelligence reports.   
In the time it had, the Commission was able to review the discussions and 
minutes of some District Security and Intelligence Committees (DSIC) and 
Provincial Security and Intelligence Committees (PSIC).  These quite clearly 
demonstrated knowledge and understanding of the security situation that was 
developing in their areas of responsibility.  In Trans-Nzoia East and West the 
committee meeting of the 30th December noted a worrying security situation in 
the two Districts where Kikuyus were specifically being targeted and an 
observation that, “whichever way the (Presidential) results go Kalenjins (Pokots, 
Nandis, Kipsigis and Sabaots) are planning to attack Kikuyus and invade their 
farms.”  The same committee communicated to the PSIC that due to the fact that 
security officers had been deployed from their area to support Molo, Nairobi and 
elsewhere for security duties, local security was sorely compromised. 
The Molo DSIC determined in its meeting of the 22 November 2008 that due to 
glaring irregularities in the party nomination process and “blatant rigging” the 
political atmosphere became charged leading to defections and acrimony.  It 
commented that there was a strong need to strengthen security operations 
preceding the elections and recommended that five police posts be established 
and additional funding be allocated to support patrols and rapid deployment 
operations.  There is no record of these initiatives being followed through.   
Minutes of the 20th December meeting of the Molo DSIC recorded that following 
the period 22 November to 4 December when ethnic hostilities reached “fever 
pitch” resulting in clashes causing death, injuries and destruction of property, 
the entire PSIC led by PC Hassan Noor Hassan visited the area to assess the 
security situation.  Appealing for peaceful co-existence between the communities 
a meeting between religious leaders, politicians and the PC was held on 5 
December where peaceful resolutions were agreed upon and a document signed 




security arrangements noting a need to recruit credible and reliable informers, 
more transport, a requirement to properly vet officers sent to the district to 
ensure reliability and a strengthening of the operational command structure and 
communications arrangements. 
There remains a question then around the utility of the machinery in its 
mandated role in terms of planning and preparing delivery agencies for key 
security tasks.  Whilst there is evidence of good information gathering, 
intelligence preparation and understanding of the security issues both nationally 
and at a local level, there is a significant weakness in translating this into clear, 
demonstrable and useful operational interventions. 
It appears that the entire security forces’ approach to dealing with security 
issues relies almost exclusively upon the KSIM.  This simply will not achieve 
anything on its own.  This information and intelligence, assuming the smooth 
operation of the machinery, only serves to inform and advise on what delivery 
agencies need to do.  The Commission received no evidence, for example, that 
there were any joint planning and/or operational arrangements between 
agencies.  Further, no evidence was provided regarding the use of desktop 
scenarios, simulated emergencies and full joint exercises to ensure that each 
organ is able to play its role when real emergencies such as the PEV occur. 
It would be expected that such arrangements would be in place and form part of 
the usual business of SSAs.  Specific planning activities for the general elections 
would have been expected to commence some considerable time before they were 
to be held and at least one to two years in the case of the largest known 
recurring security event in Kenya.    
 
National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) 
Of all the State Security Agencies the NSIS was, it seems, with the possible 
exception of the Military, best prepared.  Evidence was received to the effect that 
not only did the Service gather information and data about what could 




range of reports highlighting the issues and provided them to senior government 
officials as well as the Police, Military, Prisons, and other agencies. 
The NSIS produced both regular and special reports including Hotspots/Flash 
Points Up-dates, Situation Reports, weekly and fortnightly reports and briefs, 
security briefs at a provincial and district level as well as NSAC reports regularly 
throughout the months leading up to the General Elections299.  As early as 
September 2007 these reports warned of impending election related violence in 
clearly specified areas and provided a continuing alert process through updated 
assessments of potential PEV. 
In many instances these documents identified various individuals suspected of 
being involved in such activities as inciting, planning disruption and violence, 
threatening behaviour and other offences. 
The Service went as far as recommending that operational agencies prepare 
specific contingency plans, take special and decisive action against inciters and 
financiers of criminal gangs and ensure staff refrained from exercising partisan 
behaviour.   
The Commission heard and was provided with supporting evidence that the 
Service was in fact uncannily accurate in its forecasting of just what scenarios 
were likely to eventuate should either Odinga or Kibaki win the Presidential 
elections.  The scenarios predicting possible 2007 election outcomes and 
consequences sounded a clear warning that security organs may well be 
overwhelmed by the high intensity and widespread nature of ensuing 










A special report entitled Critical Dates and Events – General Elections 2007, was 
forwarded on 6 December to Mr. Samuel M. Kivuitu, Chairman of ECK the 
contents of which had been presented to the NSAC.  It, amongst other things, 
warned of “increased political activity and attendant lawlessness are likely to 
overwhelm the security organs.”301  A further report dated 7 December addressed 
to the same person and copied to Amb. Francis K. Muthaura, PS to the Cabinet 
and Head of the Public Service and the Commissioner of Police warned further of 
issues likely to inflame an already volatile situation including, “persisting claims 
of election irregularities...formation of anti-rigging squads by parties, and hiring 
and use of criminal gangs against opponents and persisting ethnic 
clashes/animosities in some parts of the country due to inflammatory political 
utterances..” 302 
Given the extensiveness of the intelligence developed and distributed by the 
service it was disturbing to note that in the end there was an almost fatalistic 
realisation that no or insufficient preventive action would be taken to ameliorate 
the mayhem.  In addition for many there is a case for believing that even with an 
Odinga win some areas of the country, especially North rift, may well have still 
seen high levels of violence due to the alleged level of Kalenjin organisation, 
capability and ambitions to drive so-called outsiders out of the area regardless of 
the results. 
A question remains about the utility of some of the NSIS’s systems.  Many at the 
Provincial, District, and Division level were emphatic that they did not know of 
the likely magnitude of the violence that ultimately ensued. This seems strange 
since it is those very areas within which the NSIS operatives work and therefore 








It can only be assumed that if this is the case then the information obtained was 
not shared with the PSICs or DSICs on the way up the chain.  Perhaps the 
system that the Service utilises does not allow for this and insists that only well 
developed intelligence through the instrumentality of a formal report will be 
shared with fellow SSAs.  Many Districts reported that they had no idea of the 
nature of the extent of violence to come and did not in fact receive full reports 
from their superiors.   
If this is true then the failure to fully comprehend the situation could lie in both 
the failure to utilise key information at source and in a failure of agencies 
(especially the Police) to ensure that the formal intelligence reports of what was 
happening on the ground reached those who could do something about it. 
The NSIS also warned of “..emerging allegations that the government is planning 
to use some sections of government organs including the provincial Administration 
and the Administration Police (APs) to rig the forthcoming elections..”303  A 
particularly disturbing allegation considering that the same report (dated 25 
December 2007) identified indicators of the alleged rigging schemes including, 
“The revelation that APs are involved in marking ballot papers in advance and that 
some of them will be deployed in polling stations to disrupt elections and introduce 
fake ballot papers, particularly in Lang’ata.” 
Further, the intelligence agency in warning of the real potential for security 
organs to be overwhelmed by “widespread lawlessness” pointed to the following 
challenges; 
• An overstretched (capacity) and partly demoralised police force 
• Lukewarm working relationships between the regular and 
administration police as a result of perception that the latter is 
politicised and favoured by the government. 
• A partisan public service as well as the military 








The Commission did, however, have grave reservations about the involvement, 
and attempted involvement, of the NSIS in the elections process.  This 
involvement was manifested in three specific instances.  The first concerned an 
attempt by the NSIS Regional Intelligence Coordinator (RIC), Nairobi Region to 
secure ECK accreditation badges.  The RIC wrote to the Chairman of ECK, Mr. 
Samuel Kivuitu in a letter dated 13 December 2007, requesting the issuing of no 
less than 50 accreditation badges to be issued to NSIS officers for the 
elections.305 
Mr. Kivuitu responded in writing the very next day, refusing the request outright.  
In doing so he noted, “It is the first time such a request was ever made by an 
intelligence agency.”  He also pointed out, “The acceptance of your request would 
contravene all known and well established international norms on elections... 
there can be no basis for spying on its (ECK) electoral duties... for now your 
application is impossible to accept.” 
This issue also arose during the examination of the ECK Chairman306 when he 
responded to a question about the matter; 
Harun Ndubi: I see. Now, I'm asking that to reflect back on the 
question of NSIS. Did they also ask you in any of those 
correspondences to allow their officers either to disguise or to receive 
badges as officers or observers of the ECK? 
Samuel Kivuitu: They applied - now this did not come from the 
headquarters. This came from the Nairobi office. They applied to 
become observers, election observers and I wrote back and I said they 
are not qualified. They cannot be election observers and if they were 
to be taken it would be one of the biggest blows to the administration 
of elections. 
 
A second issue concerned what the NSIS described as a “Socio-Economic Political 







conducted) between 26th November and 2nd December 2007.307  In a letter dated 
24th December 2007, General Gichangi provided survey results indicating the 
relative position of the 3 presidential candidates in the polls.  He also included 
an assessment as to the final results on 27th December 2007.   
In addition, correspondence about the survey appeared to be arranged outside 
the KSIM framework.  The Commission could find no reference to this work in 
any other document and the letter was addressed to Amb. Muthaura in his role 
as Secretary to the cabinet and Head of Public Service and not in his capacity as 
Chair of the NSAC.   
The consistent message, frequently communicated by the NSIS, around the need 
for state organs and their officers to be neutral during the elections seemed 
farcical in the face of these revelations. 
The third area of concern for the Commission also related to a written 
communication.  Dated 6th December 2007, this letter from the Director General 
to the Chairman of the ECK was headed “Critical dates and Events – General 
Elections 2007”.308 The letter purported to be on behalf of the NSAC although it 
was not forwarded by the NSAC Chair.  Amongst other things the 
communication identified counting, announcement and swearing in elements of 
the ECK’s work that the NSIS felt necessary to comment upon.  This advice 
included how certificates should be dealt with by agents and that ECK should 
meet with media house owners and editors and the candidates “with a view to 
striking a deal on the modalities of transmission and announcement of results.”  
The Commission discovered that this type of advice had been provided by the 
NSIS during the referendum of 2005 and was in fact welcomed by the ECK then 
and during the 2007 elections. Despite this the Commission finds that specific 
advice of this nature emanating from an intelligence agency is unwise and likely 









Further, this correspondence included a caution on the conduct of law 
enforcement and other agencies in and around the elections processes, “The 
involvement of government officials and the use of public resources for campaign 
purposes could lead to accusations of rigging and provide grounds for violence and 
subsequent petitions.”  Clearly the Director General and his officers failed to heed 
their own warnings. 
 
The Military 
Testimony was tendered by the Chief of General Staff of the Kenya Armed Forces, 
General Jeremiah Kianga309 to the effect that the Military were well prepared for 
the PEV.  By all accounts they not only took heed of the NSIS reports but 
conducted their own assessments, scanning and planning arrangements based 
upon their view that the 2007 elections would see a level of violence occur to at 
least levels seen at previous elections.   
The military prepared contingency plans, anticipatory orders, trained troops and 
rehearsed in order to respond appropriately to likely scenarios, conducted 
barazas with staff around their need to remain apolitical in accordance with 
military values, and other work to ensure that should the need arise military 
support could be provided quickly and effectively. 
The official mechanisms and formal procedures utilised for calling for Military 
assistance in aid of the civil power were, however, less clear.  Section 3 (2) of the 
Armed Forces Act (Chapter 199 of the Laws of Kenya) provides: - 
 
“The Kenya Army, The Kenya Air force and the Kenya Navy are charged 
with the defence of the Republic and the support of the civil power in 






time be assigned to them by the Minister after consultation with the Defence 
Council.” 
The Police Commissioner310 testified that,  
“In the context of the events after the 27th December 2007 elections, military 
resources were deployed for the limited purpose of supporting police in the 
restoration of transport infrastructure. The role of the military did not include 
quelling of riots.” 
This was acknowledged by General Kianga, the Chief of General Staff of the 
Kenya Armed Forces,311 in his statement where he stated that the primary role of 
the Armed Forces is the defence of the Republic of Kenya against any external 
threat and the secondary role is the support of Civil Power in maintenance of 
order.312 
It is notable that the Police Commissioner and the Chief of General Staff of the 
Kenya Armed Forces did not refer to any other basis for military aid to civil 
authority or elaborate on just what processes were used. 
The Commission was provided with a copy of a Government of Kenya document 
entitled “Instructions on the Use of Armed Force in civil disturbances” issued by 
the Ministry of Defence in 1962.313  This was also referred to by a senior police 
witness who referred to a number of publications that guide policing 
arrangements.314  This document spells out that such requests should emanate 
from the Provincial Commissioner or District Commissioner in any “sudden or 
urgent emergency” after consultation with the local police commander.  Some 












The Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police are generally referred to 
as the Police in this discussion except where issues touch specifically upon their 
individual mandate and/or responsibility. 
In terms of preparedness for dealing with the Post Election Violence, the Police 
were simply too far off the mark.  There was, and still is, a lack of understanding 
and reluctance to accept that a comprehensive exercise in planning and 
preparation for the elections were not only required but constitute a basic 
responsibility for the Police.  This was reflected early in the proceedings.   
The Commissioner of Police, Hussein Ali, stated to the Commission that the 
violence was unprecedented and indicated that it could not have been 
foreseen315.  The Commissioner was asked by the Commission to provide copies 
of documents prepared by the Police for policing the 2007 General Elections and 
undertook to do so.  By the time this report was written only two planning 
documents were received.  The first was an operation plan from the Coast 
Province in the form of an undated presentation, and the second was a plan 
entitled “Operation Uchaguzi” from SSP Mwamburi former OCPD Migori/Rongo 
Districts.316  
In assessing the Police preparedness overall the Commission determined that 
planning and preparation was scant, commenced far too close to the event, failed 
to take account of the intelligence received and information available on the 
ground, and did not encompass preventive activities designed to reduce and/or 
ameliorate the impact of violence around the 2007 General Elections.  There was 
also no evidence provided that indicated the police were utilising their own 
intelligence sources and systems that should have informed planning as well as 
responses.  These fundamental failures set the scene for police preparedness, 








The Commission sensed that the police approach to its task before, during and 
after the 2007 elections reflected a misplaced arrogance that they would always 
be able to control what came up.  As we will see not only does this approach fail 
to grasp the fundamental policing tenet that preventing violence and criminal 
activity is the best means of protecting citizens and property, but further 
underscores the grave underestimation of what was to  ultimately occur. 
Evidence was tendered to the effect that indeed some planning did take place.  
The Commission was told that a process was in place whereby Provincial Police 
Officers (PPOs) planned for service delivery in their provinces for the elections 
and these plans were tested at national level, reviewed and ultimately 
implemented.317   However, little evidence of planning was heard from mid-level 
police commanders.   
The Commission heard from a number of officials including the former PPO who 
was in charge of police operations for the entire Rift Valley Province until 27 
January 2008.318  He stated that due to his assessment of the issues, he 
prepared “detailed operation plans” although the evidence suggests that in fact 
there were, “adequate security arrangements made” through the instrumentality 
of “detailed operation orders.”  These orders appear to consist merely of the 
application of officers to areas where more violence was expected than others.319  
There was no indication of initiatives and strategies designed to reduce and/or 
ameliorate the possibility of violence.   
Planning here also seems to be predicated on the need to supply at least two 
officers to each polling station during the election process.  In fact it could be 
said that the Police planned for dealing with the elections process and little else.  
It should be noted that the ECK counsel made much of the significant increase 
in polling stations for the 2007 elections.  In the event some 27,555 polling 










officers assigned to these duties, albeit many were seconded from other services, 
at a time when there was little violence around the actual polling.  The impact of 
this and other requirements are discussed in detail in a following section. 
In fact one provincial CID Officer Patrick Muhuni, Kakamega320, Western 
Province was one of the few police officers to state that he actually had a plan.  
Although not written, the plan did consist of some activities designed to reduce 
the effect of pre-election violence and deal with the election process itself.  In 
addition the work involved focussed almost exclusively upon preparations for 
dealing with violence with little emphasis on prevention. 
He told the Commission that “In the month of October 2007, the provincial Police 
Headquarters directed/advised the eight Divisional Police Officers (OCPDs) in the 
province to start preparing and curb any unlawful activities before and during the 
electioneering period (that is the pre-election and post election period).”   
He further said “The preparation would involve the beefing up of security, 
deployment of police on patrol and beat duties, rehearsing police officers on the 
control of riot, lectures on providing security to presiding officers and clerks, 
manning of the polling centres, stations and tallying centres.”321  
Many however advised that their plans were not written and many seemed to be 
in the nature of an action or reaction to events as they unfolded on the ground.   
The PC, Coast Province Mr Ernest G Munyi told the Commission that “adequate 
measures were put in place during the political campaigns preceding the elections 
and during the election itself.”322  The Coast PPO, Deputy Commissioner King’ori 
Mwangi said that, “In 2007 as part of my work, I directed all OCPDs in the Coast 
province to prepare operation plans covering the build up to the general 









the biggest security operations that the Police deal with at any one time in 
Kenya.324 
The former OCPD Mombasa Wilfred Mbithi, now Assistant Commissioner 
Operations Nairobi testified that, “Before the elections, we prepared 
adequately...and to our capacity.”325  He acknowledged that on the very first day 
violence erupted on the Coast he called for reinforcements, and also stated that 
no review of the police 2007 elections operations had ever been completed.   
Despite assurances around preparedness the Police agencies have either not 
been able to provide copies of their planning documents326, state clearly when 
planning commenced or provide evidence that they conducted a full de-briefing 
and review process post the 2007 operation.327 These fundamental failures were 
indeed replicated all over Kenya. 
There were also significant variations in the understanding of senior and mid 
range police as to their level of capability in dealing with the violence that 
occurred.  In some cases the Commission was told that the SSAs were quite 
simply overwhelmed (even when heavily reinforced), in others views were 
expressed that the police were always able to control events and in fact did so 
(despite the fact that many days and weeks were taken to reduce the violence 
and heavy tactics were used). 
The Commission takes the view that the Police in fact were poorly prepared to 
deal with the PEV.  Even with the intelligence provided by the NSIS and the 
historical nature of elections in this country, police agencies quite simply failed, 
and failed badly, in this fundamental requirement of their mandate. 
 










The Commission could find little or no evidence to indicate that the Government, 
either as an entity, or through individual politicians moved to prevent or 
ameliorate the tensions leading up to the elections.  In fact there is strong 
evidence that indeed the actions of some senior duty bearers exacerbated 
tensions and violence through the misuse of executive power and authority.  The 
decision to deploy hundreds of administration police officers in apparently 
clandestine circumstances to Nyanza just before the polling day confirmed for 
many that the elections processes were indeed suspect. 
There is clear evidence that Kenya has a strong collective approach to gathering, 
processing and disseminating information and intelligence dealing with security 
issues that is principally demonstrated through the Kenya Security Intelligence 
Machinery (KSIM).  The benefits of such a system were demonstrated through 
the preparedness of the NSIS and Military in understanding their roles, planning 
for the 2007 elections and executing their mandates in terms of preparedness 
and service delivery on the ground. 
Weaknesses exposed by the very nature of the Post Election Violence however 
mitigated these positives.  Key amongst these was the lack of leadership provided 
by the Cabinet Security Committee and its co-opted members.  This committee is 
the highest level component of Kenya’s Security Intelligence Machinery yet the 
Commission could find no evidence that it operated at all let alone effectively in 
the lead up to and during the elections. It is expected that these senior members 
of the government would demonstrate leadership and decisiveness in addressing 
the issues they must have been aware of during the build up to the 2007 general 
elections.  The Commission can only speculate that individual members were 
more concerned about their personal political situation during the campaigning 
and polling periods. 
 
The Commission found a number of examples of activities undertaken by the 
NSIS as extraordinarily poor judgement, constitute partisanship on the part of a 




mandate of the agency.  These included attempts to secure ECK accreditation for 
NSIS officers to be part of the elections process, a NSIS sponsored survey of how 
the 3 presidential candidates were polling prior to the elections and 
communicating this information to the Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of 
Public Service, and advising the ECK on electoral processes. 
Omissions were also found in sub-optimal decision making, the absence of joint 
operational arrangements and the failure to translate good intelligence into 
demonstrable operational delivery.  In the event much of the information and 
intelligence that the NSIS developed and forwarded to the other agencies, 
including police, simply did not get to those who could have used it most. 
The Commission could find little evidence that delivery agencies were involved in 
joint planning and preparation leading up to the 2007 elections.  This came as a 
surprise given the history of elections violence in Kenya, and the weight of 
knowledge agencies had about the likelihood of significant violence being a 
feature in 2007/8.  Given that general elections constitute the most serious 
known security and safety issue in Kenya and that it recurs every five years, 
operational planning needs to begin a minimum of 18 months ahead of any date 
set for the next general election. 
There was also no evidence that recognised preparatory arrangements such as 
the use of desk top scenarios, simulated emergencies and full joint operational 
exercises are a part of the SSAs’ repertoire.  These activities are a standard 
operating element of many similar jurisdictions, utilising peer review strategies 
where security specialists from similar agencies act as reviewers and umpires to 
independently assess current strengths and weaknesses in the preparedness 
and capability of SSAs. 
 
Other issues that served to weaken the opportunity to reduce and/or ameliorate 
the violence were the lack of a national security policy and security plan, the 




components (including a national plan), and full recognition of the role that the 
military can play in dealing with these events. 
One of the stronger findings of an omission on the part of State Security 
Agencies before the elections was the failure of the Police to engage in 
professional, timely and quality planning and preparation for the elections event.  
It was apparent to the Commission that there was a “we will be all right on the 
day” mentality emanating from the top to the bottom of the organisation.  
Planning and preparation appeared to be something that is done close to the 
event and on this occasion focussed on the wrong things.  Plans seemed to 
consist of, where there was evidence of something written, simply an orders 
group focussing on the polling arrangements. 
Examples on the ground of the lack of planning and preparation by police 
abound.  This despite strong evidence suggesting there was at an element of 
planning and certainly organisation and facilitation in relation to much of the 
violence experienced during the post election period, especially in the Rift Valley 
Province. 
Many citizens seemed to have known at least a few days in advance that there 
would be targeting by tribal and/or political affiliation although the police 
seemed either unaware or chose not to take the information seriously. In any 
event the Police were unprepared and failed to take the necessary proactive steps 
to reduce the opportunity for violence to eventuate.  
This approach fails to take account of one of the most important roles of the 
Police and that is the protection of life and property, the prevention of offences 
and crimes and keeping the peace.  Best practice in this area demands that 
quality, extensive and specialised planning arrangements should begin many 
months if not years before such an event.  
 
Senior personnel, from the Commissioner and his key advisers to provincial and 




what is a critical and fundamental element of policing.  As a result many more 
people lost their lives, were injured, were displaced, their homes and personal 
property destroyed and ability to continue their livelihoods severed than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
These factors combine to identify a further omission on the part of the police.  
Little or no evidence was adduced supporting the existence of a police 
intelligence capability.  It is accepted that the intelligence committees provide a 
useful mechanism to collectively assess intelligence and utilise it for decision 
making, however Police organisations should and must have their own highly 
developed information gathering and intelligence systems.  Had these systems 
been in place and operating effectively and the intelligence gained been acted 
upon in a timely and effective way then perhaps more preventive action would 
have been taken.  
 
How Did State Security Agencies (SSAs) Respond to the PEV? 
The operational delivery for SSAs primarily rests with the Police (Kenya Police 
Service and Administration Police), the provincial and district security and 
intelligence committees, the Kenya Prisons Service, the Provincial and District 
Administration and from time to time other services including the Kenya Wildlife 
Service, the National Youth Service, and the Kenya Forest Guards.   
The National Security Intelligence service (NSIS) does not have a mandated role 
to deliver services other than to advise security agencies.  The Military provides 
support to the civil authority when required to do so. 
This chapter assesses the overall response by SSAs with a specific focus upon; 
interventions including use of force; the role played by various SSAs, the 
identification of some key incidents and issues arising from them; and chronicles 






Responses by SSAs to the Post Election Violence proved to be inconsistent.  They 
varied considerably.  There were instances where individuals, and agencies 
performed well, many doing their very best to provide safety and security 
services to citizens.  There were also many instances where agencies could have 
done much better as well as clear cases of neglect of duty, criminal offending and 
the use of overwhelming and lethal force on many defenceless citizens.   
 
KSIM 
At a national level and in the time available the Commission was unable to firmly 
establish just how well the CSC and NSAC operated.  It would be expected that it 
is around events such as the crisis that developed after the presidential election 
results were announced that these important, high level components of the 
Security Machinery should operate best.  It is understood that in fact the NSAC 
did not actually meet during the crisis period and communicated by other means 
and it can only be assumed that the CSC was not functional during this 
important period. 
A special Nyanza PSIC meeting held on the 4th February 2008 specifically 
referred to NSAC directives that were issued and noted for necessary action.328  
The NSAC documents were described at directives to the PSIC contained in two 
letters from the Permanent Secretary dated 7th and 28th January 2008 with 
directions that: “PSIC and DSIC should arrest all criminals engaged in planning 
and execution of killings and destruction of property; PSIC and DSIC should 
provide security to targeted individuals who supported the Government and 
PNU; PSIC and DSICs should forthwith ensure that all major feeder roads are 
free of illegal barriers; The command and coordination relationships between 
Security Committees and Security Agents while on Security Operations should 
be streamlined.  The Provincial Commissioner and District Commissioners will 






the PSIC and DSICs respectively while the Provincial Police Officer and Officer 
Commanding Police Divisions remain Operational Commanders to execute 
committee decisions.” 
The performance of the Provincial and District Intelligence Committees appeared 
mixed.  An examination of the Rift Valley PSIC minutes for example disclosed a 
functioning group demonstrating some leadership and decision-making 
throughout the crisis.  A special meeting held on 31 December 2007 reviewed 
the situation all over the province, identified activities for priority action and 
agreed that officers should exercise restraint “as killing was not the answer.” The 
committee resolved to meet frequently during this period meeting on four 
occasions during January 2008 and a number of times in February. 
In contrast the Nairobi Provincial Intelligence Committee appears to have met 
less frequently (according to the minutes provided) and not at all during 
December 2007, January or February 2008.  The Nairobi North District 
Committee met three times, during this period, Nairobi West not at all, and 
Nairobi East met on 13th December and not again until 13th February 2008. 
There was also evidence of clear and concise decision making by Committees.  A 
special PSIC meeting held at Kakamega in Western Province on 22nd January 
2008 reported an agreement to allow planned peaceful demonstrations by ODM 












Evidence received by the Commission indicated that the NSIS did continue the 
process of information collection and intelligence gathering during the PEV 
period.  Daily situation reports330 were prepared outlining key areas of concern 
including, in some cases, the identification of specific people and events of 
interest.  As stated earlier it is not clear, however, the extent to which these 
reports were disseminated to key enforcement agencies and other recipients. 
Although some of what might be described as standard reports were 
discontinued partly in December 2007, throughout January and parts of 
February 2008 this is not surprising given the nature of the events confronting 
agencies throughout the Republic.  Unfortunately even the daily situation 
reports were not produced during the critical period of 24th December 2007 and 
2nd January 2008.  The Commission believes however that in fact these events 
provided an opportunity for the Service to develop and circulate special reports 
focussing on perpetrators, planners and organisers of violence and possible 
tactics and strategies to reduce their effect.  The NSIS did not take this 
opportunity but should do so in the future.  
  
Military 
The Commission has been unable to establish the exact timing and mechanism 
that triggered the involvement of the Military in the Post Election Violence.  
Although, for example, the Commission was informed that their support began 
on 27 December 2007 a schedule of action taken covers the period 6 January to 
28 February 2008.331   
 
In the event the military were involved in a number of supporting activities right 







These activities included332; 
• Transporting IDPs from flash points to safe areas; 
• Guarding IDP camps; 
• Clearing and securing blocked roads; 
• Securing the rail line; 
• Distributing food and medical supplies to IDPs; 
• Escorting trucks from Mombasa destined for Rift valley, Western 
Kenya and neighbouring countries; 
• Escorting passenger vehicles through unsafe insecure areas between 
Nairobi and Western Kenya 
Apart from a demonstration of force both on the ground and from a helicopter in 
Naivasha there was never a requirement for the military to use force and none 
was used.  “My lords, yes we fired in the air that is a demonstration of force.  
There were one or two occasions when we fired into the air to demonstrate 
force.”333 
The Commission’s view is that the Military performed its duty well, a position 
that appeared to be shared with many commentators.  What is surprising is that 
more military support was not initiated as the circumstances of the situation 
dictated that more resources of this nature applied quickly and judiciously, may 











The role of prison officers during the PEV period basically fell into three 
categories.  Firstly very many officers were designated as police officers 
principally for duties in and around the polling stations.334   
 
Secondly a number of officers were co-opted to support the Police in a number of 
enforcement roles, effectively as reinforcements, and carried out duties such as 
patrolling.335  In some cases, such as in Naivasha, the Commission heard of 
allegations of improper conduct on the part of some officers.  In this particular 
case it is alleged that due to pressure from the public, officers were withdrawn 
from service on 27 January 2008.  Unfortunately this occurred at the very time 
Police were under severe pressure due to the retaliatory attacks that occurred in 
the town on the same day, a curious coincidence. 
 
Further evidence was received by the Commission to the effect that prison 
officers did contribute well to the provision of a safe haven for IDPs.  In Naivasha 
the Assistant Commissioner of Prisons, Duncan Okore336 allowed victims of the 
violence to stay in the outer area of the prison whilst more appropriate 
arrangements were made.  In the event, from a trickle of women and children 
arriving on 30th December 2007 the number of IDPs rose to around 10,000 on 
3rd February 2008.  By 8th February 2008 all but 20 IDPs remained.  These IDPs 
were mainly women and children and were accommodated, supported and 













The Commission heard that the Police were in fact overwhelmed by the scope 
and nature of the PEV.  One DSIC meeting held on the 1st of January 2008 
reflected that “in some cases especially in Cherangany and Saboti Divisions 
security forces were overwhelmed by the huge numbers of marauding gangs hence 
there is very serious need for the forces in the two Districts to be reinforced.”  
Further on 16th January 2008 the same committee recorded an appeal to the 
PSIC to urgently facilitate reinforcements of two special detachments of RDU338 
or GSU339 and two platoons of Kenya Army personnel. 
It is difficult to see how the Police could have coped without initiating and 
implementing preventive measures in the first place that may well have resulted 
in, with more support from the military, far fewer deaths, injuries and 
destruction of property.  Simply put the incidents police were called upon to deal 
with were all too much, too often and too widespread.  These events sorely tested 
police operating arrangements, systems, the training, ability and calibre of 
officers, equipment and decision making. The lack of planning resulted in 
effectively de-limiting available tactical options.  Much was found wanting. 
 
Policy Issues 
There were a number of nationally initiated decrees and orders that may have 
had an effect on the way in which operations were managed.  The Commissioner 
ordered a nationwide ban on political gatherings of any description.340   Many 
felt this was a violation of the Constitution and contrary to law.  Others such as 
ODM felt it was a direct attack on them and their members and supporters.  
Although there may have been some operational utility in the move in seeking to 









to the tactic of restraining people from moving out of the large informal 
settlements that exist in and around the major towns and cities. 
There were also rumours, a reality to many, that the Police had a shoot to kill 
policy341.  This rumour was heightened when it became apparent that the Police 
were firing live bullets at citizens and the reality set in that many were being 
killed.  Whilst two witnesses342 testified that there was no such policy and that 
there was no basis in law for there to be one, doubtless many will find this 
position difficult to accept.  
A ban on live media broadcasts may well have had negative unintended results 
in terms of security issues343.  Many citizens determined this act amounted to a 
further infringement of their rights, indicated that the government had 
something to hide and as a result heightened tensions that were already running 
at very high levels.  The Attorney General in fact testified that in his view the ban 
was not legal. 344 
 
The Operational Environment 
The Police faced extraordinary operational issues across much of Kenya.  
Ranging from individuals inciting and agitating for violence to occur, groups and 
gangs ravishing communities, large numbers of youth and other citizens 
damaging property and in some cases rioting, to attempts at organising and 
conducting demonstrations, these events sorely stretched and tested the police 
capability and responses.  Ultimately 1133 people were killed, very many more 
injured, thousands of private and public properties destroyed, vehicles and 














There were significant differences in the issues faced by the police around the 
country.  For example those issues facing State Security Agencies in the Rift 
Valley Province were quite different from other areas in Kenya.  Violence started 
in different areas at different times; Kuresoi on 4th December, Eldoret on 30th 
December, Nakuru on 24th January and Naivasha on 27th January and violence 
continued in one form or another until the signing of the accord on 28th 
February 2008.   
There were also a number of different aspects to the violence ranging from the 
aim of expelling certain communities from areas including Uasin Gishu to the 
so-called “revenge attacks” at Nakuru and Naivasha to even up the score.  It 
should be said on this point that these attacks were not only unlawful and 
criminal acts on defenceless men, women and children, but they did not in fact 
target the actual perpetrators of the original violence. 
It should also be remembered that a number of police officers and provincial 
administrators lost their lives during this period some in the process of saving 
lives and/or keeping the peace345.   
It is against this backdrop that the following analysis was made. 
Use of Force 
Overall the Commission determined that a total of 1133 people died during the 
PEV period of whom 1048 were male, 74 female, 11 children; 119 remain 
unidentified.  Of these 405 died from gunshot wounds.  In addition 3,561 
citizens sought medical treatment (many admitted to hospitals) and of these 557 







Whilst the Commission acknowledges the possibility that some of those killed 
and wounded by gunshots may have been the victims of people other than the 
Police, no evidence to this effect was received.  
It is also accepted that in fact these figures may not fully reflect totals of people 
killed (some may have been buried without the knowledge of officials) and the 
Commission heard from many witnesses that due to the PEV itself (road blocks, 
no available transport and too dangerous) that many people could not travel to 
medical facilities for treatment. 
Both peaceful demonstrations and uncontrolled riots were significant events 
throughout the country and are relevant to the Commission’s work for a number 
of reasons. They address the issues of the lawful rights of individuals to protest 
and the police interaction with peaceful demonstrators and their use of force. It 
also addresses the issue of police resources and their inability to protect the 
public.  
The Commission investigations included an examination of several cases 
involving both police related shooting and cases involving citizen against citizen.   
It also examined the issue of the indiscriminate firing of live rounds of 
ammunition into peaceful crowds and in riot situations.   
On many occasions when the police intervened, they resorted to lobbing tear gas 
and shooting into the air. Police themselves must have observed that this use of 
force saw limited success. Many witnesses to these events have confirmed that 
the police actions only dispersed crowds momentarily. The youth would simply 
regroup and attack others with impunity. Some witnesses described this police 
tactic as a game of hide and seek between the police and the gangs. 
The evidence received included cases where there were good witness accounts 
and where police units or senior officers involved could be identified.  On many 
occasions however further investigations will be necessary to identify officers 




Of all the incidents of state agency responses none was more reported upon or 
roundly condemned by commentators and observers alike than that which 
occurred in Kisumu.346  Despite evidence being provided by the former PPO to 
the contrary347 the OCPD Kisumu, SSP Kiragu stated that the violence starting 
on 28 December 2007 came as a complete surprise to the police.348  On this 
occasion police used tear gas to disperse a large crowd who had stormed the 
Provincial Works Offices, destroying much property. 
However after unsuccessfully attempting to disperse even larger crowds the 
following day in the process of more significant acts of looting and property 
destruction, a decision was taken to use live ammunition.349  Reinforced by both 
the GSU and Administration Police (Rapid Deployment Unit) further police action 
aimed at protecting the CBD was taken on 30 December.  During that day 25 
rioters were shot dead by police. 
Further violence continued throughout until early February 2008 and when the 
violence finally subsided Police reported killing a total of 48 people through the 
use of firearms.  This figure was revised by the hospital pathologist whose 
evidence was that there were in fact 50 people who died of gunshot wounds out 
of a total of 56 bodies examined. 
The Commission was provided with armoury records relating to the issue of 
firearms and ammunition to police officers in Nyanza during this period.  An 
analysis of these records showed that significant amounts of ammunition and 
tear gas were expended, some officers used far more ammunition than others, 
only one set of records recorded the issue and use of blanks (although these 
particular records appeared to be a reproduction where all entries were written 









ammunition expended.  These records, and others, will form the basis of further 
investigations into the use of force by SSAs.350 
The Commission heard from the Ministry of Medical Services that a total of 111 
people died in Nyanza during the PEV period.  Made up of 101 males, 9 females 
and one unidentified person the telling factor in causes of death were the 89 
(80%) who died from gunshot wounds.  In addition a total of 214 people were 
admitted to various hospitals throughout the province, of whom 48 had gunshot 
wounds. 
One of the prime difficulties the police had in defending their use of lethal force 
in these circumstances became evident through questions asked by the 
Commissioners.  In response to specific questions, the OCPD Kisumu clearly 
stated that unless there was a clear and present danger to life and/or property, 
then the use of lethal force was not justified351.  He further testified that police 
should not use teargas or firearms when citizens were running away from the 
police.  “No my lordship, once they have run away we have achieved the objective 
of dispersing them.”  
This being the case it is difficult to rationalise the use of live bullets (or tear gas) 
on retreating crowds.   
Evidence from the pathologist Dr Odour352 revealed that of the 50 people shot by 
police in Kisumu 30 were shot from behind and a further 9 from the side.  In 
addition 3 of the deceased were under the age of 14 years (one a 10 year old girl) 
and 3 were female.  One of the children, a 12 year old boy, was shot twice in the 
back.  Further a 45 year old woman was shot and killed whilst in her home just 
outside the CBD. 
The Commission could find no legal or operational basis for justifying the 
shooting of civilians from behind at any time given the circumstances presented 








circumstances indicating further indiscriminate use of firearms by the police in 
terms of people who were shot and injured. 
One witness Mr Gregory Ngoche353, a 53 year old volunteer social worker was 
sitting at his home in Kisumu at about 9am on 17 January 2008 with his 
mother and children.  He heard shouting and saw youths throwing stones at 
police.  The police were using bullets and he was hit by what is thought to be a 
stray bullet in the lower stomach and he was hospitalised for several days.  He 
said that there were bullets flying everywhere and even hitting the trees.  Mr 
Ngoche, who was paralysed in the right leg at a young age, was more than 200 
metres from the police when he was hit and now suffers from sexual 
dysfunction.  He and his family remain fearful living in their neighbourhood as a 
result of the police activity. 
A further witness Ms Alice Atieno354, a former security officer arrived home in 
Manyatta Estate, Kisumu town at about 6pm on 28 December 2007 from her 
work.   Her six year old son was playing outside nearby when she saw youths 
breaking into a nearby shop.  On hearing gunfire she gathered up her son and 
as they neared their house she was shot through the back of the head.  The 
witness regained consciousness nearly two weeks later in hospital.  She is 
unable to eat solid food, cannot now work, or afford to pay for an operation that 
would remedy much of her disability. 
Mr John Apiyo355 an Askari for the Kisumu Municipal Council testified that 
whilst working at the Kibuye wholesale market at about 11am on 6 January 
2008 some people decided to torch a building near his duty station.  A lorry full 
of armed GSU officers arrived and they ran towards the stall owners who wanted 
to torch the building.  As the GSU ran past his duty station firing their guns they 
told him to, “Close that gate quickly” but while he was complying he was shot in 
the back of the legs and his private parts were damaged.  He was admitted to 








The OCPD of Homa Bay, Jimmy J. Mnene declared that in his division rioting 
took place from 29th December 2007 and lasted a few days.356  However despite 
telling the Commission that he, “had to restrain my officers from shooting at 
people...” and “briefed the staff on each occasion not to use live ammunition, to use 
tear gas,” the only 3 deaths recorded in the area died as a result of gunshot 
wounds.  He also told the Commission that his staff were only issued with live 
rounds and not blanks or rubber bullets. 
The former OCS of the combined Migori/Rongo police divisions, Edward 
Maghanga Mwamburi357 told the Commission that he did not anticipate violence 
of the nature that unfolded although he prepared officers in riot training and 
used written materials in training activities.   
In preparation he deployed static guards at vital installations and had standby 
riot parties at each of the police stations. He further said in addition to the 11 
civilians who were shot by police during the PEV, a 54 year old APC was killed 
on duty and four others injured.  It is not known if post mortems were 
conducted on all the deceased as he indicated that most of the bodies were 
collected from the mortuaries and buried without the knowledge of the Police. 
The Commission found that Western Province was virtually forgotten in terms of 
Kenyans’ understanding of the level of violence that occurred.  Although there 
were no reports of rape, sodomy or forced circumcision from the health facilities, 
areas that bore the brunt of the violence included Mumias, Vihiga, Kakamega 
and Webuye.  The Commission learned that no specific investigations had been 
commenced into police action. 
 
Events unfolding in and around the general elections of 2007 saw the majority of 
casualties caused by the Police.  With PEV starting in Mumias District on 27th 







98 people lost their lives with a further 129 people being treated in hospitals and 
medical centres. 
Of those who were killed no less than three quarters (74) were found to have died 
as a result of gunshot wounds.  Dr Onudi, Deputy Director of Medical services 
and Provincial Medical Officer, Western Province provided data showing that in 
some facilities, the dead were almost exclusively the result of gunshots.358 
In Kakamega 26 of 31, Mumias all 11 of 12, Busia 8 of 9, Bungoma all 7, Vihiga 
15 of 18 deaths occurred as a result of gunshots.  Only the Webuye district 
hospital reported a different result with 7 of 21 deaths due to this cause. 
In addition many victims of gunshots were treated in medical facilities.  The 
pattern of injuries and their causes were similar in that virtually all injuries in 
Kakamega, Mumias and Vihiga were caused by gunshots.  
Whilst these post mortem results were not examined by Commission 
investigators to determine how these victims were shot it is inconceivable that 
there would be sufficient justification for police to shoot dead so many people. 
The Commission received aggregated data from the PS of the Ministry of Medical 
Services, Dr. Hezron O. Nyangito in mid August 2008.  He stated that in the Rift 
Valley a total of 779359 people died of which 170 were as a result of gunshot 
wounds.  The gunshot deaths amounted to a staggering 31% of the total deaths 
that occurred and a careful analysis of the manner in which these people died 
needs to be undertaken.  The report also indicated that “the leading causes of 
injury; - were gunshots...”  In the Rift Valley this amounted to 189 of a total of 
1324 – some 14.3%.  A closer analysis of those admitted and/or treated at 
medical facilities also needs to be undertaken so that a complete picture of 









It is clear that not all deaths and injury patterns were the same across the 
Province.  For example in Trans Nzoia West/East, Dr PK Too,360 the District 
Medical Officer of Health Trans Nzoia West District gave evidence to the effect 
that a total of 105 people were killed in the two districts.  Of these a total of 83 
died of gunshot wounds – almost 80%.  Whilst these victims were located all over 
the area some places suffered much more than others including; Matunda, 
Cherangany, Gitwamba, Kalaa and Munyaka.  
As with other areas where many people were shot to death, closer and more 
exhaustive investigations are required to determine the reason and establish the 
operational utility of shooting victims by police and/or culpability where this is 
established by the facts. 
Eldoret was also the site of the Police GSU action at the Moi Teaching and 
Referral Hospital that resulted in injuries to some hospital employees and 
medical staff. This illustrates the way in which police used indiscriminate and 
excessive force against innocent citizens. From the evidence of the Chief Security 
Officer and one of his security supervisors361 it was reported that the police 
where ‘chasing’ a gang of youth through the streets who headed in the general 
direction of the hospital. Despite assurances by hospital security staff that none 
of the youths had entered the compound, police resorted to the use of live 
rounds and tear gas in what was a heavily populated operational hospital 
environment. This amounted to a serious case of responding dangerously 
without sufficient consideration for the safety of hospital staff, patients and 
others in the immediate area.    
 
The violence in the Coast erupted on the evening of 30th December 2007 and 
continued until the 1 January 2008.  During this time 5 people were shot and 







citizens Commission investigations nevertheless uncovered some disturbing 
evidence. 
Dr. Anderson Kahindi, Provincial Director of Public Health and Deputy Director 
of Medical Services/Coast, produced evidence to the effect that out of the 5 
people shot dead during this period four, including a woman, were shot in the 
back.  In addition to this information he also tendered evidence to the effect that 
of the 22 patients admitted to hospital during the period where PEV was 
occurring, 12 suffered gunshot wounds.362 
The Commission heard from the police that in respect of these casualties, 
inquest files were opened in respect of the five deaths, as well as 20 others, but 
there is no apparent follow up action being taken in respect of those wounded by 
gunshots. 
The Commission heard from two further witnesses in respect of the shootings.  
The first, 56 year old Rose Gathoni Mathenge told the Commission that after the 
election results were announced on 30 December 2007 she and her husband 
were at home when they saw people passing nearby with looted goods.  Her 
husband left the house at about 8pm and when she could not raise him on the 
mobile phone a short time later went out to look for him.  Someone answered his 
phone when she called saying he had been shot by the police.  He was lying dead 
a short distance away with bullet wounds.363  The witness told the Commission 
that, “No one else was shot during that period,” and “The Police admitted later 
that they shot him as he was looting.”364  She said that this would not be possible 
due to the short time he was away and there was no evidence of looting near the 
body. 
The second witness, Alistair Msusa Mbotela365, told the Commission that he was 
at home with his wife and two children on the night of 31 December 2007.  









people running away from Mla Leo with looted items.  They were running in the 
direction of his house and away from the police so they turned to go back into 
the house.  He further said, “We heard a gunshot and as we turned to go to the 
main door of our house my wife said that she had been hurt and she then took 
two steps and fell on the floor as I was holding her.  I saw blood on my hands 
and started calling for help.”  “We took her to Jocham Hospital but she was 
pronounced dead on arrival.”366   
The witness reported the matter to the police and made several follow up 
enquiries.  He told the Commission, “The attitude of the Police has been most 
distressing.  There has been little or no progress in the attempt to identify my 
wife’s killer and bring them to book.” 
Police actions in respect of the use of lethal force in Mombasa replicate those in 
other parts of the country.  Similarities including victims shot from behind, 
victims shot whilst in and around their own homes and the rationale for using 
lethal force at all in the circumstances require a close and thorough investigation 
by specialists who are independent of the police.  
In Nairobi the Commission learned that there were a total of 125 who lost their 
lives during the clashes 23 of whom died from gunshot wounds.  A further 342 
victims were admitted to hospital during the period, 61 with gunshot wounds.367 
In addition many denigrated the apparent heavy handed approach the Police 
took to dealing with demonstrations and what the police called riots, especially 
in the informal housing areas (slums) such as Kibera and Mathare.368 
Commission investigations identified the extensive use of tear gas and firearms 
in support of what appeared to be a tactic to keep citizens inside these informal 
settlement areas.  It also served to ensure that there were no demonstrations of 











The Commission was particularly disappointed with the lack of investigative 
work by the police even when provided with strong evidence identifying 
offenders.  Witnesses told the Commission that, “many (complainants) identified 
the looters by name and address and gave definitive information to the police 
about the whereabouts of their property.  In some cases police just told 
complainants that they should be grateful that they are alive and forget what 
happened.”369 
These sentiments were repeated to the Commission and its investigators all over 
the country.   
Even in accepting the pressures facing the Police during this period, the quality 
of investigative work as well as the quantity of it left much to be desired.  The 
Commission heard on a number of occasions that no investigation would be 
undertaken unless there was a complaint.  This is particularly true in relation to 
property offences and deaths by shooting.  Even where there was clear evidence 
that a serious crime had taken place (as in the case of a building being burnt 
down) or where the circumstances demand a quality investigative effort (as in the 
case of a child being shot twice in the back) little or no follow up was evident. 
An examination of some inquest files revealed that at best a superficial 
investigative effort was undertaken.370  Standard investigative work such as a 
timely scene examination, gathering and submitting evidence secured during the 
examination, interviewing potential witnesses from the area and pursuing lines 
of inquiry to identify some of the likely suspects (marauding youth) were not 
completed.371  On at least one occasion the investigation file was returned to the 








Other examples demonstrating the need to strengthen investigations work were 
provided by victims themselves.  The two case studies reported in appendices “C” 
and “D” clearly indicate reluctance to follow-up on high level criminal offending 
to the standard expected of a functioning police agency. 
The Commission also learned that the investigation files relating to homicides 
double as an inquest file.  There is no separation of role and accountability for 
dealing with what are quite different aspects of these incidents.  In dealing with 
arrangements relating to the actual death as well as a high level investigation 
and the need to work closely with the DPP in establishing evidential thresholds, 
the Police have found themselves managing a challenging environment that may 
well have the effect of detracting from their main focus. 
Some of the issues relating to investigative capability were highlighted by the 
Attorney General, Mr Amos Wako372 who testified that, “On 21st June 2008, I 
appointed a joint team of senior officers from the department of Public Prosecutions 
in the State Law Office and the Police Department to review all cases on a case by 
case basis related to post-election violence including the following categories;  
Cases of persons charged and are in remand; cases of persons charged but are 
out on bail, cases pending arrest of known persons, cases of persons in police 
custody but are not yet charged.  The joint team is to determine and make 
recommendations to the Attorney General through the Director of Public 
Prosecutions on the basis of sufficiency of evidence whether the case should 
proceed to full trial, be withdrawn or otherwise terminated. The team is yet to 
complete its task.” 
The Commission has since noted reports in the media that some alleged 
offenders were released as a result of this examination and direction. 
The Attorney General also alluded to some issues facing investigators that 
mitigate quality investigative work.  He said in relation to the PEV, “Most of the 






located for recording of their statements [and that] some of those located have 
been reluctant to record statements, reluctant to participate in identification 
parades, unwilling to appear in court and give evidence for fear of reprisals.”    
Relating to investigations into a former Commission’s recommendations373 
he commented that there were, genuine difficulties in investigating and 
getting witnesses because of their fear of reprisals within the context of the 
ethnic clashes, a lack of capacity and resources on the part of the 
investigating authorities and self censorships or fear on the part of the 
investigators who are susceptible to pressure and manipulation. 
These issues were also raised independently by two other senior public officials 
especially in respect of investigating individuals who could influence an 
investigator’s work prospects or pose a personal threat.374 
The Attorney General also told the Commission, “As of now we are awaiting 
investigations. As of now we are awaiting the results of the Commission of Inquiry 
into all these issues because it comes within the mandate of this Commission of 
Inquiry to identify the perpetrators. But what you can rest assured that as the 
Attorney General we shall take the recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry 
together with any other investigations that have been carried out very seriously 
and if, my position is that if the offences are disclosed against any person, I'll 
prosecute.”  
 
Criminal Conduct (by police) including killings and SGBV 
In addition to the instances of excessive force used by the Police, there was 
credible evidence of criminal behaviour.  Instances ranged from murder to gang 








Commission investigators obtained information that one police officer (from the 
Rift Valley Province) was responsible for fatally shooting citizens, said to be at 
least five and possibly more, during the unrest following the election at the end 
of 2007.375  Further information was received by the Commission to the effect 
that another innocent citizen was shot in the back and is now paralysed as a 
result.  Following information received from ‘M’ above investigators spoke to one 
of the victims who confirmed the information outlined.376   Testimony also was 
received by the Commission in relation to this event from Professor Anyang’ 
Nyong’o.377  
Similar information was obtained by Commission investigators relating to an 
Administration Police officer in Nairobi.  This officer, who is known to many 
witnesses, allegedly shot a number of citizens on 30th and 31st December 2007 
many of whom were killed.  More examples were related to investigators. 
In the course of investigations, allegations were heard that Police committed acts 
of sexual violence.  The Commission’s investigators interviewed eight women 
whose evidence was that they were raped by Police378.  With one exception, these 
were gang rapes, with women saying they were raped by up to seven men.  In the 
one instance where a victim was raped by only one officer, there was a second 
officer present.   
Of the eight women, five were attacked in their homes, two within their 
neighbourhoods or local environs and one whilst in flight from the violence.  The 
women spoken to were attacked in Nairobi, Eldoret and Kisumu.  Officers were 
variously described as being GSU, Kenya Police and Administration Police.   
Sometimes the victims, on seeing the approach of state security agents, 









protection, only to be over-powered and gang-raped by them.  At least one attack 
by Police was accompanied by theft from the house of the victim (CW17).379  
Some of the officers expressed tribal/political motivation behind the attacks.380  
There was no attempt by the officers to disguise their identities and their 
behaviour implied a disturbing confidence in their impunity for these serious 
criminal acts.  Perhaps this in part arose from the fact that these officers were 
not local men, but it nevertheless portrays an alarming attitude on the part of 
these officers.             
Two female witnesses testified to various incidents of being raped by police 
officers (CWs 98 and 99)381.   One, a 21 year old with 4 children, reported being 
raped by up to 6 police officers at around 10am on 10 February 2008 near the 
Ondiek Highway.  The other, a 32 year old caring for 5 children, reported being 
raped and sexually assaulted by 2 police officers at about 9pm on 4 January 
2008 near USAID estate.  Her friend was also raped by 2 other police officers at 
the same time and was later found dead a kilometre or two from the scene. 
The Commission received depositions from a number of citizens who related 
events concerning the criminal acts of police officers.  Two of these deponents 
recounted an incident at Kabsoit Centre on 1st February 2008 when some GSU 
officers allegedly hacked a man’s hand and then robbed him of a total of Ksh. 
51,000. 
Further evidence was received in statement form382 to the effect that police 
officers failed to stop looting at the Ukwala Format Branch supermarket and 
others stated they would only protect the Ukwala Kenshop Branch if they were 
given KSH10,000 each. 
 









The Commission heard a range of examples of police behaviour that fell into the 
general category of unprofessional behaviour or misconduct.  These ranged from 
dereliction of duty, inconsistent or insensitive support arrangements for victims 
to failing to prevent offending especially property offences. 
Sexual violence appeared not to be a high priority for Police during the PEV and 
arguably this is also the case during more peaceful times.   
  
The testimony of many senior Police who gave evidence at the Commission’s 
hearings was as interesting in what was not said, as to what was said.  Some 
had not included figures relating to sexual violence in their statistics, apparently 
not deeming it important.  Many, when asked, indicated that they had not 
received any (or many) formal reports of Sexual violence:  The Provincial 
Commissioner, Rift Valley told the Commission:  “We have not received any cases 
of sexual assault throughout the one and half months of violence in Rift Valley”. 383  
However it would have been known to anyone living in Kenya at the time of the 
PEV that there were many allegations of sexual violence throughout the country, 
including allegations of Police officers being offenders.  So to merely omit this 
category of offences, or to claim no formal reports of such, seems akin to burying 
ones head in the sand, and does not speak to a strong will to uphold the law as 
it relates to sexual offending. 
It is a universal trend that Police figures in respect of sexual violence are lower 
than hospital figures.  In some places the Commission went, Police reported 
having received no such cases, and yet hospitals and NGOs were busy attending 
to victims of sexual assaults and rapes. 
Nairobi Women’s Hospital (NWH) has submitted its reports, including statistics 






that the Police Commissioner has never questioned the hospital administrators 
about their figures or the vast discrepancy between the two sets of numbers.384   
There was a variable response to sexual violence by Police and investigations 
indicated it was generally well below the standard of what can reasonably be 
expected. 
A number of victims described a dismissive response when they reported to 
Police.  Some victims were met with what could be described as an 
ineffectual/unresponsive policing effort (a Mathare victim of rape who reported to 
Police several weeks later did not have her complaint accepted, with the officer 
telling her - how was he to know if her allegation was true, given she had not 
attended a hospital on account of her rape). 385  
Still other responses could be characterized as cruel and indicative of a callous 
disregard for human safety (a Mathare victim of gang rape who presented 
bleeding and requesting help for her critically injured husband was waved away 
by Police who simply told her to run for her life).386      
From victims spoken to who had reported, or attempted to report to Police, it was 
noted that many were arbitrarily discouraged or dismissed by Police if the victim 
could not immediately identify by name the perpetrator. 
In a number of cases, victims who had gone to Police to make statements about 
serious crimes were turned away without so much as an OB (Occurrence Book) 
number.  The victim’s ability to name the offender should never be a prerequisite 
to the reporting and recording of a crime.  It calls into question many aspects of 
the Police operation, including the training of frontline officers, the quality and 
capacity of criminal investigation, commitment to addressing sexual violence and 








Many of these responses were given in the midst of the worst of the chaos and 
occurred at a time when Police were struggling to control an anarchic situation 
with multiple threats to life and property.  However the Commission’s 
investigators are not aware of any significant attempts by Police in the 
intervening, more peaceful period to follow up and investigate the serious 
offences  which they must surely know took place and to which their initial 
response was inadequate.     
It was predictable, and borne out by the work of the Commission’s investigators, 
that when women suffered sexual violence and brutality at the hands of Police, 
they were unlikely to go to that same institution to lay complaints.  However, one 
did attempt to make a report to Kilimani Police of being raped by an officer:  
 “I told them that my house had been burned down and a policeman had 
raped me.  They asked me whether I knew the police who had raped me.  
I told them I did not.  They told me to choose between the two either the 
issue of my house being burned or being raped” 
“ I went back home and later went back, I reported and wrote statement 
that my house had been burned but I left out that I had been raped.... 
They told me I was to blame for the rape and I should look into the issue 
about house.” (CW18) 387 
 
However formal, first-hand complaints to Police are not the only way in which 
the commission of crime comes to the notice of Police.  When Police became 
aware of allegations of these crimes, it would be expected that they would want 
to solicit these complaints and thoroughly investigate them.  Police would have 
been aware of the allegations at the time of the PEV through the work of NGOs 
and media.  In the course of this Commission, the allegations were once again 
put before the public and Police.   
If Police do not act decisively in the face of allegations against their own, then 
any progress or credibility they have managed to achieve in this area of sexual 






developed in the Police when their own people stand accused of such things and 
the matters are not investigated comprehensively and transparently.         
There was a report of women victims being taken into a Police station and cared 
for by the female Police officers.  However despite this compassionate response to 
the plight of the women, no statement was taken from the victims or 
investigation commenced.388        
There were indications that, at least in some places, improvements had been 
made to the manner in which complaints of sexual violence were received.  Some 
of this derived from those primary agencies (often medical) most often dealing 
with victims embarking on some liaison/training with Police.  Nairobi Women’s 
Hospital was one agency which reported such developments.389   On another 
positive note, Nairobi Women’s Hospital CEO Dr Thenya pointed out that many 
of the victims (over 100) were actually brought to the hospital by Police.   
However it seemed that it was only in the week or two prior to Dr Thenya’s 
testimony before the Commission on 15th July 2008 that Police had attended the 
hospital seeking medical records.  This raises questions in regard to the Police 
response to the many cases of sexual violence which they knew, from first-hand 
involvement, had taken place, and yet appeared to take little interest in following 
up.  From evidence given at the public hearings, the number of active or 
completed/successful prosecutions in respect of sexual crimes is few.  
 Some Police stations have established gender desks at which sexual crimes can 
be reported.  While this is a step in the right direction, the effort needs to be 
extended so that all Police officers (not just those manning the gender desk) 
should be aware of the particular needs and rights of victims at the time they 
present to Police.      
And the presence of a gender desk at a Police station is in itself no guarantee of 







centre described incidences where women presented to Police stations with their 
medical report in order to make a complaint, only to have a Police officer peruse 
the report and pronounce that there was no evidence of rape and thereby 
dismiss the complaints as baseless.   
Common themes seemed to be if the report contained evidence that the sexual 
offence did not comprise the first sexual experience for the victim – or if there 
were no lacerations (to the genital area) – or there was no evidence of presence of 
sperm reported (from swabs taken from the victim).390  Clearly the medical report 
is but one piece of evidence to be considered and to dismiss victims in the way 
described represents poor police practice and is unacceptable.    
Also, of course, reporting of sexual violence is only one step of the process.  
There needs to be a strong investigative response which follows and there was 
little evidence of this approach being taken during the PEV. 
One NGO assisting victims of sexual violence told the Commission, “The 
survivors felt that the police officers abdicated their role by taking sides during the 
post election violence and failed to protect them or record their statements when 
they reported the matters.”391 
It would have been ideal for the Police to engage in some proactive strategies 
aimed at the awareness and prevention of sexual violence and to increase the 
efficacy of their response to it.  To do this prior to the violence breaking out 
would have required a degree of foresight, receipt of criminal intelligence and 
planning.  However when the first violence broke out in some areas shortly after 
the elections, there may have been the opportunity to be proactive in other 
areas, with the thought that people in those areas may face similar risks.  It 
could also have been apprehended that as IDP camps were established, there 
would be a risk of SGBV in those places and gender-sensitive Police posts and 
other strategies established there may have served both proactive and reactive 








As long as a substantial percentage of sexual violence remains underground, it 
will be a crime which is not properly addressed and its incidence cannot be 
expected to decrease.   The higher the confidence the public has in the Police, 
the more likely it will be that these crimes will be reported and dealt with 
effectively.   
Many of the issues identified above were not reported to the police and victims 
variously described their reasons as fear of the police, especially as they were the 
perpetrators, and a sense that nothing would be done in any event. 
There appears to be good reasons for victims holding these fears.  Police 
informed the Commission that apart from the ubiquitous inquest files, no 
internal investigations into the conduct of police officers were being undertaken 
or contemplated.392  In addition no complaints of rape were recorded by the 
police during the period. 
Commission witnesses gave evidence to the effect that the Police in and around 
Mombasa did not take preventive or remedial action against thieves and looters.  
One witness, Titus Tommy Gichangi Lucas393, a businessman told of his three 
businesses being looted between the 30th December 2007 and 1st of January 
2008.  Informed by neighbours about the burglaries and looting, the witness 
called Changamwe, Nyali and Likoni Police respectively reporting the crimes.  He 
was variously informed that the police, “already sent police officers to the area 
and that there was nothing to worry about.”  “....their officers were on the 
ground.” And “....that all officers were out quelling riots.” 
However all the witness’s property was looted and despite providing police with a 
video and photographs clearly showing numerous offenders looting, only one has 








Commission witnesses heard in camera supported the premise that the police 
failed in their duty to protect property (CW 150 & CW 151)394.  They informed the 
Commission that the Police “were indifferent to the loss of property and 
wealth...as they told looters to take what they wanted but not to harm anybody.”  
They said that this message was a consistent theme all over Mombasa to the 
extent that it must have been a police strategy in dealing with the violence.   
Unfortunately this approach had unintended consequences as, “the failure of 
police to take serious action only led to larger numbers taking part in the looting.  
Word obviously spread that the police had taken an indifferent approach to the 
chaos.  We ourselves witnessed women stealing household goods from their 
neighbours’ homes in Mikindani as the police stood by and joked about it.”  “It 
was only on January 2nd with the arrival of the GSU that the looting subsided, but 
by then all of the properties of Kikuyus and Kambas had been looted.”395 
Communities used their own strategies to prevent further looting and violence 
including creating vigilante groups and spreading the rumour that, “Mungiki had 
arrived in town on a revenge mission.” 
 
Outside influence on police decisions 
The Commission received evidence that on a number of occasions the decision 
making and behaviour of senior police officers was influenced by factors outside 
the formal operating arrangements, chain of command and in direct conflict with 
mandated duties.   
Perhaps the most graphic example was depicted in evidence gained by 
Commission investigations of actions taken by the Administration Police a few 
days before polling day.  The evidence is that around the 23rd of December a 
large number of officers,  about 1600, were assembled at the Administration 







political party during elections polling. The training was conducted by a senior 
academic, and high ranking government officials including the hierarchy of the 
Administration Police.  These officers were deployed on the 24th December 2008 
to Luo-Nyanza.  Ostensibly their role was to disrupt polling and where possible 
ensure that government supporters amongst the candidates and voters 
prevailed.396   
All officers deployed were dressed in plain clothes, easily identified as they were 
not from the local community and travelled in large groups by more than 30 
chartered buses.397  In addition they received Kshs. 21,000 each for their duties. 
The entire exercise was called off a day or so later after some officers were killed 
and many more injured by citizens.398  Some senior officers from the districts 
called upon the senior command of Administration Police to cancel the 
enterprise as they could see there being more serious loss of life if it was allowed 
to continue.   
Amb. Francis K. Muthaura, PS Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Public 
Service, told the Commission that this deployment was approved by the 
Government and was commissioned for security reasons.399  He also stated that, 
“The reason for sending those people under plainclothes is that the area was very 
unfriendly.” The explanation failed to resonate with Commissioners given that 
there was little or no security issue in Nyanza at the time (or certainly no worse 
than anywhere else), the exercise was clandestine in appearance and execution 
and fell outside the overall elections security command and control 
arrangements led by the Commissioner of Police. 
A further concern to the Commission were reports of instructions from as high 












97).400  These instructions arose on at least two occasions in Nyanza province.  
One related to the arrests of criminal gang members including Chinkororo, and 
Sungusungu who were intimidating citizens who intended to vote for a particular 
candidate or not to vote at all. After some arrests the Commissioner of Police 
gave instructions for them to be released.  It is assumed that this directive was 
due to the fact that a senior politician was purported to be behind the 
Chinkororo. 
On another occasion just after the violence broke out in Kisumu the Hon. 
Shakeel Shabir and the Hon. Olago Aluoch were leading a procession around 
Kondele without serving any notice to the authorities and they were arrested and 
taken to the Central Police station.  The Commissioner of Police was informed 
but after two hours he instructed the local police to release the politicians and 
the incident was not pursued further. 
Further examples of interference by senior police were provided by a witness (CW 
80) who provided written testimony describing two serious incidents.401 
Incident #1 
On 28th November, 2007 the O.C.S. Tambach Police Station C.I Paul Karani 
received information from members of the public that there was a motor 
vehicle Reg. No.KAX 361X Toyota RV4 which was distributing hate 
campaign literature along Iten-Kabarnet road.  The O.C.S. mobilized his 
officers who later managed to intercept the motor which had the following 
occupants:- 
• No. 970069003 AP Cpl. Patrick Ndatho of Harambee House Nairobi 
who also had with him a ceska pistol S/No. 59608 with twelve rounds of 
ammunition. 
• No. 2001005150 P.C. Kinyua Muriethi also of Harambee House 
Nairobi who had a ceska pistol S/No. 9338 with twelve rounds of 
ammunition. 
• Duncan Njagi Ndwiga of cell phone No. 0722-885876 – Businessman 
Kasarani. 








The detained motor vehicle was subsequently searched and the officers 
managed to recover several bundles of hate literature in the form of posters. 
The posters showed drawings of Hon. Raila armed with a pistol and 
hanging retired President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi. Next on the hanging line 
were Ruto, Philip, Cheserem, Kosgei, Gedion, Kulei, Sumbeiyo, Biwott and 
Mark Too. The posters had also the following information written on them in 
both Kalenjin and English languages. 
• “ Tetutiet Weo nebo Arap Mibei ( Raila) en Biik at Kutt” 
• “Kyojilil Kenyit ab tomonwok sisit ak aeng ( 1982), raini kokenamak 
• “On 5th September, 2007, Raila Odinga held a meeting on the 17th 
floor of the J. Edgar Hoover building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue. NW, 
Washington DC. In the meeting, which was taped by the FBI, Raila told 
American Officers that he would finish former President Moi, Ruto and other 
Kalenjins who had ruined Kenya as soon as he becomes President. The 
tapes are available. 
 
In view of the seriousness of the matter and the public anxiety it generated, 
the then P.P.O. Rift Valley Mr. Everett Wasige directed that the motor vehicle 
and all its occupants be immediately transferred to his Provincial 
Headquarters Nakuru for further investigations. 
In response to a request for information relating to this incident the Commission 
received written advice from SSP F.M. Mwei of the Administration Police on 11 
September 2008 saying, “The Department is not aware of the APs arrested in 
connection with the alleged act said to have been committed in November last 
year.” 
 
This response combined with the testimony received from a further witness 
tended to confirm this interference.402  This witness stated that these two 
incidents (#1 and #2) were both reported to the Commissioner and that even if 
the offenders were released at the time due to the volatility of the situation, 
investigations should still have continued.  The Commission was not provided 








On the 22nd day of November, 2008 police officers from Naivasha Police 
Station were manning Naivasha road block at Karai when they received 
information that there was motor vehicle Reg. No. GK A545H white in colour 
plying from Nairobi to Western Kenya and suspected to be ferrying some 
crude weapons. At around 6.15 a.m, the said vehicle appeared from Nairobi 
direction and was subsequently stopped by the officers. The vehicle had 
three occupants who identified themselves as (1) Dick Nyaga Kivuti, a driver 
with the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, (2) Livingstone Taabu Were, an 
official driver to former Assistant Minister of Water and Irrigation Hon 
Raphael Wanjala and (3) Fredrick Egesa Wasike a personal driver of the 
Assistant Minister. The Vehicle itself belonged to the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation and was the official vehicle for the Assistant Minister. 
 
The police officers conducted a search in the motor vehicle and managed to 
recover the following crude weapons; 
• Sixty (60) pieces of maasai rungus 
• Forty (40) pieces of Arrows 
• Three (3) pieces of bows 
• Two (2) pieces of arrow sheath 
• Fifty nine (59) pieces of maasai swords 
• Eight (8) pieces of small maasai swords 
• Two hundred and seven (207) pieces of whips (Nyahunyo) 
 
The vehicle and the exhibits together with the occupants were later escorted 
to Naivasha Police Station for further investigations. Mr. Maurice Amatta a 
S/ACP of CID Headquarters Nairobi later took over the conduct of matter. 
 
A further curious situation relating to the Police and the election process was 
discovered by the Commission when it examined the Coast Province plan for 
policing the elections.  Entitled “Presentation on the 2007 General Election 
Operation within Coast Province” the document included the following special 
tasking:  
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• Task – to receive results of Presidential parliamentary and civic 
candidates from all districts and compile them and forward them to 
Police Headquarters. 
• Limit of exploitation – within the area of deployment. 
• Re-organization – at Provincial headquarters. 
 
It is not clear to the Commission why the police were receiving polling data 
relating to presidential, parliamentary and civic results.  On the face of it the 
material appears to disclose activity that is clearly not within the role or 
responsibility of the Police and has disturbing connotations. 
 
State Security Agencies and Systems Failures   
It should be said that accounting for the exact numbers of people who died and 
were injured during the PEV has been problematic.  Amongst the reasons for 
this include; antiquated and paper-based systems of recording; loose 
arrangements for the receipt, recording and disposal of bodies; methods of 
attributing cause of death to PEV; practical difficulties in getting to medical 
facilities during the hostilities; and the attempts of some to ensure that at least 
some confusion existed in the systems.  This is particularly true of the Rift Valley 
where violence occurred over a greater area, included the most significant 
incidence of citizen to citizen confrontation, and where the facilities were not 
acting as a coordinated whole. 
Examples of these issues abound but there was no more glaring instance than 
the issue of determining accurate figures relating to deaths, injuries and 
instances of SGBV resulting from PEV.  The Commissioner of Police told the 
Commission that the Kenya Police service were the custodian of the facts.  He 






efficacy of these statements has been soundly brought into question as for 
example the Commission has established that a total of 1133 people were killed 
during the PEV when the Commissioner testified that there were 616404.  The 
fact that the Police could only establish that around half of the actual number 
who were killed signifies a major problem in how incidents are recorded and 
published.   
Further the Commissioner provided a table depicting the number of crimes 
committed during the PEV.  When pressed under cross examination as to why 
there was no heading depicting sexual violence he stated that no such incident 
was reported to the Police.  Given the testimony of many victims who stated that 
they in fact tried to report incidents but were discouraged and indications for 
medical facilities to the effect that there were at least 800-900 victims treated 
demonstrates a complete lack of leadership and interest in this insidious crime 
as well as very poor systems indeed. 
The Police were also asked on a number of occasions by the Commission to 
produce figures relating to the PEV including annual crime statistics, copies of 
planning documentation, resource allocation arrangements, personnel records 
showing transfers and the reasons for them, total establishment as well as 
actual numbers of police available for service.  Virtually none of these records 
were produced.  The Commission understands that the Police do not in fact 
develop some of these documents in the first place and there are no systems in 
place to retrieve other data.   
A further example of the inadequacy of some systems relates to the reporting of 
sexual violence.  Commission investigators learned that in Nairobi, there is only 
one Police doctor who has the authority to sign the P3 form necessary for the 
reporting to Police of a sexual assault.  This particular function is one of many 
which this doctor must perform – and so it is no simple matter for a victim to 







the ability to travel to the hospital.  She may be one of 50 victims waiting in line 
for the doctor to attend the location and sign her form, only to find, after waiting 
many hours, that as the 49th victim has her form signed, the doctor’s working 
day is over and she is turned away – either to return and begin the process again 
the next day – or simply give up.   
From enquiries performed at health facilities across the country there did not 
seem to be a consistent approach to the collection, storage and analysis of 
forensic samples from victims.  It is also not usual practice to take samples for 
DNA analysis (and DNA analysis is expensive and its availability in Kenya is 
limited).   These matters obviously have the potential to impact on the success of 
any prosecution.        
Sometimes, victims found there was a fee charged in order to obtain a completed 
P3 form which they needed to make a complaint to Police405.  In some cases this 
cost was prohibitive.  Two of the possible conclusions which could be drawn 
from the fact that Police appeared to take little or no interest in sexual violence 
are that they did not regard it as serious crime and that they placed little 
importance on criminal intelligence.   
Decision-making and systems relating to the appointment and transfer of staff, 
especially senior staff, in and around this period were also brought into 
question.  In the time available to it the Commission learned that at least four 
senior police officers were transferred or retired from their area of responsibility 
during the violence and at the height of operations.406  Although there may well 
have been an operational or organisational imperative for these staff movements 
it is difficult to see their efficacy given the timing. 
Testimony was also received from Professor Anyang Nyongo’ to the effect that 
“there were massive transfers of Police and APs, to especially ODM strongholds, 







manipulations and to violently suppress and attendant protests.”407  The 
Commission was not, however, provided with any supporting evidence by this 
witness nor did its own investigations reveal evidence of such transfers. 
The pressure on Police resources was not helped by the requirement (the 
Commission was unable to establish by whom) that at least two police officers be 
stationed at each polling station.  The Commission learned that indeed many 
more officers were so deployed placing even more pressure on tactical options 
available to the Police during the PEV.408 
While the duration of this deployment was unclear doubtless it contributed to 
difficulties in the quick transfer of staff to pressure points (especially in the 
absence of contingency plans) with the result that many officers spent long 
hours on duty in some areas.  NSIS reports indicated that in Nairobi some 
officers were down on morale due to lack of replacements. 
Evidence was adduced to the effect that the Kenya Police Service has the overall 
responsibility and accountability for dealing with all deaths occurring from 
sudden, violent or unnatural causes from start to finish.  The mortuaries, 
pathologists, the Ministry of Health Services and other agencies merely provide 
assistance throughout the process.  The Police determine interim cause of death, 
delivery bodies to the mortuary, sign the body in, initiate the inquest process, 
and investigate the circumstances of the death. 
This process can be problematic for two main reasons.  Firstly, the absence of a 
fully independent process impacts upon the transparency and professionalism 
that is required in finding not only the causes of such deaths but also ways to 
reduce or ameliorate them.  Second the establishment of an independent 
Coronial service would free up police resources and reduce the burden of an 
important area of accountability. 








With investigations of this nature where reviewing activity and behaviours 
reveals weaknesses in many systems and personal culpability in some cases it is 
easy to overlook and/or dismiss interventions that were positive. 
The Commission received evidence and heard of many instances where security 
agencies and individual officers responded well to citizens in need.  These 
responses included (but were not restricted to) performing rescue operations 
where families and individuals were in danger of personal harm, providing a 
temporary refuge in/near police stations and administration premises, providing 
security for IDPs and others, demonstrating leadership in attempting to quell 
violence and in some cases, giving their lives for others. 
The Commission received testimony409 that on the morning of the 30th December 
2007 after three houses had been set ablaze at Lelmolok farm in the Kesses 
Division the District Officer, Mr. Benedict Odhiambo Omollo, “held a meeting 
with local communities in a effort to bring the tension down.  He proposed for the 
Kikuyu community to elect 10 elders and the Kalenjin community to also elect the 
same number, who would work together to help reconcile the communities.  The 
proposed meeting was to take place the following day at the Kesses DO’s office. 
This was never to be because at around 6pm on the 30th December 2007, Kalenjin 
youths attacked Kikuyu homesteads, looted and burnt the houses.”  Following 
these attacks as many as 1200 people sought refuge at the DO’s office 
compound where security was provided.  Unfortunately DO Omollo was killed on 
the afternoon of 1st January 2008 while on patrol with other officers.410  This 
occurred in the Cheptiret area when the patrol came across an illegal roadblock 
where it was attacked by youths using poisoned arrows, pangas, axes and 
stones.  The DO and AP C.I. Elias Wafula Wakhungu died whilst others on the 
patrol were injured.  Despite this situation, the IDPs at the DO’s compound, who 
were continually threatened and often surrounded by Kalenjin youth, were 







 The Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province told the Commission that a 
leaders’ meeting was held at the Provincial Headquarters Board room to design 
peace and reconciliation measures.  The attendees included the PPO, Chief 
Kadhi, Bishop of the Anglican Church, Chairman of the Hindu Council, and PC.  
Amongst other things they used five local FM radio stations appealing for calm, 
and held a series of peace meetings on many estates.  Given that the meeting 
was only held on the 2nd January 2008 the Commission considered that 
although this was a good initiative such interventions would have been more 
effective had they been introduced well before the elections.  This was 
acknowledged by the PPO.411 
One hospital clinician from Nyanza reported a good working relationship with 
the local Police station whereby she worked in concert with Police officers 
whether cases were reported directly to the hospital or initially to police.  She 
noted that when female Police officers from the local station were not available to 
deal with women victims, officers at the station would make efforts to get a 
Policewoman from the central Police station to assist.412  Effective responses to 
sexual violence require liaison between Police, medical and judicial services – 
both “on the ground” and at the highest level to establish efficacious processes 
which are consistently applied across the country.     
 
Reviewing performance 
During the seven months since hostilities ceased, SSAs have in the main, been 
slow and/or resistant to reviewing their performance.  The testimony of the 
Commissioner of Police413 for example clearly indicated that an operational 
review of the Police had yet to be completed, “yes it is still going on my Lord.  
You must bear in mind that what occurred, occurred recently, a few months ago, 









evidence from the PS of the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and 
Internal Security414 was that he relied on his personal oversight saying, “I could 
see what was happening”, and “I was able to make that observation.”    
The Commission was also variously advised by many senior officers in the field 
that reviews were not a formal (or normal) part of business. 
Formal, written de briefing and operational reviews are a critical part of overall 
performance management and developing new and improved ways of providing 
services.  These processes should be a mandated part of every security agency’s 
role, especially following significant operational events such as the PEV.  
This mindset was evident in most officers within the SSAs with the Military and 
NSIS being the exception.  Doubtless this state of affairs underpins the reasons 
why many of the planning arrangements, operating guidelines, standard 
operating procedures and standing orders fall short of the standard required for 
modern security organs. 
 
Findings on Responses to the Post Election Violence 
In determining its findings around the various responses by SSAs the 
Commission focussed primarily upon the delivery of services by the Police.  
Given that it is this organ of the state that has primacy over the delivery of 
security services within Kenya it is not surprising that it is here that much of the 
analysis and assessment is made.  Findings relative to the performance of other 










It is clear that the Police in Kenya face unique challenges in relation to policing 
large demonstrations and protests. The post election period saw numerous 
instances of both spontaneous and organised protests which in some cases 
developed into riots. Some of these demonstrations and protests occurred in 
rural towns and villages while others occurred in some of Africa’s largest urban 
slums. Each situation was unique and required a different policing response.  
Systems, functionality, operational and tactical option taking, command and 
control, communications, complaint taking processes, investigation capability, 
and the quality of the officers and their training are all sorely tested in situations 
like those facing the police between December 2007 and March 2008. 
During this time however it is clear that the Police response ranged across the 
full gamut; from examples of heroism to abject failure in discharging even the 
most basic of its mandated roles.   
 
Findings on the use of Force 
The Commission determined that the Police response in relation to the 
management of protests and crowd control was inconsistent in its application, 
jeopardized the lives of citizens and was in many cases a grossly unjustified use 
of deadly force. Their actions resulted in the senseless death of scores of 
innocent citizens which is in direct contravention of the Constitution of Kenya 
and the mandate of the Police Service both of which clearly requires the police to 
preserve the peace and protect life.  
The Commission found that there was a heavy-handed Police response whereby 
large numbers of citizens were shot – 405 fatally415 – by Police in Kisumu, 
Kakamega, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Kericho, Nakuru, Nairobi, and other 






lawful business when they were hit by bullets and many more whose wounds 
confirmed that they had been shot from behind.   
Commission investigations also determined that in all the circumstances it is 
highly likely that very many citizens were unlawfully killed by police officers.  An 
analysis of post mortem examinations provided to the Commission revealed too 
many instances of citizens being shot from behind, a number of instances of 
children being shot (some also from behind), and a further number of citizens 
being shot while sheltering in and around their own homes.416 
The Commission found that Police used a variety of tactical options during the 
PEV. Tactical options included but were not limited to; the use of tear gas, the 
use of blank ammunition, the use of rubber bullets and finally the use of live 
ammunition.  On many occasions police shot live ammunition into the air in an 
attempt to disperse protectors and thereby protect life and property.  In other 
cases, police officers shot directly into groups of protestors and crowds of people 
thought to be involved in looting or property destruction and scores were 
seriously injured or killed as a result.  
In the vast majority of cases, the force used by police occurred during lawful 
enforcement duties to protect life and property. This does not however mean that 
the force used was lawful, reasonable or desirable.  In the absence of evidence to 
the contrary the Commission determined that in all probability all persons killed 
by firearms during the post election violence were the victims of police shootings.  
This complete lack of consistency in the way in which police officers use force 
constitutes an immediate need to establish a reasonable, balanced and 
consistent national ‘Use of Force’ policy.  This lack of consistency and at times 
confusion on the part of police officers is not assisted by the fact that some of 






promulgated during the colonial times.  For example one of the guidelines is 
dated 1962 whilst another (undated) appears to emanate from the same era.417 
There is a demonstrated need for police to evaluate all of their tactical options 
and the effectiveness of each option. A tactical options policy or framework 
would act as a decision support tool to assist front line Police members in 
making decisions relating to tactical options and use of force issues. A 
framework would clearly define the legal terms reasonable, proportionate and 
necessary. It would require officers to continuously assess a situation and 
should force be required, it would emphasize that the force should be reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances. The design and subsequent implementation 
of a national ‘Use of Force’ strategy would have to be incorporated into the 
existing police training regime.  
This can be achieved through the complete overhaul of Police Standing Orders 
and manuals of Best Practice in relation to the policing of demonstrations and 
protests. There are some basic principles to apply in the policing of 
demonstrations. Police must balance the need to maintain order against the 
rights of citizens. Among those rights are; freedom of speech, the right to 
peacefully demonstrate, the right to life and property and the freedom from 
intimidation or interference.  These rights are expressly protected under the 
Constitution. 
 
The Commission also found that the current Constitution provides for the 
authorisation and justification for using arms against citizens in circumstances 
other than when life is in jeopardy.  The provision for such force to be used in 
the defence of property has little application in a contemporary society and such 
measures need to be addressed in the development of a new Constitution and 








The Commission determined that full, professional and independent 
investigations into the use of force by police officers must be commenced 
immediately. 
 
Findings in relation to Investigations 
The Police Service has a fundamental problem with its investigative capability 
and capacity.  The Commission’s own investigations found that there was an 
inability or reluctance to effectively investigate serious crimes and their 
perpetrators even when strong evidence existed.  Of a total of 1133 deaths the 
police have initiated prosecutions for merely 19 homicides.418 
 
The Commission found that for many other crimes, first hand evidence linking 
an offender or offenders to the crime existed and still exists. However for reasons 
known only to them the Police failed to fully discharge their duties in this 
respect.  Police appeared unwilling or incapable of investigating and arresting 
politically powerful individuals implicated in the PEV instead concentrating on 
the lower level perpetrators.419 
 
The Commission also established that the Police service has weak systems and 
approaches to investigating incidents where police officers are involved.  Ranging 
from the use of lethal force to the deliberate killing of innocent citizens literally 
hundreds of incidents are not being investigated with the thoroughness needed 
or to the standards required. There is no professional standards capability 









Findings relating to criminal offending by police officers 
Credible evidence strongly linked a number of police officers with serious 
criminal offending.  The offending ranged from murder and rape to theft and 
bribery. 
The extent of offending was worrisome especially considering the lack of 
reporting on the part of victims (many determined that it would be a waste of 
time considering police officers were the perpetrators), the lack of recording on 
the part of the police (even when victims did go to the police they were often 
actively discouraged) and the apparent lack of concern on the part of senior 
officers. 
To address issues of impunity, bringing to justice perpetrators of violence and 
restoring confidence in the Police, these officers must be thoroughly and 
professionally investigated and dealt with under the law. 
 
Findings relating to partiality 
Much evidence was received by the Commission relating to the activities of police 
officers being driven by their ethnicity, political leanings or both. 
In some areas, especially in the Rift Valley Province the Commission saw 
evidence of an ethnic divide within the police who were reported to be primarily 
Kalenjin. Some witnesses provided statements saying that police stood by and 
watched as homes of the non-Kalenjin were being burned and looted. In some 
cases it would appear the police members watched as individuals were killed in 
their presence.  In Naivasha one witness stated that the Kikuyu members of 
police were reluctant to assist and there was evidence of open defiance by some 





Findings relating to a lack of independence 
Instances of inappropriate decision making due to outside interference and 
influence were discovered by the Commission.  These included instructions from 
the Commissioner of Police to release arrested prisoners, the failure to continue 
with and finalise cases of police officers and government employees who were 
discovered committing offences, and the blatant use of administration police 
officers in electioneering activities. 
The marshalling and deployment of up to 1600 Administration Police officers, in 
plain clothes, to act as agents of the government in disrupting or otherwise being 
involved in the elections processes, amounts to a gross abuse of power by those 
who initiated the exercise.  This activity can have no legitimate explanation or 
legal basis and in all probability was unlawful. 
The special assignment of a group of KPS officers during the election in the 
Coast Province in collating results and forwarding these to police headquarters 
recorded in the operation orders seriously concerned the Commission, can have 
no legitimate operational utility, and requires investigation and explanation.  
Other issues surrounding the natural tensions between the role of provincial 
administrators and police surfaced during the Commission’s investigation.  
Administration Police Officers are subjected, within current structures and 
operating arrangements, to multiple lines of command and control.  For example 
the Administration Police Act requires, amongst other things that every officer 
shall assist chiefs and sub-chiefs when called upon, undergo training when the 
District Commissioner so orders, and act as a messenger in matters of 
administration or the public service.420  AP officers are also required to be under 
the command of their Commandant who is the officer in charge of the 
Administration Police.  In addition AP officers can be seconded to the KPS and 






The Commission finds this situation untenable and constitutes a fractured and 
confused command and control structure that is not conducive to ensuring clear 
accountability for policing service delivery.  This situation, if allowed to continue, 
will consistently reinforce the perception (and often reality) that the APs are not 
impartial due to the close control over them that the Provincial Administration 
system has.421 
 
Findings relating to secrecy 
The Commission found that the Police Agencies appeared to unnecessarily adopt 
a defensive position quoting the need for secrecy as a rationale for not providing 
some requested material.  This situation is extraordinary given the full 
disclosures made by other agencies that are the repository of far more sensitive 
information.   
In failing to provide the Commission with basic information such as the 
establishment and actual numbers of officers available for service, copies of 
national planning documents, and other data including success rates in 
investigations, the Police underscored an insular, introspective and 
uncooperative stance reminiscent of a bygone era. 
In the final analysis it appeared to the Commission that the Police agencies 
regarded the term security as synonymous with secrecy.  They failed to grasp the 
concept adopted by most contemporary law enforcement agencies that being 
open and interactive with communities is not only the right of citizens but 
fundamental to ensuring community support and in developing their trust and 
confidence.  The provision of information should be a two-way street with 
Kenyans receiving timely and relevant information on safety and security issues 







Findings relating to failure to respond 
Many people testified and expressed concern that in numerous cases police 
officers failed to act to protect property and save lives.  Evidence was collected 
suggesting that on a number of occasions the police simply watched as property 
was being destroyed and looting occurred.  
In Coast Province in particular there was much concern over the failure on the 
part of the police to intervene when they were clearly available and present. A 
number of victims and witnesses expressed the belief that the police were 
condoning the looting and property destruction.  There appeared to be a ‘loot but 
don’t kill’ policy. This saw the emergence of citizens from the Kikuyu and Kamba 
communities banding together to protect their own property as there was no 
confidence they would receive protection from the police.     
In many instances however police did seek to respond in the best way possible 
but were not always successful.  The Uasin Gishu District for example was the 
site of the Kiambaa church burning that resulted in the loss of many lives. Police 
attempts to rescue the situation were thwarted through a combination of an 
inability to respond quickly enough and encountering delays through unlawful 
roadblocks. 
 
Findings in relation to policies, systems and processes 
The Commission found that some systems and policies, particularly relating to 
deployments and appointments, planning and review, dealing with deaths, 
operational policy and  procedures are outdated and in need of urgent review. 
Of particular concern was that operational planning arrangements, operating 
guidelines, standard operating procedures and standing orders fall short of the 
standards required for modern security organs.  A full review of these 




While it is acknowledged that some progress has been made in relation to 
dealing with victims of sexual violence (such as setting up gender desks in police 
stations), the events of the PEV period clearly demonstrated that there is a very 
long way to go.   
The personal attitudes of officers, as well as systems to deal with the victims, 
need to dramatically improve as a matter of urgency. 
 
Findings in relation to dealing with complaints 
The Commission felt that the best example of how police officers deal with 
complaints is best illustrated by the approaches taken in relation to the victims 
of sexual offending.  There were very many instances of victims attempting to 
report their cases to the police but being thwarted for a variety of reasons.  Given 
the circumstances, scale of offending, the shortcomings which seem to have 
prevailed in regard to the investigation of these crimes and also the allegations 
against Police, it is likely that a separate entity would be best placed to 
investigate these matters. 
With that underway, work can begin on building strategies which will achieve, 
into the future, the matters set out in the mandate.  Central to these strategies 
will be an education/awareness component which will span public, medical, 
Police and legal domains.  The approach must be coordinated and consistent so 
there is a common understanding of the best responses, from all parties, to 
sexual violence.     
All parties, including Police need to understand their rights and their 
responsibilities with regard to sexual offending.  This base then needs to be 
complemented by the training, logistics, and resources through which victims 
can be treated and supported and have those who offend against them dealt with 
effectively and in a timely fashion according to the law. 
Sexual violence needs to be acknowledged by Police as a serious crime and 




environment which is secure and private and in a situation in which their dignity 
is maintained.  Police should respond in a way that is non-partisan.  Reports of 
this type of offending should always be recorded and properly investigated.    
This investigation may include, among other phases, the examination of scene(s) 
and the proper collection, storage, analysis and evaluation of evidence.  The 
investigation must be carried out by Police officers who are adequately trained 
and competent at investigating serious crime.  Reports of sexual crimes should 
form part of a criminal intelligence process.   Consideration needs also to be 
given to the safety of the victim when considering whether the accused person is 
released into the community pending the completion of the Police/judicial 
process.  
 
Findings in relation to resourcing 
The Commission was frustrated in its attempts to fully assess resourcing issues.  
Frequent use was made of raw numbers such as the ratio of police officers to 
population422.  Given that the Police agencies themselves failed to provide the 
Commission with the actual numbers of officers or the establishment figure any 
such ratio provided is speculative. 
It is clear that the police were in fact overwhelmed by the extent and intensity of 
the violence.  One NSIS report commented on the fact that officers in Nairobi 
were fatigued after being on continuous duty for several days.  However this 
aspect only presents part of the picture.  Contributing factors to this situation 
include the requirement to provide more than 54,000 officers to be present at 








Merely focussing on the total numbers of police officers is problematic.  Whilst 
there may be a case for an increase in police numbers, some basic imperatives 
must pre-exist.  These include; recruiting and training the right people, ensuring 
the existing police culture is conducive to embracing reform, systems and 
processes must be of a high standard, and organisational leadership must be of 
the highest quality.  
Other factors came to the Commission’s attention during its examination of this 
area.  The conditions that Police officers work under require close attention.  
Ranging from poor remuneration to often substandard living conditions these 
issues combine to impact negatively on the moral and incentives that impact 
personal performance.  It is expected that any reform process will look carefully 
at these issues. 
 
Findings in relation to review and improvement arrangements 
A key aspect of the planning cycle found to be absent was any form of formal 
written de-briefing and operational review process.  The Commissioner of Police 
told the Commission that one had not yet been completed albeit several months 
after the violence stopped.423  Other senior police officers reinforced this 
approach by also confirming the absence of a formal, comprehensive and written 
review process. 
Whilst the Commission observed throughout its work that the Police were not 
adequately resourced this does not detract from a finding that the absence of 









Findings in relation to other Security Agencies 
There was little, if any, leadership displayed by government in dealing with the 
violence when it (inevitably) broke out.  Although some evidence was provided to 
the Commission that a hastily formed Cabinet Security Committee (CSC) met 
early in January and the NSAC provided it a written briefing (dated 17th 
January), there was more effort assigned to dealing with the outcomes of the 
violence rather than any real effort to stop or reduce it.  
Variable performances exhibited by the KSIM were also evident including an 
apparent absence of leadership and functionality at the executive level exhibited 
by the CSC.    
Two of the directives communicated by the NSAC under the signature of the then 
PS, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security 
concerned the Commission.424 The instruction that “PSIC and DSIC should 
provide security to targeted individuals who supported the Government and PNU” 
appears to indicate a bias around just who to protect.  A further concern for the 
Commission was the advice that “command and coordination relationships should 
be streamlined.”  Given that these communications were sent on 7th and 28th 
January 2008 it can only be assumed that these important functions and 
structures were not in good operating order prior to the elections of 2007.  
The performance of Provincial and District Security and Intelligence Committees 
also varied from well organised entities that met often during the crisis, 
determined priority action and made key decisions, to others that did not engage 
at all when arguably they were needed most 
The Commission is satisfied that the Military along with supporting agencies 
such as the Kenya Wildlife Service responded appropriately during the crisis.  In 
discharging their role in backing up the prime security agencies the Commission 






In most cases the Kenya Prisons Service also responded well and in the case of 
the Naivasha Prison opted to receive victims of the crisis on their property and 
provide basic necessities (including security) for a short period before relocation.  
Although there was mention of inappropriate behaviour on the part of some 
prison officers in Naivasha no firm supporting evidence was provided. 
The NSIS also discharged its role reasonably well in that the daily situation 
reports, apart from a period of eight days, continued to be developed throughout 
January and February 2008.  However the Commission felt that the NSIS could 
have exercised more influence on the situation especially in the area of 
developing special, focused reports aimed at assisting the police and others get 
to the heart of the violence.   
 
Rationale for Recommended Action Regarding the Police 
This part recognises that, in terms of the Police, a reform programme has been 
commenced and against that backdrop identifies a number of key areas that 
require immediate action.  These should be approached in a planned, 
coordinated and integrated way to ensure that the very best value is gained from 
the resulting institutional strengthening. 
 
Background 
Like all large institutions, the Kenya Police Service is confronted with a host of 
challenges stemming from a dynamic and demanding environment.  At times, 
fundamental change must be made to address new challenges and respond to 
the evolving and changing needs of Kenyan society. 
Built over years of tradition and greatly influenced by British colonial 
convention, the entrenched mandate, principals and functions of the Kenya 





The experience of this Commission has shown that the Kenyan Police are not 
always in a position to identify and address problems regarding their service 
delivery. This is why an independent examination of policing police is critical and 
must be undertaken with some urgency. 
In spite of the development and production of a strategic plan the Kenya police 
have been slow to accept that police reform is necessary and are reluctant to 
accept that the public and others outside the police have a role to play in 
shaping police policy and reforms.  At the heart of the debate is deciding what 
philosophy of policing the Kenya Police and the public desire.  
The Commission has been in the unique position of having heard from many 
members of the public, government officials, and from the police themselves. It 
therefore brings a much needed perspective to the public debate about the 
current status of the Kenya police and the issues and challenges it faces not only 
in relation to post election violence but its overall structure and ability to deliver 
day to day policing services to Kenya. 
 
The Current Reform Programme  
In determining key recommendations the Commission took account of a number 
of key pieces of work signalled by the Government as a priority for action in the 
medium and long term.  Key amongst these is the Statement of Principles on 
Long-term issues and solutions developed through the Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation mediated by H.E. Kofi Annan, Chair of the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities on 28th February 2008.   
Specifically identified issues for the Police in agenda item 4 under Constitutional 
and Institutional reform are: 
• Constitutional review to establish an independent police commission 
(12 months) 





• Review laws and issues related to security and policing (including 
the independent complaints commission, citizen oversight of police 
services, enhanced information disclosures, human resource 
management and capacity building) to make them consistent with 
modern democratic norms (6 months) 
• Finalisation and rollout of the National Security Policy to enable the 
relevant sectors to develop their sectoral policies 
• Recruit and train more police officers to raise the police – to 
population ratio to UN standard (by 2012) 
There are also definitive reforms of the State Security Agencies encompassed 
within the Kenya 2030 plan and specific targets articulated in the First Medium 
Term Plan 2008-2012425 as well as the recently announced civilian oversight 
board.426   
Informing these processes will be the overall constitutional reform that has the 
draft constitution (Bomas and Wako drafts) as its base.427 
The Commission also recognised attempts to initiate reforms by the Kenya Police 
Service.  In their strategic plan key shortcomings relating to service delivery, the 
absence of strong institutional mechanisms for holding police accountable to 
citizens and the law, and the overlapping functions of having two police agencies 
are identified as issues for resolution.   
 
Dealing with perpetrators  
Issues and aspects relating to dealing with impunity are fully canvassed in 
chapter two.  It is, however, prudent that some focus is applied to this subject 








Given that more than nine months have passed since the start of the violence 
around the 2007 general elections it is unlikely that many more, if any, 
perpetrators will be held to account for their actions than have already been 
dealt with by the authorities.  Very many victims of these actions and events 
have not been properly heard and many more not heard from at all.  Some are 
constantly being re-victimised as they re-live their experiences every day through 
seeing their perpetrators living and prospering within their communities and 
some who have even occupied victims’ land. 
Large numbers of these perpetrators are known, considerable evidence is 
available to use as a strong investigative base and yet any such activity on the 
part of the authorities has ceased.  It is unlikely that state authorities have the 
capability or the will to rigorously pursue offending parties. 
Evidence of offending by police officers is not being actively pursued.  The 
Commission believes that special arrangements are required to deal with these 
officers as well as to independently investigate reported excesses of force by the 
Police.  It is this way that victims and witnesses alike will have the confidence to 
come forward to provide their evidence to an independent investigative entity. 
 
Using a Reform Catalyst 
The Commission has determined that there is a demonstrated need for major 
police reform that takes into account international best practices while 
recognising that policing in Kenya involves some unique challenges.  In order to 
put in place the type of reforms considered necessary the Commission believes 
that the immediate establishment of specialised and independent Police Reform 
Group (PRG) is called for.  Consisting of both national and international policing 
experts, this entity should be created and begin its work immediately.  It is 





One consistent and unfortunate theme that emerged from the Commission’s 
work was that many Kenyans simply do not have trust and confidence in their 
Police.  This was borne out by the number of victims of violence, including 
sexual offending, who simply felt they could not report their situation to police 
officers.  A variety of explanations were forthcoming ranging from the need on 
some occasions to pay for this service, a general suspicion of authorities to the 
fact that police officers were sometimes the perpetrators. 
It is the view of the Commission that policing can in fact contribute to conflict 
situations such as that experienced in the PEV.  In many cases police were seen 
as partisan in representing or favouring just one community and in some 
instances supporting one political side over the other. 
International best practice recognizes that successful policing is based upon a 
number of broad principles.  Those principles will doubtless guide the work of a 
PRG in determining priorities, processes and a timetable for key aspects of 
reform to be identified and addressed in the coming months.  The five principles 
agreed upon by this Commission are briefly outlined here.   
The Police should be representative:  There is much value in paying close 
attention to the ethnic makeup of officers in the Districts and down to division 
and station level.  While it is a rule of thumb that the police should reflect the 
community it serves, Kenya’s multi ethnic makeup requires careful management 
of these arrangements.    
The police should be impartial:  To achieve the former, the Kenya Police need 
to exhibit impartiality in all aspects of their work.  In fact impartiality is a 
requirement in achieving a representative police service.  Of assistance to this 
process would be measures in cultural sensitivity training, a common oath of 
office where officers swear to respect all cultural differences and a rigorous code 





Policing should be decentralized:  Currently policing in Kenya suffers from 
imprecise structural arrangements borne out of an antiquated policing model 
based on colonial times.  Coupled with confused operational and executive 
command across two police agencies and a provincial administration structure 
this model manifests weaknesses in being sensitive to the needs of local 
communities.   A single integrated command model based upon community 
policing elements could potentially form the basis for overall policing reform.   
Policing should be based on respect for human rights:  The basic tenet here is 
that police need to treat everyone equally and with respect.  Heavy handed 
approaches to dealing with demonstrations and the liberal application of force 
(much of it lethal) currently applied will require further and careful assessment 
in determining the way ahead.   
The police should be legally and politically accountable:   The development 
and application of accountability mechanisms would seem to be an immediate 
priority for action.  The current void could be filled by a number of reforms 
including the establishment of a Police Service Commission and the 
establishment of an Independent Police Complaints Authority (IPCA)428 to deal 
with complaints against police conduct. 
Integration of the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police 
The Commission believes that developing a world class police service for Kenya 
would be best achieved through the creation of a single police agency.  This 
means integrating the current two police organs.  Given the revelations around 
the unlawful use of Administration Police (APs) around the elections, the fact 
that the current structure is inextricably linked to the provincial administration 
system, and many of the senior officers are not police professionals integrating 






It is recognised that there are difficulties in completing this important work 
(merging two cultures, ideals, systems and approaches) but the benefits will 
greatly outweigh these temporary obstacles. 
Integration will provide accountability, resourcing, service delivery and 
performance benefits many of which are listed here.  Benefits include but are not 
limited to; 
• Total independence from the provincial administration structure and 
separation from national government oversight 
• Unified command and control 
• Across the board consistency and uniformity in all facets of policing 
including; standardised policing service delivery, standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), improved investigations capability and 
intelligence gathering and dissemination 
• Increased trust and confidence in the Police and policing 
• A single and unified Police Services Board, one head of Police 
(Commissioner), one strategic plan and a single integrated and well 
understood service delivery offering 
• A single piece of enabling legislation, Force Standing Orders, 
guidelines, practice and operational arrangements 
• Standard systems of recruitment options, entry standards including 
lateral entry options, basic and specialised training, conditions of 
service including living conditions and remuneration, human 
resource management arrangements, promotion and advancement, 
and leadership development including command and control  
• Significant efficiency gains from budgeting, purchasing, and utility of 
resources (capital, equipment and people) 
• The elimination of inter-agency tension and conflicts that impact 






Police Act  
Existing legislation on the provision of policing services, and in particular the 
governance, organisation and administration of the Kenyan Police, is inadequate. 
Some of the key weaknesses of the present Police Act 1960 (revised 2002) and 
the Police Standing Orders 1962 (revised 2001) include – 
• Unclear responsibilities and confused lines of accountability: 
• Constraints around the ability to place the right people in the right 
jobs: 
• An inadequate system for managing staff performance and discipline 
issues: 
• Little guidance to work with partner agencies, domestically or 
internationally: 
• Few supports to enable the use of modern policing tactics 
 
New legislation is needed to overcome these inadequacies; removing constraints 
to the delivery of better policing services to the community, and setting a 
platform for more effective policing in the future.  
Police Act reform would equip the Kenyan Police to provide the best policing 
services for Kenyans. In broad terms, reform would be undertaken to achieve two 
fundamental tasks: first, to confirm and strengthen Police governance, 
accountability and organisational arrangements in a way which is suitable for a 
contemporary age; and second, to improve the Police’s effectiveness, and 
establish a clear framework for the exercise of policing powers. 
 
Police Service Commission 
The Police should be politically accountable to a Police Service Commission.  
Originally signalled in the 2005 Draft Constitution (the Wako draft) this 
structure would be somewhat different in that it would cover a single 




and be made up of representatives from elected political parties, civil society, 
business interests and NGOs (there is no shortage of precedents from other 
international jurisdictions).  It is envisaged that the Commission would play a 
role in setting policing goals, budgets and appointing the Commissioner. 
 
A modern Code of Conduct 
The current Kenyan Police disciplinary rules and processes are contained within 
Chapter 20 of the Kenyan Police Standing Orders and are inadequate. The move 
to a new and modern Code of Conduct would see a transition from the current 
Para-military style of managing behavioural issues in Police to a more 
mainstream employment practice. It would establish the standards for behaviour 
across the Kenyan Police service and ensure consistent behaviour. A new Code of 
Conduct would have to be considered in conjunction with revised “Standing 
Orders”, Regulations or Best Practices Manuals.  
The simple truth is this: one of the essential components of a well-functioning 
civil society is an effective, well-disciplined police service, in which the citizens 
have implicit trust. 
The purpose of a modern Police Code of Conduct is to establish the standards of 
behaviour expected of all Kenyan Police employees not just its sworn members. 
To be successful, a policing service must have the trust respect of the citizens it 
serves. The Kenyan Police will be judged by the way its employees represent it.  It 
is therefore necessary to maintain a high standard of professional conduct. All 
Kenyan police personnel sworn and non-sworn, permanent, temporary and 
casual employees should be covered by the Code of Conduct.  
The cornerstone of a modern Code of Conduct is that all employees of the 
Kenyan Police work to the highest ethical standard. A Code of Conduct should 
recognise and include the following basic principles: honesty and integrity, 





Strengthening Investigations  
There was a general consensus that investigations per se require strengthening.  
The Commission supports the notion that quality investigations are the 
cornerstone of the justice system as far as bringing perpetrators to justice is 
concerned.  An option to address current issues was offered by Attorney General 
Wako429 was that “the Directorate of Criminal Investigations be created by an Act 
of Parliament as an independent and autonomous authority.”   
In addition to the development of workable and functioning independent civilian 
oversight arrangements430, there should still be provisions for some less serious 
allegations to be investigated and resolved by police themselves.  When an 
Authority accepts a complaint for investigation it should decide on the type of 
investigation to be adopted. The matter may be appropriate for a Police 
investigation and resolution. This means it would be investigated under the 
supervision of a senior Police Commander in the area where the matter arose 
and this would result in a speedier resolution of the complaint. At the conclusion 
of the investigation, the police should advise the Authority of the results of the 
investigation and the decision reached. If after a review of the police file, the 
matter has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the Authority, there should be 
provisions for the Authority to initiate its own investigation of the matter. 
The Commission believes that structural changes alone can and will not address 
identified issues.  Investigations capacity and capability are best addressed in a 
comprehensive review (as recommended) alongside other policing and justice 
related components to ensure the best solutions are identified.  
 
Civilian Oversight of Police (Police Conduct) 
The Commission is of the view that the hasty and presumptive creation of a 
Police Oversight Board (Kenya Gazette Notice 8144) on the 4th September 2008 







right has been missed.  The new entity has few, if any, of the key foundation 
components or properly functioning arrangements necessary for the provision of 
quality civilian oversight of the police. 
This Commission carefully considered the acts and omissions of state security 
agencies in the context of the PEV and determined that the establishment of a 
well researched, legally based, professional and independent Police Conduct 
Authority would serve Kenyans best. 
Throughout both the public and private ‘in camera’ hearings, this Commission 
was presented with clear evidence that the police use of force during the post 
election violence period resulted in serious injury and death to many Kenyan 
citizens. Some of these actions may well have been in compliance with existing 
law.  There is also a clear indication that police used excessive force in many 
instances and the actions of some individual officers may have reached the 
threshold of criminal conduct. 
Under current legislation and convention, the police are the only state security 
agency with the legal mandate and authority to investigate the conduct of its 
own officers and for that matter the conduct of their service as an 
organization.431  
Whether justified or not, there is a perception in the community that 
investigation by the police of complaints against the police is neither 
independent nor appropriate.  
The evidence before this Commission of Inquiry has identified a real need for 
police oversight by an independent body, outside the police, with the legislative 







Although from time to time there are complaints about the actions of the police 
and concerns as to the investigation of such complaints, the majority of Kenyan 
citizens have not been directly involved or been exposed to the process.  
The actions of police following the December election have intensified the 
public’s concern about police conduct and reinforced the belief that there are no 
systems in place for police accountability. 
Kenyan society is such that the bulk of the law-abiding citizens do not come into 
any open conflict with members of the police. The post election violence period 
changed that completely. For the first time respected members of society found 
themselves in direct opposition to the police. The police were faced with the 
extremely difficult task of meeting their obligation to uphold the law and order in 
the face of overwhelming odds and in an environment where innocent law 
abiding people were ‘in the mix’ and therefore vulnerable to the police response 
and use of force.   
In addition, the ethnic and tribal tensions increased during the pre and post 
election periods. These tribal loyalties and alliances were to be found within the 
Kenyan Police itself and there is evidence that the police were seen as agents of 
political parties and agendas and were therefore biased, complacent or outright 
hostile to certain sections of the community. 
The actions which have occurred during the post election violence are so serious 
that an immediate remedy is essential.  
It will be essential that any independent Authority to which complaints can be 
made and which can be dealt with be outside the police service itself.  
There are advantages to the police in adopting an independent investigative 
procedure. The police would no longer be subject to the same criticisms, but 
more importantly, they would be less likely to be affected by doubtful complaints 
brought by suspected criminals, for ulterior motives. They would also be relieved 




When the public complaint procedure for a policing service is discussed, there 
are diverse interests that must be acknowledged and taken into account. A 
public complaint procedure that favours the interest of a complainant at the 
expense of the member of the service is no more likely to provide satisfaction 
than a procedure which does the reverse. The interest of the general public and 
the Police service involved must be accorded due consideration.  
This is based on the premise that a system whereby the Police investigate 
complaints against police members is fundamentally flawed because of the 
suspicion that inevitably remains in the minds of complainants. A complaints 
procedure generally acknowledged to be fair and impartial to the public and to 
the police is essential if the police are to enjoy the degree of public support they 
needed in order to discharge their own risky and necessary tasks.  
International Police Oversight Entities 
Many international jurisdictions have introduced police oversight arrangements 
to ensure the independent monitoring and scrutiny of police organisations and 
the actions of officers.  Moreover, a number of commonwealth countries have 
embraced the concept including South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  
Although many of these institutions are differently constituted, the fundamental 
underpinnings are, in the main, similar.432  These include: 
• A legislative basis specific to the entity’s establishment, functions  
and powers 
• The operational independence from the Police  
• Freedom from political interference 
• The power to conduct its own investigations 








The Commission noted that the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) in 
South Africa was established as a result of the work of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission who recommended that; 
• The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) be governed by new 
legislation, independent of general police legislation.  
• The ICD be genuinely independent of the Ministry for Safety and 
Security. 
• The ICD have powers to compel the SAPS and others to comply with 
its requests related to conducting an investigation, including powers 
of search and seizure. 
• The ICD be given the authority to bring to the attention of relevant 
officials any failure on the part of the SAPS to respond to ICD 
recommendations to take disciplinary or legal action. 
• The ICD be mandated to investigate corruption within the SAPS, 
rather than this task being allocated to a unit within the SAPS. 
• The ICD be given the capacity, resources and authority to conduct 
proactive investigations and evaluations of overall policing policies 
and practice, as well as to respond to complaints. 
 
Examples of enabling legislation, from both South Africa and New Zealand, are 







Definition of Impunity 
Impunity means “exemption from punishment or loss”.433  In the international 
law of human rights, it refers to the failure to bring perpetrators of human rights 
violation to justice and, as such, itself constitutes a denial of the victims’ right to 
justice and redress.  Impunity is especially common in countries that lack a 
tradition of the rule of law, suffer from corruption or that have entrenched 
systems of patronage, or where the judiciary is weak or members of the security 
forces are protected by special jurisdiction or immunities.  The amended Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to 
combat Impunity, submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights on 8 February 2005, defines impunity as: 
“the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of 
violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any inquiry 
that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found 
guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations 
to their victims.” 
The First Principle of that same document states that: 
 
“Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to 
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the 
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those 
suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly 
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure 
that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the 
inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other 








According to its terms of reference, this Commission is required to recommend –  
• Measures to be taken to prevent, control and eradicate the  
occurrence of similar deeds in future; 
• Measures with regard to bringing to justice those persons 
responsible for criminal acts; 
• Measures to eradicate impunity and promote national 
reconciliation. 
In making such requirements, we think, the framers of our TORs recognized that 
impunity lies at the heart of preventing the kind of violence that has been 
witnessed in this country time and time again.  The eradication of impunity will 
therefore, not only blow off the cover for persons who break the law of the land 
but also deter others who may contemplate similar deeds in future.  A firm 
foundation in the rule of law would also promote national reconciliation. 
The elements of systemic and institutional deficiencies, corruption, and 
entrenched negative socio – political culture have, in our view, caused and 
promoted impunity in this country.  Election related violence provides the best 
illustration of the malady where, in five-year cycles since 1992 when multiparty 
politics was introduced, pre- and post-election violence has rocked various parts 
of the country despite official inquiries and identification of the root causes being 
made.  We shall examine the issues of investigation, prosecution and 








Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Guilt 
The issue of impunity is directly related to the ability of the state to prosecute 
persons for criminal offences.   It is our view that the Office of the Attorney 
General occupies an important and strategic position in dealing with the issue of 
impunity.  With a view to shedding more light on that office, we invited the Hon. 
the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, Mr. Amos Sitswila Wako, who has 
been in office for the last 17 years, to testify before the Commission.  
The power to undertake criminal prosecutions in Kenya is reposed in the Office 
of the Attorney General under section 26 of the Constitution, which provides 
that the Attorney General has the power to institute and undertake criminal 
proceedings against any person; take over and continue any prosecution 
commenced by any other person;  and also takeover and discontinue 
proceedings at any stage before judgment is delivered.  In practice, the power to 
prosecute some cases is delegated to other agencies of state like the Kenya Police 
and even where this done, it is done under the supervisory authority of the 
Attorney General.   Under section 26(4) of the Constitution, the Attorney General 
also has the power to require the Commissioner of Police to investigate any 
matter which relates to any offence alleged or suspected.  It is mandatory, once 
the request is made, that the Commissioner of Police shall comply with the 
request. 
Mr. Wako,434 testified before us and enumerated some attempts made by various 
institutions to investigate election related violence among them: - 
• The National Assembly which set up a Select Committee to 
Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya 
1992, otherwise known as “the Kiliku Committee”.435 
• The Standing Committee on Human Rights (Kenya), a government 







Standing Committee investigated skirmishes occurring at the 
Coastal region in 1998 and released a report titled, “Recent 
Disturbances at the Coast province: From 13th August to date.” 
• The Law Society of Kenya, in exercise of its mandate under the Law 
Society of Kenya Act investigated and made a report on the Violence 
in Coast Province related to the attack on Likoni Police Station on 
13th August 1998. 
• The Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Tribal Clashes that 
occurred in various parts of Kenya since 1991 otherwise known as 
the “Akiwumi Commission.”  
 
Various recommendations were made in those inquiries, but the Akiwumi 
commission, which considered the earlier reports on ethnic violence, was more 
comprehensive.  How did the government deal with the report? 
 
The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry 
The Akiwumi Commission was appointed on 1st July 1998 and its life was 
variously extended up to 31st July, 1999 when it completed its report and 
submitted it to President Daniel arap Moi on 19th August 1999.  Its terms of 
reference, which were not dissimilar to those of this commission, were as follows; 
A) To investigate the tribal clashes that have occurred in various parts of Kenya 
since 1991, with view of establishing and/or determining- 
 
i. The origin, the probable, the immediate and the underlying causes of such 
clashes; 
ii. The action taken by the police and other law enforcement agencies with 
respect to any incidents of crime arising out of or committed in the course of 
the said tribal clashes and where such action was inadequate or 
insufficient, the reasons there for; 
iii.  The level of preparedness and the effectiveness of law enforcement 
agencies in controlling the said tribal clashes and in preventing the 
occurrence of such tribal clashes in future; 
 




i. Prosecution or further criminal investigations against any persons or 
persons who may have committed offences related to such tribal clashes; 
ii. Ways, means and measures that must be taken to prevent, control, or 
eradicate such clashes in future; 
iii. To do, inquire into or investigate any other matter that is incidental to or 
connected with the foregoing  
 
For three years, however, the contents of the report were not made public until 
considerable public pressure was brought to bear on the Government and it was 
released to the public in October 2002, but not without reservations.  The 
Government rejected part of the report that related to the Rift Valley and 
especially, the Kalenjin and Maasai communities, and in support of that 
assertion it produced a 31 page undated document which had no author or 
signatory, entitled “Comments on Commission of Inquiry Report”.436  Pressed 
to identify the author, the Attorney General said it was authored by “the 
Government”, presumably the President at the time, at whose instance the 
Commission had been set up and to whom the report had been submitted.  The 
reasons advanced for the partial rejection was that “the report was not objective, 
it took extraneous matters into account, ignored some evidence, did not give due 
weight to some evidence and gave a lot of weight to some evidence more than 
warranted.  Its findings and recommendations were biased and prejudiced.” 
 
The commentary, which the “Government” directed should be read together with 
the Akiwumi Report concluded: 
“….. the sad chapter of the clashes in the country’s history 
should be brought to an end to give Kenyans a chance to start 
afresh as brothers and sisters in this multiparty era….. 
Accordingly, in the absence of evidence to form the basis for 
prosecution to recommend charges or prosecution against any 
person, (sic) but where there is evidence to show a lapse in the 






recommendations can be made for other forms of condemnation 
including: 
(i)(a) naming and 
(ii)(b) admonishing.”  
 
Despite the position taken by “the Government”, the Attorney General testified 
that he had, in exercise of his independent constitutional mandate, acted on the 
report two years earlier.  We quote the relevant part of his press release dated 1st 
October, 2002; 
“The Attorney General by letter dated 14th March, 2000, in exercise of 
the constitutional powers under S.26(4) of the Constitution, directed 
that expeditious, diligent and expeditious investigations be carried out 
against all persons whom the Commission had recommended that 
they be investigated regarding their role in tribal clashes – and in 
particular those mentioned in paragraphs 526, 527 and 528 of the 
Akiwumi report. 
The Director of Criminal Investigations by his letter dated 19th 
February, 2001 forwarded to the Attorney General the relevant 
duplicate inquiry files 70 in number for my perusal and necessary 
action.  Of those 70 files, the Attorney General ordered further 
investigations in 40 cases.  Of these 40 files, 18 investigations files 
were returned to the Attorney General on 1st October, 2001 after 
further investigations.  The Attorney General after further perusal 
ordered further investigations in a number of the cases. 
The investigations are therefore still continuing in a number of cases.  
I assure the public that when I get an investigation file with sufficient 
evidence, provable in a court of law which can establish a prima facie 
case prosecution will ensue as a matter of course.”437 
 
What became of those investigations? Again we shall quote the Attorney General 






“In some cases investigations were carried out and files submitted to 
me with findings that no evidence was disclosed against named 
persons and with recommendations that the inquiry file to be closed. 
In other cases the files submitted to me were found to be incomplete 
and deficient in critical aspects.  In all such cases including some of 
the cases where closure was recommended, the inquiry files would be 
returned back to the police on my behalf by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions with directives to carry out further investigations.  Some 
of those files would again be re-submitted to me often times after 
inordinate long periods and without significant evidence having been 
gathered.  Many of the returned files would never be resubmitted 
again.  Many reasons could be attributed for this unsatisfactory state 
of affairs including: - 
(i) Genuine difficulties in investigating and 
getting witnesses because of their fear of 
reprisals within  the context of the 
ethnic clashes. 
(ii) Lack of capacity and resources on the part 
of the investigating authorities. 
(iii) Self censorships or fear on the part of the 
investigators who are susceptible to 
pressure and manipulation. 
It should be noted that although the Attorney General has power to 
request investigations to be carried out by the Commissioner of Police 
he has no enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.  
Furthermore, the Police investigators are subject to discipline and 
control not by the Attorney General but the Commissioner of Police.” 
In passing, we express our doubts about the impotence expressed by the 
Attorney General in enforcing the directives given to the Commissioner of Police.  
As stated earlier, the Constitution makes it mandatory for the Commissioner to 
comply, and the consequences of breach should be obvious. 
 
At the request of this Commission, the Attorney General forwarded further 
correspondence to confirm further follow up of investigations and a bundle of 






March, 2000 when the Attorney General wrote to the Commissioner of Police in 
the following terms; 
AG/CONF/6/D/69    14th March 2000 
Mr. Philemon Abongo 






RE: REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO 
TRIBAL CLASHES IN KENYA 
By Gazette Notice No. 3312 of 1st July, 1998 H.E. the President appointed 
the above mentioned Commission under the chairmanship of the Hon. Mr. 
Justice A.M. Akiwumi to inquire into the tribal clashes that have occurred in 
various parts of Kenya since 1991. The Commission presented its report to 
the President in August 1999. 
In CHAPTER FIVE of the said report, the Commission has made its 
RECOMMENDATIONS. I refer you particularly to paragraphs 526,527 and 
528 where the Commission has recommended that certain persons be 
investigated regarding their role in the tribal clashes as recommended in the 
Report. 
In terms of S.26 (4) of the Constitution of Kenya this is to require you to carry 
out comprehensive investigations on all persons as recommended in the 
Report. As and when you complete investigations on any persons, let me 
have the report. The investigations should be carried out diligently and 
expeditiously. 
You are requested to make arrangements to come and collect the report and 
the voluminous attached documents. 




S.Amos Wako, EGH, EBS, MP 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Cc. Mr. Francis Sang 
     Director of Criminal Investigations 
     Nairobi 
Almost a year later the Director of Criminal Investigations Department 
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INVESTIGATION INTO TRIBAL CLASHES IN KENYA AS RECOMMENDED BY 
AKIWUMI JUDICIAL COMMISSION 
I acknowledge receipt of copy of your letter AG/CONF/6/D/69 dated 14th 
March, 2000 where you had, under the powers conferred to you by section 
26(4) of the constitution, directed for expeditious and diligent. Investigations to 
be carried out against the persons named in para 526,527 and 528, of the 
Akiwumi Commissions Report. As a result of the instruction, I appointed 
Investigating Officer who visited the affected districts in Rift Valley, Western, 
Nyanza and Coast Province, scores of people mentioned in the Akiwumi Report 
were traced as hereunder. Relevant duplicate inquiry files 70 in number are 
attached herewith for your perusal and necessary action, please. 
 
[The writer then analysed the allegations made, the evidence against the 
named persons and his findings on each, and continued] 
GENERAL OBSERVATION 
The investigation team in the course of its investigations toured the areas 
affected by tribal clashes, and having gone through the paraphernalia of 
gathering evidence noted the following: 
Χ)• The time lapse from the moment some of the incidences of the tribal clashes 
occurred and the time the inquiry was conducted, resulted into some 
witnesses not being traced, whilst some traced ones were unable to correctly 
remember the sequence of events of the clashes, hence lack of corroboration. 
On the other hand scores of witnesses, who volunteered their statements, 
were ostensibly upset with the re-collection of what happened and therefore 
ended up giving vindictive statements out of bitterness. 
∆)• A survey on the list of witnesses in the Commission’s report show that, most if 
not all of them, are public servants, politicians and lawyers. These by all 
standards are administrative witnesses who were neither at the scene of 
clashes nor victims of the clashes and could not therefore adduce direct 
evidence in relation to the clashes. 
Ε)• A more critical glance at the list of persons recommended by the Akiwumi 
Commission to be investigated, revealed that they were the same people who 
testified before the very Commission as witnesses, but on realizing that their 
testimony before the Akiwumi Commission had started impinging negatively 
on their well being, decided to assume defensive stand in recording of their 
statement with the Police, a situation which gave rise to the concealment of 
vital clash related information. 
Φ)• Most of the politicians who recommended to be investigated was as a result of 
their divergent and inflammatory political views as reported in Local 
Newspapers produced as exhibits before the Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry. 
However, the evidence to support the veracity of such political views were 




information captured by Local Newspapers without any fortification by the 
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That was seven years ago and the latest report from the Criminal Investigation 
Department dated 21st august, 2008, shows that 37 out of the 70 files were 
closed; 9 files are with the DPP having been re-submitted after further 
investigations; and 24 are with the police for further investigations.  The 
reference made by the Attorney General in the press statement issued on 1st 
October, 2002 that 1324 persons had been charged for various offences ranging 
from murder, inciting violence and taking part in riots relating to the clashes 
which occurred between October 1991 and December 1992, was not related to 
the findings of the Akiwumi report.  The figures were presented to Parliament on 
27th April, 1993 in response to a question by Member of Parliament for Gichugu, 
Ms. Karua.  
The same process of investigation in respect of the Kiliku Report and the report 
prepared by the Standing Committee was no different.   The Attorney General 
would make the request under s. 26 of the Constitution and the Police 
investigators would dutifully report on the lack of evidence and difficulties 
associated with collection of it.   In the end, the Attorney General testified that 
he had done all he could within his powers to fight impunity. To quote him 




“Ahmednassir:    Now we’ve seen that impunity is a problem, 
for the benefit of this commission can you highlight your 
achievements of your 17 year tenure in your fight against 
impunity?   What have you done to fight impunity for 17 years? 
[…..] 
Amos Wako: No, within my constitutional mandate, what 
I’ve done is to do what I ought to have done and that is to direct 
the Commissioner of Police to investigate.  And that I have done 
even in cases where politically I should not have done.  Like the 
Akiwumi Report, if you read the Akiwumi report and the rebuttal, 
a weak Attorney General would not have directed the 
Commissioner of Police to investigate all the people mentioned 
there.  He would have said these are politically correct I would 
not investigate them, nor direct investigation of them and so on.  
But I did direct even if those people were regarded as politically 
correct, I did direct investigations.” 
 
In view of the lack of any visible prosecution against perpetrators of politically 
related violence, the perception has pervaded for sometime now that the Attorney 
General cannot act effectively or at all to deal with such perpetrators and this, in 
our view, has promoted the sense of impunity and emboldened those who peddle 
their trade of violence during the election periods, to continue doing so. 
The Attorney General readily acknowledged that there was a gridlock in the 
criminal justice system and particularly at the investigative level.  He proposed 
the establishment of an independent investigative arm of Government, through 
an Act of Parliament, for a Directorate of Criminal Investigations to match the 
currently independent prosecution and judicial functions of the Criminal Justice 
System.   Curiously, we note that at the time the Attorney General made a 
request to the Commissioner of Police to investigate the persons named in the 
Akiwumi Report, the Department of Criminal Investigations was directly under 
the Office of the President.  It follows, and we can safely conclude, that it was 
indeed very difficult for the officers working directly under the same President 




from the President’s.   The Attorney General himself candidly accepted this 
reality; 
“[…..]   I think it is precisely for this reason that during the 
tenure of the first Attorney General in independent Kenya, the 
criminal investigation arm of the police was under the Attorney 
General and not under the Police Commissioner.  This made the 
Police investigators answerable to the Attorney General and 
execution of the Attorney General’s general directives was 
therefore prompt, effective and efficient,   This arrangement also 
insulated the CID officers from interference and manipulation.” 
A flawed investigative process is the very antithesis of a successful prosecution.  
In other words, the quality of investigation affects the outcome of both the 
prosecution and adjudication of the matter. And where there are no successful 
prosecutions the culture of impunity creeps in as people commit crimes with the 
knowledge that it is unlikely that a proper investigation will be carried out. 
The sorry state of the criminal justice system continued to play itself out even as 
this Commission was in the middle of its hearings.  On 21st June, 2008, the 
Attorney General appointed a joint team of his officers and police officers to 
review all cases related to post-election violence including: cases of persons 
charged and are in remand, cases of persons charged but are out on bail, cases 
pending arrest of known persons, cases of persons in police custody but are not 
yet charged.  No results of such exercise were furnished to the Commission, 
despite requests and promises, up to the time of writing our report. 
 
Other aspects of the Criminal Justice System 
The other weakness in the criminal justice system as pointed out by the Attorney 
General is the lack of professional manpower in the department of Public 
Prosecutions where only 64 State Counsel serve the entire country against an 
establishment of 94.  The ideal compliment would be 450 to replace 365 police 





It was necessary, in the Attorney General’s recommendation, to empower the 
prosecution department by granting security of tenure to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and improving the terms and conditions for hiring and retaining 
staff.  It is also necessary to revamp the capacity of the judicial function 
commensurately to complete a fully independent and efficient chain of 
administration of criminal justice. 
 
Obstacles to Investigation of Post Election Violence (PEV) 
This commission recognizes that there are real and genuine difficulties in 
investigating violence of such magnitude as took place after the 2007 elections.   
Some of these difficulties have been experienced by this commission in its work 
and we do not doubt that any investigating agency will experience some 
difficulty. Some of the practical problems any investigative agency would face in 
investigating PEV include the following; 
• Most of the complainants and witnesses were victims of displacement 
hence it may be difficult trace them to carry out full and proper 
investigations. 
• The nature of violence is one that invites expectation of retribution if a 
person gives evidence against a perpetrator.  In most cases the 
perpetrators were persons known to the victim hence the fear for 
retribution is real. 
• Where the perpetrator of violence is an agent of state or perceived to be 
associated with an agency of state, there is reluctance to co-operate with 
or give evidence to the state. 
The Attorney General, in his testimony, lamented the lack of a witness protection 
programme as part of the frustrations faced by investigators.  While it was 
difficult enough to trace would be witnesses who were displaced following the 
violence, those who were traceable were reluctant to record statements and 
actively participate in identification parades, or appear in court to testify, for fear 




on 2nd September, 2008, remains untested and has received a budgetary 
allocation of only Ksh.20 million this financial year. 
 
Lack of political will and fear of the political establishment 
The Akiwumi Report and the accompanying “Comments by the Government” 
were released in 2002.   As this constituted an official inquiry into the endemic 
problem of ethnic clashes, one would have thought that the contents of the 
report would make compulsory reading for all government administrators 
particularly those working in clash prone areas.   We were shocked, however, 
that such an endeavour which was funded from the public purse, would provide 
no lessons for those in positions of leadership. The Permanent Secretary in 
Charge of Provincial Administration and Internal Security439 confirmed that he 
had not read the Akiwumi Commission Report and to us it did not come as a 
matter of surprise either that his subordinates, the PCs and DCs, had no 
knowledge of the report let alone the issues raised therein.  For example, the DC 
Molo, who testified before us, confirmed that he had not read the Akiwumi and 
Kiliku Reports yet his district was at the epicentre of ethnic and land clashes.  
He stated that he had, “intelligence reports in my office and these were 
sufficient.”440 
 
Our view is that the lackadaisical manner in which the government dealt with 
the Akiwumi Report only goes to illustrate that the state was not particularly 
interested in resolving once and for all the issue of ethnic violence.  Those who 
benefited from it were secure in the knowledge that the report, notwithstanding 
its deficiencies, would continue to gather dust and the issue of ethnic violence 








During the hearings, the Commission explored why a concerted effort had not 
been made by the government to arrest and prosecute those who are alleged to 
have incited, funded and promoted violence instead of concentrating on minor 
actors in the mayhem. Most administrators spoke of fear of the general 
population and also fear of the political leadership.  Commission Witness No. 80 
gave the example of three councillors who were arrested in Litein in Bureti 
District on account of inciting violence.  He stated;441 
“…… when you arrest the so-called politicians people don’t look 
into the crime.  They say that the police have arrested one of 
their own.   We arrested some councillors in Buret and the 
crowd was so rowdy.  They stormed the whole Buret Police 
Station so much so that we were compelled to release those 
councillors.” 
 
There is of course, a symbiotic relationship between the politicians and their 
supporters which continues to fuel impunity.   Politicians rely on their 
supporters to enforce immunity while their supporters, who are the hand 
maidens of the violence, get protection from the political god fathers.  This 
interference normally comes in the form of “orders from above.” A senior police 
officer testified to this.442 
Q: We have also noted that there was tension in Kisii/Luo border. It is 
a common phenomenal? 
A: My lord, this I found to be common and when I followed the genesis 
of this problem, even in 2002 and 1997, that is the area where the 
Luos were fighting the Kisii. So it was potentially charged area, My 
Lord. But what we were seeing is that the politicians were now 
working up the youth, so that the two sides, the Luo from the Rongo 
and Kisii South District, could now be at loggerheads. 









A: Well, we were able. We didn’t really arrest them because we didn’t 
want to create more tension than before. So what we were doing is 
that, we used to call the politicians and talk to them and say we know 
what you are up to and most of them, once they know we know, they 
sort of die down. So, actually there was no fighting at that border. 
Q: And you talked about some criminal gangs called Chikororo. Did 
you monitor this gang? 
A: We monitored Chikororo and My Lords, incidentally in that area, 
the criminal gangs are very many there. You find the Nchikororo, you 
find Sungusungu, and you find Amachuma. This is all in that area 
and Ochororo area. These are groups which are basically according to 
our investigations we found that these are men and not really boys, 
My Lord who are used specifically when the elections are near, to 
scare away potential voters who are against a particular candidate. 
So they are used every time there is an election. 
Q: And you do anything about that? 
A: We sort of arrested most of them, because most of them are known. 
We arrested most of the Nchikororo and Sungusungu; and we had a 
lot of problems. 
Q: You had what? 
A: A lot of problems, because there was a lot of tension. We arrest, 
pressure is put, I release them. That they should at least be released. 
Q: When you talk about pressure, what kind of pressure was it? 
A: You find that I get calls from Nairobi, my boss says, did you arrest 
these people? I say, yes for this and that. Then he says, well, warn 
them, let them go home. I comply. 
Q: And you said your boss is the Police Commissioner. 
A: My Lords, my boss is the Commissioner of Police. 
Q: So they would get arrested and you have to release them. 
A: Yes, we release them. 
Q: And when you arrested them, there would be tension in all those 




A: Yes, My Lords, that is what we were noticing that now there will be 
a lot of tension even than before. So that is why I am saying these are 
just imaginations to play to the psychology of people or us, because 
they know that once we arrest them, they indicate everybody else so 
that now we can’t even more or operate. 
Q: Did you find any politicians who were either organizing or inciting 
these particular youths? 
A: My Lords, for this particular Chinkororo Hon. Nyachae was behind. 
Q: And when you say behind, what exactly do you mean? 
A: He is the one who organize, financed. They were known as his 
people. 
Q: And did you find any tangible evidence of this organization of 
financing? 
A: That is where the problem is, My Lords, because to get tangible 
evidence was very difficult. But as we go along investigating, you 
come across some evidence that so and so we have arrested that 
person, that person is aligned to so and so. So you see a pattern. Of 
this group you arrest, you see which group now turns up, making a lot 
of noise or even calling my boss or whatever.  But to get tangible 
evidence, you say yes, he paid them money. 
Q: Do you know that whoever was organizing them has direct 
connections to your superiors, at least? 
A: No, my Lords, not direct connection. I won’t call it direct connection, 
My Lords. 
Q: Or had connection to level above you. 
A: What they were doing according to me is that, once we arrest, they 
couldn’t call me direct, here in Kisumu. But there is a way of 
circumventing I don’t know who and then they get my boss. So it 
would come from my boss when I report, because we kept on talking 
many times in the cause of the day. In the morning hours or even in 
the evening briefs. I will inform him I have all these people arrested, I 
have detained them in this Police station, may be after a day he will 
call me and say, you remember those people you arrested, give them 




Q: The issue I am putting to you obviously these people you were 
arresting have direct connections to persons who are higher up, who 
are able to talk or find their way to the Commissioner obviously, even 
if they were not financing. At least you can say they had some 
influential connections somewhere. 
A: Yes, My Lord, I can say that.”   
This symbiotic relationship between the politicians and their supporters creates 
a real and genuine fear among those who enforce the law.   One Provincial 
Commissioner testified that he feared to order the arrest of senior politicians 
involved in the incitement of violence because his job would be at stake.  The PC 
echoed the words of his police counterpart, Francis Gichuki, made 10 years ago 
before the Akiwumi Commission: 
“My Lords, in a political Government, we have to be cautious.  This 
is a political Government.”443 
There must be an end to this cowardice and pious sense of self preservation in 
public service if impunity will be eradicated in this country! 
 
The Judicial Function 
In order to seek further clarification on and find solutions to the gridlock in the 
criminal justice system, we also invited the Registrar of the High court to shed 
some light on the measures the Judiciary has taken to address the situation.  
The Registrar was unable to testify in person but forwarded a statement dated 
28th August, 2008. 
For a long time now, the judiciary has been vilified for failure to play its pivotal 
role in the democratic governance of this country.  Of the three arms of 
Government, it is the least understood and has therefore acquired the notoriety 
of losing the confidence and trust of those it must serve because of the 






members of it were.  That is why, for example, the leadership and members of 
the ODM refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts to resolve the dispute 
that arose after the 2007 general elections in relation to the Presidential results.  
The institution has also been accused of delays in the administration of justice 
and for non-transparency in its functions. 
In response to those accusations the Registrar stated that there has been major 
reform initiatives made by the judiciary so far, and they continue to be made.  
Some interventions for speedy delivery of justice effected so far include:  
recruitment of more magistrates and expansion of the capacity to appoint more 
Judges, establishment of Court Users Committees where all actors in the 
criminal justice system meet and resolve operational difficulties; customer care 
desks to address public concerns; mobile courts for remote areas; construction 
of new courts around the country; annual open day sessions for interaction with 
consumers of justice; publicizing judicial service charter for education of the 
public; introduction of continuous legal education for judicial officers through 
the Judicial Training Institute; comprehensive review and simplification of Rules 
of Procedure, both civil and criminal; and the establishment of the Expeditious 
Disposal of Cases Committee which has devised modalities for reducing backlog 
of cases. 
In our view, while the administrative reform initiatives so far undertaken are 
commendable, nothing short of comprehensive constitutional reforms will restore 
the desired confidence and trust in the judiciary.  The non-contentious 
provisions in the draft new constitution provided a new hope in the institution, 
but there is no certainty as to when it will become law.  Proposals for the 
enactment of the Judicial Service Bill which would guarantee financial and 
operational independence; appointment, discipline and removal of judicial 
officers, independence and autonomy of the Judicial service Commission, 





In the context of the post-election violence the police arrested numerous 
suspected offenders in more than 13,000 incidents and 1337 cases were taken 
to court.  The Registrar was unable to confirm the progress in the hearing and 
adjudication of those cases.  Many more are pending under investigations; 
others are pending arrest of known persons.  The influx of post-election violence 
cases, in our view, poses a big challenge to the judiciary considering the special 




We undertook in our various briefs to address the so-called “amnesty debate” in 
our final report.  It is “so-called” because both sides of the debate have varying 
definitions for “amnesty” and consequently how it can be applied in the context 
of post-election violence.  The difficulty is not misplaced as indeed controversy 
has dogged the term since the Greeks gave it to the world from “amnestia”, the 
same root word for “amnesia”.  In common parlance, amnesty is the act of an 
authority (e.g. parliament or government) by which the State restores those who 
may have been guilty of an offence against it to the positions of innocent 
persons.  It includes more than pardon, in as much as it obliterates all legal 
remembrance of the offence.444 The dictionary meaning is “a general pardon, 
especially for political offences.”445  
Amnesty may be extended when the authority decides that bringing citizens into 
compliance with the law is more important than punishing them for past 
offences.  Some advantages cited for using amnesty include avoiding expensive 
prosecutions, especially when massive numbers of violators are involved; 
prompting violators to come forward who might otherwise have eluded 
authorities; and promoting reconciliation between offenders and society.  The 











Simply put, the proponents of amnesty contend, and passionately so, that the 
thousands of youth who were arrested and detained in the post-election violence 
were exercising their democratic right to demonstrate against a stolen election 
and therefore committed no offence.  It was the reaction of the police to the 
peaceful demonstrators which caused violence.  Indeed, if it was not for the 
youth, there would be no coalition Government.  The release of arrested youth 
has also been tied up with resettlement of IDPs as a quid pro quo. We take it 
from the Secretary General of ODM party, Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o 447 thus: 
“The youth who were arrested should be set free as they were 
exercising their democratic right to express themselves when police 
procured violence.” 
On the other hand, the opponents contend, equally passionately, that human 
rights violations and crimes of unprecedented gravity with serious ramifications 
for the future of this country were committed and the perpetrators at all levels 
must face the full force of the law.  Amnesty would encourage impunity. 
 
The numbers 
Intertwined with the issue of amnesty in principle, was the issue of the number 
of “youths” arrested and detained in police custody and once again the parties 
on both sides of the debate were unhelpful.  In our effort to establish the exact 







we invited several witnesses to shed some light on it.  One was Prof. Nyong’o who 
stated: 
“Q:……….you made an allegation that there are youths still being held in police 
custody, first and foremost who are these youths, how many are they and would 
you know where they are being held in police custody? 
Anyang’ Nyong’o:  Mr. Chairman, the Attorney General has details on these youths 
and indeed I do believe that he has made presentations to the Commission, but Mr. 
Chairman if you want more details we are quite prepared to do so but I do know 
that the Attorney General has made presentations to this Commission and although 
some of his figures can be doubted.  But I think that is for further examination by 
the Commission to prove how many youths are still in custody. 
Chairman:  Unfortunately, the Attorney General did not give us anything; he says 
the police have the information.  So if you have the information we would like to 
have it. 
Anyang’ Nyong’o:  Okay, Chairman, I could do so; not now, but I know that the 
evidence exists. 
Chairman:  That’s alright.  If you undertake to produce it, we will be happy to have 
it.  Thank you.” 
 
Despite the promise to shore up the claim, no further information was received 
by the time we made our report.  The other example was the Chairman of the 
Luo Council of Elders, Ker Riaga Ogallo, who responded thus: 
“Protas:  Yes.  On the issue of the Luo Youth who have been arrested as a 
consequence of the violence that erupted in Kisumu, I was wondering if the 
Luo Council of Elders or any other institution of the Luo community that you 
are aware of, if there are any keeping of any records kept somewhere, either 
with your organization the Luo Council of Elders or any other Luo or Kisumu-
based community organization that you know of that have kept records, the 
number and the names, if possible of all the youth who were arrested at 
that time. 
Riaga Ogallo:  The, I think even Police Commissioner, issue those who were 
arrested in Kisumu; they issue them.  I think if you were here and yourself if 
you were able to listen to radios and papers, they issue them – not their 
name, but the number.  Though the number was small but those who were 
arrested were bigger than the number which was given out by the police 
spokesman.  And those who were killed were also, the number police gave 
out were small, but those who even Kisumu Mortuary were full of those 






Protas:  Yes, that’s the reason why I was hoping that may be sources other 
than police and I was hoping that may be the Luo Council of Elders or any 
other community-based organization could have kept some non-official 
records of these arrests and the reason is because you allude to, you 
obviously support their release and you must be aware of the debate that 
surrounds this issue whereby some in government and elsewhere argue as 
you do that these youths should be left free and others oppose this.  And a 
related issue on that debate concerns the number of these youths arrested.  
Some people put the number figure to thousands and even more, and I think 
the number that police – the police have given has been strongly disputed by 
some people including some in the government. 
So there is obviously a problem with number, with number of youths who 
were arrested and I was hoping that may be we could have in addition to 
figures that have been provided to us by police, I was hoping that you may 
be aware of some other sources where we could get other figures. 
Riaga Ogallo:  You know this thing when it happened, police were all over 
Nyanza.  In every district, they were there and demonstrations were being 
carried out all over.  IN my area, or in Oyugis, in front of my home they killed 
one boy when I am seeing like this one.  I am seeing like this and then they 
shot at him and in the town of Oyugis alone over 100 boys were gunned 
down and those who were arrested, because police cells were full, with 
those people who were arrested.  We could not know the number, but what 
we know, they were arrested.” 
The Ker continued: 
“Chairman: … and that is why we are talking about the amnesty debate, 
because it is an important aspect of our investigations which we must 
address; are there youths who were arrested,  If so, how many; are there 
youths who were charged in courts, if so, how many; are there still youths 
who were detained in some place and nobody knows how many they are; 
are there some who were killed; are there some who disappeared?  And we 
would suspect that your Council would have information of that nature this 
is why I revert to the question my brother asked.  You don’t have that 
information as a Council? 
Riaga Ogallo:  No.  We don’t have the number but the information we’re still 
having there are some youths who participated in this election violence who 
have not been seen in their respective areas.  Though some were killed and 
those who were killed, their families took them for burial, so they knew that 
so-and-so is killed and those who disappeared they were there they were 
arrested until now they have not been captured where they are. 




Riaga Ogallo:  We’re still also asking that question. 
Chairman:  That is the question, because if my family was affected 
assuming that I was in Luo Nyanza and my family was affected my son 
was – went out that day we suspect he got involved, we never found him in 
the mortuary, he was nowhere in any hospital, we have never found him for 
the last six months I would come to the Council of Elders to assist me if I 
was helpless.  Are you saying no one has ever come to complaint about any 
missing person? 
Riaga Ogallo:  No, no, no, sir. 
Chairman:  Any missing young person? 
Riaga Ogallo:  Your honour sir, no they have come.  When we also go to the 
police station they told us that we don’t have them you know where they 
are.  That is the answer we’re getting from police. 
Chairman:  Yes, that is so but you have the list of those who are missing? 
Riaga Ogallo:  No the list we have not compiled yet. 
Chairman:  Is it possible to compile that list so that we can address that 
issue instead of hearing there are young people who are missing?  
Somebody has that list or can compile one and nobody is giving it to 
anybody that we’ll never find any solution unless we address that issue. 
Riaga Ogallo:  No but this time at the moment, I cannot commit that one 
because I don’t have funds for going round because it is a wide area.  When 
I commit myself I will avail the list.  Now that, I cannot do that one, you 
honour.” 
As for the definition of “youth” Ker Ogallo said “When I refer to youths; these 
young people who still have – hot tempered people …these young people from 30 
coming to 18, they are high tempered people.  To control them is becoming a 
problem when something comes abruptly.”  It did not matter whether they were in 
school, work, business or just idle. 
The flipside was the police version and the Commissioner of Police categorically 
denied the accusation that the police had arrested any youths, who were still in 
their custody as at the time he testified on 9th July, 2008.  The police, he said, 
had received complaints on 13,416 cases which they were investigating.  They 




release was no longer in the hands of the police.  When the Attorney General 
testified before the Commission on 21st August, 2008, he alluded to an audit of 
all cases before the courts but did not disclose any figures as the matter was 
before the Cabinet.  He said in part: 
“I may here mention that I received very many complaints that there 
are some people who are being charged or who are in custody and 
there is no sufficient evidence.  Some have not even been charged and 
so on although they are in remand.  Actually very many complaints 
from all over the country.  So I set up in – towards the end of June, 
beginning of July, a joint team of two senior officers from my office 
and from the police to carry out an audit of those cases which are 
before the court and look at the files and to see where there is 
evidence, to recommend continuation and where these is no evidence, 
termination. 
But purely from the point of view of evidence or no evidence.  So that 
this allegation that there are some people who are being charged, who 
were charged, there is no evidence, and the State is deliberately 
delaying the hearing of those cases for a long time so as to delay 
those people in custody is not there.  So there is a team now which is 
carrying out what I would call an audit of the cases which are before 
the court.” 
In sum, there was no evidence before us which we could evaluate to determine 
the number of youths, if any, arrested and still being detained by police. 
 
The law 
It would be against the Constitution to arrest and hold any person suspected of 
committing a crime for more than 24 hours or 14 days if the offence is 
punishable by death.448  The amnesty debate would therefore be misplaced if it 
makes reference to persons arrested and detained beyond such periods since 
they would not be lawfully held. There is further protection of the law under 






lies exclusively in the office of the Attorney General under section 26 of the 
Constitution as discussed earlier.  When the amnesty debate was put to him, the 
Hon. the Attorney General stated:  
“Pascal Kambale:  There is this issue about the so called amnesty debate.  
And what we understand is that this is being discussed within the Cabinet 
and you obviously are a member of the government.  What can you tell us 
about where this debate is now? 
Attorney General:  I cannot of course mention anything that is discussed in 
cabinet.  I have prescribed to a constitutional oath of secrecy.  In fact that’s a 
top secret you see, so I cannot even mention what is there.  But what I can 
tell you is the position of the Attorney General now is that all cases where 
there is evidence must be prosecuted to the logical end, and all cases where 
there is no sufficient evidence should be terminated.  That is the position of 
the Attorney General.  There are some people who will say that oh no 
everything should be.  The debate is going on, it is in the public domain, I am 
not part of that debate.” 
 
The law also provides in section 27 of the Constitution that the President 
has the prerogative of mercy on various categories of persons listed under 
that section.  He also has the liberty to consult with an advisory committee 
set up under the same constitution in sections 28 and 29. 
Apart from relevant legal provisions in municipal law, we are also guided 
by International Criminal Law which does not recognise amnesty for gross 
human rights violators. 
 
Conclusion 
From our own analysis of the amnesty debate we think it has been unduly 
politicized on both sides.  It is imperative to guard against further 
encouragement of the culture of impunity by granting blanket amnesty to all and 
sundry in the post-election mayhem.  There were obvious and serious criminal 
offences committed under the laws of this country as well as breaches of human 




human rights defenders would be devastated if such amnesty was granted.  It is 
incumbent on the Attorney General therefore to apply the law firmly and 
equitably for as long as it takes to bring to justice those persons who were 
culpable.   
Having said that, we realize, and we have stated it above, that there are special 
challenges in terms of investigations and prosecution of post-election violence 
offences.  It may be necessary to consider an offer of amnesty to some minor 
offenders in exchange for truthful confession and assistance in the arrest and 
prosecution of the planners, organizers, financiers and, in the case of security 
agencies, the perpetrators of the post-election violence.  Other creative initiatives 
must also be devised to aid in investigations and prosecution of the offenders.  
Most importantly the provisions of the new Witness Protection Act 2008 should 
be fully utilized in aid of PEV related investigations and prosecutions. 
 
Findings  
We find in our assessment that the chain of criminal justice system is generally 
weak and the weakest link is the investigative function.  The weakness in the 
system impacts on the rule of law and therefore promotes impunity.  Urgent 






















This chapter contains the Commission’s recommendations that relate to the 
State Security Agencies and to issues of impunity.  The discussion, findings and 
conclusions that the recommendations are based upon are fully laid out in the 
preceding chapters. 
 
In accordance with the established Terms of Reference regarding 
recommendations for measures to eradicate impunity, legal and administrative 
measures and following an investigation into the actions and omissions of the 
State Security Agencies, the Commission makes the recommends appearing 
below. These recommendations should be implemented under the auspices of 
the Panel of Eminent African Personalities acting in consultation with the 
President and the Prime Minister of Kenya, with the full co-operation of 
Parliament, the Judiciary and the office of the Attorney General as more 
specifically described below. 
1. A special tribunal, to be known as the Special Tribunal for Kenya  be set 
up as a court that will sit within the territorial boundaries of the Republic 
of Kenya and seek accountability against persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility for crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to 
the 2007 General Elections in Kenya. The Special Tribunal shall achieve 
this through the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of such 
crimes.  
 
2. The Special Tribunal shall apply Kenyan law and also the International 
Crimes Bill, once this is enacted, and shall have Kenyan and international 






3. In order to fully give effect to the establishment of the Special Tribunal, an 
agreement for its establishment shall be signed by representatives of the 
parties to the Agreement on National Accord and Reconciliation within 60 
days of the presentation of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Post-Election Violence to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, or 
the Panel’s representative. A statute (to be known as “the Statute for the 
Special Tribunal”) shall be enacted into law and come into force within a 
further 45 days after the signing of the agreement.  
 
4. The date of commencement of the functioning of the Special Tribunal shall 
be determined by the President, in consultation with the Prime Minister, 
the Chief Justice, the Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and 
Constitutional Affairs and the Attorney-General, within 30 days after the 
giving of Presidential Assent to the Bill enacting the Statute. 
 
5. If either an agreement for the establishment of the Special Tribunal is not 
signed, or the Statute for the Special Tribunal fails to be enacted, or the 
Special Tribunal fails to commence functioning as contemplated above, or 
having commenced operating its purposes are subverted, a list  containing 
names of and relevant information on those suspected to bear the greatest 
responsibility for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the proposed 
Special Tribunal shall be forwarded to the Special Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court. The Special Prosecutor shall be requested to 
analyze the seriousness of the information received with a view to 
proceeding with an investigation and prosecuting such suspected persons.  
 
6. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall ensure that the Special 
Tribunal is insulated against objections on constitutionality and to that 





7. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall provide that the Special 
Tribunal shall consist of four organs: the Chambers (including an Appeals 
Chamber) and the Prosecutor, which shall be independent of each other, 
the Registry, and the Defence Office. 
 
8. The Bill establishing the Tribunal shall provide that Chambers shall be 
composed of 6 independent judges, three in the Trial Chamber, and three 
in the Appeals Chamber. The Presiding Judge of each Chamber shall be a 
Kenyan while the other two judges in each chamber shall be non-Kenyan 
and drawn from member states of the Commonwealth. 
 
9. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall provide for the following 
procedure for the appointment of the judges for each chamber and the 
Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal: 
 
i. The President shall appoint the Chair of the Trial Chamber in 
consultation with the Prime Minister, both acting on the advice of 
the Chief Justice, from among persons qualified to be appointed 
judge of the High Court of Kenya. 
ii. The Panel of Eminent African Personalities shall identify the other 
two members who will be appointed by the President, in 
consultation with the Prime Minister, from among persons qualified 
to serve as judge of a superior court of record in any part of the 
Commonwealth. 
iii. The same procedure shall be applied for the appointment of the 
Chair and members of the Appeals Chamber. 
iv. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal shall be appointed by the President 
in consultation with the Prime Minister from among persons 
qualified to serve as judge in a superior court of record in any part of 






10. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall further provide for: 
i. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal which shall include the jurisdiction 
to adjudicate over the criminal cases brought against persons 
bearing greatest responsibility for serious crimes, particularly crimes 
against humanity, related to the 2007 post election violence.  
ii. The right of appeal from the decisions of the Trial Chamber to the 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal. 
iii. The ouster of the Jurisdiction of ordinary courts from the in relation 
to the proceedings of the Special Tribunal.  
 
12.  The Bill establishing the Tribunal shall provide for sufficient authority and 
independence to the Special Tribunal to conduct investigations and shall 
in particular provide that: 
 
• The Special Tribunal shall have authority to recruit  and 
control its own staff, including such staff, working under 
the Prosecutor, as will be necessary to conduct 
prosecutions; 
 
• The head of investigations and not less than three other 
members of the investigation team shall be non-Kenyan so 
as to provide an independent approach to the investigation 
function of the Tribunal. 
 
• The investigations team shall report to and work under the 
general direction of the Prosecutor. 
 
13. The Special Tribunal shall take custody of all investigative material and 







Other Recommendations  
 
The Commission makes the following further recommendations: 
 
1.  The International Crimes Bill 2008 be fast-tracked for enactment by 
Parliament to facilitate investigation and prosecution of crimes against 
humanity. 
2.  The Witness Protection Act 2008 be fully utilized in the protection of all 
witnesses who will need such protection in the course of investigation, 
prosecution and adjudication of PEV cases. 
 
3.  The Freedom of Information Bill be enacted forthwith to enable state and 
non-state actors to have full access to information which may lead to 
arrest, detention and prosecution of persons responsible for gross 
violations. 
 
4.  All persons holding public office and public servants charged with criminal 
offences related to post-election violence be suspended from duty until the 
matter is fully adjudicated upon. 
 
5.  Upon conviction of any person charged with post-election violence offences 
of any nature, such persons shall be barred from holding any public office 
or contesting any electoral position. 
 
In relation to overall operational and service delivery issues emanating 
from the 2007 elections period in Kenya. 
The development and application of the National Security Policy, as articulated 
in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Agenda Item 4 and the First 
Medium Term Plan (2008-2012), be finalised as a matter of urgency, and 
The Conflict and Disaster Early Warning and Response systems,  articulated in 
the First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012), are developed and implemented as a 




The State Security Agencies develop, under the oversight of the NSAC,  joint 
operational preparedness arrangements (to be conducted at least once every two 
years) including desk top scenarios and full operational exercises to assist in 
their readiness for dealing with high level security and emergency situations, 
and 
The joint security operational preparedness arrangements comprise all key 
participants including,  in the case of elections, the ECK,  the Ministry of Health, 
and the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (Disaster Management),  and 
The NSAC take a greater leadership role in determining security priorities, 
focusing on preventive strategies and actions, and providing clear direction to 
State Security Agencies, and 
The NSAC develop and implement security review arrangements to ensure that 
agencies’ performance in security events such as the PEV are assessed, lessons 
learned and appropriate improvements and modifications to standard operating 
procedures are completed,  and 
The NSAC immediately conduct a full review of the functionality of the 
committees that make up the KSIM to determine their relative performance 
during the Post Election Violence, and 
Where improvements are identified they are implemented immediately, and 
The results of the review are made public within 14 days of completion, and 
Immediate steps are taken to put in place independent oversight arrangements 
of the operation of the NSIS, and 
The NSIS shall be required to report annually to parliament and the annual 







Specific Recommendations for the Police 
1. A comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police Service and 
Administration Police be undertaken. This reform shall be 
initiated immediately and shall: 
a. Involve a complete audit of the current police management, 
structures, policies, practices and procedures. 
b. Include extensive consultation with a wide variety of national and 
international stakeholders. 
c. Undertake extensive and comprehensive public consultations  
d. Include an examination and consideration of applicable 
international law and best practices 
e. Include a thorough examination, review and revision of all tactics, 
weapons and ‘Use of Force’ employed by the Kenyan Police. 
f. Explore international capacity building possibilities for policing in 
general with a specific focus on criminal investigations, 
community based policing and information collection analysis 
and dissemination.  
g. Include the creation of  a modern Code of Conduct 
h. Include a complete revision of the Police Act 
i. Incorporate a review of issues relating to the ethnic and tribal 
balance and deployment within the Kenya Police Service. 
j. Include an examination of the structures of the police including 
the Senior Executive 
k. Include the establishment of a Police Services Commission for the 
Kenya Police. 
l. Investigate and make recommendations relating to any other 
areas of policing and law enforcement that are, in the opinion of 
the Police Reform Group (PRG), relevant to the improvement of 







2. An ‘Independent Police Conduct Authority’ is established with 
the legislative powers and authority to investigate police conduct 
and provide civilian oversight.  Establishment will be undertaken 
in the following way: 
a. Enactment of an Independent Police Conduct Authority Act  
b. Involve a complete review of the current police complaints and 
disciplinary processes within the Kenya Police Service.    
c. Include an examination and consideration of applicable 
international law and best practices 
d. Report directly to parliament through the Minister responsible 
e. Work under the authority of its own Act and have sufficient 
powers to properly investigate all police conduct issues. 
f. The ‘Authority’ is to be a person qualified to be a judge of the High 
Court Kenya 
g. The ‘Authority’ is to have the power to investigate public 
complaints against police and ‘own motion’ conduct issues. 
h. Legislation will require that some, more serious policing actions 
‘must’ be reported to the Authority i.e. allegations of corruption, 
deaths in custody, serious injury and police related shootings. 
i. Have the legislative power to make recommendations for change 
to policing policy, practices and procedures. 
j. The ‘Authority’ is to have retrospective powers to deal with 
historical serious misconduct. 
 
3. The Administration Police is integrated into the Kenya Police 
Service creating a single police entity.  The integration shall: 
a. Commence with the command, responsibility and accountability 
for every aspect of the Administration Police transferring to the 
Commissioner of Police with immediate effect. 





c. Enable a combined police organ to function in an unencumbered 
fashion exercising constabulary independence in performing its 
functions.  
d. Ensure that all police services adopt an operational role 
independent of executive influence.  
e. Ensure that a new and contemporary police entity is led by 
professional police officers. 
 
4. All of the reforms articulated in the recommendations 
immediately above relating to the Police be initiated immediately 
and shall:  
a. Be undertaken and completed by a panel of policing experts 
(Policing Reform Group - PRG) who will work completely 
independent of but alongside the Kenya Police Service and 
Administration Police. 
b. Be comprised of a team of four experts including Kenyan and 
international specialists in transformational change, strategic 
auditing and policing. 
c. Source the international experts from likeminded common law 
countries. 
d. Have the PRG established and begin their work immediately with 
a mandated duration of 6 months. 
e. Have the PRG report directly to the Minister of Justice  
f. Furnish progress reports to the Government of Kenya and the 
African Union, regarding the conduct and findings of the PRG and 
to provide a final report within two (2) months of the end of the 
mandated period, unless otherwise agreed.  
g. Ensure that the PRG identify, early in the process, appropriate 
‘milestones’ or ‘check points’, at which time meaningful interim 




h. Provide that the PRG be able to make interim and immediate 
recommendations for reform and change at any stage during the 































Roles and Functions of SSAs 
 
In examining the various aspects of how SSAs performed during the PEV period 
the Commission found it necessary to familiarise itself with the roles and 




Officials at the highest level participate within the NSAC.  Chaired by the Head of 
the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet and meeting monthly or on an ad 
hoc basis its role includes:  
 
• Monitoring and advising the Cabinet Security Committee and the 
President 
• Keeping threats to security under constant review 
• Designing and preparing a national security strategy and 
contingency plans 
• Guiding and directing PSICs and DSICs in dealing with issues 
posing threats to law and order 
• Reviewing the effectiveness of security agencies in consultation with 
existing machinery 
JSIS 
Chaired by Director A&P (NSIS), meets once a month and is responsible for: 
• Collating and deliberating on operational reports from security 
agencies and established operational and communication centers. 




• Following up implementation of NSAC decisions. 
 
PSIC 
Chaired by the Provincial Commissioner and meets monthly or on ad hoc basis 
and is responsible for 
 
• Coordinating and directing security intelligence matters, including 
efforts against terrorism and serious crimes. 
• Reviewing the internal security situation in the Province 
• Directing and initiating actions on issues highlighted in DSIC 
minutes 
DSIC 
Chaired by the District Commissioner, meets monthly or on ad hoc basis and is 
responsible for: 
• Reviewing the internal security situation in the district. 
• Liaising with relevant departments on issues of security and 
intelligence interest  
NSIS 
The Service’s mandate is spelt out in the NSIS Act as follows:  
 
Collect, analyze and disseminate information for the purposes of: 
• Detecting and identifying any threat or potential threat to the 
security of Kenya; 
• Advising the President and the Government of any threat or 
potential threat to the security of Kenya; 
• Taking steps to protect the national security interests of Kenya 






Gather Ministerial Intelligence at the request of any Government Ministry or 
Department, evaluate and transmit as appropriate  
Coordinate in cooperation with other Government departments a  steady flow of 
intelligence  
Carry out security vetting 
Make recommendations to the Government in connection with:- 
• Policies concerning security intelligence 
• Security intelligence priorities 
• Security measures in Government Ministries, Departments or 
Agencies 




In relation to the situation around the PEV the Military provides support to the 
civil authority when called upon to do so. 
 
Section 3 (2) of the Armed Forces Act (Chapter 199 of the Laws of Kenya) 
provides: - 
“The Kenya Army, The Kenya Air force and the Kenya Navy are charged 
with the defence of the Republic and the support of the civil power in 
the maintenance of order, and with such other duties as may from time to 






The Armed Forces Act therefore allows for military aid to civil authority limited to 
the maintenance of order. However it also provides that other duties may be 
assigned by the Minister after consultation with the Defence Council. 
 
Police 
This applies to the regular police and special units such as the General Service 
Unit (GSU) and Anti stock theft Unit (ASTU). 
 
Section 14(1) of the Police Act sets out the functions of the Kenya Police as: - 
• Maintenance of Law and Order 
• The preservation of peace 
• The protection of life and property 
• The prevention and detection of crime 
• The apprehension of offenders 
• The enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is charged. 
The duties of a police officer are set out under section 15 of the Police Act and 
they include:- 
• Obedience of all lawful orders from his superiors. 
• Obedience of all orders and warrants issued to him. 
• Collect and communicate intelligence affecting Law and Order 
• Take all steps necessary to prevent the commission of offences and 
public nuisance. 
• Detect offenders and bring them to justice 
• To apprehend all persons who he is legally authorised to apprehend 






The Administration Police Force is established under the provisions of section 3 
the Administration Police Act, Chapter 85 of the Laws of Kenya under the 
command of the Commandant appointed under the provisions of that Act. 
The Administration Police Act was enacted to commence on 20th June 1958. 
Various sections of the Act have since been amended over the years and a 
revised edition was published in 1986. The latest amendments to some of the 
sections were done in 2000.  
Powers and Duties (Part III 8) 
• Every officer shall –  
When called upon by any chief or sub-chief assist him in the 
exercise of his lawful duties; 
Obey and execute promptly all orders and warrants lawfully issued 
to him by any competent authority; 
Preserve the public peace, prevent the commission of offences and 
apprehend all persons in respect of whom he holds a valid warrant of 
arrest; 
Undergo such training as may be ordered by the District 
Commissioner; 
Act as messenger in any matter connected with the administration or 
the public service. 









Other Enforcement Agencies 
Under the provisions of Section 48 of the Kenya Police Act, the Commissioner of 
Police is empowered to co-opt members into the police force, in the capacity of 
special police officers. The section provides: - 
“The Commissioner may at any time, if it appears to him to be expedient in 
the interests of public order and safety so to do, appoint persons to be 
special police officers for such period and within such area as he may 
consider necessary, and every such officer shall during the period of his 
service as a special police officer be deemed to be a police officer.” 
Under those provisions the various co-opted officers form part of the human 
resource available to the Kenyan Police in execution of its mandate. In practice, 
members of other disciplined forces   and other government agencies can and 
have in the past been co-opted into the police force under the provisions of the 
Kenya Police Act including: - 
• Kenya Prisons Service Officers 
• Kenya Wildlife Service Personnel 
• Kenya Forests Guards personnel 
• National Youth Service 
This aspect is important in that the time when most of these officers are co-
opted as police officers during the general elections.  Many are simply allocated 
duties at polling stations, of which there was a significant increase in the 2007 
elections, whilst others (such as prison officers) can be deployed with firearms 









Possible 2007 Presidential Election Outcomes and Consequences 
 
Scenario 1: A Kibaki win 
A combined Opposition likely to dispute the results, leading to; 
• Resorting to legal redress and possible attempts to form a parallel 
government, 
• Incitement of their supporters to violence especially in major towns such 
as Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and  Kakamega and other urban 
areas where criminal elements could capitalize on the shaky environment 
to perpetuate crime.  
• Spontaneous explosion/intensity of ethnic clashes mostly in traditional 
hotspot areas and heightened activities by criminal gangs like Mungiki, 
Taliban, Kamjesh, Chinkororo, SLDF and RRC. 
 
Scenario 2: A Raila win 
• Unlikely to generate the kind of violence associated with an ODM loss, 
more so if PNU concedes defeat. 
• Overzealous ODM supporters may engage in celebration related violence in 
Nairobi, Luo Nyanza and in other major urban centers  
• Blame game and acrimony within PNU and its affiliate parties, leading to 
possible disintegration of the party 
• Kibaki diehard supporters reject result, putting the President under siege 






Case Study #1450 
The witness is a 49 year old farmer and mother of 12 children of whom seven 
remain alive.  She lives in Kisumu.  This study demonstrates the desperate 
personal situation that some victims have found themselves in as a result of the 
PEV.  There also seems little follow-up or contact with the victim on the part of 
authorities. Identifying material has been removed from the original statement.  
She told the Commission that, 
“I have lived there throughout my married life. My neighbours were Luos and 
Kisiis, the majority of them being the Luos.  Before the violence, we used to live 
well with our Kisii neighbours. We were good friends.  Things changed during the 
voting. The Luos would say that all Kisiis will leave our Kisumu.  On 29 December 
2007, Luos were screaming and heading to town. 
On 10 January, 2008, at around 8 am in the morning, my husband and I went to 
our shamba, in Nyamthoi.  I wanted to get some vegetables for the family and my 
husband had accompanied me there.  At around 1 pm, my son came running to 
where we were.  I asked her what he wanted. He told me that our house was on 
fire. My husband boarded his bicycle and left to check. My son and I walked home 
on foot. On arriving at my house, I found that everything had been burnt but the 
house was still on fire. The fire began at the bedroom area. I found people trying to 
put the fire out using water. The fire was then at the roof and had started burning 
the iron sheet.  I do not know who burnt my house and why.  
I do not think is had anything to do with politics because none of my children were 
vying for the civic seats.  I did not report to the police then because people were 






were on the wrong. The roads toward town were impassable. I however was able 
to report 7 June 2008. They police officers gave me an OB number. I also 
registered the number of things burnt in my house. The police have done nothing 
from the date when I reported till now. 
On 15 January, 2008, I went to the same shamba, but this time I was alone. 
I went there to get vegetables for the family. It was about 11 am in the 
morning. As soon as I started plucking the vegetables, on turning I saw 5 
men coming towards me. They were young men, dressed in trousers and 
vests. The conspicuous thing about them is that they had ‘rastas- 
dreadlocks.’  They said to me ‘Ooh wewe ndio unasikia mzuri, unachuna 
mboga na sisi tunasikia mbaya…sasa tumepata- oh you are the person 
feeling good…you are still plucking vegetables when we are feeling 
bad..now we have found you. They were speaking in Kiswahili. I was not 
able to tell their tribes because they were all speaking in Kiswahili and they 
all had dreadlocks. 
One of the men held me on the waist, lifted me and threw me on the ground. 
Another man tore my panties and they started raping. One held my mouth so that 
I do not scream. I was trying to keep my legs together but one man held one of my 
legs while another held my other leg and kept my legs apart. There were no 
houses nearby. They raped me in turns. All the men raped me.  Once they were 
done with me, they headed to a bush that on the way to Nyalenda. The bushes 
are near a river, Nyamasaria. 
I was not even able to pluck the vegetables that I had gone to cut. I just picked my 
basket and headed home. I was walking slowly. I was under a lot of pain; my 
hips were paining very much. I got to my house at around 4 pm. I told my 
husband, who was at home by then, of what had happened to me. I did not go to 
the hospital then because as I had started, the roads were impassable. I still 
haven’t gone to the hospital to seek medical advice. I fear that since I have taken 
long before going to the hospital, the people at the hospital may never understand 





I still live in my burnt house and I fear that should it be very windy, the wind is 
going to blow off the roof. I have not been able to repair my house and when it 
rain, water get into my house. 
 My husband passed on 23 February 2008 at his place of work where he had 
been employed as a watchman. He was employed at the Wandiege Primary 
School. On the night of 23 February, 2008, my husband was attacked by 
unknown people, killed and placed  in a classroom. His body was picked by the 
police officers from Kondele Police station on 24 February 2008. They still have not 
done any investigation to ascertain who killed my husband.  
I have been affected by post election violence. My life has changed since I was 
raped, my house was burnt and the death of my husband. I do not have a 
livelihood. My husband is dead and there is no income. I do not even know who 
will rebuild my house.  I rely on people to help me. The clothes that my children 
wear, those that I wear, beddings have all come from people. Food has been a 






Case Study #2 
This male witness is a 70 year old who gave evidence of multiple murderers 
killing seven members of his family, being evicted from his home, being currently 
an IDP and that at least one of the original perpetrators is now occupying his 
land.451   
He reported a full account to the Police but there has only been partial follow-up.  
It appears that in spite of compelling evidence only one perpetrator has been 
charged with murder.  Identifying material has been removed from the original 
statement. 
The witnesses recounted that, 
“During the referendum campaigns of 2005, I was asked by my Kalenjin 
neighbours, where I would go if the Orange/No vote carried the day, because 
Majimbo would be implemented and I am not of their jimbo.  I also asked them 
where they would go, because they are Keiyo and we were in Uasin Gishu. 
A councillor, while campaigning for the No vote, used to state that whether 
Banana/yes vote or Orange/No vote won, all Kikuyus must vacate the area. 
Having lived in the area since 1970, the local community used to invite me to their 
get-togethers.  Previously, I was a senior headman.  From 1982, I was a village 
elder of a sub-location, where a majority of the residents are Kalenjins followed by 







During the 2007 campaigns, the Kalenjin politicians used to make utterances that, 
“….you ‘kimirio’ or ‘bunyot’ (both meaning enemy) must leave the area whether 
Kibaki wins or loses in the General elections.”   
On the 27th of December, 2007, I and my family members woke up very early to go 
and vote.  The Kalenjin PNU agents had been denied entry into the polling station 
and were not even allowed to vote, though the ODM agents were allowed into the 
polling stations. 
At about 6 am, the Kalenjins started voting and this was on until about 9 p.m.  The 
Kalenjins were allowed to vote up to six times.  Vote counting then continued 
throughout the evening, until the morning of 28th December, 2007.  Tension started 
building up from the 28th and the 29th, and when a certain Councillor won, it 
exacerbated. 
On the 30th of December, after a church service within my compound, I noticed that 
whereas ordinarily after the service the Kalenjins would join us in my home, on 
this day, they declined.  We felt that all was not well. 
On the 31st of December, I was in my home with my wife, four sons, daughter and 
two grandchildren.  At about 5 p.m., while we were discussing family matters in 
the compound, my neighbour visited us and told me that some youth wanted to 
cause violence, but that the elders were against it.  He assured me that the elders 
would not allow the violence to take place and I was consoled.   
I went and got charcoal from a neighbour and then and headed toward my house.  
When I got there, my wife informed me that there could be trouble, and further, 
that two people had visited us and told her that is the youth   intending to cause 
violence came to our compound, she should scream and they would come to our 
rescue.  At the time, my sons were in the men’s house. 
When I went outside, I saw about 40 armed youths at the end of my farm.  The 






The said armed youths ran into my compound screaming and my sons got out of 
their houses.  I asked one of the attacking youth, why they were attacking us.  I 
told him that is it was land they wanted, they should just let my family leave.  All 
this time, they were shooting arrows at us and throwing stones, while they made 
sounds like dogs.  He then replied that they wanted five heads from my 
compound. 
My sons asked me to get back into the house and my wife and I retreated to the 
bedroom, where I continued pleading with the attackers through the window.  The 
attackers had torched all the houses.  While I was still at the window, I saw one of 
my sons being hit with a club on the chest and he screamed.  I called to him to get 
into the house.  I got under a bed with my grandson.  My wife also got under 
another the bed, but on the side facing the door.  The attackers gained entry into 
the house by forcing the door open.  They got hold of my grandsons whom they 
threw out of the door where they were murdered.  My wife screamed and the 
attackers pulled her out from under the bed and hit her on the head with a club 
before they slit her throat with a knife.  Before they killed her, she was screaming, 
“brother, why are you attacking us?’  He replied telling her that the time for 
brotherhood was over and she had better pray. 
While I was at the window pleading with them to allow us safe passage out of the 
village, I recognized 14 people who I knew to be amongst the attackers.  Four of 
them killed members of my family including my wife, three sons, my daughter and 
two grandchildren.  One carried petrol, one was and elder, one was the leader and 
carried a gun, one was a teacher and there were others.  Only one has been 
arrested. 
One son escaped through the window and was pursued by the attackers for over 
two kilometres.  My daughter-in-law who was also hiding under the bed with her 
daughter and another granddaughter, escaped after the attackers pursued my son 





I also ran out of the burning house and hid under some bushes.  At about 10 p.m., 
I heard wailing as of a child, and on going to investigate, I found a grandson of 
mine ( 2 years), injured but still alive.  I took him and we went to hide in the bush.  
We stayed in the bush until the morning of 1st January, 2008, when I went to the 
Administration Police Post.  There were a lot of people camping there already.  
Upon arrival at the camp, I fainted.  I came to three hours thereafter.  An 
Administration Police Officer took my grandson and cleaned and bandaged his 
wounds. 
My neighbour led other neighbours in burying my family in a shallow grave, 3 
days after the attack, with the assistance of the AP officer giving guard services. 
The AP officer advised that our security was not good and that we should move to 
St. Muge Secondary School in Subukia, where we moved to, on or about the 4th of 
January, 2008. 
I know the details of the motor vehicles that were used to transport the armed 
youth from to my village.  They are owned by a village resident.  
On the 7th of January, my son-in-law came and picked me up from the camp and 
took me home to Njambini. 
On the 28th of April, 2008, the bodies of my family were exhumed and we gave 
them a decent burial. 
It is my prayer that the perpetrators of these heinous crimes are brought to book.  I 
have been informed that one of the perpetrators has started building a house on 
my parcel of land. 










Civilian oversight of police  
(Police Conduct)  
  
South African Police Service Act, No. 68 of 1995 
 
CHAPTER 10 
INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS DIRECTORATE 
50. Establishment and independence 
50.1  
a. The independent Complaint Directorate, which shall be structured at both 
national and provincial levels, is hereby established. 
b. The date on which the provincial structures of the directorate will come 
into operation, shall be determined by the Executive Director in 
consultation with the Minster. 
50.2  
The directorate shall function independently from the service. 
50.3  
a. No organ of state and no member or employee of an organ of state nor any 
other person shall interfere with the Executive Director or a member of the 
personnel of the directorate in the exercise and performance of his of 
power and functions. 
b. Any person who wilfully interferes with the Executive Director or a 
member of the personnel of the directorate in the exercise or performance 
of his or her powers or functions shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two 
years. 
50.4 
All organs of state shall accord such assistance as may be reasonably required 
for the protection of the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of 





51. Appointment of Executive Director –  
51.1  
The Minister shall nominate a suitably qualified person for appointment to the 
office of Executive Director to head the directorate in accordance with a 
procedure to be determined by the Minster in consultation with the 
Parliamentary Committees. 
51.2  
The Parliamentary Committees shall, within a period of 30 parliamentary 
working days of the nomination in terms of sub-section (1) confirm or reject such 
nomination. 
51.3  
In the event of the nomination being confirmed  
a. Such person shall be appointment to the office of Executive Director 
subject to the laws governing the public service with effect from a date 
agreed upon by such person and the Minister; and  
b. Such appointment shall be for a period not exceeding five years: Provided 
that such person shall be eligible for consecutive appointment in 
accordance with this section. 
51.4  
The Executive Director may be removed from his or her office under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the Minister in consultation 
with the Parliamentary Committees. 
52. Personnel and expenditure 
52.1  
The personnel of the directorates shall consist of persons appointed by the 
Executive Director in consultation with the Minister subject to the laws 
governing the public service and such other persons as may be seconded or 
transferred to the directorate. 
52.2  
The terms and conditions of service of the personnel of the directorate shall be 
determined by the Minister in consultation with the Executive Director and the 
Public Service Commission. 
52.3  
The functions of the directorate shall be funded by money appropriated by 





The Executive Director shall, subject to the Exchequer Act. 1997 (Act No. 66 of 
1974)  
a. be the accounting officer charged with the responsibility of accounting for 
all money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose of the performance 
of the functions of the directorate and the utilisation thereof; and 
b. cause the necessary accounting and other related records to be kept.  
53. Function of directorate 
53.1  
a. The principal function of the directorate shall be the achievement of the 
object contemplated in section 222 of the Constitution. 
b. The Executive Director shall be responsible for – 
a.i. the performance of the functions of the directorate; and  
b.ii. the management and administration of the directorate.  
53.2 In order to achieve its objects, the directorate –  
a. may mero motu or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any misconduct 
or offence allegedly committed by any member, and may, where 
appropriate, refer such investigation to the police action; and 
b. shall mero motu or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any death in 
police custody or as a result of police action; and  
c. may investigate any matter referred to the directorate by the Minister or 
the member of the Executive Council. 
52.3  
a. The Minister may, upon the request of and in consultation with Executive 
Director, authorise those members of the personnel of the directorate 
identified by the Executive Director, to exercise those powers and perform 
those duties conferred on or assigned to any member by or under this Act 
or any other law.  
b. The members of the personnel referred to in paragraph (a) shall have such 
immunities and privileges as may be conferred by the law on a member in 
order to ensure the independent and effective exercise and performance if 
their powers and duties. 
52.4 
A document, in the prescribed form, certifying that a person is a member of the 




perform the duties of a member, shall be prima facie proof that such member 
has been authorised as contemplated in subsection (3). 
52.5  
Any member of the personnel of the directorate who wilfully discloses any 
information in circumstances in which he or she knows or could reasonably be 
expected to know that such disclosure would or may prejudicially affect the 
performance by the directorate or the Service of its functions, shall be guilty of 
an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a periods not 
exceeding two years.  
52.6 The Executive Director may –  
a. at any time withdraw any referral made under subsection (2) (a); 
b. request and obtain information from any Commissioner or police official as 
may be necessary for conducting any investigation: 
c.   
d.i. monitor the progress of; 
e.ii. set guidelines regarding ; and 
f.iii. request and obtain information regarding an investigation referred to 
a Commissioner under subsection (2) (a); 
d. request and obtain the co-operation of any member as may be necessary 
to achieve the object of the directorate; 
e. commence an investigation on any matter notwithstanding the fact that an 
investigation regarding the same matter has been referred under 
subsection (2) a pending or has been closed by the Service, or the docket 
regarding the matter has been submitted to the attorney-general for 
decision; Provided that in the case of a – 
f.i. referred or pending investigation, directorate shall act after 
consultation with the member heading the investigation; or  
g.ii. docket regarding a matter having been submitted to the attorney-
general for decision, the directorate shall act in consultation with 
the attorney – general;  
f. request and obtain information from the attorney – general’s office in so as 
it may be necessary for the directorate to conduct an investigation: 
Provided that the attorney – general may on reasonable grounds refuse to 
accede to such request; 
g. submit the results of an investigation to the attorney – general for his or 
her decision; 
h. in consultation with the Minister and with the concurrence of the Minister 
of Finance, obtain the necessary resources and logistical support or 
engage the services of experts, or other suitable persons to enable the 




i. make recommendations to the Commissioner concerned; 
j. make any recommendation to the Minister or a member of the Executive 
Council which he or she deems necessary regarding any matter 
investigated by the directorate or relating to the performance of the 
directorate’s functions: Provided that in the event of a recommendation 
made to a member of the Executive Council, a copy thereof shall be 
forwarded to the Minister; and 
k. subject to the Exchequer Act, 1975 (Act no 66 of 1975), delegate any of his 
or her powers to any member of the personnel of the directorate. 
52.7  
The Executive Director shall, in consultation with the Minister, issue 
instructions to be complied with by the directorate which shall inter alia include 
instructions regarding –  
a. the lodging, receiving and processing of complaints;  
b. recording and safe-guarding of information and evidence;  
c. disclosure of information;  
d. the making of findings and recommendations; and  
e. all matters incidental to the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c)  
52.8  
The National or Provincial Commissioner shall notify the directorate of all cases 
of death in police custody or as a result of police action. 
52.9  
The Minister may prescribe procedures regarding –  
a. protecting the identify and integrity of complaints; and  
b. witness protection programmes.  
54. Reporting. – The Executive Director shall –  
a. within three months after the end of each financial year, submit to the 
Minister a written report on activities of the directorate during that 
financial year, which report shall be tabled in Parliament by the Minister 
within14 days after receipt thereof or if Parliament is not then in session, 
within 14 days after the commencement of the next ensuing session; and 
b. at any time when requested to do so by the Minister or either the 
Parliamentary Committees, submit a report on the activities of the 






 The Independent Police Complaints Authority Act (New Zealand) 
 
12. Functions of Authority 
(1) The functions of the Authority shall be:  
(a) To receive complaints 
(i) Alleging any misconduct or neglect of duty by any member of the Police; or  
(ii) Concerning any practice, policy, or procedure of the Police affecting the 
person or body of persons making the complaint in a personal capacity:  
(b) To investigate of its own motion, where it is satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to carry out an investigation in the public interest, any incident 
involving death or serious bodily harm notified to the Authority by the 
Commissioner under section 13 of this Act:  
(c) To take such action in respect of complaints, incidents, and other matters as 
is contemplated by this Act.  
(2) In the course of taking action in respect of any complaint the Authority may 
investigate any apparent misconduct or neglect of duty by a member of the 
Police, or any Police practice, policy, or procedure, which appears to the 
Authority to relate to the complaint, notwithstanding that the complaint itself 
does not refer to that misconduct, neglect, practice, policy, or procedure.  
Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall authorize the Authority to 
investigate any matter relating to the terms and conditions of service of any 
person as a member of the Police.  
17. Action upon receipt of complaint 
(1) On receiving or being notified of a complaint under this Act, the Authority 




(a) Investigate the complaint itself, whether or not the Police have commenced a 
Police investigation:  
(b) Defer action until the receipt of a report from the Commissioner on a Police 
investigation of the complaint:  
(c) Oversee a Police investigation of the complaint:  
(d) Decide, in accordance with section 18 of this Act, to take no action on the 
complaint.  
[(2) Subject to subsection (2A) of this section, the Authority shall, as soon as 
practicable, advise the Commissioner and the complainant of the procedure it 
proposes to adopt under subsection (1) of this section. 
[(2A) Where— 
(a) A complaint is made to the Police; and  
(b) The Authority decides to adopt the procedure provided for in paragraph (a) or 
paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section; and  
(c) The Authority is satisfied that the Police will inform the complainant of the 
procedure to be followed, 
the Authority is not required to inform the complainant in accordance with 
subsection (2) of this section of the procedure it proposes to follow.]  
Where any complaint appears to the Authority to be capable of resolution by 
conciliation in accordance with any conciliation procedure established by or 
under the Police Act 1958, it may indicate that view to the Commissioner.  
The Authority may decide to take no further action in certain circumstances.  
19. Subsequent powers in relation to complaint 
The Authority may at any time  
(a) Review a Police investigation of a complaint:  




(c) Where it oversees a Police investigation, give such directions to the Police 
concerning the investigation as it thinks fit: 
(d) Direct the Police to re-open an investigation, and thereafter oversee the 
investigation:  
(e) Direct the Police to reconsider their proposals for action on a complaint:  
(f) Decide, in accordance with section 18 of this Act, to take no further action on 
the complaint:  
(g) Decide that no action by the Authority is required on the ground that it 
considers that the outcome of a Police investigation is satisfactory.  
20. Duty of Commissioner to report to Authority on Police investigation of 
complaint—  
(1) The Commissioner shall as soon as practicable, and in no case later than 2 
months, after the completion of a Police investigation of a complaint, report to 
the Authority—  
(a) Whether the complaint has been upheld and, if so, what action has been 
taken or is proposed to be taken to rectify the matter:  
(b) Whether the complaint has been settled by conciliation.  
(2) When reporting to the Authority under this section, the Commissioner shall 
supply to the Authority accompanying material sufficient to enable the Authority 
to assess the adequacy of the Police investigation.  
The Commissioner may consult the Authority on any Police proposals for action 
on a complaint before reporting to the Authority under this section.  
21. Commissioner to provide information and assistance at request of 
Authority—  
(1) The Commissioner shall, whenever the Authority so requests, provide to the 




performance by the Authority of its functions in relation to its investigation of 
any complaint, incident, or other matter under this Act.  
(2) Where the Authority oversees a Police investigation of a complaint, the 
Commissioner shall, whenever the Authority so requests, provide to the 
Authority—  
(a) Any or all information in the possession or under the control of the Police that 
is relevant to the complaint:  
(b) A report on the progress of the investigation.  
23. Proceedings of Authority—  
(1) Before proceeding to investigate any matter under this Act the Authority shall 
inform the Commissioner, the complainant (if any), and, unless the interests of 
justice otherwise require, any person alleged to be aggrieved (if not the 
complainant) of its intentions to make the investigation.  
(2) Every investigation by the Authority under this Act shall be conducted in 
private.  
(3) Subject to section 31 of this Act,—  
(a) The Authority may hear or obtain information from such persons as it thinks 
fit, including, where it considers that cultural matters are a factor relevant to a 
complaint or investigation, information from such persons as the Authority 
thinks have knowledge or experience in those matters:  
(b) It shall not be necessary for the Authority to hold any hearing:  
(c) No person shall be entitled as of right to be heard by the Authority.  
[(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Authority may regulate its 






24. Powers of Authority in relation to investigations—  
(1) The Authority may require any person who in its opinion is able to give 
information relating to any matter under investigation by the Authority to 
furnish such information, and to produce such documents or things in the 
possession or under the control of that person, as in the opinion of the Authority 
are relevant to the subject-matter of the investigation.  
(2) The Authority may summon before it and examine on oath any person who in 
its opinion is able to give any information relating to the matter under 
investigation, and may for the purpose administer an oath to any person so 
summoned. Every such examination by the Authority shall be deemed to be a 
judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 108 of the Crimes Act 1961 
(which relates to perjury).  
29. Implementation of recommendations of Authority—  
(1) The Commissioner shall, as soon as reasonably practicable after receiving any 
recommendation of the Authority under section 27(2) or section 28(2) of this 
Act,—  
(a) Notify the Authority of the action (if any) proposed to be taken to give effect to 
the recommendation; and  
(b) Give reasons for any proposal to depart from, or not to implement, any such 
recommendation.  
(2) If, within a reasonable time after a recommendation is made, no action is 
taken which seems to the Authority to be adequate and appropriate, the 
Authority may, after considering any comments made by the Commissioner,—  
(a) Send a copy of its opinion and recommendations on the matter, together with 
the comments of the Commissioner, to the Attorney-General and the Minister of 
Police; and  
(b) Where it considers it appropriate, transmit to the Attorney-General for tabling 




The Attorney-General shall, as soon as practicable after receiving a report under 






SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS MOVED DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER POST ELECTION VIOLENCE 




POSTING AND TRANSFER 
DATES 





OCPD ITEN Posted to Eldoret on 18th 
November 2006 until 17th 
January 2008 when he was 
transferred to Keiyo Division. 
The transfer was in the middle of 









Posted to Nakuru on 16th April 
2007 until 25th January 2008 
when he was transferred to 
Police headquarters. 
The transfer was in the middle of 
the post election violence. 
3. EVERETT WASIGE PPO 
NAKURU/RI
FT VALLEY 
RETIRED Posted to Rift Valley on 15th 
November 2005 until 27th 
January 2008 when he was 
retired. 
He was not due for retirement 
until 23rd February 2008. He was 
called to Nairobi on 27th January 
2008 by the Commissioner of 
Police and told that he would be 
retired a month earlier than 
scheduled. 





Posted to Nyanza on 18th April 
2006 until 28th January 2008 
when she was transferred to 
Police Headquarters. 
The transfer was in the middle of 









SAMPLE ANALYSIS OF ARMS MOVEMENT REGISTERS SHOWING USAGE OF ARMS 
AND AMMUNITION FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN 27/12/2007 AND 17/01/2008 
 
 
1. KISUMU POLICE STATION 
 
NOTE: -  
a) The armoury records for the period between 28th December and 30th 
December 2007 were not provided. 
b) The armoury records for the other dates do not show any usage apart from 
the two appearing below. 
 
 













1. 27/12/2007 E. MONGERE 
CHIEF 
INSPECTOR 
 20TEAR GAS 
CANNISTERS 




2. 29/1/2008 MAOSA 
INSPECTOR 
AK47 20 ROUNDS 






2. KISUMU DIVISIONAL REGISTRY 
 























2. 29/12/2007 ROSE MWANJE 
CORPORAL 
G3 20 ROUNDS 




3. 29/12/2007 JOHN MBURU 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS TWO (2) 
ROUNDS 
 
4. 29/12/2007 T. OLABIRO 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS SEVEN (7) 
ROUNDS 
 
5. 29/12/2007 L. MUNGAI 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





6. 29/12/2007 D. LITHANDA 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





7. 29/12/2007 F. AMUGUNE 
SERGEANT  





8. 29/12/2007 MACHOKA 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





9. 29/12/2007 ENOCH ASANDE 
CORPORAL 





10. 29/12/2007 DAVID LANGAT 
CORPORAL 






11. 29/12/2007 LUKA BUNGEI 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 




















13. 30/12/2007 B. KABITI 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





14. 30/12/2007 J. ROTICH 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 







The following entries from the divisional registry are incomplete in that they do not have 
any entries on the remarks as to whether any rounds were used or not 
 













1. 29/12/2007 I.  A. NOOR 
POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
FN 20 ROUNDS OF 
7.62M 
NO ENTRY  





3 ROUNDS OF 
7.62SP 
NO ENTRY  




6 ROUNDS OF 
9MM 
NO ENTRY  




6 ROUNDS OF 
7.62MM 
NO ENTRY  
5. 30/12/207 E. NATIYWA NO 
ENTRY 
40 ROUNDS NO ENTRY  




100 ROUNDS OF 
9MM 
NO ENTRY THE OFFICER 
PICKED A TOTAL 
OF 1,200 
ROUNDS ON 




RELATE  TO HIM 









































































3. HOMA BAY POLICE STATION  
The entries in the arms movement register show that no ammunition was used in the 
period between 28th December 2007 and 28th February 2008. 
However according to a letter dated 24th June 2008 from Homabay Police Divisional 
Headquarters the OCS Homabay Police Station is given authority to strike off 
ammunition used between the dates 29th December 2007 and 15th January 2008. The 
ammunition is listed in the application as follows: - 
 
a) 993 rounds of 7.62x51mm 
b) 303 rounds of 7.62 x 51mm blanks 
c) 231 rounds of 7.62x39mm 
d) 191 rounds of 9x19mm 
e) 76 rounds of  .38 special 
f) 245 rounds tear gas canisters 











4. KISUMU EAST DISTRICT STATION 
 
NOTE: - 
1.a) Most of the officers issued with arms and ammunition from this station are 
administration police officers. 
2.b) This is the only record viewed by the Commission that shows issue and use of 
blank ammunition. 
3.c) The records appear to have been reconstructed from the original records (they 
appear to have been hand written by the same person. 
 













1. 28/12/2007 AUSTINE ONITI 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS THREE (3) 
ROUNDS 
 


















3. 29/12/2007 SYPRIANO SUNA 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





4. 29/12/2007 MICAH KITETU 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
SMG 40 ROUNDS ONE (1) 
ROUND 
 
5. 29/12/2007 JOTHAM OJUMBO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS FOURTEEN 
(14) ROUNDS 
 
6. 29/12/2007 JACOB OSANO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS TEN (10) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 40 ROUNDS TWENTY (20) 
ROUNDS 
 
8. 29/12/2007 SAMUEL NDOLO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 60 ROUNDS THIRTEEN (13) 
ROUNDS 
 











10. 29/12/2007 JOHN MOHERAJ 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS TWENTY (20) 
ROUNDS 
 
11. 29/12/2007 DANIEL TOO 
CORPORAL 





12. 29/12/2007 WELLINGTON 
ODHIAMBO 
CORPORAL 





13. 29/12/2007 RONALD MATAKA 
CORPORAL 





14. 29/12/2007 OBEDI MISATI 
SENIOR 
SERGEANT 



















15. 29/12/2007 JOHN NGOCHO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





16. 29/12/2007 KIBET NYANGWEI 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





17. 29/12/2007 MASAI K. RONO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





18. 29/12/2007 BENSON SAWE 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 60 ROUNDS SIX (6) 
ROUNDS 
 
19. 29/12/2007 THOMAS TORIEBE 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS ONE (1) 
ROUND 
 
20. 29/12/2007 MARTIN RIONGO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 














22. 29/12/2007 MAURICE OTIENO 
CORPORAL 





23. 29/12/2007 NEHEMUEL 
NYANGAU 
SERGEANT 
SMG 20 ROUNDS FIVE (5) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 60 ROUNDS SIXTEEN (16) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 40 ROUNDS THREE (3) 
ROUNDS 
 
26. 29/12/2007 PAUL ATOTO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





27. 29/12/2007 CLISTUS 
WANYAMA 
CORPORAL 





28. 29/12/2007 BENARD OCHOLLA 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS EIGHTEEN (18) 
ROUNDS 
 
29. 29/12/2007 VINCENT SAMBU 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 














31. 29/12/2007 PHILIP OBUOLA 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





32. 29/12/2007 PAUL MAGUT 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





33. 29/12/2007 MAURICE ONDUTO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 







































36. 29/12/2007 JACOB OSANO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 71 ROUNDS TWENTY SIX 
(26) ROUNDS 
 
37. 29/12/2007 DANIEL TOO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





38. 29/12/2007 JOTHAM OJUMBO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





39. 29/12/2007 JOHN NGOCHO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 





40. 29/12/2007 MAURICE OTIENO 
CORPORAL 





41. 29/12/2007 DANIEL ONDURO 
CORPORAL 



















































































































































































































































G3 40 ROUNDS SIXTEEN (16) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 40 ROUNDS EIGHT (8) 
ROUNDS 
 
69 3/01/2008 KOBIA BARIU 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS TEN (10) 
ROUNDS 
 
70. 3/01/2008 THOMAS MAKORI 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS THREE (3) 
ROUNDS 
 
71. 3/01/2008 BENARD OLOO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS TWO (2) 
ROUNDS 
 




6 ROUNDS SIX (6) 
ROUNDS 
 
73. 3/01/2008 GEORGE MAGETO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 



















74. 04/01/2008 PHILIP OBUOLA 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS SEVEN (7) 
ROUNDS 
 
75. 04/01/2008 KIBET NYANGOSE 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS FOUR (4) 
ROUNDS 
 
76. 04/01/2008 WILFRED MAGATI 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS THREE (3) 
ROUNDS 
 
77. 04/01/2008 PAUL MAGOT 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS THREE (3) 
ROUNDS 
 
78. 04/01/2008 MASAI K. RONO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS ONE (1) 
ROUND 
 
79. 04/01/2008 BENARD OCHOLLA 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS FOURTEEN 
(14) ROUNDS 
 




G3 20 ROUNDS ONE (1) 
ROUND 
 
81. 04/01/2008 MASAI K. RONO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS TEN (10) 
ROUNDS 
 
82. 15/01/2008 PHILIP OBUORA 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS TWO (2) 
ROUNDS 
 
83. 16/01/2008 JAPHETH 
MUTUNGA 
CORPORAL 
G3 60 ROUNDS SIX (6) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 60 ROUNDS FOUR (4) 
ROUNDS 
 
85. 16/01/2008 EVANS OLANDO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS TWO (2) 
ROUNDS 
 
86. 16/01/2008 KIBET NYANGUSEI 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS SIX (6) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 20 ROUNDS FOUR (4) 
ROUNDS 
 
88. 16/01/2008 EFFY VIDOLO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 20 ROUNDS TWO(2) 
ROUNDS 
 
89. 16/01/2008 DUNCAN KAUVO 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS FIVE (5) 
ROUNDS 
 
90. 16/01/2008 JOHN MAHERAI 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS FIVE (5) 
ROUNDS 
 
91. 16/01/2008 KOBIA BARIU 
ADMIN POLICE 
CONSTABLE 
G3 40 ROUNDS TWELVE (12) 
ROUNDS 
 
92. 16/01/2008 JAPHETH 
MUTUNGA 
CORPORAL 



















93. 16/01/2008 GEORGE MAGETO G3 60 ROUNDS SIX (6) 
ROUNDS 
 




G3 20 ROUNDS FOUR (4) 
ROUNDS 
 









c)5. MIGORI POLICE STATION 
There are no entries from this station for the period between 3rd December 2007 and 3rd 
January 2008 
For the entries available there was no usage of arms or ammunitions. 
 
 
 
